Fifthly, Of
Appeals, &c.

such allowance: Held, that a notice of appeal to the next subsequent sessions for which an effectual notice of appeal could be

given, was good.

The justices may respite the appeal, although the respondents do not complain of want of sufficient

notice, and object to the delay.

Inhabitants not

to be incompetent

witnesses in cer

tain cases on be

half of, or against, their parishes.

overseers in 1810; that soon after the 7th of May, 1811, when they ceased to be overseers, the account of Goddard's receipts and payments as overseer, was submitted to the magistrates of the borough of Shaftesbury at their special sessions holden for the purpose, for their allowance of the same, when Bowles objected to certain items in that account, and stated, that if they were allowed, he should appeal against the allowance; and thereupon the justices refused the allowance of the said account, but did not strike out the items objected to, alleging that the stat. 50 Geo. III. c. 49, was not imperative upon them, but only authorised them to examine the accounts of overseers if they thought proper. That on the 8th of July last, and not before, the said account was verified on the oath of Goddard before two magistrates of the borough, and by them allowed; and that the said 8th of July was the last day permitted by the practice of the sessions for giving notice of appeals to the then next sessions, which were holden in the same month of July; and that the items objected to still remaining in the account, Bowles gave notice of appeal against such account and allowance to the next subsequent sessions holden on the 8th of October, at which sessions, the justices conceiving the deponent ought to have appealed at the former sessions, dismissed the appeal on that account. After hearing Pell, Serj., against, and Casberd in support of the rule, the Court took time to look into the case of Rex v. Lord Ashburnham, 2 Nol. P. L. 462; and afterwards Lord Ellenborough, C. J., delivered their opinion. It seems to the Court that in every view of the case the mandamus should go, whether this be a proceeding under the 43 Eliz. or under the 17 Geo. II.; for supposing it to be under the 17 Geo. II., and supposing that statute in this respect to have repealed the 43 Eliz., (which from the cases cited seems by no means to be settled,) still under the circumstances of this case, we think the July sessions could not be considered the next sessions for the purpose of appealing; for the allowance by the justices was on the 8th of July, the last day when any effectual notice of appeal could have been given; and it does not appear when the appellant had any notice of such allowance; and the transaction seems to carry with it marks of design to defeat the appeal.-Mandamus granted.

Rex v. Thackwell, 4 B. & Č. 62; 6 D. & R. 61; 3 D. & R. Mag. Ca. 337. In this case the overseers of Monmouth went out of office on the 25th March. Their accounts were allowed by three justices on the 27th. On the 7th April the next quarter sessions were held at Usk, thirteen miles from Monmouth. On the same day, at two o'clock, when it was too late to enter an appeal, they delivered their accounts allowed as aforesaid to their successors. At the following (Midsummer) sessions an appeal against the allow ance of the accounts was entered, and respited, although the respite was objected to by the respondents; and at the Michaelmas sessions the order for the allowance was quashed. The order of sessions quashing the allowance was removed by certiorari into the King's Bench. And it was objected that as the words of the 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. 4, were," that if it shall ap pear to the said justices that reasonable notice was not given, then they shall adjourn the said appeal to the next sessions," it was plain that, supposing the appeal to the Midsummer sessions to be in time, still the justices had no power to adjourn it: that this power is limited to cases where reasonable notice has not been given; but that in this case, so far from objecting to the insufficiency of the notice, the respondents objected to the adjournment of the appeal. -Abbott, C. J. It is quite clear that, under the circumstances of this case, the parties were not bound to appeal at the Easter sessions, and at the Midsummer, it was for the justices and not for us to decide whether it would be proper to respite the appeal to Michaelmas. Order of sessions confirmed.

By stat. 54 Geo. III. c. 170, s. 9. No inhabitant or person rated or liable to be rated to any rates or cesses of any district, parish, township, or hamlet, or wholly or in part maintained or supported thereby, or executing or holding any office thereof or therein, shall, before any court or person or persons whatsoever, be deemed and taken to be by reason thereof an incompetent witness for or against such district, parish, township, or hamlet, in any matter relating to such rates or cesses; any law, usage, statute, or custom to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding.

Notice of Appeal.

The 41 Geo. III. c. 23, s. 4, (which see, ante, 141,) prescribes that the notice shall be in writing, and shall specify the particular causes or grounds of appeal. The following decisions have taken place upon this enactment. A notice of appeal against the allowance of overseers' accounts, which is merely general, stating that the different items, enumerating all of them, will be objected to, without stating for what cause or reason any one of them will be objected to, is clearly insufficient. And where the sessions overruled this preliminary objection, and upon hearing the appeal made an order disallowing the accounts, the Court of King's Bench upon the case reserved quashed this order, on the ground that the notice was not sufficient under the 41 Geo. III. c. 23, s. 4. Rex v. Mayall and others, 3 D. § R. 383; and 2 D. & R. Mag. Ca. 88. Rex. v. Joseph Sheard and another, overseers of Soothill, 2 B. & C. 856; 4 D. & R. 480; 2 D. & R. Mag. Ca. 261. Case: The appellant was a rated inhabitant of the township of Soothill, and having, at the October sessions, 1823, entered an appeal against the accounts of the respondents, on the 2d of January, 1824, served the following notice upon the respondents. This notice stated, that the appellant, at the last adjourned quarter sessions, had entered his appeal against the accounts of Joseph Sheard and Thomas Tong, overseers of the poor of the township of Soothill, from the month of April, 1822, to the month of April, 1823, and that the appellant would object to thirty-five items or charges of payments in the accounts specified in the notice. It then set out the names of the persons on whose account the payments were made, the sums paid, and, in some instances, the purposes for which they were made. It then proceeded to state that the appellant would insist upon the appeal that all these items ought to be struck out of the accounts and disallowed. The counsel for the respondents objected to the hearing of the appeal, on the ground that the particular causes and grounds of appeal against the items contained in the said notice were not specified and stated in the said notice, as directed and required by 41 Geo. III. c. 23, s. 4. On the 14th day of January, 1824, the day before the appeal came on to be heard, the attorney for the respondents and the attorney for the appellant entered into the following admissions:-" We do agree to admit that all the payments charged in the accounts of the respondents to which the appellant objects, were actually made to or for the use of the several persons to whom the same are charged to have been paid, and that the several sums charged in such accounts to have been paid to three several persons (named in the notice of appeal) respectively, were for debts contracted by the overseers of the poor of the township of Soothill, in one or more years previous to the year in which the respondents were overseers, and were not contracted by the respondents for the service of their current year, and the respondents undertake to produce upon the hearing of the appeal the original accounts, and vouchers regarding the items and sums of money objected to by the appellant. The court of quarter sessions, without expressing any opinion as to the validity of the notice, considered the admissions as a complete waiver of the objections to it, and entered into the merits of the said appeal. Blackburn having been heard in support of the order of sessions, and Alderson and Greenwood contra, Bayley, J., on a subsequent day, delivered the judgment of the Court. "The 41 Geo. III. c. 23, requires one of two things, either notice in writing, stating and specifying the particular causes or grounds of appeal; or, secondly, consent by the overseers, to be signified by them or their attorney in open court, that the sessions may proceed, though there has been no proper notice. The notice in writing is to be signed by the party giving it, or his attorney, and to be left at the place of abode of the officers; and the sessions are not to examine into any other cause or ground of appeal than those which the notice specifies. Two questions therefore arise: Has there been such a

(a) Sce Form of Notice of Appeal against Overseers' Accounts, post, Appendix.

Fifthly, Of
Appeals, &c.

It is not necessary to state in

notice as the statute requires? Has there been such a waiver? In this case, the original notice, which was served eleven days before the commencement of the sessions, merely stated that the appellant would object to thirty-five items or charges of payment, which he specified. On what grounds he would object he did not state. The day after the sessions commenced, being the day before their adjournment day, the attornies for the appellant and respondents agreed to admit, that all the payments objected to were in fact made, but that three of them were for debts contracted in prior years, not for debts contracted for the service of the year to which the accounts referred, and the respondents agreed to produce the original accounts and vouchers regarding the items objected to. The sessions expressed no opinion as to the notice, but thought these admissions a waiver of all objections to it. As to the waiver, the statute expressly provides that the sessions shall not examine or enquire into any ground of appeal not specified in the notice, with this single exception only, of consent by the overseers, signified by them or their attorney in open court: and we think that the statute has excluded, and intended to exclude, all questions of waiver in any other way, and that as there was no such consent as the statute requires, we cannot enter into the question of any other species of waiver. Then can it be said that this notice states and specifies the particular causes and grounds of appeal? It states only, that the appellant will object to thirty-five items or charges of payment; but why? It may be because they are false items, that they have not been paid; it may be, because they ought not to have been paid; it may be, because though paid, and rightly paid, they ought not to be brought in charge against the parish, but ought to be borne personally by the overseers. And where a notice is general, and leaves it uncertain upon which of several possible grounds of objection an item is questioned, can we say that it states and specifies a particular ground? We think not. Then, will the admissions supply the defect in this notice, not as a waiver, but as making it a good notice in itself. The statute prescribes no form of notice; it specifies no time within which it shall be delivered: and its only object being that the respondents may know distinctly what objections they are prepared to meet; and so long as that knowledge is fairly communicated to them in writing, it may be thought, that the mode in which it is communicated is immaterial. But it can never be supposed that the respondents' attorney meant, by entering into these admissions, to waive any other objections, which would otherwise have been open to him; his authority would be to uphold the rights of the respondents, not to give them up; and where the statute requires notice in writing to be left at the place of abode of the persons on whom it is to be served, we think we ought not, except upon very clear grounds, to allow it to be dispensed with." Order of sessions quashed.

A notice of appeal against overseers' accounts, merely stating that the party intended to try his appeal against the accounts, on the grounds and the appellant is a for the reasons thereinafter set forth, and then specifying the items against

the notice, that

party aggrieved

or a parishioner.

What is a reasonable notice.

which he intended to appeal, and the objection he intended to make against each item, was held to be sufficient, although it was not stated, that the party intending to appeal was a rated inhabitant of the parish, or a party aggrieved. The right of appeal given by 17 Geo. II. c. 38, s. 4, against overseers' accounts, is not within the principle of the decisions upon the 55 Geo. III. c. 68, s. 3, relating to highways; for, although the same language to a certain extent is found in both, yet the former statute, in addition to giving an appeal to the "party aggrieved," extends the right to "any person who shall have any material objection to the accounts."-Lord Tenterden added, If it should turn out that he is a mere stranger, the court of quarter sessions may refuse to hear him. Rex v. Justices of Somersetshire, 7 B. § C. 681.

A clear week's notice is usually considered "reasonable," and will satisfy the statute, unless by the practice of the particular sessions a longer notice is required, or there are peculiar circumstances in the case, which may induce the justices to adjourn the appeal to the following sessions. 2 Nol. P. L. 525; Steer's Par. L. 416; and see ante, Vol. I., title, Appeal.

V. Of the Settlement of the Poor.

This branch of the poor laws is divisible under the following heads :

by Renting a Tenement.

by Office.

by Estate.

by Payment of Rates.

by Acknowledgment by Certificate.

by Relief.

by Removal unappealed against.

(First)—Of Settlements in General. (a)

"By the term settlement, is to be understood a permanent indestructible right to take the benefit of the poor laws in a parish or place which maintains its own poor."- Gambier on Par. Sett. 1.

"A settlement is the right acquired in any one of the modes pointed out by the poor laws, to become a recipient of the benefit of those laws, in that parish or place, which provides for its own poor, where the right has been last acquired. It is not forfeitable, and may be communicated from person

First, Of

settlements in general.

Definition of a settlement.

First, Of settlements in general.

Poor people going from one parish to another.

to person notwithstanding an attainder, which works a forfeiture of most civil rights. Rex v. St. Mary, Cardigan, 6 T. R. 116. Though it ceases, and is destroyed for ever in the parish or place where it once existed, upon the acquisition of the same right in any other such parish or place."

By the earliest statute on this subject (12 Rich. II. c. 7) in which punishment was awarded against beggars able to serve, and provision made for impotent beggars, the poor were to repair, in order to be maintained, to the places where they were born. By 11 Hen. VII. c. 2, beggars not able to work were to resort to the hundred where they last dwelled, or were best known, or were born; and by 19 Hen. VII. c. 12, to where born, or to where they had made their last abode by the space of three years. By 1 Ed. VI. c. 3, this was explained to be, where they had been most conversant by the space of three years. By 1 Jac. I. c. 7, they were to be sent to the place of their dwelling, if they had any; if not, to the place where they last dwelt by the space of one year; if that could not be known, then to the place of their birth. So that beggars not able to work, were to be maintained where they were born, or where they had inhabited,-first, for any indeterminate time, next for three years, then for one year.

This last regulation as to the place were paupers were to be supported, continued to the time of 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12, by which after reciting that "Whereas the number of poor within England and Wales is very great and burthensome; and whereas, by reason of some defects in the law, poor people are not restrained from going from one parish to another, and therefore do endeavour to settle themselves in those parishes where there is the best stock, the largest commons or wastes to build cottages, and the most woods for them to burn and destroy, and when they have consumed it, then to another parish, and at last become rogues and vagabonds, to the great discouragement of parishes to provide stocks, where it is liable to be devoured by strangers: it is enacted, that it shall and may be lawful, upon complaint made by the churchwardens or overseers of the poor of any parish, to any justice of peace, under ten pounds within forty days after any such person or persons coming so to settle as aforesaid, in any tenement under the yearly value of ten pounds, for any two justices of the peace, whereof one to be of the quorum, of the division where any person or persons that are likely to be chargeable to the parish shall come to inhabit, by their warrant to remove and convey such person or persons to such parish where he or they were last legally settled, either as a native, householder, sojourner, apprentice, or servant, for the space of forty days at the least, unless he or they give sufficient security for the discharge of the said parish, to be allowed by the said justices.

How to be settled, coming to any tenement

yearly value.

In what place a settlement may be gained.

By the above act any person might gain a settlement by residence of forty days in the parish. But by 1 Jac. II. c. 17, the forty days were to be reckoned from the delivery to the parish officers by the new comers, of a notice of the place of abode and the number of the family. And by 3 and 4 W. & M. c. 11, from the publication of such notice in the church. The object of this regulation was notoriety in order that persons likely to be chargeable might be removed. But the latter act contemplated four cases in which no notice was to be given. First, when the person served an annual office. Second, when he paid parish rates. Third, when he was hired (and by 8 and 9 W. III. c. 30, s. 4, served) for a year, being unmarried and having no children. And fourthly, persons bound apprentice by indenture. Notice however was never necessary when the tenement on which the person came to settle was of more than 101. value by the year. The power of gaining a settlement by delivery, and publication of such notice, was altogether taken away by 35 Geo. III. c. 101.

Wherever a district of known limits contributes to one common fund raised within it, and which is disbursed within it, for the relief of its own poor, this right may be acquired, whether such district be a parish, a township, or hamlet, even though the township or hamlet be extra-parochial, for overseers may be appointed to an extra-parochial township or village, (Rex v. Rafford, 1 Stra. 512.)

The above rule has at different times been modified in favour of parishes in which prisons, hospitals, and other public charitable institutions are