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the effect of a refusal by the court to require [5] In order to present any question, the appellee to file a cost bond, and assuming, proper determination of which in any way also, without so deciding, that such ruling is depends on the evidence, the bill of excep properly presented by the ground of the mo- tions containing such evidence must be pretion for new trial, supra, rather than by an sented to the trial judge within the time fis. independent assignment of error, the record ed for filing the same. Joseph et al. v. Madiscloses that appellee, to relieve himself of ther, 110 Ind. 114, 115, 116, 10 N. E. 78; Cor. the necessity of giving such bond, made an nell v. Hallett et al., 140 Ind. 634, 636, 40 N. application, supported by affidavit, to prose E. 132; Stoner v. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co., 6 cute his action as a poor person. If, before Ind. App. 226, 228, 33 N. E. 242; Indiana, becoming a nonresident of the state, he had etc., Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Ind. 266, 278, 65 N. made a proper application to prosecute his ac- E. 918, 66 N. E. 742. tion as a poor person, and such application Appellants' first assignment of error, had been granted by the court, his removal which challenges the complaint on the from the state afterwards would not have ne ground that it does not state fact sufficient, cessitated the giving of a cost bond. Wright, is not longer available. Burns 1914, § 348. Adm'r, v. McLarinan, 92 Ind. 103, 105; Ful. [6] The second assigned error challenges ler, etc., Co. v. Mehl, 134 Ind. 60, 62, 63, 33 N. the overruling of the motion to make more E. 773; Pittsburgh, etc., Co. v. Jacobs, 8 Ind. specific. The only matter suggested in ap App. 556, et. seq., 36 N. E. 301, section 261, pellants' brief under this heading is that the Burns 1914. We do not see any substantial complaint should have been made to state difference between the question here attempt- “what, if any, knowledge he (appellee) had ed to be presented and that determined in the given to defendant Catherine Haehnel of the cases supra. In any event, the action of the contract for the erection of said building.” court in permitting appellee to prosecute As affecting this question, the complaint alhis action as a poor person is not challenged leges that on November 11, 1914, Herman by said ground of appellants' motion for Haehnel and Catherine Haehnel were the new trial, and could not be properly chal- owners in fee simple, as tenants by entire. lenged thereby, as such ruling constitutes ties of the lots in question, describing them, a cause for independent assignment of error. that on said day appellee and said Herman Pittsburgh, etc., Co. v. Jacobs, supra, 8 Ind. entered into the written contract filed with App. at page 557, 36 N. E. 301.

and made part of the complaint. Averments [3] Assuming, therefore, as we must, in follow, showing the performance of the work the absence of such a challenge, that the ac and the furnishing of the material under tion of the trial court, permitting appellee said contract, and also an agreement with to prosecute his action as a poor person, was said Herman Haebnel for the performance proper, it follows as a matter of course that of work and furnishing of material for anno error resulted from refusing to require other building and for certain changes in appellee to give a cost bond.

the first, a bill of particulars for which is [4] The other grounds of appellants’ mo filed with and made a part of the complaint. tion for new trial challenge the admission It is then averred that: and exclusion of evidence, and attempt to "Said buildings were constructed with the present such questions as can be presented knowledge, consent, and acquiescence of the deonly by the general bill of exceptions con- things herein mentioned said Herman Haehnel

fendant Catherine Hachnel, and that in all taining the evidence.

acted for himself, and also for his said wife, as The record discloses that the judgment her agent." was rendered March 30, 1915, and the motion

These averments, in effect, charge the for a new trial overruled June 30, 1915, wife with all the knowledge possessed by from which time the appellants were given the husband affecting said contract, and 60 days to file their bill of exceptions. There hence meet appellants' said objection to the is nothing in the record to show that this complaint. See Taggart v. Kem, 22 Ind. App. time was ever extended under section 661, 271, 277, 279, 53 N. E. 651 ; Wilson v. Logue, Burns 1914. The bill of exceptions shows 131 Ind. 191, 30 N. E. 1079, 31 Am. St. Rep. that it was presented to the judge for his 426; Dalton v. Tindolph, 87 Ind. 490. signature August 31, 1916, more than 60

Appellants' third assigned error challenges days after the ruling of the motion for new the ruling on the demurrer to the complaint, trial, and hence not within the time granted and in their brief, under points and authorby the trial court. The bill recites that:

ities, applied to such alleged error, their ob"On this 31st day of August, 1915, and within jection to the complaint is stated as follows: the time allowed by the court for the filing of their bill of erceptions

the said de

“The complaint on its face showed that the fendants presented to the judge *

their plaintiff had contracted with one of the owners bill of exceptions," etc. (Our italics.)

by entirety without the consent or knowledge

of the other owner.” The recital in the bill of the day it was The averments of the complaint, quoted presented will be taken as correct, regard- supra, show the contrary. less of the italicized language, supra, which [7] In this connection, we might add that follows. Malott v. Central Trust Co., 168 section 7860, Burns 1914, which requires the Ind. 428, 431, 79 N. E. 369, 11 Ann. Cas. 879. written consent of the wife in order to

charge her personally and alone with re-16. PLEADING w 236(4)—AMENDMENT-WITHpairs or improvements made on her sepa


COURT. rate real estate by order of the husband, has

It is within the discretion of the court, unno application to real estate which the wife der Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 403, relating to and husband own as tenants by the entire amendment of pleadings, to permit a plaintiff to ties. Taggart v. Kem, supra, 22 Ind. App. withdraw the submission of the case and file an

additional paragraph to the complaint, taxing at page 275, 53 N. E. 651.

the costs against the plaintiff, and such withHinding no reversible error in the record, drawal is not a dismissal of the action. the judgment below is affirmed.

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pleading,

Cent. Dig. & 601; Dec. Dig. 236(4).] (63 Ind. App. 192)


DENNEY V. REBER. (No. 9159.)

Error in permitting a plaintiff to withdraw (Appellate Court of Indiana. Dec. 12, 1916.) submission of the case to add a paragraph to

the complaint is not prejudicial to defendant, 1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE O 130_JUDGMENT where he is not shown to have been harmed

CONCLUSIVENESS MATTERS CONCLUDED thereby, but instead recovered judgment below. -TITLE.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and A judgment, rendered by a justice of the peace in an action for forcible entry and detain. Error, Cent. Dig. § 4107; Dec. Dig.

1041(2).) er, is not conclusive as to the title to the property in a subsequent suit by the defendant in 8. APPEAL AND ERBOR 1031(2) - PREJUDI. that action to have a deed given by her to plain CIAL ERROR PRESUMPTION OVERBULING tiff set aside for duress, since the question of DEMURREB TO ANSWER, title could not have been litigated before the Error in overruling a demurrer to a bad anjustice of the peace.

swer is presumed to be harmful, and is reversible [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Justices of error, unless affirmatively shown not to be harmthe Peace, Dec. Dig. Om130; Judgment, Cent. ful, potwithstanding the rule that error in sus Dig. $ 989.)

taining a demurrer to a good answer, where the

same proof is admissible under another para. 2. ESTOPPEL Om58 — EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

graph, is not prejudicial. PAYMENT OF RENT. One who conveyed her property to another Error, Cent. Dig. 8 4039; Dec. Dig. Om 1031(2).)

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and under duress and after judgment had been rendered against her in forcible entry and detainer proceedings, paid her grantee $15 for permission

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jay County ; to occupy the premises for a short time, and Clark J. Lutz, Special Judge. did so occupy them was not thereby estopped to Action by Zėlpha Denney against Milton suo to set aside the deed for duress, both parties D. Reber. Judgment for the defendant, and having had equal knowledge of the facts and the

Reversed, with instrucgrantee not having been induced to change his plaintiff appeals. position to his damage.

tions. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Estoppel, James R. Fleming, of Portland, for appelCent. Dig. 88 144, 145; Dec. Dig. Om58.]

lant. John F. La Follette and Emerson Mc3. CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS 37(7)– Griff, both of Portland, for appellee. COMPLAINT-DURESS.

A complaint, alleging that plaintiff conveyed certain lots to defendant to prevent his carrying FELT, C. J. This is a suit by appellant, out threats to prosecute her husband and for Zelpha Denney, against appellee, Milton D. no other purpose or consideration whatsoever, Reber, to cancel and set aside a deed executand that by the threats she was coerced, put in fear, and induced to convey the property, and ed by appellant and her husband to appellee not otherwise, shows that no consideration was for certain real estate. The case was tried paid for the property without a specific allega: on the second and third paragraphs of comtion to that effect, and is sufficient, though it plaint. An answer of three paragraphs was does not allege the value of the property, since it is immaterial in such a case whether the value addressed to the second paragraph of comwas great or small,

plaint, and one of two paragraphs to the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Cancellation third paragraph of complaint. A demurrer of Instruments, Cent. Dig. 88 68, 75, 76; Dec. was sustained to the third paragraph of an. Dig. Om37(7).]

swer to the second paragraph of complaint. 4. CONTRACTS Ow95(5)-VALIDITY—“DURESS." Appellant's demurrer to the second para

“Duress" is a species of fraud in which compulsion in some form takes the place of decep- graph of answer to the third paragraph of tion in accomplishing the injury; and, where a complaint was overruled, to which appellant contract or other instrument is obtained from reserved an exception. Replies in general the wife upon a threat to prosecute her husband, denial were filed to the affirmative parathe instrument is voidable by the wife. (Ed. Note. For other cases, see_Contracts, court without a jury, and a judgment ren.

graphs of answer. The case was tried by the Cent. Dig. 88 439, 440; Doc. Dig. Om95(5).

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, dered that appellant take nothing by her First and Second Series, Duress.)

complaint, and that appellee recover costs. 5. CONTRACTS 95(1)-VALIDITY-DURESS. From such judgment this appeal was taken,

In determining the question of duress, courts and the only error assigned is the overruling consider the age, sex, capacity, situation, and of appellant's demurrer to appellee's second relation of the parties and all the attending circumstances.

paragraph of answer to the third paragraph [Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Contracts, of the complaint. Cent. Dig. $8 431, 433, 434; Dec. Dig. Om 95(1).j The second paragraph of complaint was

drawn on the theory that the deed which ap It is also averred that on July 10, 1913, by pellant sought to have set aside was in fact agreement of the parties, a judgment was dua mortgage, executed by appellant, a married ly rendered by said justice of the peace, to woman, to secure the debt of her husband. the effect that appellee should have posses

The third paragraph of complaint proceeds sion of the real estate in controversy, but on the theory that the deed in question was provided also that if appellant should, within procured by the duress of appellee, and, in five days, pay to appellee $15, she should substance, charges that on December 30, 1912, have the right to occupy the property until appellant was the owner in fee simple of lot September 1, 1913; that the money was paid 7 in Meeker's addition to the city of Port- in accordance with said agreement; that apland, Ind.; that prior thereto her husband, pellant did not remove from the property on Riley H. Denney, had been employed by ap- September 1, 1913, and on September 2, 1913, pellee as a salesman of cigars, and appellee a writ of restitution was issued for the posthen and there accused him of embezzling session thereof, and in October, 1913, appelcertain money belonging to him, and unlaw- lee removed from the real estate, and since fully and fraudulently represented to appel- that time has not occupied or used the same; lant that he would cause her husband to be that the parties to this suit are identical arrested and sent to the penitentiary unless with the parties to the suit before the justice the amount he claimed to have been embez- of the peace, and the judgment aforesaid is zled was paid to him, or the real estate in full force and unappealed from. aforesaid conveyed to him in satisfaction The demurrer to the aforesaid second parathereof; that to induce her to make such graph of answer was for insuficiency of the conveyance appellee unlawfully promised facts alleged to constitute a defense to ap and agreed not to prosecute her husband for pellant's cause of action alleged in her third said crime if she would make such convey- paragraph of complaint. ance; that her husband had been arrested

The memoranda accompanying the demuron said charge, and was then under bond, rer is, in substance, as follows: (1) The facts and appellee promised her to procure the dis alleged do not show a former adjudication of missal of the charge against him and to pro- appellant's cause of action; (2) such facts cure his release if she would make such con- do not constitute an estoppel against appelveyance to him; that for more than a week lant; (3) the facts alleged do not show a prior to the execution of said deed, she was ratification of the conveyance sought to be set in great fear, sick, and confined to her bed aside. on account of the threats against her hus Appellee does not contend that the answer band, and on the date aforesaid, to prevent is good as showing a ratification of the transthe carrying out of the threats of prosecution action and conveyance by which he obtained made against him, and for no other purpose title to the property, but asserts its sufficienor consideration whatever, she executed and cy, both as a plea of former adjudication and delivered to appellee a deed, conveying to as an estoppel. Neither do the averments of him the title to said real estate; that the the answer, viewed from their general scope threats and promises aforesaid, so made by and tenor, indicate any other possible theory appellee, were made for the purpose of than those asserted by appellee. We shall cheating, defrauding, and coercing appellant, therefore consider the answer from the viewand she was thereby coerced, put in fear, point of appellee's contention as to theory. and induced to so convey said real estate,

[1] The answer in question is not good as as aforesaid, and not otherwise.

a former adjudication of title. The question The first paragraph of answer to the third of title was not in issue under the averments, paragraph of complaint was a general denial. nor does it come within the rule that quesThe second paragraph of answer admits the tions will be deemed adjudicated which ownership and conveyance of the real estate might have been litigated and settled within by appellant, and alleged that the property the issue. The justice of the peace could was conveyed subject to a mortgage for $300 not have adjudicated the question of title, and subject to a mechanic's lien and to ac- and had the title been put in issue before crued taxes; that as a further consideration him, it would have been his imperative duty for the conveyance the parties agreed that to have certified the case to the circuit court. appellant should occupy the premises and Section 1722, Burns 1914; Deane v. Robison, dwelling house thereon for six months with 34 Ind. App. 468-472, 73 N. E. 169; Mitten v. out the payment of rent, at the expiration of Caswell-Runyan Co., 52 Ind. App. 521-525, which time she and her husband were to 99 N. E. 47. surrender possession to appellee; that appel [2] Neither do we regard the answer suflant did so occupy and use said property for ficient as a plea of estoppel. In the first six months, and then refused to vacate the place both parties to the transaction had same in accordance with the aforesaid agree equal knowledge of all the facts and circumment; that thereupon appellee brought suit stances involved in the transactions alleged. before a justice of the peace for possession Appellee was not induced to change his posiof said property, the details of which are al- tion to his damage by anything said or done leged.

by appellant. He asserted his title both be

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fore and subsequent to the proceedings before to appellant, and that by threats and promthe justice of the peace and the arrangement ises, as averred, she was deprived of her about possession of the property. Appellee's free will and induced to convey her property technical legal title was not, and is not, dis- in payment of an alleged debt which was in puted by appellant; for her complaint pro- no sense an obligation she was bound to disceeds on the theory that he has the legal charge, to accomplish a result appellee had title, but that was procured by fraud and no power, or legal right, to control, but which duress, and should not be allowed to stand. The unlawfully assured appellant he could and Under such conditions the payment of the $15 | would control. Cooley on Torts, vol. 2 (3d and the occupancy of the property as alleged Ed.) pp. 966, 967, says: do not estop appellant from asserting her “Duress is a species of fraud in which comright to have appellee's evidence of legal pulsion in some form takes the place of deception title--the deed-set aside. Penn American

in accomplishing the injury.

Where Plate Glass Co. v. Schwim, 177 Ind. 645–650, the wife upon a threat to prosecute, arrest, or

a deed, mortgage, or notes are obtained from 98 N. E. 715; State v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 175 imprison her husband, the instruments are void." Ind. 59-83, 93 N. E. 213, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 256; Indianapolis, etc., Co. v. Henby, 178

The above statement is in harmony with Ind. 239-251, 97 N. E. 313; Johnson v. Spen- the decisions of our own courts and the precer, 49 Ind. App. 166–171, 96 N. E. 1041; vailing weight of authority generally, with Steele v. Michigan Buggy Co., 50 Ind. App. the possible modification or explanation that 635-642, 95 N. E. 435.

contracts or other instruments so procured [3] But appellee contends that the third are not, strictly speaking, void, because they paragraph of complaint is insufficient to may be ratified, but are voidable by the state a cause of action, and that the demur- party so induced to execute them. To give rer to the answer should be carried back to validity to any contract, the law) requires the the complaint and be sustained. A demurrer free assent of the parties to be bound there to the third paragraph of complaint was duly by, and the trend of modern authority is to presented and overruled. Appellee could have relieve a party from his obligation or deed assigned cross-errors, but has not done so. when, through fear, terror, or violence, he Whether, in such case, under our present has been deprived of free and voluntary acdemurrer law, the demurrer to the answer tion by the other contracting party, or by could be carried back to the complaint, and one acting for and in behalf of such party. sustained, if the paragraph of complaint were

[5] In determining the question of duress,

the courts take into account the age, sex, insufficient, we do not decide, for the reason we deem the paragraph sufficient to state a ties and all the attending circumstances

capacity, situation, and relation of the par. cause of action for procuring the deed by which throw any light upon the particular duress.

transaction under investigation. 2 Cooley [4] Appellee now asserts that the paragraph is bad for failure to aver the value on Torts, p. 969; Rose v. Owen, 42 Ind. App. of the real estate, and to show that appellee Ind. 573-577, 578, 19 Am. Rep. 695; Schee

137-141, 85 N. E. 129; Bush v. Brown, 49 did not pay full value therefor; also that the

V. McQuilken, 59 Ind. 269–278; Line V. averments do not show that appellant was Blizzard, 70 Ind. 23–25; Adams v. Stringer, deprived of her free agency, and did not act 78 Ind. 175–180; Baldwin v. Hutchison, 8 voluntarily in executing the deed to appellee. Ind. App. 454-458, 35 N. E. 711; Cribbs v. The allegations show that appellant was the Swole, 87 Mich. 340, 49 N. W. 587, 24 Am. St. owner of the real estate, and that to prevent Rep. 166–171; First Nat. Bank v. Sargent, the carrying out of the threats against her 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 595, 59 L R. A. 296– husband, “and for no other purpose or con- 299; Bryant v. Peck & Whipple Co., 154 sideration whatever,” she executed the deed Mass. 460, 28 N. E. 678; Turner v. Overall, to appellee; that by the threats and prom- 10 Ga. App. 18, 72 S. E. 604; Benedict v. ises of appellee she was coerced, put in fear, Roome, 106 Mich. 378, 64 N. W. 193; State and induced to so convey her property and not Bank, etc., v. Hutchinson, 62 Kan. 9, 61 Pac. otherwise. Under the rules of pleading now 443; Woodham v. Allen, 130 Cal. 194, 62 established in this state, these averments Pac. 398; Lomerson V. Johnson, 44 N. J. show that there was no consideration what- Eq. 93, 13 Atl. 8; Galusha v. Sherman, 105 ever moving to appellant for the conveyance Wis. 263, 81 N. W. 495, 47 L. R. A. 417; of her property; that she was put in fear Pierce v. Brown, 7 Wall. 205, 19 L. Ed. 134and made sick by the threats against her 137; 9 Cyc. p. 443; 14 Cyc. p. 1123. husband, and by such threats and the prom [6, 7) Appellee asserts that in any event the ise of appellee to prevent the prosecution of judgment should not be reversed for two her husband for embezzlement and to pro reasons, viz.: (1) Because the record shows cure his release she was coerced into ex- that after the submission of the cause and ecuting the deed, and was moved to do so the hearing of evidence, the court perwholly on account of such threats and prom- mitted appellant to withdraw the submission ises. Whether the value of the property was and file the third paragraph of complaint, great or small is immaterial when the al- which was in effect a dismissal of the ac



the ruling complained of was harmful and for further proceedings not inconsistent with has failed to do so. On the record before us this opinion. neither of these contentions can be sustained. While the court permitted appellant to with

CALDWELL, IBACH, MCNUTT, and HOTdraw the submission of the cause and file TEL, JJ., concur. MORAN, P. J., not parthe third paragraph of complaint, it ad. ticipating. judged the costs up to th time against ap

(63 Ind. App. 211) pellant before permitting her to file such third paragraph. Appellee moved to strike


CRAMER. out certain parts of the third paragraph, and

(No. 9116.) thereafter demurred thereto and obtained the (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. rulings of the court thereon. The case was

Dec. 13, 1916.) duly put at issue on the third paragraph of 1. INSURANCE ww131(1), 145(1) — CONTRACTS complaint as above shown, the cause was TO RENEW POLICY-ORAL CONTRACT. resubmitted for trial without a jury, the evi An insurance company can, by a preliminary dence heard, the case taken under advise- oral contract, bind itself to issue or renew a

policy of insurance in the future. ment, and later on the finding of the court

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, was announced and the judgment rendered Cent. Dig. 88 204–207, 280; Dec. Dig. as above stated. The procedure was fully 131(1), 145(1).] within the discretionary power of the court, 2. INSURANCE 145(2) AUTHOBITY

AGENT-RENEWAL. and, furthermore, appellee has not properly

Where the agent of a live stock insurance challenged the court's action and has wholly company, whether called a general or special failed to indicate that he was in any way agent, had apparent authority to solicit insurmisled or harmed by the action of the court, ance, deliver policies, and do all things neces

sary to transact the business intrusted to his but, on the contrary, he obtained judgment care and no restriction of his authority was in his favor. The case was not dismissed brought home to the applicant, the company by the withdrawal of the submission, and is bound by his oral contract to renew a policy was not finally disposed by the trial court un

made prior to the expiration of the former pol

icy. til the judgment was rendered from which

(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, this appeal was prayed. Section 403, Burns Cent. Dig. $ 277; Dec. Dig. Om 145(2).] 1914; Burnett v. Milnes, 148 Ind. 230-235, 3. INSURANCE 145(2) AUTHORITY 46 N. E. 464.

AGENT-RENEWAL LETTER FROM COMPANY. [8] Where the court overrules a demurrer policy holder, notifying him of the expiration

A letter from an insurance company to a to a bad answer, the ruling is presumed to be of his insurance and requesting him to see its harmful, and will constitute reversible error, agent and to let the agent take care of his unless it is affirmatively shown by the rec- that the agent had full and general authority to

interest, justifies the policy holder in assuming ord that the ruling was not harmful. In

act for it. making such ruling, the court commits an [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, error of law which is presumed to be car- Cent. Dig. $ 277; Dec. Dig. Om 145(2).] ried into the final judgment, unless the con- 4. INSURANCE @ww145(2)–CONTRACT OF INSUBtrary is shown by the record and the duty of


Provisions in an insurance policy, limiting making such showing rests upon the party the authority of the agent and requiring notice who contends that the error was harmless. of certain facts, are limited to that policy, and This rule is sometimes confused with the one do not apply to an oral contract for renewal. which obtains where the court erroneously Cent. Dig. § 277; Dec. Dig. 145(2).]

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, sustains a demurrer to a good answer and

5. APPEAL AND ERROR 1033(9)--PARTIES it appears that the same proof was admis

ENTITLED TO ALLEGE EBROR-ERROR FAsible under another paragraph held good, VORABLE TO APPELLANT. or that the party in some way obtained the A defendant who appeals from the judgment full benefit of such answer, in which event the findings the judgment should have been for

rendered against him cannot object that under the error in sustaining such demurrer is hell a larger amount. to be harmless. Gregory v. Arms, 48 Ind. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and App. 562-578, 96 N. E. 196; Norris v. Tice, Error, Cent. Dig. $ 4061; Dec. Dig. 13 Ind. App. 17-21, 39 N. E. 1046; Bowlus 1033(9).] V. Phenix Ins. Co., 133 Ind. 106–118, 32 N. Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; E, 319, 20 L. R. A. 400; C., C., C. & St. L John F. La Follette, Special Judge. Ry. Co. v. Case, 174 Ind. 369-376, 91 N. E. Action by Joe Cramer against the National 238.

Live Stock Insurance Company. Judgment For the error in overruling the demurrer for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Afto appellee's second paragraph of answer to firmed. appellant's third paragraph of complaint, M. S. Meyberg, of Indianapolis, for appelthe judgment is reversed, with instructions lant. Forkner & Forkner, of New Castle, for to sustain appellant's motion for new appellee. trial, to sustain the demurrer to said second paragraph of answer, and to permit the par IBACH, J. Appellant issued a live-stock inties to amend their pleadings, if desired, and I surance policy to appellee for a term of one

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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