promise, without new consideration, and working a detriment to the promisee, can be held a ratification of a void and criminal assumption of agency. In Thirteenth and Fifteenth Streets Passenger Railway v. Boudrou, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Jan. 19, 1880, 8 W. N. C. 241, the plaintiff got upon a crowded street car, and stood with six or eight other passengers upon the rear platform. While there he was struck in the back and severely injured by the pole of a following car, by reason of the breaking of the brake chain of the last car. In an action for that injury, the defendants asked the following instructions, which were refused: "That if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff voluntarily got upon the platform of the car, knowing the car to be so crowded with passengers that he could not enter the car, but would be obliged to stand on the platform; that he did so stand on the platform, and in consequence of being in that place on the car he received the injury, then he was guilty of negligence, and the verdict must be for the defendant. That the platforms of a passenger railway car are intended for ingress and egress from the car, and it is negligence in a passenger to use them for any other purpose. That if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff occupied the back platform of the car, on which he received his injury, for the purpose of being carried as a passenger, he was guilty of contributory negligence, and the verdict must be for the defendant." A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. The court said: "Such were the instructions prayed, yet the defendant now urges that, 'under the testimony, the question whether Mr. Boudrou's position on the rear platform contributed to his injury was one for the jury.' In truth, there was no controversy as to the circumstances of the accident, there was but one way to find the facts, if the jury regarded the testimony, and at the trial the defendant demanded that the court should say there was concurrent negligence, if certain facts were found. The learned judge taking a different and correct view, very properly charged that the plaintiff could not recover if the injury resulted from any negligence on his part; that if the jury should find that the plaintiff was negligent in standing on the rear platform, and yet find that the collision could not have happened but for the negligence of the driver of car 14, plaintiff's negligence was remote and not a bar to his recovery. His reasons given as leading to that conclusion are unanswerable. The large number of passengers in this city, who voluntarily stand on the platforms, because there is neither sitting nor standing room in the cars, do not, and ought not to anticipate that they will be run over by following cars. Their position has no tendency to induce the driving of one car into another, whatever the degree of their negligence in riding on the platforms, and the risks they take in so doing. Every one knows that so long as he remains there he is in no danger of being run down by a car, unless from its heedless handling. When the plaintiff was struck, his post was a condition, but not a cause of his injury. It neither lessened the speed of the car he was on, nor increased that of the other; his presence was not a cause of the broken chain and reckless driving of car 14; his place was an incident of an over-crowded car, whose conductor had left the platform to give him standing room, and had not pointed him to a seat or requested him to enter the car. We are not persuaded that different minds could honestly draw different conclusions from the facts." Counsel cited Gale v. Lisbon, 52 N. H. 174, holding that a traveller, who in meeting another turns to the left, but does not thereby occasion injury to any one but himself, is not a violator of law, and is not barred from maintaining an action against a town to recover for injuries sustained in consequence of an obstruction on the left hand side of the highway, with which he is thereby brought in contact. case of Spooner v. Brooklyn City Railroad Co., 54 N. Y. 230; S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 570, is, however, exactly in point. There the plaintiff got upon the foot-board or fender of a sleigh, which was being used by the railway company in consequence of the obstruction of the track by snow, the interior of the sleigh being full. He was allowed to ride there, and his fare was taken. It was held that he could maintain an action for an injury snstained by him by a collision while thus riding. The court say: แ The a passenger upon such a vehicle has a right to assume that the parts of the vehicle prepared for the use of passengers, and destined to receive them while in transit, are suitable and safe for the purpose; and that the care of the drivers will avoid any special risks which attach to the particular position." CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE-LIMITATION OF TIME FOR PRESENTING CLAIM FOR DAMAGE. Ν IN Capehart v. Seabord and Roanoke Railroad Com pany, 81 N. C. 438, it was held that a stipulation in a bill of lading given by a common carrier, that in case any claim for damage should arise for the loss of articles mentioned in the receipt, while in transit or before delivery, the extent of such damage or loss should be adjusted before removal from the station, and claim therefor made in thirty days to a "trace agent" of the carrier, is an unreasonable provision, which the courts will not uphold. The court said: “The jury having found that there was negligence on the part of defendant, we must take that as a fact, and adhering to the principles established in the cases cited, we are of the opinion that the defendant's liability for damages is not diminished or affected in any way by the notice or contract annexed to the bill of lading, not even by the stipulation that the damages must be adjusted before the removal of the goods from the station and the presentation of the claim for payment within thirty days; for the stipulation must be reasonable; and we do not think it is reasonable to require the consignees of a car load of cotton to cut into the bales before they are received to ascertain whether they have been seriously damaged. ‘A contract restricting the responsibility of the carrier must be reasonable in itself, and not calculated to ensnare or defraud the other party. A contract requiring notice of losses in thirty days is not reasonable.' Adams Express Co. v. Reagan, 29 Ind. 21; So. Ex. Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101; S. C., 4 Am. Rep. 118; Place v. Union Ex. Co., 2 Hilt. 19." In Adams Express Co. v. Reagan, 29 Ind. 21, it was held that a condition that the carrier should not be liable for any loss, unless a claim was presented within thirty days after shipment, was void. The shipment was to Savannah, Georgia, during the war, when transportation was much interrupted. The court said: "The conditions must be reasonable in themselves, and not such as will operate as a snare and a fraud upon the public." "In the case under consideration, the company, in a shipment of a package sent from Clayton, in this State, to Savannah, Georgia, at a time when the country was in an unsettled condition, occasioning great delays in shipments, and in the transmission of the mails, attempt to incorporate into their contract a condition precedent, that they will not answer for any loss or damage, unless the claim therefor shall be presented to them, at their office at the former place, within thirty days after the date of the receipt; thus placing it in their power, by a delay which perhaps under the circumstances would not have been unreasonable, to prevent any claim for loss or damage, however gross might have been their negligence. We think the stipulation in question void as being against public policy.” assent to which by the other party is only proven by his acceptance of the paper.' The court queried whether the paper constituted a special contract. In Weir v. Express Co., 5 Phila. 355, the condition was that claim must be made within thirty days after the time when the property had or ought to have been delivered. The particular facts are not disclosed. The court say: "This is a very reasonable and proper provision, to enable the defendants, while the matter is still fresh, to institute proper inquiries, and furnish themselves with evidence on the subject. The defendants do a large business, and to allow suits to be brought against them, without such notice, at any length of time, would be to surrender them bound hand and foot to almost every claim that might be made. It would be next to impossible, when a thousand packages, large and small, are forwarded by them daily, to ascertain any thing about the loss of one of them at a distance of six months or a year." In Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, a condition that the claim must be made within ninety days from delivery to the company, was held reasonable where the time required for the transportation is not long, as in that case a single day. The court said: "Policies of fire insurance, it is well known, usually contain stipulations that the insured shall give notice of a loss, and furnish proofs thereof within a brief period after the fire, and it is undoubted that if such notice and proofs have not been given in the time designated, or have not been waived, the insurers are not liable. Such conditions have always been considered reasonable, beIn U. S. Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127, there cause they give the insurers an opportunity of inwas a condition that any claim must be presented quiring into the circumstances and amount of the within thirty days from the date of the receipt, at loss, at a time when inquiry may be of service. the office of shipment. The shipment was at Pitts- And still more, conditions in policies of fire insurburgh, Penn., for Jonesboro, Ind. The court say: ance that no action shall be brought for the recovery "We know of no reason why this stipulation is not of a loss unless it shall be commenced within a binding and valid between the parties." "It seems specified time, less than the statutory period of limito us * reasonable." They lay tations, are enforced, as not against any legal polstress on the fact that the transportation would or- icy. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 7 Wall. 386. dinarily be completed in a day or two, and cite "Telegraph companies, though not common carSouthern Express Co. v. Caldwell, and Weir v. Ex-riers, are engaged in a business that is in its nature press Co., infra. They distinguish Adams Express Co. v. Reagan on the ground of the peculiar circumstances of that case. * * In Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101; S. C., 4 Am. Rep. 118, the condition was that the claim should be made, at defendant's receiving office, in writing, within thirty days from the date of the receipt, with the receipt annexed. The transportation was to be from Stevenson to Huntsville, Ala. On this point the court simply said: "He cannot be allowed to make a statute of limitations so short as to be capable of becoming a means of fraud. Thirty days might elapse before the consignee became aware that any thing had been consigned to him, especially if he was absent from home. It was the duty of the defendant to deliver this package to Mr. Cruse, and it is more than unreasonable to allow it to appropriate the property of another by a failure to perform a duty, and that, too, under the protection of a writing signed only by its agent, the almost if not quite as important to the public as is that of carriers. Like common carriers they cannot contract with their employers for exemption from liability for the consequences of their own negligence. But they may by such contracts, or by their rules and regulations brought to the knowledge of their employers, limit the measure of their responsibility to a reasonable extent. Whether their rules are reasonable or unreasonable must be determined with reference to public policy, precisely as in the case of a carrier. And in Wolf v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 62 Penn. St. 83; S. C., 1 Am. Rep. 387, a case where one of the conditions of a telegraph company, printed in their blank forms, was that the company would not be liable for damages in any case where the claim was not presented in writing within sixty days after sending the message, it was ruled that the condition was binding on an employee of the company who sent his message on the printed form. The condition pany within thirty days after the property had been, or ought to have been, received; and the ruling was that the owner had lost his remedy, where non-delivery was complained of, if the claim was not pre printed in the form was considered a reasonable one, and it was held that the employer must make claim according to the condition, before he could maintain an action. Exactly the same doctrine was asserted in Young v. Western Union Telegraph Com-ferred within thirty days after delivery ought to have pany, 34 N. Y. Superior, 390. "In Lewis v. Great Western Railway Co., 5 H. & N. 867, which was an action against the company as common carriers, the court sustained, as reasonable, stipulations in a bill of lading that 'no claim for deficiency, damage, or detention, would be allowed unless made within three days after the delivery of the goods, nor for loss, unless made within seven days from the time they should have been delivered.' Under the last clause of this condition the onus was imposed upon the shipper of ascertaining whether the goods had been delivered at the time they should have been, and in case they had not, of making his claim within seven days thereafter. In the case we have now in hand the agreement pleaded allowed ninety days from the delivery of the parcel to the company, within which the claim might be made, and no claim was made until four years thereafter. Possibly such a condition might be regarded as unreasonable, if an insufficient time were allowed for the shipper to learn whether the carriers' contract had been performed. But that cannot be claimed here. The parcel was received at Jackson, Tennessee, for delivery at New Orleans. The transit required only about one day. We think, therefore, the limitation of the defendants' common-law liability to which the parties agreed, as set up in the plea, was a reasonable one, and that the plea set up a sufficient defense to the action." The court then advert to Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, and after describing the case, remark: "It will be observed that it was a much more onerous requirement of the shipper than that made in the present case, and more than was necessary to give notice of the loss to the carrier." "This case is a very unsatisfactory one. It appears to have regarded the stipulation as a statute of limitations, which it clearly was not, and it leaves us in doubt whether the decision was not rested on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence of a contract." In Lewis v. Great Western Railway Co., supra, Pollock, C. B., said: "Such a condition is perfectly reasonable. The law allows persons to make their own bargains in matters of this sort." In Southern Express Co. v. Hunnicutt, 54 Miss. 566; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 385, the condition was that claim must be made at the shipping office within thirty days from the date of the receipt. The shipment was at Lauderdale, Miss., for delivery at New York city. The court said: "We find that the precise condition set up in the plea was held to be reasonable, and a discharge of the company from all liability if not complied with, in United States Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127. There, as in the case before us, the claim for loss was required to be made in thirty days from date of receipt. In Weir v. Express Co., 5 Phila. 355, before Sharswood, P. J., the claim was required to be made of the express com been made. Such provision in the contract was said to be reasonable, as enabling the express company while the matter was fresh to institute proper inquiries, and furnish themselves with evidence on the subject. The chief business of express companies, as is well known, is to carry small but valuable packages. There is more or less liability, that in the vast multitude of parcels which they handle, passing through the hands of so many agents, a loss, by mistake or accident, or by the appropriation of an employee, will at times occur. It is not unreasonable that the individual shippers, who have, or may be supposed to have, distinct knowledge and recollection, should be required to give notice of non-delivery or unreasonable delay. The law is settled by the great weight of authority that a common carrier may limit his liability by contract, provided the special contract does not exempt from losses by negligence or misconduct. The exemption thus claimed must be reasonable, and the carrier cannot take advantage of his powers and of the necessities of the public, to exact exemptions from that measure of duty which public policy demands. Such was the line of observation of the Supreme Court of the United States in Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, upholding as reasonable a stipulation in the contract, not differing from that in this case, except that the time for making the claim was ninety days. The only case holding a contrary doctrine is Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala. 101; S. C., 4 Am. Rep. 118, which is said in the case last cited to be a very unsatisfactory decision. The Alabama court puts its objection to the covenant on the ground that it was a statute of limitations. Clearly it was not, any more than is notice of a fire, and proof of loss within a specified time. The stipulation is no more than a condition, with which the owner and shipper must comply, or lose his claim; if he does comply, he may bring his suit within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations. "It appears that the usual time required for the transportation of this package to New York from Lauderdale station is three or four days. We are not called upon in this case to say whether thirty days from the date of the receipt is an unreasonably short time to make claim for damages or loss. The pleadings raise no question of that sort, but admit that it was reasonable. Reasonable time would be time ample to ascertain the non-delivery of the parcel at the place of destination, which depends on the distance and facilities of communication. If Hunnicutt received no tidings of his package in ten or twelve days from the shipment, his suspicion ought to have been aroused, and inquiry made. If that had been done, it is almost certain that the parcel would have been found in due time for its delivery at New York." The condition in the principal case, it will be observed, was much more stringent than in any of the cases above reviewed, and it may well be that it was unreasonable even within those cases. Mr. Lawson, in his recent valuable monograph on Contracts of Carriage, speaks of the principal case as holding the condition "reasonable except as to latent defects." We do not find any warrant for this construction of the case. ABSTRACT OF THE LEGISLATION OF NEW YORK DURING THE FIRST CENTURY M OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT. ANY years since, Dr. Franklin B. Hough, of Lowville, N. Y., well known-throughout the State for his statistical and historical publications, undertook to prepare a summary of legislation upon certain subjects of practical study, the idea being to embrace a concise statement of all the laws upon the subject under examination, from its origin down to date, and the object being of a historical and practical character. The work dates back to the years 1854 and 1855, when he was preparing from public records and official sources the first edition of the New York Civil List, which he originally prepared and edited for the first eight years. These abstracts of laws upon particular subjects embraced, besides titles, dates and references, a concise statement of the subject, and citations to all documentary information that could be found having relation to the matter in hand, and each item being upon a separate paper, it could be readily arranged chronologically and subdivided into such a classification as the subject required. The preparation required a careful examination of the session laws, not only as the object of search was expressed in titles, but also as it was concealed under the obscure heading of "other purposes." Each of these hidden acts was brought out and placed in the same order as if it had stood alone under its proper title. The work also required a careful examination of the legislative journals and documents of the period embraced, and necessarily made him thoroughly acquainted with the sources of information and the resources that exist in the public libraries and offices where these books could be found. After the death of Gov. Marcy, Dr. Hough purchased the whole series of his State documents, and adding to these from time to time, he has now almost a complete collection of the laws and documents of the State in his own library. About ten years ago he began at leisure times to prepare a like summary of the legislation of single years, and as the centennial of our State government approached, he conceived the idea of extending his work to the full hundred years. In this he became associated with his son, Franklin H. Hough, a counsellor at law, who as an improvement upon the plan, proposed to add citations to reported cases in which the meaning of laws had been construed on their constitutionality decided in the State courts or in the Supreme Court of the United States. To this was added a summary of the legislation of Congress and of the bordering States, so far as related to the State of New York. This enormous undertaking has by their joint labors been now nearly completed, and its plan, as perfected from time to time, can best be judged from its title: "Abstract of the Laws of New York. Being an analysis and classification of all of the laws passed by the State Legislature, from the beginning of a State government in 1777, to the close of the 100th Session in 1877; showing in full the title of every act, with the date of its passage, and references to places where each may be found in full; with a concise abstract of the subject-matter, copious references to documentary and other information having reference to these laws, and statements of the result of elections, where they have been submitted to a popular vote. Also, an abstract of all the statutes of the Congress of the United States and the bordering States, and of Canada, that have been passed during the century, having reference to the State of New York. Together with full references to the decisions of State and Federal courts, in which the meaning of these laws has been explained or their constitutionality decided." A statement of the plan, with a specimen of the work itself, has been printed and laid before the Legislature. The subject taken as an illustration of the plan is the war of 1861-'65, embracing some 250 statutes, chiefly relating to the raising and equipment of troops, aid to families of volunteers, bounties, quotas, local debts, etc. A table of contents presents a classification of the whole of this subject, and the remainder of the pamphlet gives the abstracts and references to documents in their proper order, as far as its limits will allow. The work has now been carried on as far as it can be without legislative patronage, and a proposition for aid to the extent of placing one copy of the work in the same manner as the session laws are distributed is now under consideration. We hope this will find favor in the Legislature. The work, if published, will be in volumes of 1,000 pages each, in double columns, the pages being of the same size as those of the United States Statutes at Large (Little & Brown's edition). Its extent cannot be fully estimated, but it is thought that it will make about four volumes. A thoroughly exhaustive index to every name and subject will be prepared. Those who may not have an opportunity of seeing the specimen pages will be able to form an idea of the matter upon a page from a statement that the titles of the acts are printed in bourgeois, the summaries in nonpareil, and the references and citations in agate type. Two lines of running title are placed at the top of every page, of which one gives the general subject, and the other its details. 66 It may be interesting to know that the number of separate laws that is, acts numbered as chapters, that have been passed from 1777 to 1877, inclusive is 33,601; but including those hidden under the title of other purposes," the number must considerably exceed 40,000. This of course includes all laws, both obsolete and existing, which in this work are given without further distinction than the statement as to when and how they have been modified or repealed, or when they expired by their own limitation. The basis of classification adopted is that of subjects, and subordinate to this, locality, and under each subdivision the order of time. Our limits will not permit us to give an outline of the system of classiflcations which has not as yet been printed. Unlike a digest of existing laws, it could not follow any plan of arrangement analogous to that of the Revised Statutes, on account of the conflicting nature of the laws at different periods in the century. We find, for example, as in lotteries, a series of laws regulating and encouraging a custom which is now proscribed and forbidden, and in many other instances subjects of legislation now altogether unknown, or quite different from the requirements of the present day. The outline of arrangement has therefore necessarily taken somewhat of a historical direction, subdividing itself as the logical affinities and relations of the subject required, and with cross-references whenever it became necessary. CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EXCLUSION OF NEGRO CITIZENS FROM JURIES. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,-OCTOBER TERM, 1879. STRAUDER, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE OF WEST VIR GINIA. The fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution, held not only to give citizenship and its privileges to persons of color, but to deny to any State the power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws and to invest Congress with power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce its provisions. A statute of West Virginia, denying to colored citizens the right to sit as jurors, on account of their color, held to be a discrimination forbidden by the amendment. It is a denial of equal protection of the laws to the race thus excluded. Section 641 of the Federal Revised Statutes, which authorizes the removal of a civil or criminal suit instituted in a State court to the Federal Circuit Court, when against a person denied, or who cannot enforce, in the judicial tribunals of the State any right secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of the citizens of the United States, held not in conflict with the Federal Constitution. ERROR RROR to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia. The opinion states the necessary facts. STRONG J. The plaintiff in error, a colored man, was indicted for murder, in the Circuit Court of Ohio county, in West Virginia, on the 20th of October, 1874, and upon trial was convicted and sentenced. The record was then removed to the Supreme Court of the State, and there the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. The present case is a writ of error to that court, and it is now, in substance, averred that at the trial in the State court the defendant (now plaintiff in error) was denied rights to which he was entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In the Circuit Court of the State, before the trial of the indictment was commenced, the defendant presented his petition, verified by his oath, praying for a removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States, assigning as ground for the removal, that "by virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petit jury in the State; that white men are so eligible, and that by reason of his being a colored man and having been a slave, he had reason to believe and did believe he could not have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in the State of West Virginia for the security of his person as is enjoyed by white citizens, and that he had less chance of enforcing in the courts of the State his rights on the prosecution, as a citizen of the United States, and that the probabilities of a denial of them to him as such citizen on every trial which might take place on the indictment in the courts of the State were much more enhanced than if he was a white man." This petition was denied by the State court, and the cause was forced to trial. Motions to quash the venire, "because the law under which it was issued was unconstitutional, null and void," and successive motions to challenge the array of the panel, for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment were then made, all of which were overruled and made by exceptions parts of the record. The law of the State to which reference was made in the petition for removal and in the several motions was enacted on the 12th of March 1873 (Acts of 1872-3, p. 102), and it is as follows: "All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State, shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided." The persons excepted are State officials. In this court, several errors have been assigned, and the controlling questions underlying them all are, first, whether, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, every citizen of the United States has a right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury selected and impaneled without discrimination against his race or color because of race or color; and second, if he has such a right, and is denied its enjoyment by the State in which he is indicted, may he cause the case to be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States? It is to be observed that the first of these questions is not whether a colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him, has a right to a graud or petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, but it is whether, in the composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury. The questions are important, for they demand a coustruction of the recent amendments of the Constitution. If the defendant has a right to have a jury selected for the trial of his case without discrimination against all persons of his race or color, because of their race or color, the right, if not created, is protected by those amendments and the legislation of Congress under them. The fourteenth amendment ordains that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common purpose, namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy. The true spirit and meaning of the amendments, as we said in the Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall. 67, cannot be understood without keeping in view the history of the times when they were adopted, and the general objects they plainly sought to accomplish. At the time when they were incorporated into the Constitution, it required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed. Discriminations against them had been habitual. It was well known that in some States laws making such discriminations then existed, and others might well be expected. The colored race as a race was abject and ignorant, and in that condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect themselves. They especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident. It was in view of these considerations the fourteenth amendment was framed and adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States. It not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship |