cities of the State (except New York), and in certain villages named. The Mechanics' Lien Law of 1854 declares that "all acts heretofore passed for the better security of mechanics," in certain counties named, "are hereby repealed," and an act of 1858 (ch. 204), extended to all counties in the State the provisions of the mechanics' lien act, then applicable to certain counties only. Subsequent to the passage of these acts the Legislature on several occasions passed acts amending that of 1844. Held, (1) that under the principle above set forth the acts of 1854 and 1858 would not be deemed to have repealed that of 1844; and (2) that the amendatory acts amounted to a legislative declaration that the original act, except as amended, remained in force (In re Rochester Water Com'rs, 66 N. Y. 414); or an implied admission of its continued validity and force. Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330. Judgment afirmed. Whipple, appellant, v. Christian. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided April 6, 1880.] UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. OCTOBER TERM, 1879. ADMIRALTY PRACTICE JOINING SUIT IN REM AGAINST VESSEL, WITH SUIT IN PERSONAM AGAINST CONSIGNEES OF CARGO.—The steamer S. being in great peril, at the request of those in command of her, the steamer M. went to her assistance and saved her and her cargo. Subsequently her cargo was delivered to the consignees, who executed to her master an average bond, agreeing to pay their respective proportions of whatever sum should be found due as expenses, charges and sacrifices in consequence of the said disaster. An action for salvage was commenced and a libel filed by the owners, etc., of the steamer M. against the S. and her cargo. The S. was seized and service was made on the consignees, but no part of the cargo was seized. Suits for salvage may be in rem against the property saved or the proceeds thereof, or in personam against the party at whose request and for whose benefit the salvage service was performed. Power is vested in the Supreme Court to regulate the practice to be used in suits in equity or admiralty. The nineteenth admiralty rule prescribed by that court limits the right of the salvor to a suit in rem against the property saved or the proceeds thereof, or in personam against the party at whose request and for whose benefit the salvage service was performed. Held, that this suit could not be maintained against the consignees under the rule mentioned, as libellants, but they were neither employed nor sent out by the consignees, nor did the consignees request them to go to the assistance or relief of the ship or cargo. Even if the request of the master for assistance would be sufficient to enable the salvors to maintain an action in personam against the owners of the property, this would not benefit libellants, as the libel is against the ship and cargo and the consignees to whom the cargo was delivered; nor would they be in any better condition even if they had joined the owners instead of the consignees, as the difficulty would still remain that the proceeding is in rem against the ship and cargo and in personam against the owners of the cargo, without joining the owners of the ship. Cases cited, The Boston, 1 Sumn. 328; The Hope, 3 C. Rob. 215; 2 Parsons on Adm. 378; Dean v. Bates, 2 Wood. & M. 87; Ward v. Ogdensburg, 1 Newb. Adm. 139; Nott v. Sabine, 2 Wood, 211. Decree of U. S. Circuit Court, Louisiana, affirmed. The May Flower et al., appellants, v. The Sabine et al. Opinion by Clifford, J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IMPAIRING CONTRACT STATE AUTHORIZING SUIT AGAINST ITSELF-REPEAL. -The Legislature of Tennessee, under a provision in the State Constitution that "suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct," enacted that actions might be instituted against the State under the same rules and regulations that governed actions between private citizens. No power was given the courts to enforce their judgments, and the money could only be got through an appropriation by the Legislature. Subsequently this enactment was repealed. In an action brought in the State court, after such repeal, held, that the repealing act was constitutional and did not impair the obligation of a contract as to a liability of the State, incurred during the time the act allowing suits against it was in force. The remedy, which is protected by the contract clause of the Constitution, is something more than the privilege of having a claim adjudicated. Mere judicial inquiry into the rights of parties is not enough. There must be the power to enforce the results of such an inquiry before there can be said to be a remedy which the Constitution deems part of a contract. Inquiry is one thing; remedy another. Adjudication is of no value as a remedy unless enforcement follows. It is of no practical importance that a right has been established, if the right is no more available afterward than before. The Constitution preserves only such remedies as are required to enforce a contract. The right to sue which the State of Tennessee once gave its creditors was not, in legal effect, a judicial remedy for the enforcement of its contracts, and the obligation of its contracts were not impaired, within the meaning of the prohibitory clause of the Constitution of the United States, by taking it away. Judgment of Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed. Memphis & Charleston Railroad Co., plaintiff in error, v. State of Tennessee et al. Opinion by Waite, C. J. The same rule held in a case where suit was instituted during the time an act of the Legislature of Alabama of similar purport was in force, which act was repealed before the final hearing in the case. Judgment of Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. South & North Alabama Railroad Co., plaintiff in error, v. State of Alabama. Opinion by Waite, C. J. PRESUMPTION OF FACT-THAT DEBT EXISTED FURNISHES NO PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT INSURANCE PREMIUMS.--Defendant below was entitled to a percentage, as agent, on premiums on policies obtained by him in plaintiff's insurance company, after the first year, so long as the policies should continue in force. In this action, which was brought by the company against defendant after it had discharged him from his position as agent, defendant set up as a defense a set-off for the amount of such percentage. He proved that the amount of renewal premiums on policies in force at a certain date would be $8,700, and that his percentage would be $4,754, but there was no proof that any renewal premiums had been paid. Held, that the jury could not infer that such premiums had been paid. It does not follow as a necessary or even reasonable sequence from the fact that a debt existed that it has been paid. Nor is there any presumption of its payment upon which a jury can act. Much less can such a presumption arise in regard to the payment of renewal premiums upon policies of insurance, such premiums not being debts due to the insurers, and not being collectible as debts. A jury may be allowed to presume the existence of a fact in some cases from the existence of other facts which have been proved. But the presumed fact must have an immediate connection with or relation to the established fact from which it is inferred. If it has not, it is regarded as too remote. The only presumptions of fact which the law recognizes are immediate inferences from facts proved. In United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 284, the court said: "Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove a fact, the circumstances must be proved and not themselves be presumed." Referring to the rule laid down in Starkie on Evidence, page 80, they added: "It is upon this principle that courts are daily called upon to exclude evidence as too remote for the consideration of the jury. The law requires an open and visible connection between the principal or evidentiary facts and the deductions from them, and does not permit a decision to be made on remote inferences. Best on Evidence, 95. A presumption which a jury may make is not a circumstance in proof, and it is not, therefore, a legitimate foundation for a presumption. There is no open and visible connection between the fact out of which the first presumption arises and the fact sought to be established by the dependent presumption. Douglass v. Mitchell's Ex., 35 Penn. St. 446." Judgment of U. S. Circuit Court, S. D. New York, affirmed. Manning, plaintiff in error, v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Strong, J. NEW JERSEY COURT OF ERRORS AND AP- ADVERSE POSSESSION BY CO-TENANT FRAUD POSSESSION OF UNENCLOSED LANDS. — In an action of ejectment it appeared that the parties were in fact tenants in common. The defendant entered under deeds of conveyance for the entire estate in fee, containing full covenants of warranty. He purchased the entire estate of his grantors in good faith and for a full consideration, and his deeds were promptly put on record. The judge instructed the jury that in the absence of evidence of bad faith or fraud, the defendant must be considered as a stranger to the plaintiff's title, and that the strict rule with regard to adverse possession, which governs between tenants in common, did not apply in this case. Held, no error. In the acquisition of title by adverse possession the distinction between strangers and tenants in common relates to the character of the evidence necessary to prove that the possession was adverse. If the parties are strangers in title, possession and the exercise of rights of ownership are in themselves, in the absence of explanatory evidence, proof of an ouster of the true owner; whereas, in cases of privity of title, such as subsists between tenants in common, the acts of possession of one tenant will in the absence of satisfactory evidence to the contrary be referred to the community of title, and there must be clearer and more decisive evidence of an ouster by one tenant in common of his associate, than is necessary to prove that a person having no right to possession has ousted the owner in severalty. Doe v. Taylor, 5 B. & Ad. 575; Prescott v. Nevers, 4 Mason, 330; Freeman on Co-tenancy, § 221; Newell v. Woodruff, 30 Conn. 492. The presumption that the entry of one co-tenant is for the benefit of all applies to a third person who acquires an undivided interest under a conveyance to that effect, from one of the original co-tenants. But where one tenant in common conveys the whole estate to a stranger, entry by the grantee thereunder operates as a disseizin of the other co-tenants; and if the grantee, entering under such a conveyance, places his deed upon record, and continues in the exclusive possession of the premises for the period of twenty years, without any interference on the part of the other co-tenants, title to the whole estate may be acquired by adverse possession. Townsend v. Pastor, 4 Leon. 52; Co. Litt. 374 a, 330 b, n. 1; Gerry v. Holford, Cro. Eliz. 615; Bigelow v. Jones, 10 Pick. 161; Kittredge v. Locks, etc., Co., 17 id. 246; Parker v. Proprietors, 3 Metc. 91; Marcy v. Marcy, 6 id. 360; Jackson v. Brink, 5 Cow. 483; Clapp v. Bromagham, 9 id. 530; Bradstreet v. Huntingdon, 5 Peters, 402; Clymer's Lessee v. Daw To appear in 12 Vroom (51 N. J. Law) Reports. kins, 3 How. 674; Doe v. Ketty, 1 Harr. 517. The general doctrine of the law that fraud in obtaining or continuing possession, or knowledge that the party's claim to ownership is unfounded and wrongful, will not deprive him of his title by adverse possession, or relieve the true owner of the consequences of the bar of the statute of limitations, if the possession of the intruder has been in fact adverse, and has been asserted by such open and notorious acts of ownership as are essential to title by adverse possession. Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587; Co. Litt. 153b; 3 Bac. Abr. 151; Thorpe v. Corwin, Spenc. 319; Dem v. Hunt, id. 487; Gregg v. Sayre, 8 Pet. 244. It may be regarded as settled in this State by long usage, sanctioned by a uniform course of practice, and supported by judicial decision, that mere entry on waste and uncultivated and unenclosed lands, under a survey, or a conveyance, or other claim of title, and occasional acts of trespass, extending over the period of twenty years, though coupled with the payment of taxes, are not such acts of possession as will deprive the true owner of his title. Such acts are evidence of an adverse claim of title, but do not amount to that actual, continued and uninterrupted possession which is essential to title by adverse possession. In order to acquire title by adverse possession, the possession must be actual and exclusive, adverse and hostile, visible or notorious, continued and uninterrupted. Actual occupancy by residence, cultivation, or inclosure, or the erection of permanent improvements, is not necessarily required. Acts of ownership done upon the land, which are of such a nature as to manifest a notorious claim of property, and are continued for the period of twenty years without interruption or interference by the true owner, may, under the circumstances and in the situation of the property, be sufficient evidence of an ouster, and of an adverse possession, to support a claim of title by adverse possession, without any residence, cultivation or inclosure. 4 Griff. An. Reg. 1269; Cornelius v. Giberson, 1 Dutch. 1; Cobb v. Davenport, 3 Vroom, 369; Proprietors v. Springer, 4 Mass. 416; Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Peters, 41; Lord Advocate v. Blantyre, L. R., 4 App. Cas. 770; Jones v. Williams, 2 M. & W. 331; Doe v. Kemp, 2 Bing. N. Cas. 102; Tyrwhitt v. Wynne, 2 B. & Ald. 554; Stanley v. White, 14 East, 332. Foulke v. Bond. Opinion by Depue, J. INSURANCE LAW. FIRE POLICY-CONDITION AGAINST OTHER INSURANCE NOT BROKEN BY SUBSEQUENT VOID POLICY.-S. obtained from the O. D. Ins. Co. a policy of insurance on his storehouse and stock of goods, one condition of which policy was that there should be no other insurance on the property without the consent of the company indorsed on its policy. Afterward S., without the consent of the O. D. Ins. Co., and in ignorance that there was such a condition in its policy, obtained from the C. Ins. Co. another policy of insurance upon the same storehouse and stock of goods. In this policy was a condition that there is no previous policy of insurance upon the property. In an action by S. against the O. D. Ins. Co. upon its policy, held, that the condition in the first policy that if other insurance should be effected without the consent of the company, the policy should be void, related only to other valid insurance; and the fact that S. attempted to effect a second insurance with the C. Co., which was invalid, by reason of the condition in its policy, does not avoid the first policy, and the O. D, Ins. Co. is liable on its policy. The second policy must at the time of the loss be inoperative, so that no action can be maintained upon it; but it is not necessary that it shall be absolutely void. It is sufficient if it is voidable. It is a general principle of law that in order to communicated to insured was not a waiver of any claim by the company of forfeiture by reason of other insurance. The act or conduct of the company, in order to operate as a waiver, must be such that the insured might reasonably infer therefrom that the company did not mean to insist upon the forfeiture. The insured must have been misled to his prejudice, and if he is so misled by a reasonable and justifiable reliance upon the acts or conduct of the insurer, the waiver or estoppel attaches, whether it was so intended by the insurer or not. The case is not like one where the insured gives verbal notice of other insurance and the insurer does not notify him that the contract is at an end, nor like one where a defect in proof of loss is claimed and the insured is requested to incur heavy expense in perfecting proof, and does so incur it, no notice being given of an intention to rely on the for v. St. Paul, etc., Ins. Co., 43 id. 110; Kenton Ins. Co. v. Shea, 6 Bush, 174; Von Bories v. United Life Ins. Co., 8 id. 136; Baer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 4 id. 244. Kentucky Court of Appeals, December, 1879. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Stevenson. Opinion by Hines, J. 1 RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. avoid a policy on account of a subsequent insurance against an express condition therein, it must appear that such subsequent insurance is valid and can be enforced. If it cannot be enforced it is no breach of the condition of the prior policy. Hubbard & Spencer v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 33 Iowa, 326, supported by a wellconsidered and able opinion of Beck, J.; Jackson v. Mass. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 23 Pick. 418; Clark v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 6 Cush. 342; Gale v. Belknap Co. Ins. Co., 41 N. H. 170; Stacey v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 2 W. & S. (Penn.) 506; Philbrook v. New England Mut. F. Ins. Co., 37 Me. 137; Schenck v. Mercer County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 4 Zabr. (N. J.) 447; Jackson v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 5 Gray, 52; Gee v. Cheshire County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 55 N. H. 65; Rising Sun Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 20 Ind. 520; Thomas v. Builders' M. Fire Ins. Co.,119 Mass. 121; New England Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 38 Ill. 166; Knight v. Eu-iture. Webster v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 71; Gans reka F. & M. Ins. Co., 26 Ohio St. 664. In the foregoing decisions there is a difference of views upon some questions in relation to the general subject; but with perfect unanimity all of them maintain the proposition herein before announced. Opposed to all this array of authority is David v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Iowa, 69; Bigler v. New York Central Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 635, and same case, 22 N. Y. 402; Lackey v. Georgia Home Ins. Co., 42 Ga. 457; and Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Peters, 495. In the Iowa case first mentioned (Hubbard v. Hartford F. Ins. Co.), Beck, J., says his conclusion is not in conflict with the cases in 13 Iowa, 69, 20 Barb. 635, and 22 N. Y. 402. In the latter case the suit was brought to enforce the prior policy, and was defeated upon the ground 'that it was avoided by a subsequent policy, which was shown to be valid by a judgment in favor of the assured, and that a draft had been given in satisfaction of the judgment. In Lackey v. Georgia Ins. Co., 42 Ga. 457, the court says: "The question here turns not so much on the contract as upon our statute. * * And this law would make void the first policy though nothing was said in it about a second policy." The case, therefore, the court said, "turned rather on the law than on the contract." In Carpenter v. Providence Ins. Co. the action was on the second policy and it was claimed by plaintiff that the first policy was void because of fraudulent representations. It had not, however, been avoided at the time the second policy was taken, but was treated by all parties as a valid contract. Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, November term, 1878. Sutherland v. Old Dominion Insurance Co. Opinion by Anderson, J.; Moncure, P., and Staples, J., concurred; Christian and Burke, JJ., dissent. In Firemans' Ins. Co. of Dayton v. Holt, Ohio Supreme Court, Nov. 11, 1879, the same doctrine is held. In an opinion by Gilmore, C. J., it is stated that a condition in a fire policy against subsequent insurance is not broken by the taking of subsequent policies by the insured which never took effect by reason of conditions therein contained, and further that the receipt of payment on such subsequent void policies is not matter of defense in an action on the prior policy. WAIVER OF BREACH OF CONDITION AGAINST SUBSEQUENT INSURANCE-WHAT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO. -A fire policy contained a clause avoiding it in case of subsequent insurance without consent of the company. The assured having made a claim for loss under the policy the company wrote to its agent that the claim was not properly made, adding: "Be good enough to inform Mr. Stevenson that if he has any claim to make against this company under or by virtue of a policy of insurance, such claim must be made in strict accordance with the conditions of said policy, to which he is respectfully referred." Held, that this BAILMENT -LIABILITY OF WAREHOUSEMAN FOR WRONGFUL DELIVERY OF GOODS ON ONE OF TRIPLICATE BILLS OF LADING TO ORIGINAL CONSIGNEE. Goods having been shipped for London consigned to C. & Co., the shipmaster signed a set of three bills of lading, marked 'First," "Second," and "Third," respectively, making the goods deliverable to "C. & Co., or their assigns, freight payable in London, the one of the bills being accomplished, the remainder to stand void." During the voyage, C. & Co. indorsed the bill of lading marked First" to the plaintiffs for valuable consideration. Upon the arrival of the ship at London, C. & Co. entered the goods as consigned to them, and they were landed and placed in the custody of the defendants in their warehouses; the master lodging with the defendants notice under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1862, to detain the cargo until the freight should be paid. C. & Co. then produced to and lodged with the defendants the second part of the set of bills of lading. The defendants accordingly entered C. & Co. in their books as enterers, importers, and proprietors of the goods, and the stop for freight being afterward removed, they delivered the goods to various persons upon delivery orders signed by C. & Co. Held, by Field, J., that the defendants were liable in an action by the plaintiffs for the value of the goods, for without deciding whether the master could have been exonerated by a delivery of the goods to the person first presenting a bill of lading, the defendants were not by receiving the goods subject to the stop for freight, placed in the same position as the master and entitled to his rights; and further, that in delivering the goods upon the order of C. & Co., they had acted in a character beyond that of mere warehousemen, and were guilty of a conversion. Myerstein v. Barber, 4 H. L. 317; Batut v. Hartley, L. R., 7 Q. B. 594. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. v. East and West India Dock Co., L. R., 5 Q. B. D. 129. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-13 ELIZ., CH. 5-DELAYING CREDITORS.-Debtors in insolvent circumstances executed a deed by which they conveyed all their estate to trustees on trust to sell in such manner as they might think proper, and to divide the residue of the proceeds after paying expenses ratably among the creditors parties to the deed, and if the trustees thought fit, creditors who refused or neglected to execute, and if the trustees thought proper but not otherwise, to pay the dividends on debts due to non assenting creditors to the debtors. The deed provided for the payment of maintenance to the debtors if the trustees saw fit, and the executing creditors respectively indemnified the debtors and the trustees in respect to the bills of exchange and promissory notes made or indorsed to them respectively by the debtors in respect of the scheduled debts. Held, that the deed was not void under 13 Eliz., ch. 5. Spencer v. Slater, 4 Q. B. D. 13, distinguished; General Furnishing Co. v. Venu, 1 H. & C. 153; Alton v. Harrison, L. R., 4 Ch. 622. Boldero v. London and Westminster Discount Co., L. R., 5 Ex. D. 47. LIBEL-PRIVILÉGED COMMUNICATION -REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE A COURT OF JUSTICE.-A true report of the proceedings in a court of justice sent to a newspaper by a person who is not a reporter on the staff of a newspaper, is not privileged absolutely; and if it be sent from a malicious motive an action will lie. Stevens v. Sampson, L. R., 5 Ex. D., C. A. 53. SURETYSHIP-DISCHARGE OF SURETY BY LACHES OF CREDITOR -NEGLECT TO VALUE SECURITY IN BANKRUPTCY.-The defendant was surety for the repayment of a sum of money advanced by the plaintiff to the principal debtor. As a further security for the advance, the principal debtor deposited with the plaintiff a policy of life insurance. The principal debtor subsequently became bankrupt, the advance remaining unpaid, and the plaintiff proved against his estate for the full amount of the advance without valuing the policy of life insurance as a security, which was in consequence claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy as part of the bankrupt's estate. It was contended by the defendant in an action against him as surety, that by not valuing the policy, and so depriving him of the benefit of it, the plaintiff had discharged him from all liability as surety. Held, by Manisty, J., that the omission to value the policy was at most a mere neglect or omission on the part of the plaintiff, and as such did not discharge the defendant from all liability as surety, but only to the extent of the value of the policy. Wulff v. Jay, L. R., 7 Q. B. 756, followed; Polak v. Everett, 1 Q. B. D. 669, distinguished. Rainbow v. Juggins, L. R., 5 Q. B. D. 138. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. BROWNE ON STATUTE OF FRAUDS. • A Treatise on the Construction of the Statute of Frauds, as in force in England and the United States, with an Appendix, containing the existing English and American Statutes. Fourth Edition. By Causten Browne, counsellor at law. Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1880. Pp. lxxxiii, 671. THE THE Statute of Frauds is undoubtedly the most famous of statutes, and it is quite probable that it has created more fraud and litigation than it has prevented. It is a little singular that it has not been oftener treated by writers. Mr. Browne's work is, we believe, the best and most thorough, and is regarded as good authority in our courts. His division of the subject is simple and natural, his treatment is methodical and clear, and his researches seem abundant. The list of cases cited covers 70 pages of double columns. The great number of cases does not obstruct the text, but the principles are generally well stated, according to the theory of a treatise rather than a mere digest. The present edition is said to contain references to above a thousand cases not included in the last, which was issued in 1870. The volume is handsome. XLVII WISCONSIN REPORTS. This volume contains cases determined at the January and August terms, 1879, and shows a commenda ble degree of care and promptness on the part of Mr. Conover, the reporter. The following cases are of especial interest: Redman v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 89. An application for fire insurance contained a statement that "the foregoing is a just, full and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value, and risk of the property to be insured, so far as the same are known to the applicant and are material to the risk, and the same is hereby made a condition of the insurance and a warranty on the part of the assured;" and the policy made the application a part of it and a warranty. Held, that the warranty was only such as was described in the application. Dayton v. Walsh, 113. - Crops raised on a wife's land by the husband's labor are not liable for his debts. Ingram v. Rankin, 406. — In an action for conversion or breach of contract to deliver goods, unless the plaintiff has been deprived of some special use of the goods, anticipated by the defendants, or is entitled to exemplary damages, the measure of damages is the value of the goods at the time and place of conversion or when and where delivery was due, with interest to the time of trial. Klauber v. Biggerstaff. 551.-The word "currency," in a certificate of deposit, means money, and bank notes, issued by lawful authority and in circulation at par with coin. Mellen v. Goldsmith, 573.-If a creditor, having orally agreed with the debtor and with other creditors to join in a composition deed, and such deed having been executed by the others, refuses to sign it, he can recover only the rate fixed in the agreement. Thompson v. Herman, 602.-A common seaman is bound to obey orders, and if he receives an injury in obeying an order manifestly perilous, he is not chargeable with contributory negli gence. Sanger v. Dun, 615. - Plaintiffs intrusted a claim for collection to a mercantile and collecting agency, taking a receipt conditioned that the claim was to be transmitted to an attorney for collection or adjustment at the risk and on the account of the plaintiffs, and signing a similar agreement in the defendants' books. Held, that these instruments constituted the contract, and the defendants were not liable for the attorney's acts or default, in the absence of proof of gross negligence in selecting him. Townsends v. Smith, 623. — Where a defendant was fraudulently induced to come within the jurisdiction of the court, the service of civil process upon him will be set aside, although the design, when the representations were made, was to arrest him on a criminal charge. Cottrill v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 634. - A locomotive engineer, killed by remaining upon his engine when a collision was imminent, and taking measures to stop his train, is not chargeable with contributory negligence, although he might have escaped injury by leaving his post. - To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: A rustic, seeing a post by the side of a railway, on which were painted the letters W. & R., and being told that the letters on the post stood for the words 66 whistle " " and "ring," said, after some reflection: blowed if I see how you get an R into whistle." When "Well, I know that w-r-i-n-g spells wring, but I'm reading law, I frequently, in copying papers, came upon the mysterious symbol "ss.," and in answer to my request for an explanation, the lawyer with whom I was studying told me that those letters stood for the word "scilicet." This silenced but did not satisfy me; for from that day to this it has never been clear to me how the word "scilicet" could furnish comfortable accommodations to more than one "s." Yet the lawyer who answered my question had all authority at his back. Every dictionary, legal or otherwise, which contains the abbreviation " ss.," states that it is an abbreviation for the word "scilicet." Every legal word which attempts to explain the meaning of "ss.," gives the explanation by the abrupt declaration that the letters represent the word "scilicet." It seems to be a tradition, the origin of which has been lost sight of, and which, like many other traditions, will not endure a close scrutiny. Years ago when small Greek children were taught that Atlas supported the heavens on his shoulders, they were doubtless warned not to make any further inquiries, but to accept the statement blindly and reverently. The same warning should accompany the "scilicet" explanation of "ss." For in spite of the authority in its favor, I venture to believe that "ss." does not represent "scilicet." That abbreviation is only used in acts requiring peculiar solemnityaffidavits, acknowledgments, certificates. In the last two it is sometimes omitted, but it always precedes and introduces an affidavit. Apparently as the act becomes more solemn, the "ss." becomes more important. What then is its meaning? Certainly not "scilicet"-"to wit," which, occupying the place which "ss." occupies, would be absolutely meaningless. There is, however, an explanation, which, whether or not it be correct, is at least plausible. The most binding oath which the Rosicrucians could take was that in the name of the Holy Spirit-Sanctus Spiritus-and in writing the oath the name of the Holy Spirit was abbreviated to ss. Doubtless they were not the first to make use of this oath. It is declared in the Scriptures that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is a sin which shall not be pardoned either in this world or in the world to come. The awful consequences of this sin probably led to an early adoption of the appeal to the Holy Ghost, as the weightiest obligation which men could attach to their promises or acts. If this theory be correct it is reasonably certain that the name of the Holy Ghost would, in writing, be abbreviated, after the fashion of early times, to ss. Thus we have I. H. S. for the Latin Iesus Hominum Salvator: Ichthus for the Greek "Jesus Christ, Son of God, Saviour;" and numerous other abbreviations of a like character. It is therefore probable that the Rosicrucians, in using the oath in the name of the Holy Spirit and in abbreviating that name to ss. originated nothing, but merely adopted an old form of oath, with its written abbreviation. Certainly the similarity between the ss. of this oath and the ss. of legal usage is striking. And if they may claim an origin not merely similar, but identical, we shall then have the reason for the use of ss. in those acts whose execution calls for particular solemnity. This theory may be incorrect; but so long as the "scilicet" explanation is as feeble as it now is-so long in fact as it is not an explanation but an assertion - it is not, in my opinion, as deserving of acceptance as the one here given. ROCHESTER, April 14, 1880. H. [We have always thought "ss." a singular abbreviation of "scilicet." But the latter expression would not be meaningless where "Ss." is used. Although "scilicet" is always defined "to wit," as if it were equivalent to "namely," yet "to wit" was originally employed there in the sense of "to know" "wit" being an old form of "know." "Scilicet" is derived from scire and licet, and means "it is permitted to know." As thus understood the cabalistic letters have the force of the phrase "Know all men by these presents."-ED. ALB. L. J.] LAWSON'S CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE. To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: I observe, in your last issue, in concluding an article upon "Contracts of Carriage," you say "Mr. Lawson, in his recent valuable monograph on Contracts of Carriage, speaks of the principal case (viz., Capehart v. Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad Co., 81 N. C. 438), as holding the condition 'reasonable except as to latent defects,' we do not find any warrant for this construction of the case." You are undoubtedly correct as to there being no warrant for such a construction of the case in 81 N. C., but are you not in error as to the case cited by Mr. L.? was it not Capehart v. S. & R. R. Co., 77 N. C. 355? there the court did hold the doctrine as Mr. L. states. The two cases are in fact one and the same, and though no reference is made in 81 to the former de cision, both decisions were rendered upon identically the same point, and are in direct conflict, the court, in the first instance, granting a venire de novo, because his honor below refused to instruct the jury that the clause or condition in the bill of lading was reasonable, and in the second, they reversed him because he had followed their decision and held that the clause was reasonable. Reading the two decisions, it would seem to have been the principal aim of the court to let the judges below understand that exactly how the Supreme Court would decide a point of law was something that 66 no fellow could find out." The facts, however, are that the court was differently constituted when Capehart v. S. & R. R. Co. was again brought before it, and the decision in 81 N. C. was intended to overrule the decision in 77 N. C.; that no reference is made to the one in the other, was probably an inadvertence on the part of Judge Ashe in delivering the opinion of the court. Very respectfully, JACKSON, N. C., April 19, 1880. [We observe that the case cited and reported by Mr. Lawson was the case in 77 N. C. The case in 81 N. C. was probably too late for his book. — Ed. ALB. L, J.] To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Your issue of April 17 (p. 108) contains an article on the subject of "Contracts of Carriage-Limitation of Time for Presenting Claim for Damage," the text of which is the recent case of Capehart v. Seaboard, etc., R. R. Co., 81 N. C. 438. In the last paragraph you remark that in my work on "Contracts of Carriers," just published, I refer to the principal case as holding the condition reasonable except as to latent defects, and you add: "We do not find any warrant for this construction of the case." In Capehart v. Seaboard, etc., R. R. Co., 77 N. C. 355, decided in 1877, the bill of lading stipulated that any claim for loss or damage to the article shipped should be adjusted in the presence of an officer of the road before it was taken from the station; and also that within thirty days thereafter the claim should be taken before another officer who had the authority of the road to settle such matters. On the trial the defendant asked the court to charge the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover because he had not proceeded according to the stipulations of the bill of lading. This the court refused, and there was a verdict for the plaintiff. "We think," said Reade, J., in reversing the judgment below, "that it is a reasonable regulation that a claim for damages should be made by the consignee at the delivery station before the article is taken away." * ** "Of course the pro |