of that state enacted that "any woman of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, belonging to either of the classes mentioned in article 7 of the constitution of the state of Illinois, who shall have resided in this state one year, in the county ninety days, and in the election district thirty days preceding any election held for the purpose of choosing any officer of schools under the general or special school laws of this state, shall be entitled to vote at such election in the school district of which she shall at the time have been for thirty days a resident; provided, any woman so desirous of voting at any such election shall have been registered in the same manner as is provided for the registration of male voters." Laws 1891, p. 135, § 1. In People v. English, 139 Ill. 632, 29 N. E. 678, the question arose as to the right of women to vote for county superintendent of schools, and it was held that, as he was a constitutional officer, the qualifications of electors as prescribed by the constitution applied to all persons authorized to vote for him, and, as the qualified electors under the constitution were confined to male persons possessing certain qualifications, women were not authorized to participate in such an election. In the later case of Plummer v. Yost, 33 N. E. 191, decided in that state in January, 1893, it was held, under the same act, that women could vote for all other school officers not provided for by the constitution. The two cases are not at all in conflict, and the distinction between them is clearly pointed out. While no person was authorized to vote for the election of any officer mentioned in the constitution unless he possessed the qualifications of an elector prescribed by that instrument, yet this was not true of officers over whom the legislature had complete power and control. It was said: "It cannot be doubted that, in providing for a system of free schools, a form of organization essentially different from the present one might have been adopted. Entirely different officers might have been provided for, and provision might have been made for the designation of those officers by appointment, rather than by an election. Accordingly, it is provided, by section 17 of article 6 of the general school law, that in cities having a population exceeding 100,000 the members of the school board of education shall be appointed by the mayor, by and with the advice and consent of the common council; and unquestionably a similar mode of appointment of school officers, other than the two above mentioned, (provided for in the constitution,) might have been constitutionally adopted. The general assembly, having complete control of the subject, had, of course, the power to provide for the choice of these officers by popular vote; but such an election is not necessarily a proceeding identical with the elections provided for by the constitution, nor is it necessary that the qualifications of those voting for school offi

cers should be the same as those of electors, as defined by the constitution." To the same effect is the decision in Wheeler v. Prady, 15 Kan. 26. It is said in this case: "There is no school-district election nor meeting provided for in the constitution. There is no provision as to how school-district officers shall be elected, appointed, or chosen, and we suppose that no one will claim that they are, by the terms of the constitution, to be elected at either of the elections provided for in the constitution. Hence it would seem that the legislature would have complete power over the matter; that the legislature might provide for the election or appointment of school-district officers as it should choose, when it should choose, in the manner it should choose, and by whom it should choose." The cases of State v. Cones, 15 Neb. 444, 19 N. W. 682, and Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1, 43 N. W. 24, were decided on the same principle. The late case of Coffin v. Board, 56 N. W. 567, (decided by the Michigan court in October, 1893,) does not conflict with the decisions above cited. The act of the legislature declared unconstitutional in the Coffin Case authorized women to vote at all elections for school, village, and city officers, and it was decided that it was not competent for the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon women for the purpose of voting in city elections. Such elections were embraced in the constitution of that state, and hence the qualifications of electors prescribed by the constitution for voters at all elections applied. The constitution expressly referred to city elections, and provided that "the officers of cities and villages shall be elected at such time and in such manner as the legislature may direct;" but the distinction drawn in the cases we have cited was recognized. The opinion says: "These cases involved the validity of acts conferring upon females the right to vote for school-district officers, under constitutions which, like our own, name no schooldistrict officer, do not prescribe or suggest how such officers shall be chosen, but in express terms relegate to the legislature the duty of providing for and establishing a system of primary schools." In speaking of the power of the legislature to prescribe qualifications of city officers, Judge Dixon said, in State v. Von Baumbach, 12 Wis. 310: "As to all offices and public trusts to which the people, in the exercise of their paramount authority, have impliedly declared who shall be eligible, either by prescribing special circumstances which shall disqualify, or by reserving to themselves, or to the appointing authorities, a certain freedom of choice, there are very obvious reasons for holding that eligibility is in the nature of a constitutional right, and that the legislature possesses no power of exclusion not given by the constitution; but it is manifest that those reasons cannot be applied to a mere statutory office which the legislature may create and abolish

at will, and concerning which the constitution contains no express provisions."

A careful examination of all the authorities at hand has not revealed any conflict as to the principles of law announced in the foregoing cases. The right of suffrage is not an inherent right, but is subject to the disposal of the sovereign power of the state. If the constitution has regulated it in any department of government, it is subject to the limitations of that instrument; but should this matter, important as it is, be entirely relegated to the legislature, or left entirely to its discretion, the only limitations placed upon legislative power are contained in the federal constitution. The principles of law here stated must govern us in testing the constitutionality of the act of the legislature in question, and, guided by them, the conclusion is inevitable. The constitution is a limitation upon the powers of the legislature, and it is incumbent on those who maintain that the legislature is forbidden to act in the matter to point out the specific provisions of the constitution containing the prohibition. If we entertain a reasonable doubt about the act being in violation of the plain spirit and provisions of the constitution, the question must be resolved in favor of the act. There are provisions in the constitution which apply to municipal corporations, but we do not think that section 1 of article 6 does. On the contrary, a careful consideration of the provisions of the constitution applicable impresses us with the view that the revisers have purposely exempted municipalities from its provisions, and relegated the matter to the legislature. We are duly sensible of the gravity of this question, and have given it that consideration which its importance demands. Municipalities are auxiliaries of state governments, and the rights and interests affected by them are just as vital and dear as those involved in state and county governments, and in some particulars even more so. The justice or wisdom of constitutional or statutory regulations, however, are matters not subject to our control, but we must give effect to the law according to its meaning, to be ascertained by a consideration of all of its provisions. The authorities cited by counsel on this branch of the case have been carefully read; and, while they sustain fully the position that the legislature cannot make any unreasonable or unnecessary regulations tending to abridge or impair the right of suffrage secured by the constitution, they fall short of establishing the vital point in this case, that elections to fill municipal offices created by the legislature are subject to suffrage clauses in constitutions with provisions similar to our own. The decision in Gooding v. Brown, 22 Fla. 437, was made under the old constitution, and it is clear that the clause in that instrument, prescribing the qualifications of voters, was recognized as applying to municipal elections, as it un

doubtedly did; but the limitations in the present constitution do not apply to such elections, as we have pointed out. The case of People v. Canaday, supra, was well considered, and contains a lucid statement of the law; but there it was clear that the constitutional limitation as to suffrage did apply to municipal elections. The constitution of North Carolina in broad terms provided that every male person 21 years old, resident in the state 12 months, and in the county 30 days, should be an elector. In other sections it was provided that all county and township elections should be by the qualified voters therein, and that no county, city, town, or other municipal corporation should contract any debt unless by a vote of a majority of the qualified voters therein. There was nothing in the North Carolina constitution to negative its application to municipal elections, but its provisions showed clearly that it was intended to so apply. The same may be said of the case of Attorney General v. Detroit Common Council, 58 Mich. 213, 24 N. W. 887. There the clause of the constitution prescribing the qualification of voters expressly refers to elections in townships and wards, and there was no question raised as to the application of the suffrage clause to municipal elections. None of the decisions cited conflict with the construction that we are constrained to put upon the clauses of our constitution. The re sult is that none of the grounds alleged in the information for annulling the act in question, based upon the exclusion of the classes of persons mentioned possessing the constitutional qualifications of voters for state and county officers since the general state election in 1892, are availing. The legislature had complete power over this matter, and, in the absence of constitutional limitation, its will must prevail.

2. Another alleged ground attacking the validity of the act in question is that, by its terms, persons were permitted to vote in the municipal election who were qualified electors at the general state election held next prior thereto, but who had afterwards lost their domicile in the state of Florida and county of Duval, and had not regained the same in time to become an elector at the time of the city election. The act confines the right to vote in municipal elections to residents of the city at the time of the city election, who were qualified electors, or entitled to become such, in any of the election districts within the city at the time of the general state election held next preceding. It is insisted that this will permit persons to vote in the city election who, though qualified electors at the last general state election, may have become disqualified to vote since said state election by reason of conviction for crime or other cause. It is not alleged, as a matter of fact, that any such disqualified persons voted at the election in July, 1893, but the law is claimed

to be void because, by its terms, such persons are permitted to vote.

The election commissioners named in the act are required to prepare a list of the electors qualified to vote in each of the city wards at the last general state election, and this is made the list of electors at the city election, "except that the said commissioners shall add to or strike from the lists the names of such persons as may, as herein provided, appear improperly placed upon or left off said lists, or by reason of subsequent qualification entitled to be added thereto." In making the list of electors for the city election the commissioners are given access to the county registration books, tally sheets, and poll lists used at the last general state election, as well as to all other papers in the office or custody of the county supervisor of registration, and in the office of the tax collector of Duval county. The names of the persons on the list when made are required to be published, and the election commissioners, from the best information obtainable, are to revise the lists so as to contain all, and only, the names of persons who, at the time of revision, are residents of the city, and who were, at the time of the last general state election, qualified electors of the election districts in the city, or who have since that time registered and paid their poll taxes, as provided in the act. It is also provided that, if an elector be challenged, he shall make oath that he is a resident of the city, and entitled to vote at the election. "If his name appears upon the list of electors for the ward, (and, if required, he take such oath,) he shall be permitted to vote, but no person whose name does not so appear shall be permitted to vote."

The constitution provides that no person convicted of any felony by a court of record shall be qualified to vote at any election unless restored to civil rights, and the legislature is directed to enact the necessary laws to exclude persons convicted of certain crimes from the right of suffrage. Sections 4, 5, art. 6. In obedience to this command the legislature has enacted a general law excluding persons convicted of certain crimes from the right of suffrage. Rev. St. § 154, subd. 5. There is no purpose manifested, in the act under which the election in question was held, to repeal the general law in reference to excluding persons convicted of crime from voting at elections, and, if the two can be construed in harmony with each other, the rule is that it must be done. The act, it is true, declares those persons, residents of the city, who were qualified electors at the time of the last general state election, or entitled to become such by registration and the payment of poll taxes due for 1890 and 1891, qualified and entitled to vote in the city election; and there is in the act no express direction to the election commissioners to strike off the names of persons

convicted of crimes disqualifying them to vote at any election, but the reference is to the qualified voters at the last state election, and no purpose is shown to suspend the operation of the criminal laws in reference to crimes disqualifying one to vote. The general law and the act we are construing can be construed in harmony in reference to the conviction of crimes taking away the right of suffrage, and, this being the case, such construction should be given to them. Those who possessed the qualifications of electors at the general state election next preceding the city election, and complied with the law as to registration and the payment of poll taxes, or could have done so, were authorized to vote at the city election, provided they were at that time residents thereof. Residence of a qualified voter in the city at the time of the election, in connection with the qualifications mentioned, at the preceding general state election, conferred the right to vote at the city election, without regard to changes of residence since the said state election. There is no constitutional prohibition against the power of the legislature to prescribe such qualifications.

3. It is further alleged that the act is void for the reason that, by the terms thereof, only those persons were allowed to vote whose names appeared on the lists after the same had been revised by the commissioners of election, without regard to registration in fact. After declaring who should constitute the qualified electors authorized to vote at the city election, (being those persons residing in the city at the time of the city election, and who, at the time of the general state election held next preceding, were qualified electors of any of the election districts within said city, or who were entitled to qualify themselves to vote at said state election by registering and paying their poll taxes due for the years 1890 and 1891,) the act directs the commissioners of election to prepare a list of the electors qualified to vote at each of the city wards at the last general state election; and this list, it is declared, shall constitute the qualified electors to vote at the city election, subject to revision and alteration as provided in the act. In making up the list of qualified voters for the city election, access was given the commissioners to the county registration books, tally sheets, and poll lists used at the last general state election, and all other papers in the office or custody of the county supervisor of registration, and in the office of the tax collector of Duval county. The names of the qualified voters on the list prepared by the commissioners are required to be published, not more than two weeks before the city election, one time in a newspaper, with notice of a time and place when the commissioners would meet to revise the list; the notice to be published at least two days before the meeting. At the time and place mentioned in the notice.

the commissioners were required to meet, and, "from the best information obtainable, revise said lists so as to contain all and only the names of persons at that time residents of said city, and who were, at the time of the last general state election, qualified electors of the election districts in said city, or who have since that time registered and themselves paid their own poll taxes for the years 1890 and 1891. Such lists so revised shall constitute the list of qualified voters for the several wards at said city election." It is further provided that not less than five printed copies of the list for each ward shall be made out, on the same form as the county registration books, so as to show the number of registration certificates, age, color, etc., and each copy to be certified to be correct by the chairman of the board of election commissioners. The lists so made and certified are for the use of the inspectors and clerks appointed to hold the election, and they are required to be prepared and open to inspection at least five days before the election, and subject to correction of clerical errors by the board of election commissioners. No person whose name does not appear upon the list of electors for the wards shall be permitted to vote.

It is apparent from the provisions of the act that the commissioners were not given arbitrary power to put on the list to be prepared by them such names as they pleased, but it was made their duty to place thereon all, and only, the names of persons possessing the qualifications of electors prescribed by the act for voting in the municipal election. In ascertaining who were the persons authorized to vote in the city election, the commissioners were under a duty to act according to law, and not arbitrarily, and their action in this respect was subject to review by a court of competent jurisdiction. Many authorities hold that, where a law provides that no vote shall be received at an election unless the name of the voter is on the registration list as prepared by the registering officers, it is in violation of that portion of the constitution defining the qualifications of electors. Dells v. Kennedy, State v. Corner, Daggett v. Hudson, and People v. Canaday, supra, belong to this class of decisions. They are based upon the theory that the constitutional qualifications of electors apply, and that the legislature cannot, by any regulations, deprive the voter of a right given him by the constitution, without fault on his part. But, as we have already seen, the qualifications of electors prescribed by our constitution at all elections under it do not apply to municipal elections; hence there is no inhibition in this clause against the authority of the legislature to make the ascertainment of the elector's right to vote in the city election by the election commissioners conclusive. It may be contended, however, that, after prescribing the qualifi

cations of those who were entitled to vote in the municipal election, the legislature could not confer upon the commissioners the power to conclusively determine who were possessed of the qualifications thus prescribed, on the ground that it was granting to a mere ministerial board judicial powers, with which it could not be invested. If it be conceded that the legislature could not make the ministerial ascertainment by the board of election commissioners conIclusive of the voter's rights under the statute, this will not authorize the vacation of the election held in July last, on the showing before us. It is not alleged or claimed that any voter was denied his right to vote at said election by reason of the failure of the commissioners to perform their duty under the statute, and, for aught we know, every person in the city authorized to vote cast his ballot. The legislature had the right to prescribe the qualifications of voters at such an election, and it was competent for it to provide the means of ascertaining who were the persons authorized to vote. Although the action of a ministerial board in performing the duty of ascertaining the qualified electors under a statute may not be given a conclusive effect as to the voter's rights, and to the extent that the statute before us undertakes to make such action conclusive it may be inoperative, yet this alone should not invalidate an election, in the absence of any showing that voters were deprived of any rights under the statute.

4. It is also alleged that by the terms of the act in question the qualified electors of the city of Jacksonville were not permitted to vote for whom they pleased, but were restricted in the right of suffrage to vote for persons whose names were placed upon an official ballot by the election commissioners. It has been held by this court that the last clause of section 6 of article 6 of the constitution, which is that "in all elections by the people the vote shall (be) by ballot," applies to municipal elections. State v. Anderson, 26 Fla. 240, 8 South. 1. We still adhere to this decision. It was here said that "the material guaranty of this constitutional mandate of vote by ballot is inviolable secrecy as to the person for whom an elector shall vote. The distinguishing theory of the ballot system is that every voter shall be permitted to vote for whom he pleases, and that no one else shall be in a position to know for whom he has voted, or shall know unless the voter shall, of his own free will, inform him." There is no doubt in our minds about the right of the legislature to prescribe an official ballot, and to prohibit the use of any other; and the provisions of the act in reference to printing the names of candidates regularly nominated by a convention, mass meeting, or primary election, or who run as independents, are valid. But the legislature cannot, in our judgment. restrict an elector to voting for some one

of the candidates whose names have been printed upon the official ballot. He must be left free to vote for whom he pleases, and the constitution has guarantied to him this right. If the legislature can restrict the voter to some candidate whose name is print-ed on the official ballot, then it may prescribe such regulations for getting the names of candidates on the ballot as will completely destroy the liberty of choice.

Counsel for defendants contend that while the act prescribes an official ballot, and prohibits the use of any other, and also provides for the printing upon the official ballot to be used the names of all candidates who have been certified to the election commissioners as put in nomination by any convention, mass meeting, or primary election, as well as independent candidates who have the indorsement, for that purpose, of 10 per cent., and not less than 25, of the electors qualified to vote for such office, yet it does not prohibit the voter from putting another name by "paster" over the name of any candidate on the ballot, or from - erasing the name of any candidate, and writing in lieu thereof another, of the voter's choice. We have considered the cases cited on this point, (Ransom v. Black, 54 N. J. Law, 446, 24 Atl. 489, 1021; Common Council v. Rush, 82 Mich. 532, 46 N. W. 951; and De Walt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. St. 529, 24 Atl. 185,) and recognize fully the rule that every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law, and that it will require a very clear case to justify a court in -striking it down on the ground of unconstitutionality. It is also true that where an act is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which conflicts, while the other Is in harmony, with the constitution, that construction which supports will be preferred to that which destroys the law. City of Emporia v. Norton, 13 Kan. 569. The act before us prescribes an official ballot, and prohibits the use of any other. Upon each ballot shall be printed, in uniform, plain type, in a single column, the names of all the candidates certified to the election commissioners in the manner provided in the act, and the names of all candidates for the same office shall be printed together, and arranged alphabetically according to the initials of their surnames, irrespective of party. Immediately to the left of each name, in a line with the middle of the letters of the name, a dash or short line not less than onequarter of an inch in length is required to be printed. Specific directions are then given for arranging on the ballot the names of the various officers to be voted for, as follows, viz.: "On said ballots shall be printed, first, under the head of 'Mayor,' the words 'Vote for one,' followed by the names of all the candidates for that office; next under the head 'Councilmen at Large,' the words 'Vote for seven,' followed by the names of all the candidates for that office;"

and so on for all the officers to be elected. On the ballots for councilmen at large, on the line with the name, the number of the ward in which the candidate resides is printed, and each ballot is to have attached to it a stub so attached that, when the ballot is folded, the stub can be detached without injury to the ballot, or exposing its contents, upon which stub the number of the ballot for that ward must be printed. Provision is also made for attaching together in blocks the ballots for use at the wards, the number of the ballots to be used, and for furnishing the inspectors of election with the ballots for use on the day of election. It was entirely competent for the legislature to prescribe the regulations here referred to, and, if there were no others on the subject of casting the ballot, we think the voter, although confined to the use of the official ballot, could put upon it the name of any person in lieu of the name of the candidate printed thereon, and such a ballot would be legal. There is in the provisions here referred to no denial, express or implied, of his right to do so, and, under the decisions cited, we think he would have such right. But in another portion of the same section of the act, in providing for the entrance of the voter into the polling place, and the re ceipt by him of an official ballot, it is enacted that "he shall go to one of the voting shelves, tables or compartments, and there privately cross or check-mark across the dash, or short line in front of the name of the candidate of his choice for each office to be filled, which cross or check shall constitute his vote." The requirement is that he shall check the name of the candidate of his choice. The candidate here referred to cannot fairly or naturally mean any other than some candidate whose name had gotten on the ballot in the manner provided in the act. This is the only fair and reasonable construction to be put upon the clause mentioned, and its effect is to restrict the voter to a choice of candidates printed on the ballot, which we have said cannot be done. That phase of the act, then, which restricts the voter to checking the name of some candidate on the official ballot, is in conflict with the constitutional provision in reference to voting by ballot.

The result just stated gives rise to the question whether the valid parts of the act can remain operative, notwithstanding the unconstitutional feature, and whether they are so essentially and inseparably connected in substance that the legislature would not have enacted the one without the other. If the two can be separated, and the legislative purpose expressed in the valid portion can be accomplished independently of the void part, and, considering the entire act, it cannot be said that the legislature would not have passed the valid part had it been known that the invalid portion must fail, it is our duty to sustain so much as is good. In English v.