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2. HEALTH21-REGULATION OF PLUMBERS | approved by the state board of health, the -CONSTITUTIONALITY. defendant could not take an examination to

St. 1909, c. 536, as amended by St. 1914, c. be a master plumber until the lapse of three 287, as to plumbers, so far as it requires an examination and license for master plumbers, is years from being licensed as a journeyman not unconstitutional, as plumbing bears so close plumber, or until March 25, 1917, he having a relation to the public health that its regula- been licensed as a journeyman plumber on tion is subject to legislative control within reasonable limits. March 25, 1914. The defendant testified at the trial that he had a place of business in Northampton, where he carried the stock of 13-PLUMBERS-JOURNEYMAN materials usual in such a store and necessary for doing the plumbing business and that he Under such statute, a journeyman plumber had contracted to do plumbing work and had has the right to work for himself and take contracts for, or to do by his own labor, plumb-employed journeymen plumbers. There was ing upon buildings, but not to employ other other evidence tending to show that he had plumbers. employed at least one journeyman plumber

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Health, Cent. Dig. 25; Dec. Dig. 21.] 3. LICENSES PLUMBERS.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Licenses, for several months who with the defendant, Cent. Dig. § 24; Dec. Dig. 13.] worked at plumbing in numerous places. 4. LICENSES 20 PLUMBERS PROBATION.

- PERIOD OF This evidence was sufficient to show that he had conducted business as a master plumber Such statute, providing that the state examiners of plumbers may make necessary rules within the statutory definition of that term. for the performance of their duties, to take ef- ["Master or employing plumber" is defined by fect when approved by the state board of health, St. 1909, c. 536, § 9, to be "a plumber having does not authorize the state examiners of a regular place of business and who himself, plumbers, even with the approval of the state board of health, to establish a rule that no one or by journeymen plumbers in his employ, can take an examination to be a master plumb-performs plumbing work." er until after three years from his being licensed as a journeyman plumber.

[2] St. 1909, c. 536, as amended by St. 1914, c. 287, so far as it requires an examination and license for those engaged in the business of master plumbing, is not unconstitutional. 40-PLUMBERS-PROSECUTION This in substance is settled by Common

[Ed. Note. For other cases. see Licenses, Cent. Dig. § 55; Dec. Dig. 20.] 5. LICENSES

-DEFENSES.

The invalidity of a rule of the state examiners of plumbers, unjustly prohibiting one from taking an examination for license as a master plumber, does not justify him in carry ing on the business of master plumber without a license.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Licenses, Cent. Dig. §§ 79-83; Dec. Dig. 40.] 6. MANDAMUS 87 STATE EXAMINERS Or

PLUMBERS-EXAMINATION.

Where opportunity to take an examination for license as a master plumber is unlawfully withheld from an applicant by the state examiners of plumbers, his remedy is a writ of mandamus to compel the board to give him a reasonable examination as to his qualifications to be a master plumber.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mandamus, Cent. Dig. §§ 189-194; Dec. Dig. 87.]

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampshire County; James H. Sisk, Judge.

Eugene J. McCarthy was found guilty of engaging in the business of a master plumber without being registered or licensed as such, and excepts. Exceptions overruled.

J. H. Schoonmaker, Dist. Atty., of Ware, for the Commonwealth. Frank J. McKay, of Holyoke, for defendant.

wealth v. Beaulieu, 213 Mass. 138, 99 N. E 955, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1080. That case related to the provisions of the statute as to the examination and licensing of journeymen plumbers, and it there was held that they did not violate the fundamental law. Plumbing bears so close a relation to the public health that its regulation as to those conducting the business, as well as the craftsmen working at the trade, are subject to legislative control within reasonable limits. The reasons which led to the conclusion that the licensing of journeymen plumbers was within the po lice power of the state require the same result in the case at bar as to the regulating of master plumbers.

General regulations providing for the licensing of those engaged in the business of plumbing have been upheld by many decisions. People v. Warden, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E. 686, 27 L. R. A. 718; Douglas v. People, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N. E. 341, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162; State v. Benzenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345; State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599, 51 N. E. 136, 41 L. R. A. 689, 65 Am. St. Rep. 785; Singer v. State, 72 Md. 464, 19 Atl. 1044, 8 RUGG, C J. [1] This is a complaint, L. R. A. 551; Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo. 111, charging the defendant with being engaged in 132 S. W. 607; State v. Justus, 90 Minn. the business of a master plumber without be- 474, 475, 97 N. W. 124; Vicksburg v. Mullane, ing registered or licensed as such, contrary 106 Miss. 199, 211, 63 South. 412, 50 L. R. A. to St. 1909, c. 536, as amended by St. 1914, (N. S.) 421. In some of these cases the parc. 287. The defendant was licensed as a ticular statute has been held invalid while journeyman plumber but not as a master the general principle has been sustained. But plumber. Under a rule attempted to be pro- the constitutionality of such an act has mulgated by the state examiners of plumbers, been denied in State v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237,

84 Pac. 851, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674, 114 Am. [Ed. 1129, L. R. A. 1915D, 677, Ann. Cas. St. Rep. 114, 7 Ann. Cas. 577. 1915D, 420.

[3] The defendant as a journeyman plumber had the right to work for himself and to take contracts for, or to do by his own labor, plumbing upon buildings. Burke v. Holyoke Board of Health, 219 Mass. 219, 106 N. E. 976. But under the statute he had no right to employ other journeymen plumbers to assist in the doing of such work. That would make him a master plumber.

[4] The statute does not provide that no one can be licensed as a master plumber until after he has held a license as a journeyman plumber for three years. It does not authorize the making of any rule to that effect. It only enacts that:

"The state examiners of plumbers may make such rules as they deem necessary for the proper performance of their duties, which rules shall take effect when approved by the state

board of health."

[5, 6] But the invalidity of the rule which unjustly prohibited the defendant from taking an examination for license as a master plumber does not justify him in carrying on the business of master plumber without a license. His remedy is to bring a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the proper board to give him a reasonable examination as to his qualifications to be a master plumber. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 377, 79 N. E. 745, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1160, 118 Am. St. Rep. 523; Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N. E. 369, 21 Ann. Cas. 1061; Rea v. Alderman of Everett, 217 Mass. 427, 105 N. E. 618. The fact that the examiners, who are amenable to the writ of mandamus, made a mistake of law as to their power to prescribe a period of experience before giving an examination does not warrant the defendant in proceeding, without resort to the courts, to violate the terms of the statute. Exceptions overruled.

(225 Mass. 163)

REED v. EDISON ELECTRIC ILLUMINAT-
ING CO. OF BOSTON (two cases).

WAITE 7. SAME.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Worcester. Nov. 29, 1916.)

DIRECTED VERDICT

DENCE.

927(7)-REVIEW

INFERENCES OF EVI

-

927(7).]

This provision goes no further than to authorize the making of rules to guide the state examiners in the details of their own duties. It does not extend to the establishment of a period of probation before an applicant for registration can be examined. It falls far short of empowering a subordinate board to make a rule that no one shall take an examination to demonstrate his fitness to earn his living in his chosen employment until he has spent any given time in preparation. It is a grave interference with personal liberty to prohibit one from doing work with his 1. APPEAL AND ERROR hands in a lawful and necessary occupation, which he is fitted to do, until he has been examined. The Legislature has never con- ant, the court will disregard all evidence, inIn reviewing a directed verdict for defendferred power upon a board to prescribe a cluding inferences of fact, unfavorable to the period of preparatory study before an exam-contention of plaintiff as set out in his declaration. ination could be taken, without explicit words to that effect, even for professions requir- Law, Cent. Dig. § 3748; Dec. Dig. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal ing a high degree of skill. It was not until 2. HIGHWAYS 213(2) St. 1915, c. 293, that any such provision was made as to registration in medicine. See, also, express provisions as to examinations for the practice of dentistry, St. 1915, c. 301, § 5, of osteopathy, St. 1909, c. 526, § 1, of optometry, St. 1912, c. 700, § 5, and for admission to the bar, St. 1904, c. 355, § 1. But no such provision exists, for example, as to the examination of nurses, St. 1910, c. 449, § 3, or of veterinary practitioners, St. 1903, c. 249, of engineers and firemen, R. L. c. 102, § 81, electricians, St. 1915, c. 296, and many others. Since the statute neither makes any provision as to the time for preparation for an examination nor undertakes to authorize any subordinate board to make a rule governing that subject, it is unnecessary to consider the delicate and serious constitutional question whether a statute or rule, to the effect that no one could be licensed as a master plumber until he had been licensed as journeyman plumber for three years, would be valid. See in this connection, Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 34 Sup. Ct. 681, 58 L.

ACTION FOR OB-
STRUCTION-AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT.
In action against an electric light company
for personal injuries and property damage from
collision of automobile with an electric light
that ten days before the accident another pole
pole lawfully standing in the highway, evidence
removed to give place to the standing pole had
been left lying projecting diagonally onto the
the car skidded its wheels were guided by this
traveled portion of the highway, so that when
pole up to the standing pole with which it col-
lided, held sufficient to carry the question of
defendant's negligence to the jury.

Cent. Dig. § 536; Dec. Dig. 213 (2).]
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways,
3. HIGHWAYS 200-LICENSE TO USE.

A license to an electric light company to use a highway for the purpose of erecting and removing poles by the side of the way, does not authorize or excuse such use for an unreasonable time, or for a purpose that interferes with, obstructs, or endangers unnecessarily the rights of others.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 509; Dec. Dig. 200.] a 4. HIGHWAYS 192- OBSTRUCTION

ELEC

TRIC LIGHT POLE LYING ON HIGHWAY.
An electric light pole, left lying projecting
onto the traveled right of way of a highway, is

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
114 N.E.-19

a public nuisance, unless its being there has tracks in the center of the way were free some justification. and wheels ran upon the macadam.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. 88 480, 483-485; Dec. Dig. ~ 192.]

5. EVIDENCE 506-EXPERTS OPERATION OF AUTOMOBILES.

Expert testimony is not admissible as to whether it is safe and proper to operate an automobile under certain conditions; this being a question of fact for the jury.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see, Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2309; Dec. Dig. 506.]

The tread of the automobile was fifty-six inches. The space of smooth and rough macadam outside the wheel tracks was ten feet and two inches on each side. A pole that had been used as an electric light pole was lying on the ground between the southerly wheel track and an electric light pole. It had been removed by the defendant to give place to the standing electric light pole ten days before the collision. It was twentyfour feet in length and extended from within a few feet of the upright pole to a point Three actions, by Mary T. Reed, Edgar ten feet southerly of the south wheel track, Reed, and Ruth A. Waite, against the Edi- which point was two inches to the north of son Electric Illuminating Company of Boston, the south line of the rough macadam. At a tried together. Verdict was directed for de-point east of and distant from the standing fendant in each case, and plaintiffs except. electric light pole sixty to seventy feet, the Exceptions sustained. car skidded to the left of the travelled macadam way; the driver turned his front

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Wm. Hamilton, Judge.

E. H. Vaughan, Edwd. T. Esty, and Jay Clark, Jr., all of Worcester, for plaintiffs. Chas. C. Milton and Frank L. Riley, both of Worcester, for defendant.

PIERCE, J. [1] Disregarding all evidence, including inferences of fact unfavorable to the contention of the plaintiffs as set out in their several declarations, under the rule rec

ognized and followed in Metayer v. Grant, 222 Mass. 254, 110 N. E. 310, and cases cited therein, the remaining testimony warranted the jury in finding that the plaintiffs while riding in an automobile on the state highway, known as Central avenue, in the town of Weston, suffered damage by reason of the collision of the automobile with an electric light pole of the defendant, lawfully standing within the limits of the highway.

wheels to the left "to catch the skid"; he caught it, then he turned back to the center of the way; he pulled on his steering wheel -could not get back-he had run up against wheel, and the car, so guided, ran straight the pole on the ground which held the left to and against the upright electric pole.

[3, 4] There was also testimony to justify the car against the butt of the prostrate a finding that the pressure of the wheels of pole caused the tip of that pole to swing two

position of the pole was changed by confeet to the north, and that the tip before the tact with the automobile wheel, was two feet and two inches on the travelled macadam way. Upon the evidence the jury also might find that the position of the pole had not changed during the ten days it was on the ground, that its presence was not neces[2] Upon the evidence a jury might find the sary or helpful to the prosecution of any resurrounding conditions at the scene of the maining work of the defendant, that it was accident to have been as follows: The state an obstruction and menace to travel, and highway runs westerly from the town of made the travelled way unsafe and dangerWeston. It includes within the limits of its ous. A license or permit to use the way for location the stone walls on the north and the purpose of erecting and removing poles south sides. Between the walls the surface by the side of the way, does not authorize of the way was nearly level and was usable or excuse such use for an unreasonable time, for travellers with teams or automobiles or for a purpose that interferes with, obwith the exception of the space covered by a structs or endangers unnecessarily the rights sidewalk on the north side of the location of others. Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239, and that occupied by trees and an electric | 242, 49 Am. Rep. 27, and cases cited; Dolan light pole on the south side, which, respec- v. Charles J. Jacobs Co., 221 Mass. 256, 108 N. tively, stood twelve or fifteen inches and four and one half feet from the face of the north side of the stone wall. The highway as located was three rods wide; on the north side the sidewalk was somewhat above the surface level of the way; then, there was a space three and one half feet wide of rough macadam; then, one of eighteen feet of smooth macadam; then, one of three and one half feet of rough macadam; then, a grass plot eight to ten feet wide extending to the south wall. On the roadbed and sides of the way there were snow and slush in spots protected by the trees, but the J. Jacobs Co., supra.

E. 939. The pole in the position which the jury could have found it to have been was a public nuisance, unless the fact of its being there was justified by evidence which the record does not disclose. Bemis v. Temple, 162 Mass. 342, 38 N. E. 970, 26 L. R. A. 254; Horr v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., 193 Mass. 100, 78 N. E. 776; Commonwealth v. Morrison, 197 Mass. 199, 83 N. E. 415, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 194, 125 Am. St. Rep. 338; Stoliker v. Boston, 204 Mass. 522, 90 N. E. 927; Igo v. Cambridge, 208 Mass. 571, 95 N. E. 557; Dolan v. Charles

GERS-INVITATION TO BOARD STREET CAR. to board a street car, if the jury found that In an action for injuries while attempting passengers were permitted by the street railroad to enter and leave that car, it could have been found there was an invitation to plaintiff to become a passenger.

We are of opinion that the jury might 14. CARRIERS 247(3)-CARRIAGE OF PASSENfind rightfully, that the collision with the upright pole was a consequence of the contact of the left wheel of the automobile with the pole lying on the ground in the position which the jury might have found it to have been on the testimony of the witness for the plaintiff, and that the consequent damage was sufficient to found an action against the defendant. Leahy v. Standard Oil Co., 224 Mass. 352, 361, 362, 112 N. E. 950; Rapier v. London Tramways Co. (1893) 2 ch. 588, 599; Salmond Law of Torts, 199.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 988-990; Dec. Dig. 247(3).] 5. CARRIERS 320(9), 347(4)-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS-NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTOBY NEGLIGENCE-QUESTIONS FOR JURY.

dence.

In an action for injuries while attempting to board a street car, if plaintiff was a We do not think it necessary to determine ercise of due care and whether the street railpassenger, questions whether she was in the exwhether the pole was a nuisance in the high-road was negligent held for the jury on the eviway if at the time the automobile came in contact with it, it was lying in the grass, parallel to and eighteen inches or two feet from the southerly wall as might be found to be the fact on the testimony of the witnesses of the defendant.

[blocks in formation]

Cent. Dig. §8 988-990, 1160, 1167, 1322; Dec. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, Dig. 320(9), 347(4).]

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Henry A. King, Judge.

Action by Helen Nuttall against the Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company. Verdict was ordered for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions. Exceptions sustained.

Chas. F. Campbell, Jas. C. Donnelly, and Thos. C. Carver, all of Worcester, for plaintiff. Chas. O. Milton, John M. Thayer, and Francis H. Dewey, all of Worcester, for de

fendant.

CROSBY, J. This is an action to recover for injuries received by the plaintiff while

NUTTALL v. WORCESTER CONSOL. ST. attempting to board an electric car of the de

RY. CO.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Worcester. Nov. 28, 1916.)

1. CARRIERS 247(3)-CARRIAGE OF "PAS-
SENGERS"-BOARDING STREET CAR.
Ordinarily, a person who attempts to board
a street car at a place which is not a regular
stopping place does not thereby become a "pas-
senger," in the absence of an invitation, express
or implied, to board the car at that place.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers,
Cent. Dig. 88 988-990; Dec. Dig. 247(3).
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases,
First and Second Series, Passenger.]
2. CARRIERS 247(3)—CarriagE OF PASSEN-
GERS-BOARDING STREET CAR-INVITATION.
The carrier is not liable for injuries to a
person who attempts to board its street car at
a place other than the usual stopping place, in
the absence of any invitation from its agents,
and when they did not see him, or were not
chargeable with knowledge of his presence.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers,
Cent. Dig. §§ 988-990; Dec. Dig. 247(3).]
3. CARRIERS ~320(2)-CARRIAGE OF PASSEN-
GERS-IMPLIED INVITATION TO BOARD STREET
CAR-QUESTION FOR JURY.

In an action for injuries while attempting to board a street car, whether passengers were being received and discharged from the particular car which plaintiff attempted to enter held for the jury under her evidence that passengers were entering and leaving a long line of cars,

of which hers was last.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1118; Dec. Dig. 320(2).]

fendant, on Main Street in the City of Worcester. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony a verdict was ordered for the defendant. The plaintiff testified that there was a line of cars on Main Street that extended from Franklin Street to Chatham Street; that she walked in a diagonal direction from the westerly sidewalk to the last car, which was standing still; that with her right hand she took hold of the car, it start

ed, and she was thrown backward against it and was injured. She further testified that she did not see the motorman or the conductor until after she was injured and had gotten on the car.

[1, 2] There is no evidence to show that the place where the plaintiff attempted to board the car was a regular stopping place. It is well settled that ordinarily a person who attempts to board a street car at a place which is not a regular stopping place, does not thereby become a passenger, in the absence of an invitation, express or implied to board the car at that place. Although this court has held that if a conductor, in response to a signal from a person who desires to enter a car, brings it to a stop at a place other than a regular stopping place, and such person is injured by reason of the negligent starting of the car before he has a reasonable opportunity to reach a position of safety, the car

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes®

rier is liable for such injury. Rand v. Boston Elev. Ry., 198 Mass. 569, 84 N. E. 841; Lockwood v. Boston Elev. Ry., 200 Mass. 537, 86 N. E. 934, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 488. It is equally well settled that a carrier is not liable for injuries to a person who attempts to board a car at a place other than the usual stopping place, in the absence of any invitation from the agents of the carrier; and when they did not see him, or were not chargeable with knowledge of his presence. O'Loughlin v. Bay State St. Ry., 221 Mass. 65, 108 N. E. 905.

[3, 4] The plaintiff, after having testified that there was a line of cars on Main Street extending from Franklin to Chatham Street, was asked, "Did you see any people getting on or off those cars?" She answered, "Yes, they were receiving passengers and some getting off of these cars." Upon this evidence, we are of opinion that it was a question of fact for the jury whether passengers were being received and discharged from the last car, which the plaintiff attempted to enter. If the jury found that passengers were permitted by the defendant to enter and leave that car, then it could have been found that there was an invitation to the plaintiff to become a passenger. Rand v. Boston Elev. Ry., ubi supra; Lockwood v. Boston Elev. Ry., ubi supra; Buckley v. Boston Elev. Ry., 215 Mass. 50, 102 N. E. 75; Leavitt v. Boston Elev. Ry., 222 Mass. 246, 110 N. E. 961.

It is argued by the defendant that there was no evidence that passengers were entering or leaving the car the plaintiff attempted to board. This contention cannot be sustained. The plaintiff did not specifically testify that passengers were leaving the car she attempted to board, nor did she particularly refer in this connection to any other car. Her testimony was to the effect that passengers were getting on and off "of these cars" which included the last car, at least the jury could have so found. This would seem to be the natural and usual interpretation of the language embodied in her reply.

The case at bar is plainly to be distinguished from those relied on by the defendant, in which there was no evidence to warrant a finding that the plaintiff had become a passenger when injured. Yancey v. Boston Elev. Ry., 205 Mass. 162, 91 N. E. 202, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1217, 137 Am. St. Rep. 431; Coneton v. Old Colony St. Ry., 212 Mass. 28, 98 N. E. 602; Lauchtamacher v. Boston Elev. Ry., 214 Mass. 103, 100 N. E. 1068.

In view of the conclusion reached, it is not necessary to decide whether the plaintiff could have been found to be a passenger if there had been evidence that persons were entering and leaving other cars in the line, but it had been shown that no persons were so entering or leaving the car which the plaintiff attempted to board.

whether she was in the exercise of due care and whether the defendant was negligent were upon the evidence for the jury. Exceptions sustained.

(225 Mass. 247)

POTVIN v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF
AMERICA.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Bristol. Nov. 28, 1916.)

1. INTERPLEADER 12, New, vol. 4 Key-No.
Series-RIGHT TO MAINTAIN-STATUTE.

§ 37, touching rights of a defendant to bring
Under the express terms Rev. Laws, c. 173,
interpleader, defendant insurance company when
sued on policies of insurance was entitled to
interplead acknowledging its liability on the
policies, averring that certain other persons had
demanded payment and bring the amount due on
the policies into court to await judgment.
2. INSURANCE 665(1)—ACTION ON POLICY-

EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.

In an action on policies of insurance brought by the administratrix of the insured, evidence held sufficient to warrant a finding that there signment of each policy, accompanied by its was the equivalent of an unqualified oral asdelivery, to claimants.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. $$ 1708, 1710; Dec. Dig. 665(1).]

3. INSURANCE 208-LIFE INSURANCE-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY.

policies, accompanied by their delivery under An unqualified oral assignment of insurance an agreement that assignees would pay the premiums and have the benefit of the policies, was sufficient, in the absence of a prohibition of beneficial interest to the exclusion of the persuch assignment by the company to transfer a sonal representatives of the insured.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 478; Dec. Dig. 208.]

4. INSURANCE 114, 122-LIFE INSURANCE— BENEFICIARIES-INSURABLE INTEREST.

that the transaction was a wagering contract,
In the absence of any evidence indicating
it is not necessary that the beneficiary or as-
signee of a policy of insurance should have an
insurable interest.

Cent. Dig. §8 136-138, 166, 167; Dec. Dig.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance,
114, 122.]

Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol
County; George A. Sanderson, Judge.

the estate of Zephirin Potvin, deceased, Action by Eva Potvin, administratrix of against the Prudential Insurance Company of America, in which defendant filed a petition of interpleader acknowledging liability and averring other claimants and making Adele Patenaude, and others, parties. On plaintiff's exceptions to a finding for claimants, and appeal from the order of judgment. Exceptions overruled.

The following rulings requested by plaintiff were overruled and exceptions taken to the refusal to rule as requested:

(1) The claimants have not shown any such interest in the policies declared on as will give them a claim upon the fund.

(4) It does not appear that the claimants had [5] If she was a passenger, the questions any insurable interest in the life of the assured;

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