property of an individual is forfeited by the English law, is, be-. cause the lands are all supposed to be held mediately or immediately of the Crown; and the property having been acquired under the government, it is proper that it should revert to the source from whence it flowed. But these relations do not apply to the present case. The Company and the Nabob were joined only by a federal union, which equalized their claims, without conferring on either a paramount authority. Where the union was inconvenient, the federal tie might be dissolved; but neither could assume the property of the other. An urgent and imperious necessity, threatening the existence of a state, will often sink the considerations of equal justice. But was there any such necessity here? A greater security it is sald was necessary. Security against what? Not against Tippoo, for he was gone; and as to security against the Nabob himself, what could he do? Had he troops? Had he arms, or money, or credit? No; he had not a single trooper, nor a firelock, hor a thousand pagodas in his chest, nor credit to borrow half that sum without coilateral security. He was poor and peaceable; and every way the most eligible ruler we could have appointed over a nation of Hindoos.. But his family has riches and influence. The Boody Begum, his sister, is rich. Nessum ul Mulk, his brother, is not less so. We have ensured the inveterate enmity of all these persons, and exchanged a secure and substantial power for a nominal dominion, which must be hated and opposed. From a dread of hostility, we have created enemies where we had none before.

A great deal is said, in the report, on the circumstance of a 'cypher having been used. But is a cypher, then, so uncommon a thing? Is it not used in every durbar in India? Do not our residents use it in every letter that is written at these durbars ? Or is there nothing besides treason that men may wish to conceal? There are two circumstances, however, which render all this discussion ludicrous. The first is, that in the letters which are most excepted against, the cypher is not used at all. The other is, that it appears to be composed only of eighteen characters, descriptive merely of personal qualities, and utterly incapable of being used for the purposes of political communication.

There is a great deal also, in the report and other papers, about the Nabob having allowed the language of rebellion to be preached' in our capital. The foundation of which charge is, that, upon one occasion, some lessons were read, or discourses pronounced, in the mosque, recommending war against Christians. To those who know any thing of Mahometanism, it must be needless to say, that this is one of its leading and avowed principles, and that it would not be easy to read a lesson from

- the

the Koran,, without, being guilty of this sort of rebellion. The following texts are taken almost at random. War is enjoined you against infidels, Koran, c. 2. p. 38. O true believers! take not the Jews or Christians for your friends. c. 5. p. 141.

They are infidels who say verily God is Christ the son of Mary. c. 5. p. 133. Oh true believers! wage war against such of the infidels as are near you, and let them find severity in you, and know that God is with those who fear him.' c. 9. p. 265. When ye encounter the unbelievers, strike off their heads, until ye have made a great slaughter among them.' &c. &c.

Such passages are read daily in every mosque in Indostan; and they are read without danger, because every man of sense knew that the age of fanaticism, like that of chivalry, is over; and that Mussulman soldiers, now-a-days, fight for pay rather than for faith.,, A circumstance, pretty well proved indeed, from Mahometans being to be found alike in the service of every state, or prince, of whatever religion, throughout India or Asia. We doubt, indeed, very much, whether there is a single instance. on record, of any one sepoy, officer, or other person, having deserted our service, because we were at war with a prince of the same religion which he himself professed. Thus, then, the whole story of preaching the language of rebellion, when examined into, turns out to be only preaching the Mahometan faith; which

thmany other exhortations from the pulpit) had little effect on.

those who heard it.

We have now gone hastily over most of the considerations that bear upon the justice of this most extraordinary proceeding; and few, we believe, will be hardy enough to defend it on this ground; but we know that it has found advocates on the score of policy. For our own parts, we are very much disposed to doubt if there can ever be any sound policy in injustice; but, in the present case, there is no need to refer to such a general maxim. We hold India by the tenure of opinion only; our physical strength is as nothing to that of the natives; and our dominion over all these fair countries, is upheld solely by certain opinions and prejudices, which it is the obvious tendency of our present policy to destroy. The mass of the people is kept in order by their attachment to their religion, and to rank and caste, which makes it easy to ma hage them by the instrumentality of their rulers; and these rulers, again, we have hitherto preserved in alliance or subjection by the fidelity with which we have discharged to them the duties of protectors and allies. By our usurpation of the Carnatic, we have done our utmost to subvert both these principles. We have degraded rank, and violated sanctity: and have availed ourselves of our power to despoil our most antient ally of his influence and

honours.

honours. The dispossessed family, of course, will hate us with a deadly hatred; and the great body of Rajahs throughout the o country, will be apt to join in a deadly feud against that power which has only been exerted of late for their destruction. Al lowing, for a moment, that they will not carry along with them a great proportion of the people, and that the superior equity of our government should at first render us popular with the lower classes, it is evidently quite absurd to suppose, that we should. ever succeed to that influence which was secured to their native rulers by ancient habits, and superstitions more strong than compulsion. A handful of strangers and infidels must speedily be annihilated among a vast nation of independent bigots, and our 1? rule is absolutely at an end, the moment we cease to rule by the a help of superstition and prejudice.

It is remarked by Thucydides, as a principle in human nature, that the existing government is seldom liked by the subjects. During the period of the Nabob's government, we were hardly known to the inhabitants of the country, otherwise than as gentlemen, living in the large towns, who spent their money freely; were regular in their payments, and behaved well to their domestics, We had no invidious duties to discharge; and the good we did, made us to be respected. The Nabob's government performed all the invidious duties.-They exacted the revenue, levied the customs, and inflicted the punishments. They were naturally re garded as the oppressors, whilst we were considered as the bes nefactors of the country.-But how is it now? We have changed places with the Nabob; and our relations of esteem are also changed in the eyes of the natives. A certain degree of severity will always attend the collection of the revenue in India; at least, many years must elapse before a system can be found sufficiently regular, to ensure at once a prompt and easy payment. Is it wise then, to take upon ourselves a task which must naturally render us disagreeable to the inhabitants, especially as it is at least very doubtful, whether we can collect more from the Carnatic than the Nabob did and, considering the expenses of our judicial system, the balance will not, perhaps, be much in our favour.

Such is the situation into which we have brought ourselves by this rash act of cupidity or ambition. We have been guilty of a great wrong, in order to bring on ourselves a great calamity—amt have committed injustice, without any prospect of advancing our worldly prosperity. Such is the aspect of the present and the past. Before concluding, we may cast a hasty glance to the future. Is the evil which has been done remediable; and how are we 78 conduct ourselves in the circumstances which have actually occurred?-Very opposite notions are entertained upon this subject;

and

and we shall state them very briefly, without presuming to offer any opinion of our own.

It is said, on the one hand, that the country should be retained, because our civil government and internal economy, though necessarily defective, contains within itself a principle of mehoration, which no Mahometan government ever does; and because it is believed, that the native princes, if restored once more to their power, would gather wisdom from their misfortunes; and, whilst they appeared to forget the wrongs they had suffered, would only wait for an occasion of revolt. There are many things which ought not to be done, but, being done, must be adhered to.

On the other hand, the advocates for the restitution of the country affirm, that the permanency and real stability of our empire depends entirely on the degradation of the natives; and that every thing that tends to ameliorate their condition, must sap the. foundations of our power. Hence it is thought, that the vesting a proprietary right in the inhabitants, the introduction of equal laws, the overthrow of the ancient families, and every thing else which tends to create a revolution in the habits and manners of the people, will in the end prove fatal to our empire. They regard the security of our government, as a greater object than any little addition to our revenues; and this, they think, would be best produced by governing the natives through the medium of their ancient rulers, and removing ourselves from the invidious duties of being their immediate controulers. They affirm, that the seizure of the Carnatic has disgraced us, in the eyes of all. the country powers; and that no confidence will be placed in our government, until it is restored to its rightful owners. Spoliatus

ante omnia restituendus.

ART. XIV. Orders in Council; or, an Examination of the Justice, Legality, and Policy of the New System of Commercial Regula tions. With an Appendix of State Papers, Statutes and Authorities. pp. 114. Longman & Co. and J. Ridgway, London, 1808.

WE have received this interesting and very able little publication, just as we were preparing to close our labours for the present quarter; and have been so much struck with the importance and novelty of the disquisitions which it contains, that we cannot resist the temptation of laying a hasty account of it before our readers.

As a considerable part of the argument is applicable to the question in the precise shape which it will assume before Parliament, and regards, therefore, the particular form of the mea

sures

sures lately adopted by the English government, rather than the general views of belligerent, or commercial policy, from which those measures took their rise, we shall pass over this branch of the subject very rapidly; and, referring our readers to the work itself for satisfaction on it, shall bestow our chief attention upon the latter portion of the discussion, in itself quite general, and applicable to the prevalent notions of trade and war, as a system.

The tract is divided into three parts. The first, discusses the question, whether the late Orders in Council are consistent with the law of nations; and endeavours to show, from various considerations, that they are wholly repugnant to it: That they are mea sures of pretended retaliation against our enemy, whom no one ever considered as a party in the cause; but are in reality directed against neutral nations, whom we have no possible right to injure, merely because our enemy has done so, unless they have first acquiesced in the wrong, and thus made themselves parties to his quarrel: That no time was given for even asking the neutrals, whether they were disposed to yield or to resist, the French decree of blockade having been explained by the French government in a manner quite consistent with the law of nations, and acted upon accordingly, up almost to the date of our Orders in Council: That even admitting the general plea of retaliation, the act of our government is not in the nature of a retaliating or reciprocal proceeding;-it is not preventing neutrals from direct trade with France, because she would prevent them from direct trade with England, but forcing them to trade with France in a particular way profitable to ourselves, because France would blockade England altogether: That the regulations respecting certificates of origin, are still less like retaliation; and that, in truth, whatever may be the enemy's intention, as to his decree, his power of executing it is confined to the part which is strictly justifiable by the law of nations, viz. the shutting of his ports to certain ships,-all the rest being empty threat and insult, and forming no excuse whatever for our aggressions on neutrals,— whether they resent them or put up with them.

To every one of these arguments we are ready to subscribe; and they appear to us quite decisive of the question, touching the law of nations. But we could have wished that the defence of the Order issued by the late Administration, on January 7. 1807, had been less broadly stated. The arguments by which it is supported, are, many of them, just; and viewing it as an application only (for it is in truth scarcely an extension) of the rule of the war 1756, we must admit, that it rests on the same grounds with this rule. The preamble, too, when it mentions retaliation as the plea for issuing it, very possibly means only to state the motive

for