Magistrates are often in too great a hurry to warn prisoners against making statements. Provided that no stratagem be made use of to induce a prisoner to make one, he ought to be encouraged to say what he thinks proper; if what he state be true, it may be of great benefit to him afterwards on his defence; and if he make a false one, it is only right that it should operate to his prejudice. He should not, however, be entrapped into making statements; and whenever a man who has been so entrapped (as was the case of the prisoner here,) is brought before a magistrate, it is the duty of that magistrate to inform him, that all that he may have said previously, is to go for nothing; but that any thing he is about to say then, will be taken down and used as evidence against him. Magistrates had better drop the use of the word FOR, as it tends to raise a question of law.-Guilty.

Lord DENMAN subsequently mentioned, that as the prisoner would only be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which would expire before the opinion of the judges could be taken, the above point would not be brought before their Lordships.

The Charge of Lord Chief Justice DENMAN to the Grand Jury upon the Arraignment of the prisoners at these Assizes, amongst whom were those connected with Thom, alias Sir William Courtenay, for Murder, occasioned by the changes made in the Criminal Laws.

LORD DENMAN" Gentlemen,-I have, according to my duty, gone through the calendar, and have read the depositions which have been returned to me; and, generally speaking, I think I may state that there is nothing to call from me any remarks to the effect that the state of crime in this county is more unfavourable than that of any other. On the contrary, there are some circumstances which may be observed as shewing a pleasing fact, namely an absence of malice and wanton cruelty in the offences set forth. There are two cases to which I more particularly feel myself called on to allude, but it is from the depositions alone that I have become acquainted with them, whilst you will have the advantage of having the witnesses before you, and of hearing their testimony; you will therefore be better able to form a more correct opinion. Of these cases one was for an offence revolting to our nature. The other was a case of one person shooting at another. There are also two or three cases under the class burglary. I ought, perhaps, to mention the recent alterations in the law sespecting these cases. The changes in the law no longer make it necessary for the grand jury to inquire into the precise hour of the night when the offence was committed, inasmuch as the act now lays it down that it is sufficient to constitute burglary if the breaking and entering be committed between the hours of nine at night and six in the morning-the period when the light of the heavens, by the working

of nature, is excluded. These are the general observations which I feel called on to make, but you will, of course, expect some peculiar remarks from me in reference to cases with which you yourselves are acquainted, which appear to have grown out of a series of circumstances as extraordinary on the one hand, as on the other they have been unfortunate in their results, and being too, as they are, without precedent on record. It appears that towards the close of May a large body of men were parading certain districts of this county, under the guidance of an individual of a wild and desperate character, who had obtained an influence of a strange nature over their minds, all armed, some of them with fatal weapons, and others with dangerous instruments, to the peril of the lives of individuals and the disturbance of the public peace; that they continued for some days banded together before any opportunity was afforded to the magistrates to act with a view to arresting their progress, and then that they proceeded threatening acts of violence of the most dangerous description. It appears, then, that the magistrates having been duly informed of their proceedings most properly sent out warrants for the apprehension of the principals in the riot; that when the person who was intrusted with that instrument attempted to take the ringleader into custody, that individual instantly shot him and he died. It seems that after this proceeding, another course which, under the circumstances, was in itself undoubtedly the most humane that could have been adopted, was pursued; a large body of the military were called into requisition-a force which from its number was the best calculated at once to overcome all resistance, and to put an end to the scene which was going on,-which was sent to meet the band of rioters. On the arrival of this force, one of the officers advanced, as he had a right to do, in front of the rest, when the same ringleader shot him through the heart. These cases have undergone investigation before a coroner's jury, and by them declared to be wilful murder, thereby leading to this result, that as many as 16 persons were committed for that offence. Such being the case, it is fit that I should put you in possession of what the law on the subject is. It has been held by all the judges, and is reported by Lord Coke, that if any magistrate or minister of justice, in keeping the peace, according to the duty of his office, be killed, it is murder, for their contempt and disobedience of the king and his laws; and if any justice of peace or constable acting in his office be killed, it is murder for the cause aforesaid, for when the officer requires the breakers of the peace to keep the peace in the king's name, and they notwithstanding disobey the command and kill the officer, reason requires that this killing shall be an offence in the highest degree of any offence of this nature, and that it is voluntary, felonious, and murder of malice prepense.' Now the same protection which is given to the justice of the peace or to the constable is ex

tended to any other individual when lawfully interfering with a view to the preservation of the peace, and it is highly and absolutely necessary that the provisions of such an act of parliament in that particular respect should be known to every person, and that by some of those provisions they are bound, when properly and legally called on for that purpose, to assist in the endeavour to keep the peace. I may read to you, for your further satisfaction, a quotation from another book of very great authority in regard to what has been held upon former occasions. That quotation is taken from the book of Mr. Serjeant Hawkins, a book, as I have already said, of great authority, and runs thus When divers persons resolve generally to resist all opposers in the commission of any breach of the peace, and prosecute it in such a manner as materially tends to raise tumults and frays, and in so doing happen to kill a man, they are all guilty of murder; for they must at their peril abide the event of their actions who wilfully engage in such bold disturbances of the public peace in open opposition to, and defiance of, the justice of the nation, but in such case the fact must appear to have been committed strictly in prosecution of the purpose for which the party was assembled.' This authority will be found in Hawkins, book 1, c. 13, s. 51 and 52. These principles are as old as the laws of England. The benefits which are manifest from their observance have accrued from the feeling arising out of the principle of self-defence; and furthermore, neither individual nor state would be for a single moment safe if such principles were not to be held sacred, and being held sacred, then duly regarded. Now, if these principles are applied to the late transactions, it will appear that all these persons were certainly guilty of the crime which the coroner's jury have returned against them. You will, however, have the best opportunities of judging of the particular part which each of these unfortunate individuals may have taken on the occasion in question, inasmuch as bills against them will be presented before you, and it is not for me, after the careful inquiry which the proceedings underwent, to suppose that the result will not be borne out. It is enough for me to lay down these general principles, and inasmuch as it appears that all the parties accused were present at the time of the illegal assembling, it is sufficient, death happening to have ensued to some of the individuals who were clothed with the proper legal authority, to constitute their crime the highest known to the law; perhaps in saying that, I am wrong in my expression, because the highest offence known to the law is that of high treason. But this offence, it will be admitted, approaches very near to that which I have just named. If, then, you shall think that all these persons who, under the strange circumstances of which you have heard, being under the control of a wild individual, were perfectly aware of the mischievous intentions by which he was actuated-if you shall think that they were prepared to resist all or any

legal authority which might be sent to arrest their career, and in so doing the death of a man has ensued, they are all guilty of murder, and have all rendered themselves equally liable to the peril of the law. Now, all those who remained together for days after the first act had been committed, when the military were called out, were in a different situation, for they also knew what had been done, and it appears to me that it would be stretching the feeling of charity somewhat too far were we to consider that they were not fully cognisant of the intention to offer resistance to the law of the country. If, therefore, you find that they remained there for the purpose of carrying out their particular object, and that the same act of violence took place as when the constable was shot, it would appear that they, being aware of the former proceeding, were ready to go all lengths in defeating the operation and execution of the law, and consequently were guilty of the crime of murder. It is not necessary for me, probably, to go into the case of each of these 16 persons; but I think I should not be doing my duty were I to omit to notice that when the military afterwards attacked them, several of their body fell under the bullets and bayonets which were directed against them. In those cases the coroner's jury sat, and the verdict they returned was justifiable homicide;' and supposing those facts to have appeared which I have spoken of, and those depositions to be correct, there can be no doubt but that every person who was engaged in the necessary process of stopping the progress of these men would be perfectly justified in taking the course which had unfortunately led to so much loss of life; quite as much so, indeed, as though the parties who were so killed had been indicted, tried, and convicted of the offence, and afterwards undergone execution. On this subject I will refer to the authority of my Lord Coke, written in the fanciful language of his time, because it has direct reference to the principle in question. He says -And it is true that the life of a man is much favoured in law, but the life of the law itself (which protects all in peace and safety) ought to be more favoured, and the execution of the process of law, and of the office of conservator of the peace, is the soul and life of the law, and the means by which justice and the peace of the realm are kept.' Now, we must all hope that the consequences which have arissen to these poor deluded men, and the lesson which yet awaits them, will have a salutary effect, and act as a warning and as a prevention to the encouragement of similar proceedings in other parts of this country. It is greatly to be hoped that all persons will feel the danger they are incurring by associating together for the purpose of offering resistance to the laws. It appears to me to be a most extraordinary circumstance, that a large body of persons should have been got together within so short a space of time, and that they should have been able to compel others to join them without any

apparent cause, without any apparent suffering or deprivation, without the slightest ill-feeling against any obnoxious individual, but solely from the harangues of a single person, who did not appear to have been governed by any specific object. Neither were they actuated by a cause which had been represented in other parts of the country to have been the origin of the events out of which these results had sprung, viz., a spirit of discontent, issuing from the existing New Poor Laws. If there really had been that spirit of discontent abroad, and the administration of that law had led to deprivations, it is not easy to imagine that the person by whom they appear to have been infatuated would have missed the opportunity of alleging these facts as a cause for their combination. It is impossible, on reflection, to suppose that he would have abstained from imputing, as had been done elsewhere, to that law-a law which tends so greatly to the alleviation of the distresses, and extends relief so largely to the poorer and more unfortunate classes of society —hardships under which his victims might, by possibility, have been labouring at the time. The only cause for the proceedings which does appear to have existed in an astonishing degree of credulity and ignorance, which it is hardly possible to conceive could have existed to such an extent in any part of this country. Now, I heard it said yesterday in a most admirable sermon preached after my arrival in this place, That the great end of public justice is not to avenge crimes, but to prevent them, by teaching that practical morality founded on religious truth which is necessary both to secure good conduct in this world, and to prepare men for the enjoyment of happiness in the world to come; and if it is the credulity arising from extreme ignorance which has made these unfortunate men the dupes of one, himself not under the guidance of reason, and supposed not to be responsible for his acts, still if they adopt and make those acts their own, they are responsible in law. If that be So, I am sure (and I wish it to become known throughout the country, that the consequences of similar conduct to that charged against these men are those to which I have referred) it is urgently necessary that the country should apply itself to the discovery of some remedy for an evil so great and so alarming. Should it then appear that ignorance has been the cause of these unfortunate men having been so easily led away, I trust that we shall all admit the necessity there is for the most strenuous efforts being made on our parts to secure a better state of things, and thereby lay a foundation for a better observance and obedience of the laws. If the minds of these poor men had been properly directed, or if they had enjoyed a higher degree of intelligence, it would to a considerable extent, if not entirely, have tended to the defeat of the strange delusion under which they appear at the time to have been labouring. If this be proved to be the case-if the mischiefs which have taken place have arisen from the absence of a proper cul

tivation of the mind, there is no one who will not readily join in effecting the improvement which these events shew to be loudly demanded-an improvement which might materially be effected by inculcating the great truths of religious morality, and teaching them to understand and reason on the occurrences passing around them. In my opinion, too, opportunities may arise of introducing into the pastimes of the people such a spirit of cheerfulness and interest, as may have the effect of laying the foundation for weaning them from the dangerous delusive inclinations they seem to have existing amongst them. The noble and learned lord concluded by strongly urging the magistrates and gentry of the county to exert themselves in the improvement of the minds of their peasantry."

PREROGATIVE COURT.

HOBBS. KNIGHT.

This was a question under the New Will Act, 1 Vict. c. 26. The testator, Mr. John Hobbs, died in the present year, leaving a will, dated in 1835, from which (at what time did not appear) he had cut out his signature, intending to make a new will, which intention he had partly carried into effect in February last, the latter instrument, however, being invalid. The question was, whether the cutting out the signature was a revocation of the will under the new statute, which enacts, that 66 no will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked otherwise than aforesaid," that is, by marriage, "or by another will or codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required, or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a will is hereinbefore required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his direction, with the intention of revoking the same." The question was raised on the admission of the allegation.

Dr. Phillimore, in opposition to the allegation, contended that the excision of the signature was a destroying of the will, which became thereby inoperative as a testamentary paper.

Dr. Lushington, on the other hand, argued, that the act of the testator was not one of the modes prescribed by the new statute for the revocation of a will. Under the old law devises of lands could be revoked by burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating the same. The statute of Victoria prescribed "burning and tearing," omitted " cancelling and obliterating," and inserted "otherwise destroying." This act must be construed strictly, and as the Legislature had omitted the words "cancelling and obliterating," it must be taken to have been advisedly so done. If the testator had struck his pen through the whole will, nay, if he had said "I revoke this will,” that would be no revocation under the statute. It might be a demonstration of his intention to revoke, but not an execution of that inten

and all detainers which were in force against || him at the time of such discharge or which shall have since been duly lodged against him, shall thereupon be deemed to be in force; and that any insolvent so discharged out of custody as aforesaid, shall, on his appearing before the said court, or commissioner, or justices, be considered for all the purposes of this act, in the custody in which he was at the time he was so discharged." Now, a material question arose in respect to persons confined in country prisons. The court had, after mature consideration, arrived at the conclusion that they could not discharge any person on bail under the act unless the sureties presented themselves here in court. The commissioners had no power to depute any one to take bail in the country, and it would be seen in Tidd's Practice that the power of the superior courts on the subject of bail in country cases was specially provided for. The commissioners had anxiously looked through the act to see if they were empowered to dispense with the attendance of the proposed sureties, but they could find nothing so empowering them there. It was clear the sureties must attend the court in London in person. The court would moreover, in taking bail, consult the interests of all the creditors in the schedule, and fix the amount of the bail from an examination of it. They would not be doing justice to creditors if they did not, in fixing the amount of the bail required, vigilantly attend to the interests of the whole body of them. With respect to the question whether the court would receive objections to bail on a viva voce examination of witnesses or on affidavits, he would say that the majority of the commissioners were of opinion that the power of viva voce examination should be reserved.

Mr. Commissioner HARRIS remarked that, with respect to the amount of bail, the least the court could do would be to require the amount to be double the amount of the detainers lodged against the party applying at the time of his application.

The CHIEF-COMMISSIONER said the court would require the sureties to be possessed of the amount fixed in goods and chattels. They would not be satisfied with parties possessing property only in money or landed estate.

Two cases of bail, Samuel Richardson and George Patteson, were then investigated, and the sureties allowed.

In Re SAMUEL RICHARDSON. The insolvent had on a former day been directed to be liberated till his day of hearing on filing bail. On the day on which the bail had been allowed, and before his actually leaving prison, but whilst waiting for the order of the court, a fresh detainer had been lodged, which rendered the order of the court of no effect.

Mr. Cooke now applied for the order to be amended, and the said detainer to be inserted, and complained of the hardship which would arise to applicants for liberation on bail, if they were rendered liable to fresh incarceration in cases like this, in which it was not in

COURT OF BANKRUPTCY.

THE SWEARING OF AFFIDAVITS IN BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE NEW ACT RELATING TO THE RELIEF OF INSOLVENT DEBTORS.

A solicitor appeared before the Court to swear an affidavit of debt under the 8th clause of the new act.

On the solicitor presenting the affidavit,

Mr. Commissioner MERIVALE said, now, as to the swearing of the affidavits under the new act, he had only to state that he entertained very great doubts whether he had jurisdiction to take those affidavits at all.

The Solicitor.-I know your Honour has expressed that opinion, and I have seen the observations you made yesterday respecting the clause, as reported in the daily journals.

Mr. Commissioner MERIVALE, in continuation, further remarked, that as far as a newspaper report went, it was nothing; but what he had to say was, that the Commissioners were only empowered by act of Parliament to swear on oath affidavits in matters of bankruptcy: this was where the doubt arose, for these affidavits could not be termed matters in bankruptcy, as no bankrupt was yet declared. He knew that the Masters in Chancery took affidavits under the Lord Chancellor, and also in matters in bankruptcy; but with respect to the present affidavits, they were in the same situation as the Commissioners. He had spoken to one of the Masters in Chancery on the question, and that party entertained the same doubts on the clause as himself. There could be no objection to receive them; but it was difficult to say what would be the effect of them. If the applicant chose to swear in the affidavit after what he had said, it should be put on the file, but what could be done hereafter was another thing.

The Solicitor said he would take the chance of it.

Mr. Commissioner MERIVALE then observed I wish to add, in the event of what I have said appearing before the public, that I am sincerely sorry these doubts should arise, because I believe the clause, as intended, would