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2 HEALTH O 21-REGULATION OF PLOMBERS approved by the state board of health, the --CONSTITUTIONALITY.

defendant could not take an examination to St. 1909, c. 536, as amended by St. 1914, c. be a master plumber until the lapse of three 287, as to plumbers, so far as it requires an examination and license for master plumbers, is years from being licensed as a journeyman not unconstitutional, as plumbing bears so close plumber, or until March 25, 1917, he having a relation to the public health that its regula: been licensed as a journeyman plumber on tion is subject to legislative control within reasonable limits.

March 25, 1914. The defendant testified at [Ed. Note.–For other cases, see Health, Cent. the trial that he had a place of business in Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. 21.)

Northampton, where he carried the stock of 3. LICENSES w 13–PLUMBERS-JOURNEYMAN materials usual in such a store and necessary PLUMBERS.

for doing the plumbing business and that he Under such statute, a journeyman plumber had contracted to do plumbing work and bad has the right to work for himself and take contracts for, or to do by his own labor, plumb-employed journeymen plumbers. There was ing upon buildings, but not to employ other other evidence tending to show that he had plumbers.

employed at least one journeyman plumber [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Licenses, for several months who with the defendant, Cent. Dig. § 24; Dec. Dig. Om 13.)

worked at plumbing in numerous places. 4. LICENSES 20 - PLUMBERS PERIOD OF This evidence was sufficient to show that he PROBATION.

had conducted business as a master plumber Such statute, providing that the state examiners of plumbers may make necessary rules within the statutory definition of that term. for the performance of their duties, to take ef- “Master or employing plumber” is defined by fect when approved by the state board of health, St. 1909, c. 536, § 9, to be "a plumber having does not authorize the state examiners of a regular place of business and who himself, plumbers, even with the approval of the state board of health, to establish a rule that no one or by journeymen plumbers in his employ, can take an examination to be a master plumb- performs plumbing work." er until after three years from his being li

[2] St. 1909, c. 536, as amended by St. 1914, censed as a journeyman plumber. (Ed. Note. For other cases,

c. 287, so far as it requires an examination

see Licenses, Cent. Dig. § 55; Dec. Dig. Om 20.]

and license for those engaged in the business

of master plumbing, is not unconstitutional. 5. LICENSES C40-PLUMBERS-PROSECUTION This in substance is settled by Common-DEFENSES.

The invalidity of a rule of the state exam- wealth v. Beaulieu, 213 Mass. 139, 99 N. E. iners of plumbers, unjustly prohibiting one 955, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1080. That case relatfrom taking an examination for license as a ed to the provisions of the statute as to the master plumber, does not justify him in carry. examination and licensing of journeymen ing on the business of master plumber without a license.

plumbers, and it there was held that they did [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Licenses, not violate the fundamental law. Plumbing Cent. Dig. $$ 79–83; Dec. Dig. Ew 40.]

bears so close a relation to the public health 6. MANDAMUS Em87 – STATE EXAMINERS OF that its regulation as to those conducting the PLUMBERS—EXAMINATION.

business, as well as the craftsmen working Where opportunity to take an examination for license as a master plumber is unlawfully at the trade, are subject to legislative conwithheld from an applicant by the state ex. trol within reasonable limits. The reasons aminers of plumbers, his remedy is a writ of which led to the conclusion that the licensing mandamus to compel the board to give him a of journeymen plumbers was within the po reasonable examination as to his qualifications to be a master plumber.

lice power of the state require the same re[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mandamus, sult in the case at bar as to the regulating of Cent. Dig. 88 189–194; Dec. Dig. 87.) master plumbers.

General regulations providing for the 11Exceptions from Superior Court, Hamp- censing of those engaged in the business of shire County; James H. Sisk, Judge.

plumbing have been upheld by many deci. Eugene J. McCarthy was found guilty of sions. People v. Warden, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 engaging in the business of a master plumber N. E. 686, 27 L. R. A. 718; Douglas v. Peo without being registered or lic sed as such, ple, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N. E. 341, 8 L. R. A. (N. and excepts. Exceptions overruled.

S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162; State v. J. H. Schoonmaker, Dist. Atty., of Ware, Benzenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345; for the Commonwealth. Frank J. McKay, of State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599, 51 N. E. Holyoke, for defendant

136, 41 L. R. A. 689, 65 Am. St. Rep. 785 ;

Singer v. State, 72 Md. 464, 19 Atl. 1044, 8 RUGG, a J. [1] This is a complaint, L. R. A. 551; Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo. 111, charging the defendant with being engaged in 132 S. W. 607; State v. Justus, 90 Minn. the business of a master plumber without be- 474, 475, 97 N. W. 124; Vicksburg v. Mullane, ing registered or licensed as such, contrary 106 Miss. 199, 211, 63 South. 412, 50 L. R. A. to St. 1909, c. 536, as amended by St. 1914, (N. S.) 421. In some of these cases the par c. 287.

The defendant was licensed as a ticular statute has been held invalid while journeyman plumber but not as a master the general principle has been sustained. But plumber. Under a rule attempted to be pro the constitutionality of such an act has mulgated by the state examiners of plumbers, been denied in State v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237,

84 Pac. 851, 5 L, R. A. (N. S.) 674, 114 Am. (Ed. 1129, L. R. A. 1915D, 677, Ann. Cas. St. Rep. 114, 7 Ann. Cas. 577.

1915D, 420. (3) The defendant as a journeyman plumb [5, 6] But the invalidity of the rule which er had the right to work for himself and to unjustly prohibited the defendant from taktake contracts for, or to do by his own labor, ing an examination for license as a master plumbing upon buildings. Burke v. Holyoke plumber does not justify him in carrying on Board of Health, 219 Mass. 219, 106 N. E. the business of master plumber without a 976. But under the statute he had no right license. His remedy is to bring a petition to employ other journeymen plumbers to as- for a writ of mandamus to compel the propsist in the doing of such work. That would er board to give him a reasonable examinamake him a master plumber.

tion as to his qualifications to be a master [4] The statute does not provide that no plumber. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, one can be licensed as a master plumber un- 377, 79 N. E. 745, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1160, til after he has held a license as a journey-118 Am. St. Rep. 523; Crocker v. Justices of man plumber for three years. It does not Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N, E. 369, authorize the making of any rule to that ef- 21 Ann. Cas. 1061; Rea v. Alderman of Everfect. It only enacts that:

ett, 217 Mass. 427, 105 N. E. 618. The fact "The state examiners of plumbers may make that the examiners, who are amenable to the such rules as they deem necessary for the prop- writ of mandamus, made a mistake of law as er performance of their duties, which rules shall take effect when approved by the state to their power to prescribe a period of exboard of health.'

perience before giving an examination does This provision goes no further than to au- not warrant the defendant in proceeding, thorize the making of rules to guide the state without resort to the courts, to violate the examiners in the details of their own duties. terms of the statute. It does not extend to the establishment of a

Exceptions overruled. period of probation before an applicant for registration can be examined. It falls far

(225 Mass. 163) short of empowering a subordinate board to

REED v. EDISON ELECTRIC ILLUMINATmake a rule that no one shall take an ex

ING CO. OF BOSTON (two cases). amination to demonstrate his fitness to earn his living in his chosen employment until

WAITE 7. SAME. he has spent any given time in preparation. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. It is a grave interference with personal lib

Worcester. Nov. 29, 1916.) erty to probibit one from doing work with his 1. APPEAL AND ERROR Om927(7) REVIEWhands in a lawful and necessary occupation, DIRECTED VERDICT INFERENCES OF EVIwhich he is fitted to do, until he has been examined. The Legislature has never con- ant, the court will disregard all evidence, in

In reviewing a directed verdict for defendferred power upon a board to prescribe a cluding inferences of fact, unfavorable to the period of preparatory study before an exam-contention of plaintiff as set out in his decination could be taken, without explicit words laration. to that effect, even for professions requir: Law, Cent. Dig. $ 3748; Dec. Dig. 927(7).]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal ing a high degree of skill. It was not until

2. HIGHWAYS Om 213(2) ACTION FOR OBSt. 1915, C. 293, that any such provision was

STRUCTION-AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT. made as to registration in medicine. See, In action against an electric light company also, express provisions as to examinations for personal injuries and property damage from for the practice of dentistry, St. 1915, c. 301, pole lawfully standing in the highway, evidence

collision of automobile with an electric light $ 5, of osteopathy, St. 1909, c. 526, § 1, of that ten days before the accident another pole optometry, St. 1912, c. 700, § 5, and for ad- removed to give place to the standing pole had mission to the bar, St. 1904, c. 355, 8 1. But been left lying projecting diagonally onto the no such provision exists, for example, as the car skidded its wheels were guided by this

traveled portion of the highway, so that when to the examination of nurses, St. 1910, c. 449, pole up to the standing pole with which it col$ 3, or of veterinary practitioners, St. 1903, lided, held sufficient to carry the question of c. 249, of engineers and firemen, R. L. C. 102, defendant's negligence to the jury. 81, electricians, St. 1915, c. 296, and many Cent. Dig. § 536; Dec. Dig. Om213(2).]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, others. Since the statute neither makes any 3. HIGHWAYS M200-LICENSE TO USE. provision as to the time for preparation for

A license to an electric light company to use an examination nor undertakes to authorize a highway for the purpose of erecting and reany subordinate board to make a rule govern- moving poles by the side of the way, does not ing that subject, it is unnecessary to consider able time, or for a purpose that interferes


authorize or excuse such use for an unreasonthe delicate and serious constitutional ques- obstructs, or endangers unnecessarily the rights tton whether a statute or rule, to the effect of others. that no one could be licensed as a master [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, plumber until he had been licensed as a

Cent. Dig. $ 509; Dec. Dig. 200.)

4. HIGHWAYS 192 - OBSTRUCTION - ELECjourneyman plumber for three years, would

TRIC LIGUT POLE LYING ON HIGHWAY. be valid. See in this connection, Smith v.

An electric light pole, left lying projecting Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 31 Sup. Ct. 681, 58 L. I onto the traveled right of way of a highway, is

Raw For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

114 N.E.-19


a public nuisance, anless its being there has / tracks in the center of the way were tree some justification.

and wheels ran upon the macadam. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, The tread of the automobile was fifty-six Cent. Dig. 88 480, 483-485; Dec. Dig. Om inches. The space of smooth and rough ma192.]

cadam outside the wheel tracks was ten 5. EVIDENCE C506–EXPERTS OPERATION OF Peet and two inches on each side. A pole AUTOMOBILES.

Expert testimony is not admissible as to that had been used as an electric light pole whether it is safe and proper to operate an au was lying on the ground between the southertomobile under certain conditions; this being a ly wheel track and an electric light pole. question of fact for the jury.

It had been removed by the defendant to [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see, Evidence, give place to the standing electric light pole Cent. Dig. $ 2309; Dec. Dig. Om506.)

ten days before the collision. It was twentyExceptions from Superior Court, Worces- four feet in length and extended from withter County; Wm. Hamilton, Judge.

in a few feet of the upright pole to a point Three actions, by Mary T. Reed, Edgar ten feet southerly of the south wheel track, Reed, and Ruth A. Waite, against the Edi- which point was two inches to the north of son Electric Illuminating Company of Boston, the south line of the rough macadam. At a tried together. Verdict was directed for de- point east of and distant from the standing fendant in each case, and plaintiffs except electric light pole sixty to seventy feet, the Exceptions sustained.

car skidded to the left of the travelled maE. H. Vaughan, Edwd. T. Esty, and Jay cadam way; the driver turned his front Clark, Jr., all of Worcester, for plaintrås. wheels to the left “to catch the skid”; he Chas. C. Milton and Frank Riley, both caught it, then he turned back to the center of Worcester, for defendant.

of the way; he pulled on his steering wheel

—could not get back-he had run up agamist PIERCE, J. (1) Disregarding all evidence, wheel, and the car, so guided, ran straight

the pole on the ground which held the left including inferences of fact unfavorable to the contention of the plaintiffs as set out in to and against the upright electric pole.

[3, 4] There was also testimony to justify their several declarations, under the rule recognized and followed in Metayer v. Grant, the car against the butt of the prostrate

a finding that the pressure of the wheels of 222 Mass. 254, 110 N. E. 310, and cases cited pole caused the tip of that pole to swing two therein, the remaining testimony warranted feet to the north, and that the tip before the the jury in finding that the plaintiffs while position of the pole was changed by conriding in an automobile on the state high-tact with the automobile wheel, was two way, known as Central avenue, in the town feet and two inches on the travelled maof Weston, suffered damage by reason of cadam way. Upon the evidence the jury also the collision of the automobile with an elec- might find that the position of the pole had tric light pole of the defendant, lawfully not changed during the ten days it was on standing within the limits of the highway.

the ground, that its presence was not neces[2] Upon the evidence a jury might find the sary or helpful to the prosecution of any resurrounding conditions at the scene of the maining work of the defendant, that it was accident to have been as follows: The state an obstruction and menace to travel, and highway runs westerly from the town of made the travelled way unsafe and dangerWeston. It includes within the limits of its A license or permit to use the way for location the stone walls on the north and the purpose of erecting and removing poles south sides. Between the walls the surface by the side of the way, does not authorize of the way was nearly level and was usable or excuse such use for an unreasonable time, for travellers with teams or automobiles or for a purpose that interferes with, obwith the exception of the space covered by a structs or endangers unnecessarily the rights sidewalk on the north side of the location of others. Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239, and that occupied by trees and an electric 242, 49 Am. Rep. 27, and cases cited; Dolan light pole on the south side, which, respec- v. Charles J. Jacobs Co., 221 Mass. 256, 108 N. tively, stood twelve or fifteen inches and E. 939. The pole in the position which the four and one half feet from the face of the jury could have found it to have been was a north side of the stone wall. The highway public nuisance, unless the fact of its being as located was three rods wide; on the there was justified by evidence which the recnorth side the sidewalk was somewhat above ord does not disclose. Bemis v. Temple, 162 the surface level of the way; then, there Mass. 342, 38 N. E. 970, 26 L. R. A. 254 ; was a space three and one half feet wide of Horr v. New York, New Haven & Hartford rough macadam; then, one of eighteen feet R. R., 193 Mass. 100, 78 N. E. 776; Comof smooth macadam; then, one of three and monwealth v. Morrison, 197 Mass. 199, 83 one half feet of rough macadam; then, a N. E. 415, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 194, 125 Am. grass plot eight to ten feet wide extending St. Rep. 338; Stoliker v. Boston, 204 Mass. to the south wall. On the roadbed and 522, 90 N. E. 927; Igo v. Cambridge, 208 sides of the way there were snow and slush Mass. 571, 95 N. E. 557; Dolan v. Charles in spots protected by the trees, but the J. Jacobs Co., supra.


We are of opinion that the jury might |4. CARRIERS Om 247(3)-CARRIAGE OF PASSENfind rightfully, that the collision with the up


In an action for injuries while attempting right pole was a consequence of the contact to board a street car, if the jury found that of the left wheel of the automobile with the passengers were permitted by the street railpole lying on the ground in the position road to enter and leave that car, it could have which the jury might have found it to have been found there was an invitation to plaintiff

to become a passenger. been on the testimony of the witness for the

(Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Carriers, plaintiff, and that the consequent damage Cent. Dig. 88 988–990; Dec. Dig. Om 247(3).] was sufficient to found an action against the

5. CARRIERS Om 320(9), 347(4)-CARRIAGE OF defendant. Leahy v. Standard Oil Co., 224 PASSENGERS-NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTOMass. 352, 361, 362, 112 N. E. 950; Rapier BY NEGLIGENCE-QUESTIONS FOR JURY. V. London Tramways Co. (1893) 2 ch, 588, In an action for injuries while attempt599; Salmond Law of Torts, 199.

ing to board a street car, if plaintiff was a We do not think it necessary to determine ercise of 'due care and whether the street rail.

passenger, questions whether she was in the exwhether the pole was a nuisance in the high- road was negligent held for the jury on the eviway if at the time the automobile came in dence. contact with it, it was lying in the grass, Cent. Dig. $S 988-990, 1160, 1167, 1322; Dec.

[Ed._Note.--For other cases, see Carriers, parallel to and eighteen inches or two feet

Dig. Ow320(9), 347(4).] from the southerly wall as might be found to be the fact on the testimony of the witnesses Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcesof the defendant.

ter County ; Henry A. King, Judge. [5] Whether was or was not "safe and Action by Helen Nuttall against the Worces proper" to operate the car under the condi- ter Consolidated Street Railway Compations it was run was a question of fact for ny. Verdict was ordered for defendant, and the jury and not of expert opinion, and the plaintiff brings exceptions. Exceptions susanswer of the witness Gallup should not tained. have been received. We find no other reversible error in the admission or rejection Thos. C. Carver, all of Worcester, for plain

Chas. F. Campbell, Jas. C. Donnelly, and of testimony.

tiff. The case should have been submitted to Francis H. Dewey, all of Worcester, for de

Chas. O. Milton, John M. Thayer, and the jury.

fendant. Exceptions sustained.

CROSBY, J. This is an action to recover (225 Mass. 167)

for injuries received by the plaintiff while NUTTALL V. WORCESTER CONSOL. ST. attempting to board an electric car of the deRY. CO.

fendant, on Main Street in the City of Worcester.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Worcester. Nov. 28, 1916.)

testimony a verdict was ordered for the de

fendant. The plaintiff testified that there 1. CARRIERS en 247(3)–CARRIAGE OF "Pag- was a line of cars on Main Street that exSENGERS"-BOARDING STREET CAR.

Ordinarily, a person who attempts to board tended from Franklin Street to Chatham a street car at place which is not a regular Street; that she walked in a diagonal direcstopping place does not thereby become a “pas- tion from the westerly sidewalk to the last senger, in the absence of an invitation, express car, which was standing still; that with her or implied, to board the car at that place. [Ed. Note. -For other cases, see Carriers,

right hand she took hold of the car, it startCent. Dig. 88 988–990; Dec. Dig. Om 247(3).

ed, and she was thrown backward against it For other definitions, see_Words and Phrases, and was injured. She further testified that First and Second Series, Passenger.]

she did not see the motorman or the conduc2. CARRIERS Om 247(3)—CARRIAGE OF PASSEN- tor until after she was injured and had gotGERS-BOARDING STREET CAR-INVITATION. ten on the car. The carrier is not liable for injuries to a

[1, 2] There is no evidence to show that the person who attempts to board its street car at a place other than the usual stopping place, in place where the plaintiff attempted to board the absence of any invitation from its agents, the car was a regular stopping place. It is and when they did not see him, or were not well settled that ordinarily a person who atchargeable with knowledge of his presence.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, tempts to board a street car at a place which Cent. Dig. 88 988–990; Dec. Dig. Om 247(3).] is not a regular stopping place, does not 3. CARRIERS 320(2)—CARRIAGE OF PASSEN- thereby become a passenger, in the absence

GERS-IMPLIED INVITATION TO BOARD STREET of an invitation, express or implied to board CAR-QUESTION FOR JURY.

the car at that place. Although this court In an action for injuries while attempting has held that if a conductor, in response to a to board a street car, whether passengers were being received and discharged from the particu- signal from a person who desires to enter a lar car which plaintiff attempted to enter held car, brings it to a stop at a place other than for the jury under her evidence that passengers a regular stopping place, and such person were entering and leaving a long line of cars, is injured by reason of the negligent starting of which hers was last. [Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Carriers,

of the car before he has a reasonable opporCent. Dig. § 1118; Dec. Dig. 320(2).] tunity to reach a position of safety, the car

Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

rier is liable for such injury. Rand v. Bos-, whether she was in the exercise of due care ton Elev, Ry., 198 Mass. 569, 84 N. E, 841; and whether the defendant was negligent Lockwood v. Boston Elev. Ry., 200 Mass. were upon the evidence for the jury. 537, 86 N. E. 934, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 488. It Exceptions sustained. is equally well settled that a carrier is not liable for injuries to a person who attempts

(225 Mass. 247) 'to board a car at a place other than the usu

POTVIN V. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF al stopping place, in the absence of any in

AMERICA, vitation from the agents of the carrier; and when they did not see him, or were not

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. chargeable with knowledge of his presence.

Bristol. Nov. 28, 1916.) O'Loughlin v. Bay State St. Ry., 221 Mass. 1. INTERPLEADER 142, New, vol. 4 Key-No. 65, 108 N. E. 905.

Series-Right TO MAINTAIN-STATUTE. [3, 4] The plaintiff, after having testified $ 37, touching rights of a defendant to bring

Under the express terms Rev. Laws, c. 173, that there was a line of cars on Main Street interpleader, defendant insurance company when extending from Franklin to Chatham Street, sued on policies of insurance was entitled to was asked, “Did you see any people getting policies, averring that certain other persons had

interplead acknowledging its liability on the on or off those cars?” She answered, “Yes, demanded payment and bring the amount due on they were receiving passengers and some the policies into court to await judgment. getting off of these cars." Upon this evi- 2. INSURANCE Om665(1)-ACTION ON POLICY

EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY. dence, we are of opinion that it was a ques

In an action on policies of insurance brought tion of fact for the jury whether passengers by the administratrix of the insured, evidence were being received and discharged from the held sufficient to warrant a finding that there last car, which the plaintiff attempted to en- was the equivalent of an unqualified oral aster. If the jury found that passengers were delivery, to claimants.

signment of each policy, accompanied by its permitted by the defendant to enter and leave [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, that car, then it could have been found that Cent. Dig. & 1708, 1710; Dec. Dig. there was an invitation to the plaintiff to be-665(1).] come a passenger, Rand v. Boston Elev. Ry., 3. INSURANCE 208–LIFE INSURANCE-Ag. ubi supra; Lockwood v. Boston Elev. Ry., ubi SIGNMENT OF POLICY. supra; Buckley v. Boston Elev. Ry.215 policies, accompanied by their delivery, under

An unqualified oral assignment of insurance Mass. 50, 102 N. E. 75; Leavitt v. Boston an agreement that assignees would pay the preElev. Ry., 222 Mass. 246, 110 N. E. 961.

miums and have the benefit of the policies, was It is argued by the defendant that there sufficient in the absence of a prohibition of

such assignment by the company to transfer a was no evidence that passengers were enter- beneficial interest to the exclusion of the pering or leaving the car the plaintiff attempted sonal representatives of the insured. to board. This contention cannot be sus

(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, tained. The plaintiff did not specifically tes- Cent. Dig. $ 478; Dec. Dig. 208.] tify that passengers were leaving the car she 4. INSURANCE 114, 122-LIFE INSURANCEattempted to board, nor did she particularly


In the refer in this connection to any other car. that the transaction was a wagering contract,

absence of any evidence indicating Her testimony was to the effect that passen- it is not necessary that the beneficiary or asgers were getting on and off “of these cars" signee of a policy of insurance should have an which included the last car, at least the jury

insurable interest. could have so found. This would seem to be Cent. Dig. $8 136-138, 166, 167; Dec. Dig. Om

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, the natural and usual interpretation of the 114, 122.] language embodied in her reply. The case at bar is plainly to be distin

Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol

County; George A. Sanderson, Judge. guished from those relied on by the defendant, in which there was no evidence to war- the estate of Zephirin Potvin, deceased,

Action by Eva Potvin, administratrix of rant a finding that the plaintiff had become a passenger when injured. Yancey v. Bos- against the Prudential Insurance Company of ton Elev. Ry., 205 Mass. 162, 91 N. E. 202, 26 America, in which defendant filed a petition L. R. A. (N. S.) 1217, 137 Am. St. Rep. 431;

of interpleader acknowledging liability and Coneton v. Old Colony St. Ry., 212 Mass. 28, averring other claimants and making Adele 98 N. E. 602; Lauchtamacher v. Boston Elev. Patenaude, and others, parties. On plain. Ry., 214 Mass. 103, 100 N. E. 1068.

tiff's exceptions to a finding for claimants, In view of the conclusion reached, it is not and appeal from the order of judgment. Exnecessary to decide whether the plaintire ceptions overruled. could have been found to be a passenger if The following rulings requested by plainthere had been evidence that persons were tiff were overruled and exceptions taken entering and leaving other cars in the line, to the refusal to rule as requested: but it had been shown that no persons were (1) The claimants have not shown any such so entering or leaving the car which the interest in the policies declared on as will give

them a claim upon the fund. plaintiff attempted to board.

(4) It does not appear that the claimants had [5] If she was a passenger, the questions ) any insurable interest in the life of the assured;

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