$10.40, was issued for stamps bought and paid for by Painter as sheriff between October 3, 1902, and October 31, 1902; that warrant No. 46, for $985.80, was issued to Painter for criminal work done by him as sheriff of said county from January 1, 1902, to March 31, 1902; that warrant No. 47, for $1,687.90, was issued to Painter for criminal work done by him as sheriff of said county during the quarter ending June 30, 1902; that said funds in the hands of the county treasurer were not liable for any of said indebtedness, but that the said indebtedness was payable, if at all, out of the funds derived from the sale of lots in the town of Lawton, which fund was in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior, and had never been in the hands of the county treasurer or subject to the order of the board of county commissioners; that there was at that time in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior a sufficient balance of said town lot sale fund to pay all charges against the same, and to more than pay plaintiff's claims. To this return to the alternative writ the plaintiff filed a general denial. The alternative writ and the return constitute the pleadings in the case, and the reply should be treated as a demurrer to the return. The facts are admitted in the argument to be as alleged in the writ and return, and the court so found.

In

The facts presented call for the application and interpretation of the act of Congress of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1093, 1094, c. 846. This act provides for the reservation of lands in each county for a county seat, the manner of disposal of the town lots, and the disposition to be made of the funds arising from such sale. It may be stated generally that the power of Congress to dispose of the public lands, as well as to legislate directly for the territories, is unquestioned. any case, when Congress legislates upon any subject over which it has jurisdiction, its laws supersede all laws upon the same subject and serving the same purposes enacted by any of its subordinate dependencies. The territcry of Oklahoma possessed the legislative power to create county offices, to fix their compensation, and provide the manner of their payment. Congress possessed the same powers. Yet there could be no conflict of authority or of laws. The superior includes the inferior. Its laws are paramount, and when the superior legislates, and makes specific provision for the payment of county officers, and provides the fund from which they are to be paid, the laws of the territory upon the same subject are suspended and inoperative, and the laws of Congress must prevail. The portion of the act in question is as follows: "The receipts from the sale of these lots in the respective county seats snall, after deducting the expenses incident to the surveying, subdividing, platting and selling of the same, be disposed of under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior in

the following manner: A courthouse shall be erected therewith at such county seat at cost of not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and the residue shall be applied to the construction of bridges, roads and such other public improvements as the Secretary of the Interior shall deem appropriate, including the payment of all expenses actually necessary to the maintenance of the county government until the time for collecting county taxes in the calendar year next succeeding the time of the opening. No indebtedness of any character shall be contracted or incurred by any of said counties prior to the time for collecting county taxes in the calendar year next succeeding the opening, excepting where the same shall have been authorized by the Secretary of the Interior." In the interpretation of statutes, courts must find the meaning and intent in the language of the act itself, where there is no repugnancy or uncertainty. This statute seems clear. Congress knew what it wanted to accomplish, and said so; and we have no right to attempt to read into it some other purpose or meaning. Congress recognized the fact that under the laws of Oklahoma, which were then operative in these Indian reservations, county governments would be put in operation as soon as the country was opened to settle ment; and by section 2 of the act it was provided: "The Governor of the territory shall appoint and commission for each county all county and township officers made necessary by the laws of the territory of Oklahoma, who shall hold their respective offices until the officers elected by the people at the general election next following the opening shall have qualified." Congress knew that these officers so appointed would have to be paid, and the funds for the maintenance of a county government would have to be provided. By the laws of Oklahoma no taxes would be available for the payment of current expenses until December of the next year following the opening. The country was opened in August, after the time for the assessment of property for that year had elapsed. The first assessment that could be made under our laws would be in the spring of the following year, and the first installment of taxes from this assessment would be payable December 15, 1902, and until this date Congress made provision for maintaining county governments and provided the funds and manner of their disbursement. In addition to providing a fund for the payment of all the necessary expenses incident to the maintenance and support of the county government during a given period, a prohibition was also imposed upon the counties. It was provided: "No indebtedness of any character shall be contracted or incurred by any of said counties prior to the time for collecting county taxes in the calendar year next succeeding the opening, excepting where the same shall have been authorized by the Secretary of the

able act.

It has been suggested in the argument that this inhibition relates only to contractual obligations and does not affect imposed obligations or liabilities; that the salary of the sheriff was fixed by the laws of Oklahoma, and the law required him to be paid certain fees by the county; and that it was not the intention of Congress to take from the counties the authority to pay this class of obligations. The language used by Congress will not admit of this contention. The law says "contracted or incurred." The word "contracted" includes all of one class, and the word "incurred," to be given any meaning whatever, must be held to include another class. There are only two classes of county obligations, contractual and imposed, and evidently Congress meant to include both classes. The word "incurred" is defined by Webster as "to become liable or subject to; to render liable or subject to." Black says: "Men contract debts. They incur liabilities. In the one case, they act affirmatively; in the other, the liability is incurred or cast upon them by operation of law. 'Incur' means something beyond contracts, something not embraced in the word 'debt.'" In Scott v. Tyler, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 202, "incur" is held to i mean "to become liable for." Flanagan v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 83 Iowa, 639, 50 N. W. 60: "To become liable for." In Beekman v. Van Dolsen, 24 N. Y. Supp. 414, 70 Hun, 288: "To become liable for." In Deyo v. Stewart, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 101: "Brought on himself." In Ashe v. Young, 68 Tex. 123, 3 S. W. 454: "Brought on, occasioned, or caused." Hence it is apparent that the word "incurred" means more and embraces a different class of liabilities or obligations from these contracted. It means the indebtedness imposed upon the county by salaries of county officers and other required and necessary expenses, all of which, to be a charge against the lot sale fund, must be authorized or approved by the Secretary of the Interior. To use a phrase somewhat familiar in these days, Congress imposed "departmental government" upon these new counties until such time as the revenues from the taxes levied upon their own property were available for their expenses, and until that time no indebtedness could be created by the county officers or imposed by the laws of Oklahoma until such time as the prohibition in the act of Congress expired by limitation, when the laws of Oklahoma become operative and the "embryo quarantine" was raised.

The services for which Painter filed his claim should have been presented to the Secretary of the Interior, and his authority obtained to incur the liability against the funds in his hands, and payment enforced against the special fund set apart for this special purpose. It was a part of the expense of maintaining the county government which is charged with the enforcement of the crim

The return set up a complete defense to the allegations of the writ, and, being found true, the peremptory writ was properly re

fused.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed, at the costs of the plaintiff in error. All the Justices concur, except GILLETTE, J., who tried the case below, not sitting, and IRWIN, J., absent.

(19 Okl. 590)

LONG-BELL LUMBER CO. v. NEWELL et al. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Sept. 5, 1907.) APPEAL-DISMISSAL-SCURRILOUS BRIEF.

Where the plaintiff in error files what is designated as a brief in support of his assignment of error, and in such written argument makes an abusive, wanton, insulting, and scurrilous assault upon the judgment appealed from, and which is an inexcusable and unwarranted reflection upon the trial judge, the so-called brief will be stricken from the files, the case treated as if no brief had been filed, and the appeal dismissed for failure to comply with the rules of the court.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, § 3102.]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from District Court. Garfield County; before Justice F. E. Gillette.

Action by Albert F. Newell and Frank M. Ross against the Long-Bell Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant brings error. Dismissed.

W. R. Cowley, L. L. Cowley, and E. E. Chesney, for plaintiff in error. Robberts & Curran and W. S. Denton, for defendants in

error.

PER CURIAM. This cause was tried in the district court of Garfield county before an associate justice of this court sitting as a district judge. During an active service of over five years upon the Supreme and district bench the distinguished justice has established a record for integrity, fairness, and impartiality which is unassailable, and which will endure to his credit long after his detractors will have passed into oblivion. The plaintiff in error is the Long-Bell Lumber Company, a foreign corporation. which comes into this jurisdiction by comity and sufferance, and, while seeking at the hands of this court relief from an alleged erroneous judgment, overlooks the common courtesy and amenities due from a guest in the house of his host, and makes an unwarranted, wanton, and vicious attack upon a member of his host's family. The brief filed by plaintiff in error. after citing a principle contended for, contains this statement: "If this is the law, and, indeed, it, beyond even cavil, is the law, then the judgment in the case at bar simply cannot remain, is everywhere unsupported, is vicious, virulent with venom. through and through, infected and infectious, fit for that antidote for that bane spoken of by Justice

Swayne in Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 25 L. Ed. 808." Such insolent, discourteous, and uncalled-for denunciations of a judgment of a court of high standing, and necessarily reflecting upon the judge who rendered it, can have no place in the records of a court of justice, and not only calls for severe rebuke, but exemplary punishment. And this stranger, a guest in the house of a friend, guilty of such wanton disregard of decency, must submit to the customary treatment usual in such cases-that of being unceremoniously ejected from the household whose hospitality and generosity it has for so long enjoyed and preyed upon, but at last outraged.

The case is one where the defendants in error obtained a judgment against the plaintiff in error for a fraud alleged to have been committed through its attorney and agent. The trial court found that the corporation had a judgment against one Payne. which was a lien upon a lot in the city of Enid. The lot was worth considerably more than the judgment. It was sold at sheriff's sale, and bid in by the corporation, and its bid assigned to the M. E. Church South, and the church paid the amount of the bid. While proceedings were pending for confirmation of the sale, the agent sold the property to the defendants in error, who paid off the judgment held by the company against Payne, paid Payne the balance of the purchase money, and obtained a deed for the property. The agent represented that the church had paid nothing and had no interest in the property They relied on his representations. and paid $800 on the strength of them. the meantime the corporation was resisting the claim of the church, but was defeated, and the sale was ordered confirmed, and the sheriff directed to convey the property to the church. The defendants in error got nothing. The court found that the corporation received and accepted the money paid by the defendants in error to their agent, thereby ratifying his acts and binding itself by his representations made in order to induce the payment to him of said money. The judgment in this case is to reimburse the defendants in error for the amount of money paid by them to the company for this property.

The company was charged with fraud and bad faith. The court found it guilty. It denied the authority of its agent, while holding onto the fruits of his deceit. It is in no position to make wanton and vicious assaults upon our courts. It is entitled to and will receive all the rights and privileges of a citizen of our territory in the courts of our territory; but it must submit to the same rules and observe the same respect for our courts and laws as is due from our own citi

A foreign corporation dealing in lumber and building materials and occupying one of the most fruitful and profitable fields ever opened to commerce, enjoying an extensive trade with our builders and consumers,

and diligent in its efforts to extend its field of operations, should be the last person to make unprovoked assaults upon the courts. In these days of the aggressions of combined wealth and the importunities of organized labor, the courts are the powerful civic regulators, which stand between the two great antagonistic forces in our social and political organization, and, uninfluenced by the one and unawed by the other, compel obedience to law and deal out justice evenly and justly, and are entitled to the respect and support of all well-disposed citizens. An examination of this entire record discloses absolutely nothing to inspire, provoke, or excuse any criticism of the trial court in the proceedings had before it. There is nothing in the judg ment to condemn

This foreign corporation also comes into our court by foreign counsel, who has been permitted to appear by courtesy, and, forgetting his duty, is guilty of discourteous and unprofessional conduct in placing such a brief on file. The matter set out in the brief of plaintiff in error is improper, unwarranted, inexcusable, and reprehensible. This court cannot recognize a document containing such matters as a brief, or the filing of such a compliance with the rule requiring a brief.

The so-called brief is stricken from the record and ordered removed from the files; and, for the reason that the plaintiff in error has failed to file a brief as required by the rules of this court, the appeal is dismissed, at the costs of the plaintiff in error.

RESERVATIONS.

The taxing officers of Comanche county, Okl., have the lawful right to levy and collect taxes on personal property belonging to private individuals and located on the Ft. Sill military reservation, which is wholly within such county and constitutes a part thereof. The legislative power of the territory extends to all rightful subjects of legislation, and the only property which Congress has prohibited the territory from taxing is the property of the United States. [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 45, Taxation, § 54.]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from District Court, Comanche County; before Justice Frank E. Gillette.

Action by T. R. Rice and W. H. Quinette against C. C. Hammonds, sheriff. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. firmed.

Parmenter & Myers, for plaintiffs in error. S. M. Cunningham and Frank P. Cease, for defendant in error.

BURWELL, J. F. R. Rice and W. H. Quinette were partners in the cattle business; the firm name being Rice & Quinette. They owned quite a lot of cattle, which were lo

Comanchie county, Okl. The taxing officers assessed these cattle for territorial, county, township and school district purposes. The owners of the cattle commenced this action against the sheriff of Comanche county (a tax warrant having been placed in his hands), praying that he be enjoined from levying such tax warrant upon the property of the plaintiffs. On a hearing for a temporary injunction the court enjoined the collection of the district school tax on the ground that none of the plaintiffs' property had been located within such district, and denied the injunction as to the other taxes.

The sole contention of the plaintiffs is that, inasmuch as these cattle were located on a military reservation of the United States, even though such reservation is within an organized county of Oklahoma, they cannot be taxed under the territorial laws, asserting that a military reservation is under the sole legislative control of the United States. We have read counsel's brief, and while it is true that, as long as Oklahoma remains a territory, Congress may legislate as to all matters pertaining to this reservation and exclude the territorial authorities from exercising any control thereof, it has not done so. By section 6 of the organic act of the territory of Oklahoma, it is provided: "That the legislative power of the territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil, no tax shall be imposed on the property of the United States, nor shall the lands and other property of nonresidents be taxed higher than the lands or other property of residents, nor shall any law be passed impairing the right of private property. nor shall any unequal discrimination be made in taxing different kinds of property, but all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value." Under this express grant of power from Congress, the territory may subject all property within the territory to taxation except the property of the United States. It is immaterial where the property is located. If it is not the property of the United States, the Legislature may require it to bear its just proportion of the burdens of government. A military reservation in a territory is no more under the legislative control of Congress than is an Indian reservation; and it has been expressly held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the territory may tax property on an Indian reservation, even though it is not located within an organized county, but only attached to an organized county for judicial purposes. Thomas v. Guy, 169 U. S. 264, 18 Sup. Ct. 340, 42 L. Ed. 740; Polson v. Purcell, 4 Okl. 93, 46 Pac. 578; Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588, 18 Sup. Ct. 730, 42 L. Ed. 1154: Steil v. Territory, 4 Okl. 497, 46 Pac. 1117; Truscott, Co. Treas., v. Hurlbut Land

Foster v. Pryor, 189 U. S. 325, 23 Sup. Ct. 549, 47 L. Ed. 835; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Bryan, 11 Okl. 357, 66 Pac. 348. See, also, Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Rowe, 114 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. 995, 29 L. Ed. 264.

Under the laws of the territory of Oklahoma the property in question is subject to taxation in Comanche county. The property of the United States located on this reservation or anywhere else in the territory cannot be taxed. The territory is expressly prohibited as to such taxation by the organic act. But should Congress exclude the territory from taxing the property of the plaintiff simply because it is located on this reservation? It did not intend to do so, nor has it done so. Counsel have overlooked the fact that Congress has not only exclusive legislative control over military reservations in the territories, but it has legislative control of the territories themselves. The Ft. Sill military reservation is within the organized county of Comanche and constitutes a part thereof. The persons and property within such reservation have the protection of the laws of the territory, and it is only equitable that the property therein not belonging to the United States should pay a part of the expenses of the same. If Congress had intended that the property on this or other reservations in the territory should not be taxed, it would have so declared, as it did with reference to property of the United States and property belonging to certain In- . dians. As the property in question was within an organized township of an organized county of the territory, the power exists to exact taxes for all three purposes, to wit, territorial, county, and township.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. All of the Justices concurring, except GILLETTE, J., who presided at the trial below, not sitting, and IRWIN, J., absent. Costs taxed to appellant.

(19 Okl. 375)

BOARD OF COM'RS OF DAY COUNTY v. STATE OF KANSAS. (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Sept. 5, 1907.) 1. EVIDENCE JUDICIAL NOTICE.

Courts of record in any county will take judicial notice of the county seat of such coun ty, and, if the seat of public business in any county is the county seat de facto, such courts will take notice thereof, and the validity of the proceedings of such court transacted at the county seat de facto cannot thereafter be questioned in a collateral proceeding.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, § 31.]

2. COURTS CORRECTIONS OF RECORD-NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER.

A person interested in the proceedings of a court of record may appear before the court at any time and ask to have the journal of the court made correct and complete as of the date such record should have been made, and the court should entertain and hear such motion upon notice given to those adversely interested.

Where the default was that of the court or its officers, it is the duty of the court to make its record complete at any subsequent date when the default is called to its attention without the formality of a motion.

3. JUDGMENT RES JUDICATA-BONDS-VALID ISSUE.

Where a court of competent jurisdiction has determined the validity of the bonds involved in a proceeding provided by the statute, and has decreed that the bonds were valid obligations and issued in strict conformity with the laws of the territory, and no objection or exception was taken therefrom, the decree and judgment of the court is final and conclusive upon all matters put directly in issue, tried, and determined in that proceeding. Following Territory v. Hopkins, 9 Okl. 133, 59 Pac. 976.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 30, Judgment, § 1251.]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from District Court, Day County; before Justice J. L. Pancoast.

Action by the state of Kansas against the board of county commissioners of Day county. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

This action was originally commenced in the district court of Day county, Okl., by the defendant in error filing therein its petition, which, with exhibits attached and referred to in the petition, is as follows:

"The state of Kansas, the plaintiff herein, complains of the board of county commissioners of Day county, the defendant herein, and for its causes of action against said defendant says: That the state of Kansas is one of the states of the United States of America, and was admitted into the Union on January 29, 1861. That the defendant, the board of county commissioners of Day county, is the lawful executive and administrative body of Day county, Okl., and that said Day county was organized on or about

1902, and is now, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, one of the duly organized counties of the territory of Oklahoma. That by various acts of Congress the state of Kansas, plaintiff herein, was granted large tracts of land out of the public domain for the purpose of creating a fund, to be known as the agricultural college endowment fund of the state of Kansas, and providing that the said fund realized from the sale of said lands should never be diminished, but should be perpetual, and the principal sum of the said fund should be invested, and the interest money derived from such investments should be for the support of the Kansas State Agricultural College. That, in pursuance of said acts of Congress, the state of Kansas has accumulated a large fund, to wit, five hundred thousand dollars, which is invested from time to time in municipal bonds, and interest thereon is devoted to the support of said college. That the defendant, the board of county commissioners of Day county, on July 10, 1900, in open court in the district court of said Day county. Okl., at the lawful sitting of said court, ordered by the Supreme Court

| of the territory of Oklahoma to be held at Grand, Day county, Okl., for the issue of county bonds, July 10, 1900, before the judge of said court, executed certain judgment funding bonds of said county, as more fully hereinafter appears, and the said bonds were then and there signed by the duly qualified and acting chairman of the board of county commissioners of said county, and the said bonds were then and there attested and signed by the duly qualified and acting county clerk of said court, and the said bonds were then and there signed by the duly qualified and acting judge of the district court of said county, and were then and there duly attested and signed by the duly qualified and acting deputy clerk of the district court of said county.

"Thereafter the bonds so executed as aforesaid were duly registered by the auditor of the territory of Oklahoma, and said auditor certified on the back of each bond aforesaid, under the seal of his office, that the said bonds were legal and regularly issued according to law. True copies of the said auditor's certificate of registration and of the legality and regularity of the issue of the bonds aforesaid are hereinafter 'set out in Exhibits B and C, attached hereto and made a part hereof. That the defendant issued the said judgment funding bonds as aforesaid, and said bonds were made payable to bearer, and thereafter divers and certain of said bonds of said judgment issue of July 10, 1900, aforesaid, more fully hereinafter set forth, were bought in good faith in the open market by the loan commissioner of the State Agricultural College of the state of Kansas as an investment for the endowment fund of said college, for a valuable consideration; and out of an abundance of prudence and caution on the part of the said loan commissioner, before purchasing said bonds, the said loan commissioner required to be furnished to him a certified copy of all the papers on file in the office of the auditor of the territory of Oklahoma containing the history of the issue of said judgment funding bonds, and particularly showing the journal entry of the judgment upon which this issue of bonds was based, and particularly showing the amount of said issue, and particularly showing the total outstanding indebtedness of said Day county, and particularly showing the assessed valuation of said Day county, which copy of all the papers on file as aforesaid, in the office of the auditor aforesaid, was duly certified by the auditor of Oklahoma under the seal of his office, a true copy of which is hereto attached, marked Exhibit A, and made a part of this petition. That the bonds of this judgment funding issue so purchased as aforesaid by the loan commissioner as aforesaid are bonds numbered 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, for $1,000.00 each, and bond numbered 18 for $100.00, and all of said bonds so purchased as aforesaid are issued as of the date of July 10, 1900, and due July 10, 1910. A true copy of bond