execution of the trust deed, as is required by the homestead act (R. S., 1868, p. 386) in case of mortgages executed after the property is claimed as a homestead, that the trust deed was executed against the provisions of law. Having reference to the condition of the property, at the time the trust deed was made, Benson alone was a necessary grantor, even if a trust deed is to be considered as a mortgage within the meaning of that word as used in the homestead act. Drake v. Root. 2 Col. 689.

The subterfuge adopted by making the entry of "homestead" on the record on the very day that Benson and family vacated the premises, can not be held to invalidate the trust deed. The deed from Benson and wife to the defendant in ejectment was subject to the encumbrance contained in the deed of trust, and must yield to any title legally deduced under it. Taylor v. King, cited supra.

Wells having purchased with the record notice of the trust deed, occupies no better position than his grantor. The source of title in both appellant and appellee is the same. The court did not err in excluding the deed from Benson and wife to Wells. As we discover no error in the record, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

THE BANKRUPT LAW-ITS PROVISIONS AND OBJECTS-SHOULD THE LAW BE

REPEALED.

Prior to the bankruptcy law of 1867, there had existed in the United States two similar laws. One became a law and went into practical operation April 4, 1800; the other on the 19th day of August, 1841; the former was repealed in less than three, and the latter in less than two years from the date of their passage. The former law seems to have largely favored the creditor, while the latter law went to the opposite extreme, and favored the debtor.

Although the words bankrupt and insolvent are now used in this country almost as convertible terms or as being equivalent to each other, under the law of 1800, the word bankrupt seems to have been used and understood in quite the technical sense it bore under the English law. The word bankrupt occurs for the first time in the title of the statute 34 and 35, Henry VIII, ch. 4, "against such persons as do make bank rupt -a literal translation of the French idiom qui font banque route.

The broad distinction between a bankrupt law and an ordinary law is: The summary and immediate seizure of all the debtor's property; the distribution of it pro rata among the creditors in general; the discharge of the debtor from future liability for debts then existing.

It is evident, from the speeches made and proceedings taken, that the bankruptcy law of 1867 was passed with the view and intention of throwing off the commercial gyves from myriads of unfortunate debtors, and to open to the honest insolvent or bankrupt the door of freedom from his debts, and to give him a new lease of business life.

It was supposed and intended that, under this bankrupt law, the debtor and the creditor class would unite on the common ground of obligation and duty. But whether or not the practical operation of the law has yielded that protection to the creditor, or even to the debtor class, as was at first anticipated it would do, or whether the measure was fraught with beneficence to all, may be reasonably questioned. It will not, we think, be reckoned harsh to apply to our bankrupt law the terms which are generally applied against the German law based upon a similar system-" that it has been, and is, subject to much delay, expense, fraud and abuse."

By section thirty-nine of the bankrupt law, as amended by the supplementary act of 1874, it is declared what shall be deemed acts of bankruptcy, among which are: Departing from the state, or remaining absent therefrom, with intent to defraud creditors, or concealing or removing his property to avoid its sequestration; or making any assignment, gift, sale, conveyance, or transfer of his estate or property, with intent to delay, defraud or hinder his creditors; or disposing of any property, rights or credits, with the intent to give a preference; or who, being a bank, banker, broker, merchant, trader, manufacturer or miner has fraudulently stopped payment and not resumed payment, within forty days, of his commercial paper, (made or passed in the course of his business as such), or who, being a bank or banker, shall fail for forty days to pay any depositor upon demand of payment lawfully made, shall be deemed to have committed an act of bankruptcy, and shall be adjudged a bankrupt on the petition of one or more of his creditors, who shall constitute one-fourth thereof in number, and at least one-third in amount of the debts provable under the law. Creditors whose respective debts do not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars in amount shall not be reckoned in such number. If the provable debts exceed the said sum, and constitute one fourth in number of the creditors holding provable debts exceeding said sum, the requirement as to the number of petitioning creditors is held to be satisfied In re Hymes, 10 N. B. R. 433, Blatchford, J. Those debts only are to be counted which are not secured by liens and the like. In re Frost, 7 Chic. L. N. 42, Blodgett, J. The debtor is entitled to have a copy of the petition served upon him personally or left at his usual place of abode. Service may, in certain cases, under direction of the court, be made by publication. On the return-day the court may hear the allegations of the petitioner and the answer of the debter, or may adjourn the proceedings for good cause shown for that purpose to a future day. Section 41 as amended: The court may, at the request of the debtor, award a venire facias to the marshals, returnable within ten days thereafter, for the purpose of having the allegations set out in the petition tried. All proceedings in bankruptcy may be discontinued on reasonable notice and hearing, with the approval of the court. As amended by section 14, act of June 22, 1874: That if the facts set forth in the petition are proved to be true, or if default be made by the debtor, the

court may adjudge the debtor to be a bankrupt, and a warrant may issue and the property of the debtor be taken thereunder. If the debtor fails to appear in the proceedings,a certified copy of the adjudication shall forthwith be served on him, as provided for in the service of the order to show cause. In case of an abandonment of the bankruptcy proceeding by the creditor as well as by the debtor, it is held that any other creditor may intervene, and upon proper application may proceed to an adjudication. In re Lacey, 10 N. B. R. 488, Woodruff, J. And such intervention may be made at any time to which the matter has been adjourned for the purpose of showing cause.

As to Composition with Creditors.-Under section forty-three, as amended June 22d, 1874, § 17, the provisions of which seem to have been based upon §126 of the English bankrupt law of 1869, 32 and 33 Victoria, Ch. 71, it is declared, that the creditors of a bankrupt may, upon ten days' notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting, resolve that a composition proposed by the debtor be accepted, in satisfaction of his debts. Such resolution must be passed by a majority in number and three-fourths in value of the creditors assembled at such meeting, which provision is held to be mandatory (In re Spades, 13 N. B. R. 72), and must be confirmed by the signature thereto of the debtor and two-thirds in number and one-half in value of all the creditors of the debtor. The confirmation need not be presented to the register. Re Spillman, 13 N. B. R. 214. Those whose debts amount to sums exceeding fifty dollars may be reckoned in the majority in value, but not in the majority in numbers to pass and confirm the report. Re Spades, 13 N. B. R. 72; Re Wald, 12 Id. 491. The resolution, as passed and confirmed ( Re McDowell, 6 Biss. 193, 15 N. B. R. 73), shall be presented to the court, and if found to have been passed in accordance with the law, it may direct and cause the resolution to be recorded. The terms of the composition may be subsequently varied in the same manner as the original resolution was passed, without any prejudice to any persons taking interest under such provisions who do not assent to such addition or variation. It has been held that the decision of the majority of the creditors is conclusive as to the amount of the compromise being for the best interests of all parties.

Re Morris, 11 N. B. R. 443. Such proceedings shall be binding upon all creditors whose names, addresses and the amounts of the debts due to whom, are shown in the statement of the debtor produced at the meeting at which the resolution was passed. Compositions made in pursuance of the bankrupt law may be enforced by the court, and the same may likewise be set aside in consequence of legal difficulties, or for any sufficient cause shown. Re Weber F. Co., 13 N. B. R. 529; Re Whipple, 11 Id. 524. The proceedings for composition may be taken whether an adjudication has been had or not, and this feature of the law has been affirmed as constitutional. matter of Reiman, 13 N. B. R. 128.

In the

The composition is held not to be vitiated by a mistake on the part of the debtor as to his assets,

or as to the amount due to creditors; but if incorrectly stated, may be corrected at a meeting of the creditors. Re Asten, 14 N. B. R. 7; Re Morris, 11 Id. 443; Re Trafton, 14 Id. 507; Re Reiman, 13 Id. 128.

Much difficulty has, at times, been experienced upon the question as to whether payment under a composition, in indorsed notes, was valid under the law; and by several well considered cases, Re Hurst, 13 N. B. R. 255, Re Reiman, 11 Id. 21, it has been held that such payments are valid, but that the debtor is not entitled to his discharge unless the amount agreed upon is actually paid. It has also been conclusively held that a resolution of compromise does not affect an attaching creditor, whose attachment is less than four months old, unless an assignee has been elected and an assignment been made of the bankrupt's effects. Re Clapp, 14 N. B. R. 191; Re Shields, 15 N. B. R. 532. See an exhaustive opinion on this subject in Re Scott, 13 N. B. R. 73. The composition is held to be in itself a discharge (Re Becket, 12 N. B. R. 201) of the debtor. And this section of the law applies to copartnerships and corporations. Re Weber Furniture Co., 13 N. B. R. 529; Pool v. McDonald, 15 N. B. R. 560.

Section forty-four, as amended, provides that, if the bankrupt shall, after the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, secrete any property belonging to his estate, or part with, destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify any book or document relating thereto, or cause any of those acts to be done, or removes the same, or any part thereof, out of the district, to prevent the same coming to the assignee, or make any payment, gift, sale or transfer of property belonging to his estate with like intent, or shall spend any part in gaming; or, shall, with intent to defraud, willfully and fraudulently conceal from the assignee or omit from his schedule "any property or effects whatever," or shall attempt to account for any of his property by fictitious losses or expenses; or, within three months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, under false color and pretense of carrying on business and "dealing in the ordinary course of trade," obtain on credit from any person any goods or chattels with intent to defraud; or shall, within said time, pawn, pledge or dispose of, otherwise than by bona fide transactions in the ordinary way of his trade, any of his goods or chattels which have been obtained on credit and remain unpaid for, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, in any court of the United States, shall be punished by imprisonment with or without hard labor, for a term not exceeding three years. While section forty-four and other provisions of the bankrupt law, would seem to throw around the debtor quite a network of acts, the conviction of either one of which being sufficient to make him answerable to the crime of misdemeanor, it is a notorious fact, that very few cases appear in the reports where a bankrupt has been found guilty of either one of them. Notwithstanding the fact that cases frequently occur where the bankrupt has disposed of goods otherwise than by bona fide transactions "in

the ordinary way of his trade," the proof requisite to a conviction in such cases is, that the creditor must show that the goods in question were disposed of within "three months;" and further, the creditor has the onus upon him of showing that the goods claimed to have been so sold were the identical goods that remain unpaid for; and such identity must be absolutely proved, nothing being left to inference, in a proceeding of that character. And thus, the creditor being held to strict proof, can in hardly any case obtain a conviction.

While the present bankrupt law is in many respects a great improvement on either of the two former laws, there is evident need of amendment in many particulars before the law will work that beneficence to the commercial interests of the country that the advocates of it at the outset promised and assumed. One general benefit and advantage, however, is vouchsafed by the bankrupt law over all other laws, and that is, it prevents a creditor from gaining an undue advantage by action at law, as, where a debtor finds that he is being sued and judgment is likely to go against him, he may file his petition in bankruptcy and enjoin the creditor from proceeding in his action. Creditors may also unite and put the debtor into bankruptcy for the purpose of effecting a similar result.

It is evident, on all hands, that the merchants and the monied interests of the country take the proper and wise view of the matter in insisting upon either a repeal of the bankrupt law, or that it shall be so amended as to better protect the creditor class.

J. F. B.

SOME RECENT FOREIGN DECISIONS.

RAILWAY COMPANY-LUGGAGE OF PASSENGERSDELIVERY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. Patscheider v. Great Western R. R. English High Court, Ex. Div., 26 W. R. 268.-Taking a passenger's luggage out of the van and putting it on the platform, does not constitute a delivery by a railway company to the passenger. The company are bound to give the passenger reasonable time for claiming it and taking it away before their liability ceases.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-ADMINISTRATION-INTEREST -LEX FORI.-Hamilton v. Dallas. English High Court, Chy. Div., 26 W. R. 326.—In an administration by the court of the assets in this country of a testator who had a foreign domicil at the time of his death, although the property will be distributed according to the law of the place of domicil, the payment of interest will be governed by the practice of this court.

DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS PRIVILEGE-COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SOLICITOR AND CLIENT IN A FORMER ACTION.-Bullock v. Corne. English High Court, Q. B. Div., 26 W. R. 330.Communications between solicitor and client, to which privilege once attaches, are always privileged, whether they have been made with reference to the existing action, or to a previous one; a fortiori are they privileged when the question in dispute is the same in the second action, as in the former one. So held, where A., having failed in an action brought against him by B., brought an action for indemnity against C., who was under the same obligation to him as he was to B.,

and the application was by C. to inspect documents to which privilege attached in the former action.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF CORPORATION TO SERVANT-DEFECTIVE APPLIANCES-NEGLIGENCE-NOTICE.-Oak Bridge Coal Co. v. Reed. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 5 W. N. 3. Opinion PER CURIAM. 1. A master is not liable to his servant for injuries occasioned by the use of defective appliances furnished by the master, if such defects are so obvious that no prudent man would use the appliances, and the servant gives no notice to the master that such defects exist. But where such appliances, though in fact dangerous, are not obviously defective, and the servant, in the execution of his employment, notwithstanding the exercise of skill and caution in their use, is injured by reason of defects in the appliances, the master will be held liable. 2. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a brakeman; his duty required him to couple cars while on a trestle work, and, while so engaged, he was injured by reason of an alleged defect in the construction of this trestle work. The court below submitted to the jury the question of fact as to the defective character of the trestle work, and instructed them that if the plaintiff, in obedience to the requirements of the defendant, incurred the risk of the alleged insufficiency of the trestle work, and it was reasonably probable that the trestle work could be used without danger by the exercise of ordinary care, and the plaintiff did in fact exercise such care, and was, nevertheless, injured by reason of the defect of the trestle, then the defendant was liable. Held, not to be error.

ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO MURDER-PRESUMPTION-INDICTMENT-INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE WHO SETS OUT SPRING GUNS. -Simpson v. State. - Supreme Court of Alabama. From original opinion of BRICKELL, C. J.-1. Section 3670, of the Revised Code, which punishes assaults, with certain intents, as felonies, was designed for the punishment of several distinct offenses, elements of each being an act done, which, of itself, may be indictable, yet is aggravated by the intent attending it and the higher offense contemplated. 2. Each of these offenses, though not recognized at common law as separate, distinct, technical offenses, was an offense known to the common law, and indictable and punishable as a misdemeanor; and our statute not declaring the constituents of the offenses, resort must be had to the common law to ascertain the facts, which must concur to constitute the felonious assault or attempt. 3. Indictments, under the statute, as at common law, charging one offense, can not be supported by proof of another offense; and as the gist of the offense charged in assault with intent to murder is an assault with intent to murder the person named in the indictment, there can be no conviction of the offense charged if the intent was to murder some other person or to commit some other offense, though there may be of the minor offense of an assault, or an assault and battery. 4. The specific intent to murder the person named in the indictment must be proved as a matter of fact, the jury ascertaining its existence from all the facts and eircumstances in the evidence. 5. An act done with a particular specific intent is the offense at which the statute aims; the doctrine of an intent in law different from the intent in fact, has no just application, and if the real intent shown by the evidence is not that charged, there can be no conviction of the aggravated offense charged. 6. Whatever may be said of a charge "that if a man shoots another with a deadly weapon, the law presumes that by such shooting he intended to take the life of the person shot," when

given on a trial for murder, it is manifestly erroneous when given on a trial for an assault with intent to murder; for if it had any force it converts the material element of the offense, the intent to murder a particular person, into a presumption of law drawn from the nature of the weapon, and the act done with it, whereas the intent is a fact to be ascertained by the jury, in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case; the weight to be given to the character of the weapon and the manner of its use being facts to be considered along with the other evidence. 7. The common law rule once prevailing in England, allowing the owner of property to set spring guns to protect it against trespassers, is inconsistent with our customs and institutions, and has never been in force in the state. 8. While the owner may use necessary force to prevent a trespasser from taking property, the rule is subject to the qualification that he must not, except in extreme cases, endanger human life or great bodily harm; and if, in order to prevent a bare trespass, life is taken with a deadly weapon, the killing is murder; while if the weapon used is not a deadly weapon, and is suited rather for alarm or chastisement, and there was no intent to kill, the killing will be manslaughter. 9. The owner can not, because he inflicts injuries by means of spring guns which can not harm the trespasser without his concurring unlawful act, lawfully inflict other or greater harm to the person of the trespasser, to deter or frighten him, then he could, if personally present, directing or doing the shooting himself; and the principle is not different because the tresspasses are repeated, secret and under cover of darkness, by persons unknown to the owner. 10. On the trial of an indictment for an assault with intent to murder, instructions that if death had ensued from the wounding of the prosecutor by spring guns, placed by defendant to protect his own property from trespassers, the killing would have been murder, it follows that the defendant was guilty of an assault with intent to murder, is erroneous. 11. So, also, instructions that the defendant was guilty of an assault with intent to murder, if the spring gun wounding the prosecutor was set with the specific intent to kill him, the defendant suspecting him to be the trespasser and bearing malice against him, although there was also a general intent to kill whoever was the trespasser, are erroneous in such a case. 12. Setting a spring gun on a man's own premises, to prevent or shoot trespassers, is not an assault; and where a person trespassing there is wounded by it, although it was set to kill him, the defendant suspecting him to be the trespasser and having malice toward him, it is not an assault with intent to murder, under the statute. 13. Whether, where a gun is set with intent to kill a particular person who is injured by it, it is not an attempt to commit murder by means not amounting to an assault, indictable under another section of the statute, is a question not presented by this case. Reversed and remanded.

cumbrances. Rehearing denied. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Walker v. Deaver.

JURY-COURT REFUSING TO RECEive VerdiCTMANDAMUS.-1. The court instructed the jury that, under the pleadings and evidence, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Plaintiff refused to take a nonsuit; the cause was then submitted to the jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiff for $4,300, in due form; the court refused to receive the verdict, and directed the jury to retire and return a verdict for defendant, which was done, and judgment entered thereupon. Held, in a proceeding for a mandamus to compel the trial judge to receive and record the first verdict, that the petition setting forth those facts set forth no sufficient grounds for issuing the writ. 2. The giving of the above instruction was equivalent to sustaining a demurrer to the evidence, and when a demurrer to the evidence is sustained, the jury has nothing to do with the facts; their act in returning a verdict is then merely formal; the judge alone is responsible for the verdict, and the jury are as much bound to render it as they are to obey any other lawful direction of the judge. Demurrer sustained. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-State ex rel. Griswold v. Thayer.

LARCENY-COFFIN VALUE.-1. A coffin used to cover a corpse may, after burial, be the subject of larceny. 2. The property may be said to be in the person who bought the coffin for the purpose of interment. 3. Articles which have no market value, may, nevertheless, have a value which the law will recognize. It is competent for a jury, in case of larceny of a coffin, to arrive at the value of the coffin at the time it was stolen, from the fact that the coffin was new, and from the price shown to have been paid for the coffin when bought. And, where it was shown that the coffin cost thirty-five dollars, they might well, under the circumstances, find the offense grand larceny, under an instruction that, to so find, they must find the coffin to be worth more than ten dollars. Affirmed. Opinion by HAYDEN, J Per LEWIS, P. J., concurring. -In a buried coffin containing a corpse there is no ownership that can be asserted by one person against another in a civil action; but an ownership of a character sufficient to support a charge of larceny will be taken to exist somewhere. It is not necessary for the purposes of the criminal law to fix this ownership, and an indictment is sufficient which charges that the coffin is the property of some person to the jurors unknown.-State v. Doepke.

Associate Justices.

EJECTMENT EQUITABLE ANSWER-PRACTICE.Where an answer in ejectment admits the plaintiff's legal title, and sets up facts which constitute an equitable defense, but does not constitute an estoppel or bar to the action, the answer should contain a prayer foran account, and that the amount found to be due defendant be declared a lien on the land, 64 Mo. 518; 58 Mo. 563. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-Sims et al. v. Gray.

ENDORSEE AND ENDORSER-PAROL TESTIMONY.In an action by the endorsee of a promissory note against the endorser, who was payee thereof, verbal testimony is not admissible to show that the payee signed in any capacity, or assumed any liability except that which the law attaches to his signing. 42 Wis. 56; 3 N. H. 132; 29 Barb. 489; 6 Black. 509; 29 Ind. 271; contra, 19 Penn. St. 396. Opinion by HOUGH, J.Rodney v. Wilson, adm'r.

RAILROADS-KILLING STOCK.-Under section 43 of the railroad law, there can be no recovery for injuries resulting from negligent management of the train. 60 Mo. 209; 64 Mo. 255. The opinion comments on Lloyd v. P. R. R. Co., 49 Mo. 199; the 5th section of the damage act; Ellis v. P. R. R., 48 Mo. 231; Parks v. St. L. & I. M. R. R., 58 Mo. 45; Carey v. R. R., 60 Mo. 209; Wood v. R. R., 58 Mo.; and the conclusion drawn from all the cases is that under section 43 the action is not based upon negligence; that section 5 of the damage act was designed as an inducement to railroads to fence the track where the law did not require it to be done, but where it might be properly fenced; and that the action in this case being for the killing of hogs within the limits of the town of New Cambria, but outside of the part of the town laid off into and crossed by streets and alleys, ought to have been brought under section 5. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-Edwards v. H. & St. Jo. R. R.; also Eliot v. H. & St. Jo. R. R.

DEED-DELIVERY.-Delivery is essential to make a deed effective, and must be made actually or constructively during the life-time of the grantor. 12 Wend. 407; 12 Johns.421; and the constructive delivery must be made by some one holding the deed in escrow or as trustee. 2 Mass. 447; Greenl. Ev. Vol. II, § 297; 34 N. H., 460, 476. The test of the delivery of a deed is the fact that the grantor has divested himself of control over it. Where a father made a deed to his son and retained the custody of it himself, keeping it in a chest to which the son had access, and it was the grantor's intention that the son should have it after his own death, there was no delivery. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-Henry v. Henry.

PRACTICE SUIT FOR DELINQUENT TAXES.-An application for judgment for delinquent taxes is a summary proceeding and governed by the revenue act and the act in relation to trial by jury has no application to such a case, and the refusal of a jury in such a case held not error. Opinion by BREESE, J.-Mix v. The People.

EVIDENCE-EXPERT - REAL ESTATE. -In proving the value of property the rule does not confine it to experts, but any person having a knowledge, general or specific, may testify to its worth. Nor can the court determine as to the extent of the witness's knowledge before he can testify, or after having testified, determine what weight his evidence shall receive by excluding it, unless it fails in its tendency to prove the issue. The jury are presumed to be able to determine the weight that should be given to it, and if the means of information are limited, the jury should give his evidence slight if any weight. In proving values some latitude from the very nature of the question must be given as to the person who shall testify. Opinion by WALKER, J.-The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. v. Jones.

CONTRIBUTION-TENANTS IN COMMON - REMOVAL OF INCUMBRANCE.-A died seized of lands, leaving B, his widow, and C, D and E, his children and heirs at law. In 1874 C sells to D his interest in the lands and he thereby becomes owner of two-thirds, the premises still being subject to the dower and homestead interest of the widow. In September, 1874, D and E filed their petition for partition against their mother as

defendant. While the suit was pending D purchased of the widow her dower and homestead interest, paying therefor $1,500. D then dismissed the bill as to B and made E defendant and offering to permit him to share in the benefits of the purchase by contributing her proportion, prayed that if she refused, he be reimbursed one third of the outlay by decree of court. The lower court granted a partition and decreed that E pay to D one-third of the cost of purchasing the dower and homestead. To this E excepted on the grounds that dower and homestead are not such incumbrances on property as one tenant in common may compel a co-tenant to contribute to, and because a person cannot create another his debtor without the consent of the other. Held, that if E claims and holds an equality of benefit from the purchase of dower and homestead, she must submit to an equality of burthen, and that in equity the rule as to the making of a person a debtor without his consent, has always had an exception where tentants in common hold property encumbered. Opinion by WALKER, J.-Wilton v. Tazewell.

GRAND JURORS-QUALIFICATION- LIQUOR LAWS.1. That a person has subscribed funds for the purpose of legitimately suppressing crime, does not disqualify him from sitting on the grand jury; nor is it ground of disqualification that he has evinced a desire and purpose to enforce the laws. 2. The fact that township trustees caused one of their number to be returned as grand juror, does not disqualify him from serving as such. 3. In an indictment for selling intoxicating liquors, in violation of law, the time of the alleged offense is immaterial, and proof of a number of sales about the time alleged in the indictment and prior to the finding thereof, is sufficient to warrant conviction. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by WRIGHT, J.-Koch v. State.

RAILROADS-NEGLECT OF CONDUCTOR TO EJECT UNRULY PASSENGER.-1. It is not only the right of a conductor to expel from a train a drunken, unruly, boisterous passenger, but when such a person endangers, by his acts, the lives of people, it is the duty of such conductor to remove such passenger in order to protect others from violence and danger. 2. But this right must be reasonably exercised, and not so as to inflict wanton or unnecessary injury upon the offending passenger, nor so as to needlessly place him in circumstances of unusual peril. 3. If having exercised reasonable prudence, considering the time, place and circumstances, as also the condition of the drunken man himself, the conductor expels such passenger, who is afterward run over and killed by another train not in fault, the expulsion itself is not such proximate cause of the death as will make the company liable. Judgment reversed. Opinion by ASHBURN, J. Scott, J., being absent, did not sit.-Pits., Ft. Wayne & Ch. R. R. v. Valleley.

MARRIED WOMAN-CONTRACTS.-1. An indebtedness incurred by a married woman, for the benefit of herself or her separate property, and upon its credit, and the giving of a note or other obligation therefor, are facts from which a court of equity may imply and enforce a charge against such property. 2. But an intention to charge such property will not be implied merely from the giving of a note or other obligation