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1. In an equity suit for the infringement of a copyright, where the defend-
aut appeals from the final decree, if exceptions were taken to the
report of a master in favor of the plaintiff, it is the duty of the appel.
lant to bring the exceptions into this court, as part of the record ;
and, if he took no exceptions, the report stands without exception.
Belford v. Scribner, 490.
2. Where the authoress of a book was a married woman, the copyright of
1. Under the statute of Missouri, authorizing execution upon a judgment
against a corporation to be ordered against any of its stockholders to
the extent of the unpaid balance of their stock,“ upon motion in open
court, after sufficient notice in writing to the persons sought to be
charged," a notice served in another State upon a person alleged to be
a stockholder, and who has never resided in Missouri, is insufficient to
support an order charging him with personal liability. Wilson v.
2. The trust arising in favor of creditors by subscriptions to the stock of a
corporation cannot be defeated by a simulated payment of such sub-
scription, nor by any devise short of an actual payment in good faith;
and it was not intended, by anything said in Clark v. Berer, 139 U. S.
96: Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118; or Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417,
to overrule this principle, or qualify it in any way, but only to draw
a line beyond which the court was unwilling to go in affixing a lia-
bility upon those who had purchased stock of the corporation, or had
taken it in good faith in satisfaction of their demands. Camden v.
3. Applying this rule to the testimony and mass of figures in this case, the
court affirms the judgments of the court below against stockholders in
these cases, whose subscriptions for their stock in the corporation,
defendant in error in No. 613, were shown to be in part unpaid. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, C, 4.
See PRACTICE, 10;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 2, 4.
COURT AND JURY.
This action was brought by the defendant in error as plaintiff below
against the plaintiff in error, defendant below, to recover a balance
alleged to be due from him to the plaintiff below as its treasurer.
The defendant below denied that any sum was due, and set up an
accord and satisfaction. At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the
defendant opened his case at length, setting forth the grounds of his
defence. After some evidence had been introduced including the
books of account and the evidence of a witness who kept those books,
a conversation took place between the court and the defendant respect-
ing the introduction of evidence alleged by the court to be outside of
the statements made in the opening. The defendant insisted that the
evidence offered was within those statements. A further conversation
resulted in the defendant's offering to show that all the moneys ever
received by him as treasurer were duly accounted for and paid over.
The court held this to be a mixed proposition of law and fact, and
therefore not to be proved by witnesses or other evidence; and, having
excluded it, charged the jury that the question at issue was a book-
keeper's puzzle or problem, which must be solved in favor of the plain-
tiff, although nothing had occurred in the testimony which reflected in .
the slightest degree upon the integrity or honesty or upright conduct
of anybody who was concerned or had at any time been concerned in
the transaction. Held, (1) That under the rule laid down in Oscanyan
V. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, it was competent for the court, if, assuming
all the statements and claims made in the defendant's opening with all
explanations and qualifications to be true, he had no case, to direct a
verdict for the plaintiff; but (2) that he should have been allowed,
especially in view of the statement that there was no imputation upon
his integrity or honesty, to offer proof to show that he had accounted
for and paid over the money for which he was sued; and that if the
proof, when offered, did not tend in law to establish those facts, it
could have been excluded. Butler v. National Home for Disabled Sol-
See NEGLIGENCE, 3, 4.
1. The consolidation, under section 1024 of the Revised Statutes, of several
indictments against different persons for one conspiracy, if not ex-
cepted to at the time, cannot be objected to after verdict. Logan v.
United States, 263.
2. An act of Congress, requiring courts to be held at three places in a judi-
cial district, and prosecutions for offences committed in certain coun-
ties to be tried, and writs and recognizances to be returned, at each
place, does not affect the power of the grand jury, sitting either
place, to present indictments for offences committed anywhere within
the district. Ib.
3. A jury in a capital case, who, after considering their verdict for forty
hours, have announced in open court that they are unable to agree,
may be discharged by the court of its own motion and at its discre-
tion, and the defendant be put on trial by another jury. Ib.
4. A juror summoned in a capital case, who states on voir dire that he has
conscientious scruples in regard to the infliction of the death penalty
for crime, may be challenged by the government for cause. Ib.
5. The provision of section 858 of the Revised Statutes, that “the laws of
the State in which the court is held shall be the rules of decision as to
the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States in trials
at common law, and in equity and admiralty,” has no application to
criminal trials. 1b.
6. Under section 1033 of the Revised Statutes, any person indicted of a
capital offence has the right to have delivered to him, at least two
days before the trial, a list of the witnesses to be produced on the
trial for proving the indictment; and if he seasonably claims this
right, it is error to put him on trial, and to allow witnesses to testify
against him, without having previously delivered to him such a list;
and, it seems, that the error is not cured by his acquittal of the capital
offence, and conviction of a lesser offence charged in the same indict-
7. There are no common law offences against the United States. United
States v. Eaton, 677.
8. It is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should exist for
declaring any act or omission a criminal offence; and the statutory
authority in the present case was not sufficient. Ib.
See EvideNCE, 2;
JURISDICTION, A, 8;
1. Under the provision in the act of May 9, 1890, 26 Stat. 105, c. 200, the
more than all the rest of the materials put together, were not liable to
a duty of 30 per cent ad valorem, as "manufactures and articles of
leather,” under Schedule N of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, (22 Stat.
513,) but were liable to a duty of only 15 per cent ad valorem, under
Schedule M of that act, (22 Stat. 510,) as a manufacture of paper, or
of which paper was “a component material, not specially enumerated
or provided for" in that act. Liebenroth v. Robertson, 35.
4. Under § 6 of that act, (p. 491,) title 33 of the Revised Statutes was abro-
gated after July 1, 1883, and § 2499 in that title was made to read so
that “on all articles manufactured from two or more materials the
duty shall be assessed at the highest rates at which the component
material of chief value may be chargeable,” instead of reading that
“ on all articles manufactured from two or more materials the duty
shall be assessed at the highest rates at which any of its component
parts may be chargeable;" and that new provision was applicable to
this case, although the new § 2499 also provided that “if two or more
rates of duty should be applicable to any imported article it shall be
classified for duty under the highest of such rates." Ib.
5. This last provision was not properly applicable, under $ 2499, to an arti-
cle “manufactured from two or more materials,” and it had sufficient
scope if applied to articles not manufactured from two or more mate-
rials, but still prima facie subject to “two or more rates of duty.” 1b.
6. Laces made by machinery out of linen thread were imported in 1881
and 1882, and charged with duty at 40 per cent ad valorem, as
factures of flax, or of which flax shall be the component material of
chief value, not otherwise provided for,” under Schedule C of $ 2504
of the Revised Statutes (p. 462). The importers claimed that they
were chargeable with a duty of only 35 per cent ad valorem, as “thread
lace," under the same schedule (p. 463). Held, that, as the evidence
clearly showed that the goods were invariably bought and sold as
“ torchons," and not as thread laces, and that thread lace was always
hand-made, it was proper to direct a verdict for the defendant, in a
suit brought by the importer against the collector to recover an alleged
excess of duty. Meyerheim v. Robertson, 601.
7. Elastic webbings, used as gorings for shoes, some composed of worsted
and india-rubber, and the rest of cotton, silk and india-rubber, im-
ported in March and June, 1881, were assessed with duties, the former
as “ gorings," at 30 cents per pound and 50 per cent ad valorem, under
Schedule K of $ 2502 of Title 33 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted
by § 6 of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, 22 Stat. 509, and the latter
at 35 per cent ad valorem, as “ webbing, composed of cotton, flax or
any other materials, not specially enumerated or provided for in this
act," under Schedule N of the same section. Id. 514. The importers
claimed that they were dutiable at 30 per cent ad valorem under said
Schedule N, (Id. 513,) as “india-rubber fabrics, composed wholly or
in part of india-rubber, not specially enumerated or provided for in