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The questions sought to be raised have been, , versal. In this action the court did not comhowever, determined as indicated above. mit error. It has been held uniformly by
The complaint of the overruling of a mo- this court that such motions are not recog. tion of the McClearys is stated to be the nized by our practice. When any or all of fourth error relied on for reversal. This mo- the facts are not sustained by the evidence, or tion seems to be an application to be admit- are contrary to law, or where facts should ted as parties. They were subsequently ad. have been found, but were not, the proper mitted as parties, and the other questions remedy is by motion for a new trial. Delanraised under this assignment have been con- ey v. Gubbins (1914) 181 Ind. 188, 195, 104 N. sidered.
E. 13, and cases cited; Richards v. Wilson [4, 5] The fifth error asserted is that the (1916) 184 Ind. — 112 N. E. 780. court erred in overruling another motion The tenth error asserted involves the overmade by the McClearys to strike out of the ruling of motions for a new trial made by report everything in it relating to the estab- appellants. Aside from questions hereinbelishing of that part of the arm of the drain fore determined, the questions presented by which extended into Allen county. Manifest- the motions for a new trial so far as they are ly the motion asked for the impossible. The properly presented are given consideration drain and the arm were reported as a whole, in the order in which they are urged. and the assessments apportioned for it as one Excluding the testimony of Bash, whose system. The impossibility of separating the remonstrance was stricken out, was assignassessments is obvious. Nor did the motion ed as error. Bash testified as a witness, and follow the proper proceeding in any event. the only testimony specifically complained Had the report of that part of the arm in of having been excluded the record shows he Allen county not have been within the law. gave. It is true that after he answered an ful authority of the commissioners, objection objection was sustained to the question, but should have been taken to it under the first the answer was not stricken out. But in any cause of remonstrance provided by the stat- event the purpose of the testimony was to ute, namely, “that the report of the commis- show that Bash's land was not benefited, and sioners is not according to law."
he had no remonstrance raising the issue of  Certain of the appellants urge that the his benefits. court erred in overruling their motions, based (10) The report of the commissioners was on not very material alleged defects, to admitted in evidence as a part of the case of strike out the proof and return of service of the petitioners in chief over objections by apnotice on themselves and others who were pellants, and complaint is made of this. brought in by the report of the commission. The report was competent evidence, and the ers. There was no error in the court's ac- court did not err in admitting it. Seybold v. tion. The notice was sufficient to bring the Rehwald (1911) 177 Ind. 301, 310, 95 N. E. parties into court, and appellants' motion 235; Shields v. Pyles (1912) 180 Ind. 71, 81, was not made until long after they had ap- 99 N. E. 742. peared and filed remonstrances.
 It is asserted that the court erred in  The seventh error asserted is based on admitting in evidence two exhibits marked the action of the trial court in striking out G and H. These exhibits are agreements remonstrances of certain appellants. All of made between the petitioners and two groups these remonstrances were filed more than of landowners who were brought in by the ten days after notice had been served on report, and who were contesting their indithose filing them. Hence, under the settled vidual assessments. By them it was agreed rule declared by this court, they came too that these assessments should be reduced to late, and were properly rejected. Pittsburgh, sums fixed which it was agreed represented etc., R. Co. v. Hodges (1911) 175 Ind. 669, the full benefits accruing to these lands. It 94 N. E 324, and cases cited.
does not appear that appellants offered any  It is argued that the court erred in its evidence to refute these agreements, and it is conclusions of law-that the proposed drain not claimed by them that the assessments so should be established for the reason that agreed upon were not the full benefit to the the court's findings showed that the costs, lands involved. If the assessments agreed damages and expenses of the drain would ex- upon did represent the full benefits to the ceed the benefits. The court expressly found lands, we cannot see why this summary and stated the contrary fact, and the excepc method of reaching the result could have tions to the conclusions of law admit the been more harmful to the appellants than the fact to be well found. If appellants desired more prolonged one of hearing evidence from to present to this court the question of wheth- the persons and from the remonstrators imer the evidence sustained the findings on this mediately concerned. question, they should have done so by the  Under the remaining causes of a new medium of a motion for a new trial on that trial it is made to appear that appellants' ground. This they have not done.
lands had many years before been heavily as The action of the court in overruling sessed for drains in the upper part of the basthe separate motions of appellants to modify in for which the drain involved in this proand correct the court's special findings of ceeding was intended to give an adequate outfacts is asserted to be an error requiring re. let for the entire basin, and that those drains
adequately drained their lands. As we un Appeal from Superior Court, Porter Counderstand appellants' points, they contend that ty; Harry B. Tuthill, Judge. the court should arbitrarily have given them Suit by Isabella Carson against the Tollescredit for these assessments as against the ton Club of Chicago, Amos W. Walker, and assessment made against their lands in this others. Judgment in part for plaintiff, and proceeding. To do so would have wiped out defendants appeal. Reversed, with instrucany assessments against them for this drain. tions to grant venire de novo. It would absolve them from bearing any part of the cost of making a sufficient outlet H, Gillett and Fred Barnett, both of Ham
Randall W. Burns, of Chicago, Ill., John for the waters their drains cast upon the mond, and Simeon P. Shope, of Chicago, Ill., lower part of the basin. The question before for appellants. Peter Crumpacker and F. C. the court was: What benefits would flow to the lands of appellants from the construction Crumpacker, both of Hammond, for appellee. of this drain? It is not contended that there
ERWIN, J. Appellee, Isabella Carson, was not evidence to support the assessments brought an action against appellants, the against appellants' lands which the court Tolleston Club of Chicago, Amos W. Walker, made. To support their contention that the and many others, to quiet her title to certain court should arbitrarily allow them for real estate in section 17, township 36 north, their previous assessments counsel for ap- range 8 west, in Lake county, Ind., and depellants cite section 4 of a drainage act of scribed as follows: Beginning at a point in 1881. Acts 1881, p. 410; section 5657, Burns the middle of the north line of lot 2, in said 1901. It needs but a glance to show that this section; thence south on a line parallel with section would have no application to the the north and south middle line of said secquestion involved here, even if such a provi- tion, to the south line thereof; thence west sion were found in the present law, which to said north and south center line of said it is not.
section; thence north along said center line Appellants have presented no error suffi- to the northwest corner of said lot 2; thence cient to compel a reversal, and the judgment east to the place of beginning. Also, comis affirmed.
mencing at a point 591.1 feet east of the
southwest corner of the northeast quarter of ERWIN, J., not participating.
the northwest quarter of said section; running thence east to the northeast corner of
lot 3 as surveyed and designated by the UnitTOLLESTON CLUB OF CHICAGO et al. ved States government in said section; thence CARSON. (No. 22692.) *
south along the east line of said lot 3 to the
south line of said section 17; thence west (Supreme Court of Indiana. Dec. 20, 1916.)
along said south line to a point due south of 1. PUBLIC LANDS F114(3)-PATENTS/CON- the place of beginning; thence north to the STRUCTION.
place of beginning. Where the patent from the United States to the state conveyed land according to official
Appellant Walker answered in three paraplats of the survey, which plats described the graphs: (1) In general denial; (2) claiming land by section numbers and acreage without title to the lands described in the complaint reference to the meander line or thread of the by virtue of a quitclaim deed from appellee stream, and the total acreage called for was less than the acreage would have been had it and her husband to an undivided interest included a so-called impassable morass within amounting to five acres in certain described the meander lines, such morass remained the lands in which they held an undivided interproperty of the United States, and the patentee of the state took no title thereto.
est, and alleging that by previous partition [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Public Lands, proceedings lands described in the complaint Cent. Dig. 88 317, 318; Dec. Dig. Om 114(3).) were set apart to appellee and husband; and 2. COURTS Om97(1) – RULES OF DECISION (3) that he also acquired title by virtue of a
JUDGMENT OF FEDERAL COURTS-EFFECT IN tax title, purchased by him from one Dillon STATE COURTS.
The judgment of a federal court on the fed upon all the lands described in the second eral question as to what passed to the state paragraph of answer. Appellant Walker under a grant by the United States must be then filed his cross-complaint asking that his followed by state courts.
title be quieted to the same lands described (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. in appellee's complaint. Dig. § 329; Dec. Dig. Om 97(1).]
Appellant Tolleston Club answered the 3. TRIAL 363(2) IMPROPER VERDICT complaint and cross-complaint in general deRIGHT TO VENIRE DE Novo.
nial. Where there are two verdicts returned by the jury, and the court does not send the jury
Appellee filed her answer of general denial back to their room under proper instructions to to Walker's cross-complaint, and also four return a single verdict before their discharge, paragraphs of affirmative answer.
Her secand where the verdict of the jury is imperfect, ond paragraph was to the effect that the quituncertain, or incomplete, a motion for a venire de novo must be sustained.
claim deed from herself and husband was [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. fraudulently procured and never actually Dig. $8 863, 869, 875; Dec. Dig. Om363(2).) delivered. Her third paragraph alleges that
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
•Superseded on rehearing, see 123 N. E. 169. Rehearing denied.
the deed was made for an undivided five acres regard his cross-complaint; in refusing to in all the lands described, and that the gran- grant his motion to amend the verdict in his tee's name was blank; that Walker was to favor; in granting appellee's motion to sell the same for $1,500, and fill in the pur- amend the verdict; in amending the verdict; chaser's name; and that he never sold such in overruling his motions for a venire de interest, but inserted his own name and now novo, new trial, and to modify the judgment; claims title thereunder. For her fourth para- and in granting the motion of appellant club graph of answer, she alleges that there never to modify the judgment by adding the words was any delinquent taxes on the lands of her "nothing in this judgment shall be construed husband and herself, but that the taxes were to be an adjudication as between the crossupon the other lands described in Walker's complainant and defendant Walker and the second paragraph of answer. Her fifth para defendant the Tolleston Club of Chicago," graph of answer alleges that no part of the and in so modifying the judgment. lands described in the cross-complaint, ex Appellant Tolleston Club contends that the cept an undivided five acres thereof, belong court erred in giving its instruction numto Walker by either of his deeds.
bered 4, which is, in part, as follows: Appellant Tolleston Club bases its claim
“This action is brought by the plaintiff against herein upon its title to lots 5, 6, and 7 in sec- the defendant Tolleston Club to quiet ber tition 17, township 36 north, range 8 west, de- tle, to the following described real estate in
Lake county, Ind. * Plaintiff claims rived from grantors, who obtained patents that the patent from the United States governtherefor from the United States, under the ment to the state of Indiana and the patents provisions of the act of Congress entitled “An from the state of Indiana to her remote grantor, act in relation to certain unsold lands in the ed States government and of the state of In
Aaron N. Hart, conveyed the title of the Unitcounties of Porter and Lake in the state of diana in and to all of the lots claimed by her. Indiana,” and enacted in 1870. These lots including said low, wet, and submerged lands, cover all that portion of section 17 south of of said meander line, as well as the land north
sometimes styled the impassable morass, south the meander line of the original survey. The thereof. And I instruct you as a matter of Tolleston Club also seeks to show that it has law that these patents to said Aaron N. Hart been in possession of the same as owner and conveyed all the lands both north and south of
the meander line and extending southwardly as lessee of their grantors for more than 20 to the south line of the section 17. years.
agreement of parties the government meander The cause was tried by jury, resulting in line is the border line between the lands on the
north, admittedly by the Tolleston Club owned two verdicts at the November, 1912, term of by the plaintiff Carson and the lands south of the court, which were amended during the said meander line title to which plaintiff Carson February, 1913, term. Upon the amended and defendant Club each claim. So the issue verdicts the court rendered judgment, which presented to the jury has to do with that part
of the lands mentioned in the complaint which is in substance as follows: Appellee is the lie between the government meander line on the owner in fee simple of all the land described north and the south line of section 17 on the
south." in her complaint, excepting therefrom an undivided interest amounting to five acres be Appellant Tolleston Club contends that longing to appellant Walker, and subject to the patent of the United States to the state the rights, if any, of appellant Tolleston Club, of Indiana did not convey to the state that in and to said undivided ive-acre tract south portion of lots 2 and 3 claimed by appellee of the meander line across the described to extend south of the meander line of the lands; and that appellee's lands are subject impassable morass designated in the official to a tax lien in favor of appellant Walker plats of survey of the lands returned to the for the sum of $487.23, which is hereby fore-General Land Office by the Surveyor Genclosed, and appellee is given six months in eral. It is also contended that appellant which to discharge the same, or Walker may Tolleston Club is the owner of the lands in sell under the foreclosure.
dispute under patents issued to its remote Appellant Tolleston Club assigns as errors grantors under the provisions of the act of herein the ruling of the court in granting Congress of 1870. appellee's motion to amend the verdict, in In the case of Tolleston Club v. State, 141 amending the verdict returned in favor of Ind. 197, at page 213, 38 N. E. 214, 219 (40 Walker; in granting appellee's motion to N. E. 690), this court was considering much amend the verdict which was returned by the same question as here involved. It was the jury after retiring; in overruling its mo- there shown in the list of swamp lands setions for a venire de novo, for new trial, for lected in the Winamac land district, of Innew trial with supplement filed therewith, in diana, that "part of sections 12, 15, 17, 18, arrest of judgment, and to modify the judg. 19, and 20 amounting to 2,443.67 acres were ment.
chosen, together with all of sections 2, 3, 6, Appellant Walker assigns as errors the 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, and 22, and the northwest court's action in overruling his demurrers to quarter of section 23, amounting to 5,727 appellee's second, third, fourth, and fifth par- acres, all in township 36, range 8 west. As agraphs of answer to his cross-complaint; in further shown in that case, the patent from setting aside the default of the Tolleston the United States to the state of Indiana
9, 10, and 11, the whole of fractional sections Justice White, dissenting in the Kean 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22, the north- Case, supra, concludes his very able discuswest quarter of fractional section 23." The sion of the cases of this and other jurisdiccourt in passing upon the question of own- tions as follows: ership of the land said:
“Concluding that the patents of the United “It may be observed that the riparian doctrine, States to the state of Indiana for the fractionstrictly speaking, does not apply here. In none al lots abutting upon Wolf Lake and Lake of the conveyances was the land bounded by the George did not convey title to land under the river, by the lake, or by the morass, if there is water, ard that the patents subsequently issuch a thing as a meander of a marsh or morass. sued by the United States, based upon the WalNo survey was made to or abutting on the riv- cott survey of 1875, purporting to pass the tier or its meander. The sections were surveyed tle to land once a part of the beds of the lakes, in full, each one mile square and containing were valid, I dissent.” 610 acres. The sections or parts of sections The majority opinion in discussing the sold, therefore, extend, not to the morass or to the river, but to the opposite section lines. question said that: Were the survey, or any of the land bounded on
"It is not necessary to consider how we should the river, the lake, or the morass, then un- decide the case with our present light if the doubtedly the riparian doctrine would apply, question were a new one.' and the land described would extend to the
In 1905, the Supreme Court of the United thread of the Little Calumet, or Calumic, river. As it is, all the land is bounded by section lines. States decided the case of Whitaker v. McWe are therefore of opinion that the state
re- Bride, 197 U. S. 510, 25 Sup. Ct. 530, 49 L. ceived good title to all the land in controversy | Ed. 857, wherein it was held that by the laws by virtue of the act of Congress of 1850, and of Nebraska riparian proprietors are the that the state, in selling this tract, conveyed to its grantees all the land so received, in the owners of the bed of a stream to the center respective sections, both within and without the of the channel, that the government, as origmeander lines."
inal proprietor, has the right to survey and The court, in interpreting the term “frac- sell any lands, including islands in a river tional” as applied to the sections named in or other body of water, that if it omits to the patent, said that:
survey an island in a stream and refuses, It “refers simply to the circumstance that when its attention is called to the matter, to they do not contain 640 acres each of dry land. make any survey thereof, no citizen can overAs we have seen, however, the sections were rule the action of the department, assume fully surveyed; the corners and boundary lines that the island ought to have been surveyed, were determined and recorded in each instance."
and proceed to occupy it for the purposes of This same question arose again in Tol- homestead or pre-emption entry, and that in leston Club of Chicago v. Clough, 146 Ind. such case the rights of riparian proprietors 93, 96, 43 N. E. 647, 648, and this court said: are to be preferred to the claims of the set
"The lands here in dispute are a part of the tler, said that: lands in controversy in the case of Tolleston Club v. State, supra. There it was held that v. Smith, 159 U. S. 40 [15 Sup. Ct. 988,
Nothing therein "stated conflicts with Horne the lands between the meanders of the Calumet 40 L. Ed 68), Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 175 river, including the bed of the river, were fully U. S. 300 (20 Sup. Ct. 124, 44 L. Ed. '171), surveyed in 1834, and the lands so surveyed all French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 conveyed by patent to the state before 1870; U. S. 47 [22 Sup. Ct. 563, 46 L. Ed. 800), or and therefore that, the government not having Kirwan v. Murphy, 189 U. s. 35 [23 Sup.' Ct. any such lands unsold or unsurveyed in 1870, 599, 47 L: Ed. 698). In the first of those cases the act of Congress for that year and all pro- it appeared that the survey stopped at a bayou, ceedings thereunder were wholly void. It follows that the appellant in the case at bar, as and did not extend to the main channel of the also in the case against the state, could have Indian river a mile distant; and we beld that no title under the act of 1870, and the survey the line of that bayou must be considered as the thereunder, as here claimed.”
boundary of the grant, that it could not be ex
tended over the unsurveyed land between the The United States Supreme Court, in the bayou and the main channel of the Indian river, case of Kean v. Calumet Canal Co. (1903) 190 that it was a case of an omission from the U. S. 452, at page 459, 23 Sup. Ct. 651, at and that such omission did not operate to trans
survey of land that ought to have been surveyed, page 652 (47 L. Ed. 1134), said:
fer unsurveyed land to the patentee of the sur“On general principles of conveyancing, the veyed land bordering on the bayou. In the state would have acquired the land in contro- second we held that, as the survey showed a versy here by, a conveyance from the United meander line bordering on a tract of swamp or States describing the upland according to the marsh lands, the grant by patent terminated at survey, because the local law of Indiana and the meander line, and did not carry the swamp the common law as understood by this court lands lying between it and the shores of Lake are the same, so far as this case is concerned. Erie. In the third, it appeared that there was Stoner v. Rice, 121. Ind. 51 (22 N. E. 968, 6 L. no body of water in front of the meandered line, R. A. 387); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 and we held that that line must therefore be [11 Sup. Ct. 808, 838, 35 L. Ed. 428]. The case the limit of the grant, and the fact that outside is stronger if the land passed under the swamp the side lines extended there was a body of waland act, as has been held by the state court ter did not operate to extend the grant into any with regard to this and similar patents. Mason portion of that body of water. In the last of v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 150 Ind. these cases the complainants, the owners of 099 [50 N. E. 85); Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 859.38 acres as shown by the descriptions in 221 (42 N. E. 1011); Tolleston Club of Chin their patents of fractional lots, claimed by reacago v. Clough, 146 Ind. 93 (43 N. E. 647); son thereof to be the owners of 1,202 acres Tolleston Club of Chicago v. State, 141 Ind. lying between the meandered lines and a lahe, 197 [38 N. E. 214, 40 N. E. 690). See Mitchell and sought by injunction to restrain the Land v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 414 [11 Sup. Ct. 819, Department from making a survey of these lat810, 35 L. Ed. 442]."
ter lands. We held that injunction would not
lie, and that the officers of the government could , and continuing down to Chapman v. St. not be restrained from making a survey; that Francis, supra, said: the rights of the complainants could be settled after a survey and transfer of the legal title be tedious and unprofitable; thorough acquaint
"A review and analysis of these cases would from the government, by an action at law."
ance with the varying and controlling facts is In Chapman & Dewey Land Co. v. Bigelow, essential to a fair understanding of them. They 206 U. S. 41, 27 Sup. Ct. 679, 51 L. Ed. 953, unquestionably support the familiar rule rethe court held that it could not maintain lied on by counsel for the oil company that, in
general, meanders are not to be treated as jurisdiction to revise the conclusions of the boundaries, and, when the United States conSupreme Court of Arkansas which held: veys a tract of land by patent referring to an
“That swampy lands, checked by bayous, sub- official plat which shows the same bordering on ject to inundation, but reclaimable to some ex a navigable river, the purchaser takes title up tent for agricultural purposes, lying between the to the water line. But they no less certainly government meander line and the main channel establish the principle that facts and circumof the river, were not lands the title to which stances may be examined, and, if they affirmwould pass to the grantee by virtue of riparian atively disclose an intention to limit the grant rights."
to actual traverse lines, these must be treated In Chapman & Dewey v. St. Francis, 232 follow from the presence of meanders that a
as definite boundaries. It does not necessarily U. S. 186, 196, 34 Sup. Ct. 297, 299 (58 L. Ed. fractional section borders a body of water and 564), the court said:
that a patent thereto confers riparian rights." “If the patent conveyed these lands to the
This case is cited with approval in the state, we are not concerned with their subse, later case of Moss v. Ramey (1916) 239 U. S. quent disposal, for that is a question of local law. But did the patent include them? This, 538, 36 Sup. Ct. 183, 60 L. Ed. 425. of course, is a federal question. _*
Of The patent of the United States to the course, the words in the patent, 'The whole of state of Indiana, in so far as it applies to the the township (except section sixteen)' are comprehensive, but they are only one element in the lands in question in the cause now under description and must be read in the light of consideration, is as follows: the others. The explanatory words, 'according "Whereas, by the act of Congress approved to the official plats of survey of said lands re- September 28, 1850, entitled 'An act to enable turned to the General Land Office of the Sur- the state of Arkansas and other states to reveyor General,' constitute another element, and claim the swamp lands within their limits,' it a very important one; for it is a familiar rule is provided that all the swamp and overflowed that, where lands are patented according to such lands, cade unfit thereby for cultivation witha plat, the notes, lines, landmarks, and other in the state of Indiana, which remained unsold particulars appearing thereon become as much at the passage of said act, shall be granted to a part of the patent and are as much to be con- said state; and, whereas, in pursuance of insidered in determining what it is intended to in- structions from the General Land Office of the clude as if they were set forth in the patent. United States, the several tracts or parcels of
The specification of the acreage is still land hereinafter described have been selected as another element, and, while of less influence swamp and overflowed lands, inuring to the said than either of the others, it is yet an aid in as- state, under the act aforesaid, being situated in certaining what was intended, for a purpose to the district of lands subject to sale at Winamac, convey upwards of 22,000 acres is hardly con- Indiana, to wit: Whole of sections two, three, sistent with a specification of 13,815.67 acres. six, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven. The
* Giving to each of these elements its whole of fractional sections twelve, fifteen, sevappropriate influence, and bearing in mind that enteen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, the terms of description are all such as are and twenty-two," (Here follows the description usually employed in designating surveyed lands, of many additional tracts of lands not included we are of opinion that the purpose was to pat- in this controversy). "all in township thirty-six ent the whole of the lands surveyed, except north of range eight west, containing in all fractional section 16, and not the areas meander- eleven thousand, three hundred and three acres, ed and returned, as shown upon the plat, as and thirty-nine hundredths of an acre, .accordbodies of water.
ing to the official plats of survey of the lands "But it is said on behalf of the levee district returned to the General Land Office, by the Surthat, even though the lands were not included in veyor General, and for which the Governor of the patent, they passed to the state under the the said state of Indiana, did on the eighteenth swamp land act independently of any patent, day of December, one thousand, eight hundred and passed thence to the district under the state and fifty-two request a patent to be issued to act of 1893. The contention is not tenable. the said state, as required in the aforesaid act. The lands were never listed as swamp lands, “Now therefore, know ye, that the United and their listing does not appear to have been States of America, in consideration of the premeven requested, doubtless because they were not ises, and in conformity with the act of Congress, surveyed. Assuming that in fact they were have given and granted, and by these presents swamp lands, the state's title under the swamp do give and grant, unto the said state of Inland act was at most inchoate and never was diana, in fee simple subject to the disposal of perfected.”
the Legislature thereof, the tracts of land above The court held that as the lands were not described, to have and to hold the same, together patented and, under the findings below, did with all the rights, privileges, immunities and
appurtenances thereto belonging, unto the said not pass to the state or to the defendants by state of Indiana, in fee simple and to its asriparian right with the adjoining fractional signs forever.” sections and subdivisions, it follows that they We herewith include a copy of the official remain the property of the United States. plat of survey of 1843 returned to the General
In Producers' Oil Co. v. Hanzen (1915) 238 Land Office by the Surveyor General, above U. S. 325, 339, 35 Sup. Ct. 755, 760 (59 L. Ed. mentioned, marked “Exhibit A," and a copy 1330), Justice McReynolds, after citing a of official plat of survey under the act of long list of cases beginning with Railroad Congress of 1870 (Act July 1, 1870, c. 199, 16