terms "during the continuance of" and "last so long" would seem to be precisely equivalent, and the full performance of the contract to be limited alike by the life of the patent and by the life of the boat. It is difficult to understand how the duration of the patent and the duration of the boat differed from one another in their relation to the performance or the determination of the contract; or how a contract to use an aid to navigation upon a boat so long as she shall last can be distinguished in principle from a contract to support a man so long as he shall live, which has been often decided, and is generally admitted, not to be within the statute of frauds. At October Term, 1877, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Miller, said: "The statute of frauds applies only to contracts which, by their terms, are not to be performed within a year, and does not apply because they may not be performed within that time. In other words, to make a parol contract void. it must be apparent that it was the understanding of the parties that it was not to be performed within a year from the time it was made." And it was therefore held, in one case, that a contract by the owner of a valuable estate, employing lawyers to avoid a lease thereof, and to recover the property, and promising to pay them a certain sum out of the proceeds of the land when recovered and sold, was not within the statute, because all this might have been done within a year; and, in another case, that a contract, made early in November, 1869, to furnish all the stone required to build and complete a lock and dam which the contractor with the State had agreed to complete by September 1, 1871, was not within the statute, because the contractor, by pushing the work, might have fully completed it before November, 1870. McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404, 416, 417; Walker v. Johnson, Id. 424, 427. In Texas, where the contract now in question was made, and this action upon it was tried, the decisions of the supreme court of the State are in accord with the current of decisions elsewhere. In Thouvenin v. Lea, 26 Tex. 612, the court said: "An agreement which may or may not be performed within a year is not required by the statute of frauds to be in writing. It must appear from the agreement itself that it is not to be performed within a year." In that case the owner of land orally agreed to sell it for a certain price, payable in five years. The purchaser agreed to go into possession, and make improvements; and the seller agreed, if there was a failure to complete the contract, to pay for the improvements. The agreement to pay for the improvements was held not to be within the statute; the court saying: "There is nothing from which it can be inferred that the failure to complete the contract (by reducing it to writing, for instance, as was stipulated should be done), or its abandonment, might not occur within a year from the time it was consummated. The purchaser, it is true, was entitled by the agreement to a credit of five years for the payment of the purchase money, if the contract had been reduced to writing. But appellant might have sold to another, or the contract might have been abandoned by the purchaser, at any time; and upon this alone depended appellant's liability for the improvements." See, also, Thomas v. Hammond, 47 Tex. 42. In the very recent case of Railway Co. v. Wood, 88 Tex. 191, 195, 196, 30 S. W. Rep. 859, 860, it was held that an oral agreement by a railroad company to issue to one Wood annually a pass over its road for himself and his family, and to stop its trains at his house, for 10 years, was not within the statute. The court, after reviewing many of the authorities, said: "It seems to be well settled that, where there is a contingency expressed upon the face of the contract, or implied from the circumstances, upon the happening of which within a year the contract or agreement will be performed, the contract is not within the statute. though it be clear that it cannot be performed within a year except in the event the contingency happens." "If the contingency is beyond the control of the parties, and one that may, in the usual course of events, happen within a year, whereby the contract will be performed, the law will presume that the parties contemplated its happening, whether they mention it in the contract or not. The statute only applies to contracts not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof.' If the contingency is such that its happening may bring the performance within a year, the contract is not within the terms of the statute; and this is true whether the parties at the time had in mind the happening of the contingency or not. The existence of the contingency in this class of cases, and not the fact that the parties may or may not have contemplated its happening, is what prevents the agreement from coming within the scope of the statute. Applying these principles to the case under consideration, we think it clear that the contract above set out was not within the statute. The agreement to give the pass and stop the trains was personal to Wood and his family. He could not transfer it. In case of his death within the year, the obligation of the company to him would have been performed, and no right thereunder would have passed to his heirs or executors. If it be held that each member of his family had an interest in the agreement, the same result would have followed the death of such member, or all of them, within the year. If the agreement had been to give Wood a pass for life, it would, under the above authorities, not have been within the statute; and we can see no good reason for holding it to be within the statute because his right could not have extended beyond ten years. The happening of the contingency of the death of himself and family within a year would have performed the contract in one case as certainly as in the other." In the case at bar, the contract between the railroad company and the plaintiff, as testified to by the plaintiff himself, who was the only witness upon the point, was that, if he would furnish the ties and grade the ground for the switch at the place where he proposed to erect a sawmill, the railroad company would "put down the iron rails and maintain the switch for the plaintiff's benefit for shipping purposes as long as he needed it." The parties may well have expected that the contract would continue in force for more than one year. It may have been very improbable that it would not do so; and it did in fact continue in force for a much longer time. But they made no stipulation which, in terms, or by reasonable inference, required that result. The question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual performance of the contract was, but whether the contract, according to the reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed within the year. No definite term of time for the performance of the contract appears to have been mentioned or contemplated by the parties nor was there any agreement as to the amount of lumber to be sawed or shipped by the plaintiff or as to the time during which he should keep up his mill. The contract of the railroad company was with and for the benefit of the plaintiff personally. The plaintiff's own testimony shows (although that is not essential) that be understood that the performance of the contract would end with his own life. The obligation of the railroad company to maintain the switch was in terms limited and restricted by the qualification "for the plaintiff's benefit for shipping purposes as long as he needed it," and no contingency which should put an end to the performance of the contract, other than his not needing the switch for the purpose of his business appears to have been in the mouth or in the mind of either party. If, within a year after the making of the contract, the plaintiff had died or had abandoned his whole business at this place or for any other reason had ceased to need the switch for the shipping of lumber, the railroad company would have been no longer under any obligation to maintain the switch, and the contract would have been brought to an end by having been fully performed. The complete performance of the contract depending upon a contingency which might happen within the year, the contract is not within the statute of frauds as an "agreement which is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof." Nor is it within the other clause of the statute of frauds, relied on in the answer, which requires certain conveyances of real estate to be in writing. The suggestion made in the argument for the defendant in error, that the contract was, in substance, a grant of an easement in real estate, and as such within the statute, overlooks the difference between the English and the Texas statates in this particular. The existing statutes of Texas, while they substantially follow the En glish statute of frauds, so far as to require a conveyance of any "estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more than one year, in lands and tenements," as well as "any contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof for a longer term than one year," to be in writing, omit to reenact the additional words of the English statute, in the clause concerning conveyances, "or any uncertain interest of, in, to, or out of" lands or tenements, and, in the other clause, "or any interest in or concerning them." St. 29 Car. II. ch. 3, §§ 1, 4; Rev. St. Tex. 1879, arts. 548, 2464; Pasch. Dig. arts. 997, 3875; James v. Fulerod, 5 Tex. 512, 516; Stuart v. Baker, 17 Tex. 417, 420; Anderson v. Powers, 59 Tex. 213. Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the circuit court, with directions to set aside the verdict, and to order a new trial. NOTE.-Recent Decisions on Contracts not to be Performed within a Year under the Statute of Frauds. A verbal contract, made in August, for one year's service, to commence in the following October, is not to be performed within a year, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, requiring all contracts not to be performed within a year to be in writing. Lee's Admr. v. Hill (Va.), 12 S. E. Rep. 1052. By a lease entered into orally in August, 1888, the term was to begin March 1, 1889, and end March 1, 1890. Held, that the lease was within the prohibition of the statute cf frauds. Rev. St. Mo. 1879, sec. 2513; Beiler v. Devoll, 40 Mo. App. 251. Where plaintiff, who had been in defendant's employ under a contract for a definite period, claimed that the contract had been renewed at the end of that period, it was no objection that the contract was originally void under the statute of frauds as an oral contract not to be performed within one year, since it became valid upon perform. ance, and before the new contract began. Adams v. Fitzpatrick (N. Y.), 26 N. E. Rep. 143, 125 N. Y. 124. By a writing which contained the terms of an agreement between plaintiff and defendants, but was not signed by the latter, and which was dated November 27, 1888, the agreement was "to take place and effect December 1, 1888, for one year." Held, that the agreement ran from December 1st, and was therefore not within the statute of frauds as an agreement "by its terms not to be performed within one year from the making thereof." 2 Rev. St. N. Y. p. 135, sec. 2. Blake v. Voight, 11 N. Y. S. 716. The obligation of a verbal agreement by a railroad company to maintain cattle-guards in consideration of a right of way over plaintiff's land is limited to the time during which the company shall use the right of way for railroad purposes, and as that use may cease, and the road be removed within a year, it is not a contract "not to be performed within one year from the making thereof," within Mansf. Dig. Ark. sec. 3371. Arkansas Midland Ry. Co. v. Whitley (Ark.), 15 S. W. Rep. 465. A promise by a man to marry when he recovers his health is not a promise to be performed within a year, within the statute of frauds. McConahey v. Griffey (Iowa), 48 N. W. Rep. 983. An agreement to adopt and care for a child during her minority is not within the statute of frauds, since it might have been terminated in less than a year by the child's death during that time. Taylor v. Deseve (Tex.), 16 S. W. Rep. 1008. A contract whereby plaintiff is to trade defendant's lands for other lands, to manage the lands thus acquired, and to resell them and the tim ber thereon for a compensation of half the profits after paying defendant his advances, is not within the statute of frauds invalidating agreements not to be performed within a year (Rev. St. Ind. 1881, sec. 4904), as it cannot be said that the contract could not be performed in a year. Durham v. Hiatt (Ind.), 26 N. E. Rep. 401. Where a husband conveys property to his wife on the sole consideration of her promise to reconvey to him on request, and no time is fixed for the reconveyance promised, the verbal promise is not void, under the statute of frauds, as one not to be performed within a year. Haussman v. Burnham, 22 Ati. Rep. 1065, 59 Conn. 117. A parol contract of leas ing entered into in March for a period of one year beginning April 1st is within the prohibition of the statute of frauds, as "an agreement not to be performed within one year from the making thereof." Cook v. Redman, 45 Mo. App. 397. A contract by an actress to render services, entered into in June, 1888, and to continue so long as the success of the play continues, the season of the play having terminated within a year, was not within the statute of frauds. Haines v. Thompson, 19 N. Y. S. 184. Where a corporation by acquiescence adopts as its own a contract made by its promoter before organization, the act of adopting is not a ratification, which relates back to the date of the contract by the promoter, but is the making of a contract as of the date of the adoption; so that, though the contract made by the promoter was, by its terms, not to be performed within one year, it is not within the statute of frauds, if it be performed within one year from the date of its adoption. McArthur V. Times Printing Co. (Minn.), 51 N. W. Rep. 216. An agreement not to use certain land conveyed, for a particular purpose, is not an agreement "not to be performed within one year," and void under the statute. Hall v. Solomon (Conn.), 23 Atl. Rep. 876. An agreement by a tenant, made at the time of taking possession of a farm, that in consideration of his having the ice then in the icehouse he would refill it, and leave as much ice in it when he went away as there then was, is not within the provision of the statute of frauds that no action shall be maintained on an agreement not to be performed within a year from the making thereof unless it be in writing. Brown v. Throop, 22 Atl. Rep. 436, 59 Conn. 596. An oral contract of employment from month to month, although continued for three and a half years, is not within the statute of frauds, as an agreement not to be performed within one year. Kiene v. Shaeffing (Neb.), 49 N. W. Rep. 773. A verbal agreement to render services as a servant girl for another for $100 per year, the services to commence at the date of such agreement, is not within the statute of frauds (Gen. St. Kan. 1889, par. 3166, ch. 43, sec. 6), as the agreement might have been performed within one year. Aiken v. Nogle (Kan.), 27 Pac. Rep. 825, 47 Kan. 96. A parol contract made in November, to employ a person for one year, beginning with the 15th of the following December, is void under the statute of frauds, declaring void "every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof." Baker v. Codding, 18 N. Y. S. 159. A verbal agreement, whereby a railroad company undertakes to lay a switch for the use of a sawmill owner, and to maintain it as long as he should need it, is within the statute when it was expected and understood that he would need it for many years. Warner v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (U. S. C. C. App.), 54 Fed. Rep. 922. Under Rev. St. Tex. art. 2464, a verbal agreement, which, by a fair interpretation, and in view of all the circumstances exist ing at the time, does not admit of performance within a year from the time of its making, is void. Warner v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (U. S. C. C. App.), 54 Fed. Rep. 922. Evidence of an agreement to buy property, part of the price in cash, balance in two years, and, in case of default, the buyer to forfeit all claims to the property, as well as to any payments made thereon, negatives any idea that provision in regard to default is an executory agreement, distinct from the agree ment of sale, and not to be performed within a year. Von Kamen v. Roes, 20 N. Y. S. 548, 65 Hun, 625. Where the purchaser of land sues for damages on account merely of the fraud of the seller's agent in misrepresenting the value of the land, and not on the contract for the sale of the land, it is not proper to allow the defense of the statute of frauds, on the ground that the contract, although one not to be performed within a year, was not in writing. Tate v. Watts, 42 Ill. App. 103. A contract of employment of plaintiff as an actress, "the employment to endure for thirty-five or forty weeks, perhaps a year," creates no obligation to employ for a year, and is not within the statute of frauds. Haines v. Thompson (Com. Pl. N. Y.), 21 N. Y. S. 991, 2 Misc. Rep. 385. An oral agreement entered into in October, 1886, for the sale and delivery by plaintiff to defendant of a quantity of corn, of more than $50 in value, by which the seller was to receive the market price paid for corn in the county on any day between the time of delivery and May, 1888, is not void under the statute of frauds, since performance within one year is possible. Powder River Live Stock Co. v. Lamb (Neb.), 56 N. W. Rep. 1019. Where an oral lease of a farm requires the exclusive use of the land by the tenant during three months after the end of a year from the date of the lease, it creates an interest in land, within the statute of frauds, and is void. Carney v. Mosher (Mich.), 56 N. W. Rep. 935, 97 Mich. 554. A verbal agreement by a railroad company to issue once a year for 10 years an annual pass to a person and his family, and to stop its trains during that time at his house, was not an agreement not to be performed within a year, within the statute of frauds, since it was to be performed within a year upon the contingency of the death of such person and his family within that time. Weatherford, M. W. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wood (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. Rep. 411, affirmed in (Tex. Sup.), 30 S. W. Rep. 859. A promise not to be performed within a year, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, is only one which is necessarily not to be per formed within the year. Fain v. Turner's Admr. (Ky.), 29 S. W. Rep. 628. An agreement not to engage in a rival business in a certain localilty so long as the other party remains in such business is not within the statute of frauds. O'Neal v. Hines (Ind.), 43 N. E. Rep. 946. An extension of a note for a period longer than a year is within the statute of frauds. Kearby v. Hopkins (Tex. Civ. App.), 36 S. W. Rep. 506. A contract capable of performance, and which may be required to be performed, within one year, is not within the statute requiring agreements not to be performed within one year to be in writing. Hughes v. Frum (W. Va.), 23 S. E. Rep. 604. A contract of fire insur ance for a period of three years, the policy being payable after loss, is not within the statute of frauds. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. De Jarnett (Ala.), 19 South. Rep. 995. A parol agreement by an employer to give the employee regular work as long as he does faithful and honest service is not within the statute of frauds. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Of futt (Ky.), 36 S. W. Rep. 181. A contract of employ. ment for one year, to commence when an employee secures a release from a former emyloyment, is not within the statute of frauds, where his release on the date of the contract was a possibility, though not in fact secured to a later date. Baltimore Breweries Co. v. Callahan (Md.), 33 Atl. Rep. 460, 82 Md. 106. A contract whereby one, for a consideration, agrees to employ another at certain wages so long as the works of the first are kept running, or until the other shall see fit to quit, is not within the statute. Carter White-Lead Co. v. Kinlin (Neb.), 66 N. W. Rep. 536. BOOKS RECEIVED. Commentaries on the Laws of England, in Four Books. By Sir William Blackstone, Knight, one of the Justices of His Majesty's Court of Common Pleas. With Notes selected from the Editions of Archbold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others; and in addition, Notes and References to all Text Books and Decisions wherein the Commentaries have been cited, and all Statutes Modifying the Text. By William Draper Lewis, Ph. D. Dean of the Department of Law of the University of Pennsylvania. Book I. Philadelphia, Rees Welsh & Company. 1897. WEEKLY DIGEST Of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of the United States, except those that are Published in Fall or Commented upon in our Notes of Recent Decisions, and except those Opinions in which no Important Legal Principles are Disenssed of Interest to the Profession at Large. ARKANSAS. ILLINOIS......10, 18, 22, 45, 62, 66, 67, 87, 88, 92, 96, 119, 120 INDIANA.. 32, 49, 61, 65, 71, 75, 80, 97, 112 ......52 56 INDIAN TERRITORY.. 12, 44, 94 ..5 .26, 39, 105, 108, 113 .20, 43, 68, 114 86 .2, 25, 36, 51, 55, 57, 64, 93, 98, 109 .........19, 27, 50, 72, 81, 91, 104 TEXAS..... ..73 1. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Application.-A provision in the application and policy that no agent can waive any provisions of the policy does not protect the company, where the applicant truly states the facts, and then answers in accordance with the agent's advice, as to the effect of such facts.-STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDEST INS. Co. V. FRASER, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 705. ACCIDENT INSURANCE - Cause of Death.-Where virulent matter, which produces blood poisoning, is communicated to a wound coincident with its inflic tion, and death is produced thereby, it is a death within policy which provides that the insurance shall not exteud "to any case except where the injury is the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death."— MARTIN V. MANUFACTURERS' ACCIDENT INDEMNITY Co., N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 377. 3. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Unnecessary Danger.-One who hunts for game with a loaded gun cannot be said to have voluntarily exposed himself to unnecessary danger by such act, within the meaning of the provision in an accident insurance policy which declares that for injuries sustained by reason of a voluntary expos ure to unnecessary danger, there can be no recovery. -CORNWELL V. FRATERNAL ACC. ASSN. OF AMERICA, N. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 191. 4. ACTION-Assumption of Mortgage Debt. Whether an action to enforce against the grantee of a mortgagor an agreement in the deed to assume the mortgage debt must be brought at law or in equity is to be determined by the law of the place where the remedy is Bought.-WILLIARD V. WOOD, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 176. 5. ADMINISTRATION - Sale of Land for Decedent's Debts-When Authorized.-Though a conveyance of land made in trust to secure an existing debt and fu ture advances is not recorded till after the grantor's death, the title vests in the grantee as against creditors of decedent who did not attach the property during his life; and the executors have no power to sell the same for the payment of decedent's debts, under Pub. St. ch. 134, § 2, as land "liable to attachment or execu. tion by a creditor of the deceased in his life-time.”— EDWARDS V. BARNES, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 351. 6. ADVERSE POSSESSION.-One who sets up the defense of adverse possession must overcome the presumption that the occupation by one of premises to which another holds the legal title is deemed to have been under and in subordination to such title, unless it appears that the premises have been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for the statutory period of limitation, and must show, not only the adverse character of the possession on which he relies, but that it has been continuously adverse for the requisite period. - RYAN V. SCHWARTZ, Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 179. 7. APPEAL-Parties.-A receiver of an insolvent bank, duly appointed to take charge of the assets under the banking law, is a necessary party to a proceeding in error in this court to reverse a judgment rendered in favor of the bank prior to his appointment.-SCANNELL V. FELTON, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 948. 8. APPEALS — Parties.-An insolvent railroad company in the hands of a receiver appointed in foreclos. ure proceedings is a necessary party to an appeal from an order giving to certain judgments against it priority over the mortgages, and directing the receiver to pay such judgments.-FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO. V. LONGWORTH, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 609. 9. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS -Void Provision. Where an assignment is made by an insolvent debtor for the benefit of his creditors, and the deed of assignment contains a provision directing the trustee to distribute the estate in a manner inconsistent with the statute relating to general assignments, such provision will not avoid the conveyance, but should be treated as a nullity by the assignee, and the estate distributed by him as the statute prescribes.REESE V. PLATT, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 990. 10. ATTACHMENT-Fraud.-To warrant the issuance of an attachment on the ground that a debtor has disposed of his property to defraud creditors, the disposi tion must have been actually, as distinguished from constructively, fraudulent.-WADSWORTH V. LAURIE, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 435. less against public policy.-WEST V. Grand Lodge of THE ANCIENT ORDER of UNITED WORKMEN OF TEXAS, Tex., 37 8. W. Rep. 966. 12. CARRIERS-Passengers-Duty to Light Platform. -A railway company is only required to give a passenger reasonable time to leave the car and get out of the way of the train, before starting. It is not required to give the passenger time to leave the depot platform. -LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. RICKETTS, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 952. 13. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Passenger in Sleeping Car.-A complaint in an action to recover for personal injuries and maltreatment alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff while a passenger on a train of defendant railroad company, where she occupied a berth in a sleeper, by reason of the failure of defendant's servants to awaken her until the train had stopped at her place of destination, and by their hurrying her from the car without being dressed, states a cause of action in tort, and not for breach of contract.-McKEON V. CHICAGO, M. & St. P. RY. Co., Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 175. 14. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-After-acquired Property.At common law nothing can be mortgaged that is not in existence, or when it does not belong to the mortgagor at the time when the mortgage is made, but parties may make a contract with reference to afteracquired property, to be added to and made a part of the property mortgaged, and the contract will be valid and binding between the parties, and all those dealing with the property with a full knowledge of the condition of the mortgage; and, if the future-acquired property is mingled with the property described in the chattel mortgage, and added to and becomes a part of the stock of goods mortgaged, and the rights of third person have not intervened, it becomes a lien on all of the property intermingled and added to the mortgaged property.-DODGE V. SMITH, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 990. 15. CHATTEL MORTGAGE Description-Fraud.-The fact that the goods mortgaged are more than enough in value to secure the indebtedness does not of itself, establish fraud, even if a badge thereof; but perhaps the security might be so excessive as to cast suspicion upon the transaction to the extent of requiring an explanation.-BANE V. HARTZELL, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 961. 16. CHATTEL MORTGAGE Possession Fraud. The rule of the common law is that a mortgage of personal property, unaccompanied by possession, is prima facie void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith; yet the presumption of fraud arising from continued possession of the mortgagor may be rebutted by explanations showing the transaction to be fair and honest, and giving a reasonable account of the retention of possession.-ARKANSAS CITY BANK V. SWIFT, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 950. 17. CONTRACTS-Assignment.-Where one party to a contract stipulates therein that he will not assign the same without the consent of the other, this does not prevent an undisclosed third party, for whom he acted as agent in making the contract and in carrying on the work provided for therein, from maintaining an action upon it.-PRICHARD V. BUDD, U. S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 710. 18. CONTRACTS-Construction-Risks of Contractor.Under a contract with a city to construct a newly-designed apparatus for filtering water, to stand certain tests, the risk that the apparatus will stand the tests and demands made upon it is upon the contractor.SHOENBERGER V. CITY OF ELGIN, III., 45 N. E. Rep. 434. 19. CORPORATIONS Insolvency-Claims-Validity.It was error to disallow a claim of a foreign corporation against an insolvent domestic corporation whose affairs were being wound up, on the ground that the former was a branch of the latter, where it appeared the former was also insolvent, and in the hands of a receiver; that there were dealings between them; and that an indebtedness existed, though some stock of the domestic company was held by the foreign com pany, or had been taken in the name of its stockholders, and paid for by and held for it; and the foreign company was organized to assist in disposing of the domestic company's stock.—ALABAMA MARBLE & STONE Co. V. CHATTANOOGA MARBLE & STONE Co., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 1004. Ac. 20. CORPORATIONS — Liability of Stockholders. — cording to its articles, a domestic corporation was organized "to manufacture and deal in azotine and other fertilizing materials, grease and stearin." Held, that it was not organized for the purpose of carrying on a manufacturing business exclusively, and that its stockholders are not within the exception found in Const. art. 10, § 3.-COMMERCIAL BANK OF ST. PAUL V. AZOTINE MANUFG. CO., Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 217. 21. CORPORATIONS Liability of Trustees. The Montana statute providing that, if the trustees of a corporation organized thereunder fail to make a report of its affairs at a specified time, they shall be lia. ble for its debts, creates a joint and several liability to each creditor, which can be enforced by an action at law against one or all of the trustees. This liability is not in the nature of a penalty. The right of the cred itor is vested as soon as it accrues, and may be assigned, and cannot be defeated by any subsequent change or repeal of the statute.-FITZGERALD V. WEIDENBECK, U. S. C. C., D. (Minn.), 76 Fed. Rep. 693. 22. CORPORATIONS - Mortgages Foreclosure. In foreclosure against a corporation, the mortgagee, by the production of the note and mortgage, duly made and executed by the corporation under the hand of its president, and corporate seal attested by the secretary, makes out a prima facie case that they are valid obligations, executed by authority.-ASHLEY WIRE CO. V. ILLINOIS STEEL CO., Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 410. 23. CORPORATIONS Stock and Stockholders.-Under Rev. St. § 1754, providing that, unless otherwise expressly provided by law or the articles of organiza. tion, the directors of any corporation may call in the subscriptions to the capital stock by installments by giving such notice thereof as the by-laws shall prescribe, to render a call for an installment of stock enforceable, in the absence of any provision of law or of the articles of association fixing the time for its pay. ment, a notice to be given must be prescribed by a bylaw, or resolution or regulation having the effect of a by-law, as to such call, uniform as to all stockholders. -GERMANIA IRON MIN. Co. v. KING, Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 181. 24. CORPORATIONS-Stockholders' Liability.-The action given by Gen. St. Kan. par. 1192, to enforce the stockholders' liability when an execution against a corporation is returned unsatisfied, is transitory, and may be brought outside the State against a non-resi dent stockholder. NATIONAL BANK OF OXFORD V. WHITMAN, U. s. C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 76 Fed. Rep. 697. 25. CORPORATIONS-Ultra Vires Lease Contracts.Where the lessee of the franchises and property of a gaslight company takes possession of and occupies the property, the lessor may recover on the lease for rent accrued, though the lease is ultra vires.-BATH GASLIGHT CO. v. CLAFFY, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 390. 26. COUNTIES - Division of County - Apportionment of Taxes.-The defendant county was at one time a part of plaintiff county, and was set off and organized subsequent to the State equalization of 1881. In the apportionment of State taxes for the years 1883, 1884, and 1885, the defendant county was not mentioned, and, as a result, the tax for the whole territory was apportioned to and paid by plaintiff county: Held that, as plaintiff county had an adequate remedy by assumpsit to recover the amount of the taxes so paid, mandamus would not lie to compel defendant county to raise the amount by tax upon property within its limits.-BOARD OF SUP'RS OF BAY COUNTY V. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF ARENAC COUNTY, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 146. 27. CREDITORS' BILL Pleading and Proof. - In a creditors' bill, where a deed of trust is attacked for fraud, and it also is alleged that complainants have a |