« PreviousContinue »
valid. No substantial right of the original lant entered into a contract with J. E. Harcontractor under the judgment of lien is af ris to erect a building for him for the sum fected. Hence he was not a party interested of $7,000, according to certain plans and specin maintaining it, and not an adverse party ifications, and the respondent as subcontractupon whom a notice of appeal should have or contracted with the latter to do the plastbeen served.
ering and hard finish work according to specThe District Court of Appeal in dismissing ifications providing therefor for the sum of this appeal when the matter was before it $750. As the work progressed, he was paid based its decision on Lancaster y. Maxwell, the amount of his contract price, except $178, 103 Cal. 67, 36 Pac. 951, which it cited as for which the lien herein was filed and to justifying its action. In that case, however, recover which the suit was brought.
The it does not appear that any personal judg court found that plaintiff completed his conment was rendered against the original con tract according to its terms, and it is claimtractor fixing a primary liability on his part ed that this tinding is not supported by the to the subcontractor for the entire amount evidence because there were certain discoloof his claim. The personal judgment there rations on the plastering appearing after the rendered was for such a deficiency as ap completion of the work. The contract bepeared after the sale of the property, and tween the owner and the original contractor this fact seems to have controlled the deci for the construction of the building containsion. In the case at bar the personal judg. ed specifications relative to the plastering ment is for the entire amount of the claim, thereof, and the contract between plaintiff separate and distinct from any deficiency and said original contractor embraced these judgment which it is provided shall be dock latter specifications. The specifications set eted against the original contractor. Noth forth in detail the character and quality of ing is said in the portion of the judgment the material to be furnished for the mortar providing for such docketing that it shall and hard finish to be used in the work, the be docketed as a personal judgment. This manner in which they should be compounded would be its effect, not, however, by virtue and applied and the work done, and the eviof the provision for docketing, but because dence shows that in discharging his conindependent of it there was a personal judg tract plaintiff used exactly the materials ment expressly given against the original that were required by the specifications and contractor in another part of the judgment. performed the work in a workmanlike manIf, in the case at bar, the judgment, so far ner, but that upon its completion portions of as it established a lien, were reversed and the surface of the walls showed a yellowish the deficiency judgment provided to be dock tint appearing in some places in streaks and eted against the original contractor were to in others in spots of a cloudlike form. How fall with it, this would nevertheless leave these discolorations were caused is not disthe personal judgment against the original closed by the evidence. In fact, the testicontractor entered against him elsewhere un mony showed that the cause of them was affected and subject to enforcement upon unknown. Such discolorations might occur, execution. Aside from this, in the Max the evidence shows, from various extraneous well Case, the effect of section 1193 of the causes having no relation to the character of Code of Civil Procedure upon the rights of
the materials used or the workmanship emthe owner of the premises affected by the ployed, and might occur where the best matelien against the original contractor did not
rial and workmanship, as in the case at bar, seein to have been presented for considera were used and employed and still be inextion, nor the record examined upon the mer plicable. The usual result, however, of the its of the appeal to ascertain whether ap use of good materials properly applied is to plying this section to the matters disclosed produce a white coat or surface on the walls, by it, and properly to be considered on the and it is insisted by appellant that because motion, any injury to the original contractor that was not the result of the work of plaincould possibly result from a reversal of the tiff his contract was not properly performed; judgment establishing the lien. The con that it was the duty of plaintiff to show that sideration of these matters differentiates this such discolorations were occasioned by some Case from the Maxwell Case sufficiently to cause for which he was not responsible. make the ruling there inapplicable here, that connection it is insisted that there was even if that ruling should be deemed cor both an express and implied warranty acrect in principle upon the record to which it companying his contract that the rooms is applied, which, we think, is extremely should be finished so that the walls would be doubtful. The motion to dismiss the appeal white. The express warranty is based upon is therefore deniedl.
a provision of the main contract between the Now, as to a consideration of the appeal owner and the original contractor that the on its merits. Aside from the question of latter was to deliver appellant the building attorney's fees, the principal contention of properly and entirely finished and “in an unappellant is that the findings inade by the damaged state." It is sufficient, however, on (ourt in support of the judgment in favor of this point to say that the subcontractor was the plaintiff are not sustained by the pri not a party to this main contract, its providence. As we have beretofore stated, appelsions were not incorporated in his contract
with the original contractor, and he is not, and plastered and hard finished the rooms bound by its terms. His contract was with with the materials specified in the contract the original contractor alone, and related and did the work skillfully, he did all that solely to doing the plastering and hard he had contracted to do. He did not exfinishing according to the requirements of pressly warrant any particular color, the specthe specifications in the main contract, and ifications did not call for any, and, the he is only bound by the terms of his agree work being done in a workmanlike manner meut in that respect, and it is not claimed with the materials designated in the specifithat the agreement between plaintiff and the cations to be used, the plaintiff is not responoriginal contractor contained any require sible under any implied warranty for the ment or warranty that the walls should be of result. Bancroft v. San Francisco Tool Co., any particular color.
120 Cal. 228, 52 Pac. 196; McKnight-Flintic But it is said there was an implied war Stone Co. v. Jayor, 100 N. Y. 72-81, 51 X. ranty that they should be white; that as the E. 661. usual result from the use of the materials There is nothing in the other points made specified and their application would be to by appellant, save as to the allowance to produce a white surface, this result was con plaintiff of $10 attorney's fees in the foretemplated and impliedły warranted, and it closure of the lien. Since the appeal herein is insisted that this contention is supported was taken, it has been decided by this court by sections 1769 and 1770 of the Civil Code. that the statute allowing attorney's fees in an The only one of these sections which could action to enforce a mechanic's lien is unconpossibly have any relevancy is section 1770. stitutional. Builders' Supply Depot et al. That section provides that "one who manu v. O'Connor et al. (Cal. Sup.) 88 Pac. 982. factures an article under an order for a par
This, however, only requires a modification ticular purpose warrants by the sale that it of the judgment. is reasonably fit for that purpose." But it is In that respect it is ordered that the judgobvious that this section has no application ment be modified hy striking out therefrom to the matter 'under consideration. As its the allowance of attorney's fees, and, as so language imports, the section only applies modified, the judgment is affirmed. where an article is manufactured for a particular purpose.
It contemplates that the We concur: ANGELLOTTI, J.; MCFARmanufacturer bas selected the materials and LAND, J.; SLOSS, J.; HENSIIAW, J.; determined the workmanship whereby the SIIAW, J. finished article is supplied for the particular purpose designed. It does not apply where the article to be furnished is to be supplied
(152 Cal. 71) under a contract requiring that it be made
HALSEY F. SUPERIOR COURT OF CITY according to a certain plan or certain specifi
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANcations. Now, in the case at bar, we have
CISCO. (S. F. 4.8.3.) seen that there was no express agreement (Supreme Court of California. Sept. 23, 1907.) that the plaintiff should plaster and hard 1. GRAND JURY_TERM OF SERVICE. finish the appellant's house so as to leave When, in obedience to Const. art. 1, § 8, the walls white. There was no agreement and Code Civ. Proc. $ 241. requiring the im
paneling of a grand jury once each year, a new that any particular result should follow. He
grand jury is impaneled, the life of the former did not agree generally to plaster the dwell grand jury ends. ing, which would leave to him the selection 2. SAME. of the materials and the method of doing the Pen. Code, $ 906. providing for the diswork. His agreement was to do it in a way
charge of a grand jury by the final adjournment
of the court, adopted as a part of the Code in that the owner and the original contractor
1872, when terms of court existed, is not effechad designed, according to the specifications tual in discharging a grand jury after the Conwhich they had agreed on. He had no dis;
stitution of 1879, under which there are no cretion in the matter. When he followed
terms, and the superior court is always open
for business. strictly those specifications, used exactly the
3. COURTS-RULES OF DECISION. materials they called for in the composition A decision construing a statute, which has of the mortar and hard finish, and applied been followed for over 20 years, will not be them in a workmanlike manner, he did all
orerruled, unless clearly erroneous.
[Ed. Vote.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. his contract called for. He did not contract
vol. 13, Courts, $ 311.) for results, but only to do the work in a
4. GRAND JURY-TERS OF SERVICE-STATUTES specified way. If the usual result of white
---COXSTRUCTIOX. walls and ceilings did not follow, he was Code Civ. Proc. $ 210, declaring that thi not responsible for it, unless there was some persons whose names are returned, as provider default on his part in furnishing the ma
in preceding sections for selecting jurors, shall
be "regular jurors, and shall serve for one ypar," terials called for in the specifications or in
refers only to the persons set apart as a bolly, doing the work with them. The court found, from which a jury, grand or petit, may be and the evidence fully sustained the finding. drawn, and in that capacity they serve for one that the plaintiff had not been remiss in ei
year, the term of service being the time during
which they may be drawn for actual jury serve ther particular. Under these circumstances,
ice, and has no refironlep to the life of a grand as he made uo express warranty as to results jury drawn from their number,
operation of law not later than February Code Civ. Proc. $ 210, providing that reg.
12, 1907, and that, by reason thereof, the ular jurors shall serve for one year, and until other persons are selected and returned, when
members have ever since constituted not a considered in connection with sections 214, re grand jury, but an illegal and unauthorized lating to the drawing, of jurors for courts of body of men, without power to perform any record, and section 241, providing for the im
function of a grand jury. paneling of grand juries, and Pen. Code, $S 906, 1140, declaring that a grand jury shall be dis
The facts relied on as accomplishing this charged by the final adjournment of the court, discharge of the grand jury by operation of and providing for the discharge of a jury unable
law are as follows: On January 27, 1907, in to agree, has nothing to do with the life of a jury, grand or petit, and under it a grand jury
conformity with section 201, Code Civ. Proc., does not end because the clerk, in conformity the judges of said superior court made an with Code Civ. Proc. $ 209, writes down the order designating the estimated number of námes in the list furnished in accordance with section 201, and deposits the same in the grand
grand jurors, and also the number of trial jury box, where no proceedings have been had jurors, that would, in the opinion of the under section 241 for impaneling any of the court, be required for the transaction of the grand jurors from such list.
business of the court and the trial of causes 6. SAME.
therein during the ensuing year, which numThe object of Code Civ. Proc. $ 210, providing that regular jurors shall serve for a year,
ber of grand jurors was 144. Immediately and until other persons are selected, is not to after said order designating the estimated prevent the keeping in existence any particular number of grand jurors had been made, said grand jury for an indefinite time, that being the purpose of Pen. Code, & 906, enacted at the same
court selected and listed the grand jurors tine, which expressly limits the life of a grand required by said order to serve as grand jury to the term of court for which it is im- jurors in said superior court duing the ensupaneled.
ing year, or until a new list should be proMcFarland, J., dissenting.
vided, which list of persons so selected was In Bank. Application for writ of prohibi at once placed in the possession of the countion by Theodore V. Halsey against the su ty clerk, and said clerk, on receiving said perior court of the city and county of San list, filed the same in his office. On February Francisco to restrain the court from pro 12, 1907, in conformity with section 209, Code ceeding with the trial of petitioner under an Civ. Proc., said county clerk wrote down the alleged indictment. Denied.
names contained on said list on separate Bert Schlesinger, William P. Humphreys, pieces of paper, of the same size and appearand D. M. Delmas, for petitioner. W. H
ance, and deposited the same in the grand Langdon, Dist. Atty., and William Hoff Cook,
jury box of said city and county. No proAsst. Dist. Atty. (Francis J. Heney and
ceedings have been had under section 241, Charles W. Cobb, of counsel), for respondent.
Code of Civil Procedure, in drawing, im
paneling, or summoning any of the grand PER CURIAM. The petitioner seeks a
jurors from said list of grand jurors so selectwrit of prohibition to restrain the superior ed in January, 1907, by the said court as court of the city and county of San Francisco
aforesaid. from proceeding with his trial under a paper
The claim of petitioner in this regard is purporting to be an indictment, charging him necessarily based on the language of section with having committed a felony, which paper
210 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for there was presented and filed in said court as an
is no other provision of our law, constituindictment by a body of men assuming to act
tional or statutory, that affords any basis for and acting as a grand jury of such city and
such a claim. Our Constitution simply procounty. It is claimed by petitioner that at
vides that "a grand jury shall be drawn and the time of the finding and presentation of
summoned at least once a year in each this indictment (March 20, 1907) this body of
county.” Article 1, § 8. Our Code of Civil men did not constitute a grand jury at all,
Procedure provides (section 241) that every and that consequently the indictment is a
superior court, whenever in the opinion of the nullity and the superior court is without
court the public interest requires it, must power to try him on the charge therein made.' proceed to impanel a grand jury, and “in all Upon the oral argument it was admitted,
counties there shall be at least one grand for all the purposes of this proceeding, that
jury drawn and impaneled in each year." this body of men was regularly and legally Nowhere, unless it lie in said section 210, drawn from the names in the grand jury box
Code Civ. Proc., is there any express limitafor the year 1906, and regularly impaneled tion on the life of the grand jury so impaneland organized as the grand jury of said city ed in pursuance of the authorization and reand county on the 9th day of November, 1906, quirement of the law, or any implied limitaand has never been discharged by any order tion except such as may be implied from the of the court, but erer since such impanelment requirement that at least one grand jury and organization has continued to act as the must be impaneled in each year. When, in grand jury of the city and county, and has obedience to this mandate, a new grand jury always been recognized by the superior court is impaneled, the life of the former grand as such grand jury. Petitioner's claim here jury must necessarily end. Section 906 of is that this grand jury was discharged by the Penal Code, adopted as part of the origi
nal Code in 1872 and nerer amended, pro Section 210, Code Civ. Proc., has existed in vides that, on the completion of the business practically its present form ever since the before them, the grand jury must be dis- adoption of the Codes in 1972, and there has charged by the court, “but, whether the busi- | been no change in any other statutory proviness is completed or not, they are discharged sion applicable to jurors or juries that is by the final adjournment of the court." This material to the controversy here. section was adopted at a time when we had cise question here presented as to the effect terms of court. As, under the Constitution of the provisions of section 210 upon a grand of 1879, we now have no such terms of court, jury regularly impaneled from the list of and the superior court is always open for busi the preceding year, was considered by this ness, there is no such thing as a final ad. court in bank in the year 1886 in the cases journment of the court, and the quoted por of In re Gannon, 69 Cal. 541, 11 Pac. 240. tion of the section is no longer effectual. It, and Kelly v. Wilson (Cal.) 11 Pac. 244. In however, assists somewhat in ascertaining the Gannon Case the court, in reply to the the proper construction of section 210, Code claim that the grand jury had ceased to exCiv. Proc., as we shall hereafter note.
ist for the reasons stated, and was not a letion 210, Code Civ. Proc., is contained in gal body, said: “But, while the statutory the article relating to the "selecting and re law fixes the time within the year for the turning jurors for courts of record" (ar
court to order the selection and return of ticle 3, c. 1, tit. 3), the article having to do
grand jurors liable to serve in the capacity with the selection and placing in the general of a grand jury, and limits the time in which jury box of the county by the proper officers they shall serve for the purpose of the drawof the names of persons who may be drawn ing and impanelment of a grand jury, it as required for actual service as jurors, both prescribes no specific time for the drawing of grand and trial, in the court. The preceding the grand jury, or for its official existence sections of the article having provided for the
after it has been drawn and impaneled. fixing by the court in January of each year
These the law seems to have left to the juof the estimated number of the grand and
dicial discretion of the court, for it provides trial jurors that will be required for the
that every superior court, whenever, in the transaction of the business of the court and opinion of the court, the public interest must the trial of causes therein during the ensu
require it, may make an order directing a ing year, the immediate selection of that
jury to be drawn' (Code Civ. Proc. $ 241); number by the officers designated for that and, when the proceedings put in motion by purpose, the placing of the lists of such per
an order made for the purpose result in the sons in the possession of the county clerk, the
drawing and impanelment of a grand jury,
it is, as an organized body, in the exercise filing of the same by that officer, the writing
of its functions and in its official existence, by him of the names on separate pieces of
subject to the control of a court that is 'alpaper, and the deposit of such papers in the
ways open,' and may at any time, in the ex"grand jury box" and "trial jury box," re
ercise of its jurisdiction, order it to be disspectively (sections 204 to 209), section 210
charged. Pen. Code, § 906. provides: "The persons whose names are so
A grand jury
cannot dissolve itself (Clem v. State, 33 Ind. returned shall be known as regular jurors, 414); and as the grand jury whose authorand shall serve for one year, and until other
ity is challenged was not impaneled for any persons are selected and returned." Section
particular time prescribed by law, and has 211 provides that “the names of persons
not been discharged by the court in which it drawn for a grand jury shall be drawn from
is acting, it still exists as an original body, the grand jury box and the names of per
with power to perform its duties.” Six of sons for a trial jury from the trial jury box, the seven justices concurred in this opinion. and if, at the end of the year, there shall be
Kelly v. Wilson, supra, which was a prothe names of persons in either of the said ceeding in prohibition by an indicted person jury boxes who may not have been drawn
to restrain the superior court from trying during the year to serve, and have not served
him, under precisely similar facts to those as jurors, the names of such persons may be existing here, was decided on the authority placed on the list of jurors drawn for the
of the Gannon Case. It is strongly urged succeeding year." Subsequent articles pro- that the language above quoted was not necvide for the method of drawing from these essary to the decision in the Gannon Case. boxes and summoning jurors, both grand and This is true in the sense that the case could trial, for actual service in the court as they have been disposed of on other grounds may be required and ordered by the court. stated in the opinion. It is to be observed. The claim of petitioner is that, under section | however, that the case of Kelly v. Wilson, in 210, the grand jury drawn and impaneled in which a decision upon this question was abthe year 1906 from the persons selected. solutely essential to a denial of the writ listed, and returned as grand jurors for that sought, was presented by the same counsel year, was discharged by operation of law up- appearing in the Gannon Case, and was deon the selection, listing, and returning of the cided on the same day as the Gannon Case. 144 grand jurors for the year 1907.
It is thus apparent that the two cases were This is not a new contention in this court. under submission at the same time and were
considered together, and practically consti the term during which they serve in that tuted but one case in which the question be capacity, the term during which they may fore us was necessary to a decision. It be drawn or selected for actual jury service. thus appears that the court in these cases This is the only possible reasonable construcconstrued. section 210, Code Civ. Proc., as tion of the language of section 210 as to the only limiting the time in which the persons term of service, in the connection in which selected shall serve for the purpose of the it is used. The meaning thus given to the drawing and impaneling of a jury, and as word "serve" is an entirely permissible one, having nothing whatever to do with the life and the fact that the same word is obviously of a jury, either grand or trial. once regu used in a different sense in other connections larly drawn and impaneled. No different con is not important. struction has been given the section by any An examination of other provisions of later case. People v. Leonard, 106 Cal. 302, law enacted at the same time as section 210, 39 Pac. 617, certainly cannot be held to have so Code Civ. Proc., demonstrates that the Legisdone. While the court in that case did ob lature could not have intended the section serve that it did not eren appear that the new to operate as a discharge of any impaneled jurors had been selected and returned, and jury. As we have seen, the section applies that, if they had not been, it was clearly prop- to both grand and trial jurors, and the clain) er to continue the jury of the preceding year of petitioner leads to the result that the seuntil such event happened, it also apparent- lection and return to the county clerk of the ly adopted the reasoning of the Gannon Case list of jurors for the succeeding year and as one of the grounds of its decision. The the placing of those names in the general above cited decisions as to the proper con jury box ipso facto discharges from service struction of the section under consideration, and dissolves any impaneled jury, grand or rendered 21 years ago, and, it is fair to as trial, that may then be in attendance on the sume, ever since followed by the courts of court, members of which were drawn from the state, certainly should not be overruled the lists of the preceding year. It is inconunless they are clearly erroneous. No such ceivable that there was any such intention situation is here presented. On the contrary, as to trial juries. It would be a most abit is our opinion that the construction given surd provision that a jury engaged in the the section by our predecessors was the cor actual trial of a cause, and perhaps just rect one.
about to render a verdict after a long and Neither section 210 nor any other section expensive trial, should be deprived of power contained in the article of which it is a to act further in the case solely by reason part assumes to deal with any impaneled of the fact that a new list of available jurors jury, grand or trial. As to these, elaborate for the ensuing year had been returned to the provision is elsewhere made. These sections county clerk, and the names had been derelate exclusively to the setting apart of a posited in a trial jury box. Such a provisufficient number of persons eligible for jury sion could accomplish no good, and would be duty from whom may be drawn and brought productive of great injury. The intention of into court from time to time so many as are the Legislature as to such juries is clearly required to render actual jury service in shown by the other section of the Code court. Section 210 refers only to the persons adopted at the same time, specially relating so set apart, and to them solely in that ca to juries. It is apparent therefrom that a pacity; i. e., in the capacity of persons set jury impaneled to try a case was to conapart as a body from which a jury may be clude that case, if possible. As to criminal drawn when wanted. In that capacity all cases, after providing for the discharge of the persons so set apart are, by express pro the impaneled jury in certain contingencies vision of the section, known as “regular only, such as sickness of a juror, etc., it was jurors," although many of them may never provided in section 1140 of the Penal Code be drawn and summoned to attend upon the that, except as otherwise provided, a jury court at all. In that capacity alone they "cannot be discharged after the cause is "serve for one year and until other persons submitted to them until they have agreed on are selected and returned" to take their their verdict and rendered it in open court," places. When, serving in that capacity, some except by consent of the parties or by the of them are drawn and summoned into court court when the jury is unable to agree. and impaneled on a jury, they there render Practically the same was true as to viril an entirely different and additional service, cases. We cannot reconcile these provisions which is regulated both as to manner of with section 210 of the Code of Civil. Proservice and time of discharge by the pro cedure if that section is to be construed as visions of the law relating to impaneled ju- urged by petitioner. ries. Section 210 refers only to the two spe The intention as to grand juries is equally cial classes from which jurors are to be tak clear. Express provision as to the time duren, and it is only as members of those spe ing which an impaneled grand jury shall concial classes one for grand juries and the oth tinue in existence was made in the Penal er for trial juries, that these so-called regu Code. Unless sooner discharged by the court, lar jurors are required to serve by that sec they were discharged only by the final adtion. The term of service there mentioned is journment of the court for the term. Section