his act an irregular or an anomalous indorsement. In a few of the States, as well as in England, he prima facie incurs the liability of an indorser, but parol evidence admissible of the intention of the parties which, when ascertained, determines his liability. 4 Lawson's Rights & Remedies, p. 2735, citing Coulter v. Richmond, 59 N. Y. 478; Jaffray v. Brown, 74 N. Y. 393; Browning v. Merritt, 61 Ind. 425; Cady v. Shepard, 12 Wis. 639; Eibert v. Finkbeimer, 68 Pa. St. 243; Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 279; Myrick v. Hasey, 27 Me. 9; Jones v. Goodwin, 39 Cal. 493; Hooks v. Anderson, 58 Ala. 238; Dubois v. Mason, 127 Mass. 37; Keyser v. Hall, 85 Ill. 511; Smith v. Long, 40 Mich. 555. But by the weight of authority he is liable as a joint promisor or comaker if he indorses the note before it was issued, and it is so presumed; but if shown to have indorsed it after its issue, he is liable as a guarantor; but in both cases evidence is admissible of the real intention of the parties, which, when ascertained, determines his liability. Union Bank v. Willls, 8 Met. 504; Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90; Carpenter v. McLaughlin, 12 R. I. 270; Stein v. Passmore, 25 Minn. 256; Herbage v. McEntee, 40 Mich. 337; Chafee V. R. R. Co., 64 Mo. 193; Sylvester v. Donner, 20 Vt. 355; Harris v. Brooks, 21 Pick, 195; Martin v. Boyd, 11 N. H. 385; Stagg v. Limenfelser, 59 Mo. 342; Houghton v. Ely, 26 Wis. 181; Wright v. Remington, 41 N. J. L. 48; Irvine v. Adams, 48 Wis. 468; Kealing v. Vansickle, 74 Ind. 529; Benton v. Hansford, 10 W. Va. 470; Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150; National Pemberton Bank v. Longee, 108 Mass. 371. Some courts, however, hold evidence inadmissible to vary the contract thus implied by law. Allen v. Brown, 124 Mass. 77; Stack v. Beach, 74 Ind. 571. A few courts have held that the quasi-indorser prima facie incurs the liability of a guarantor (Castle v. Rickly, 44 Ohio St. 490; Ellis v. Clark, 110 Mass. 392; Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal. 485; Carroll v. Weed, 13 Ill. 682; Boynton v. Pierce, 79 Ill. 145; Stowell v. Raywood, 83 Ill. 120; Gillespie v. Wheeler, 46 Conn. 410; Ford v. Henderson, 34 Cal. 673; Greathead v. Walton, 40 Conn. 226; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 176), while others hold that the law implies no contract whatever from such an indorsement. Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 N. J. L. 517; Crozer v. Chambers, 20 N. J.L. 256. One who puts his name on the back of a note payable to the order of another, on the condition that he is only to be liable as second indorser, cannot be held by the payee as joint maker if the payee subsequently indorses it above his name. Grensel v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 95. Recent Cases on the Subject.-Gen. St. Conn. sec. 1860, provides that "the blank indorsement of a negotiable or non-negotiable note, by a person who is neither its maker nor its payee, before or after its indorsement by the payee, shall import the contract of an ordinary indorsement as between such indorser and the payee or subsequent holders." Held that, where such an indorsement is made in the pres ence of the maker and payee before delivery, and there is no conversation in relation thereto, and no evidence of an agreement different from that implied by law, parol evidence cannot be admitted to vary or explain it. Spencer v. Allerton, 22 Atl. Rep. 778, 60 Conn. 410. The doctrine that when a person not a party to a note puts his name upon it before delivery be thereby makes himself an original promisor does not apply to a note payable to the maker, and indorsed before indorsement or negotiation by the maker. First Nat. Bank v. Payne (Mo. Sup.), 20 S. W. Rep. 41. No understanding between parties making and indorsing a note, that those indorsing it shall be liable only as guarantors, will avail against the payee, unless before delivery of the note he knows o such understanding. Long v. Campbell, 17 S. E. Rep. 197, 37 W. Va. 665. A person, not an original party to a note, by signing on the back thereof, becomes a guarantor, rather than a joint maker. Burnham v. Gosnell, 47 Mo. App. 637. A person other than a payee, who signs his name in blank upon the back of a promissory note at the time of its execution, and before its delivery to the payee, is, as to a subsequent bona fide holder for value, liable thereon as a joint maker, and not an accommodation indorser. Salisbury v. First Nat. Bank, 57 N. W. Rep. 727, 37 Neb. 872. Where one signs his name on the back of a note before delivery, for the purpose of giving it credit, he cannot show by parol that his agreement was that of indorser, and not of maker, though he was indorser of a prior note, for which this note was substituted. Dennis v. Jackson (Minn.), 59 N. W. Rep. 198. Where one not named 'as payee puts his name on the back of a note before delivery, he is liable as an original promisor, where credit is given on the faith thereof. McCallum v. Driggs (Fla.), 17 South. Rep. 407. An indorser of a note before deliv ery is liable to the holder thereof as a joint maker. Provident Savings Life Assur. Soc. v. Edmonds (Tenn.), 31 S. W. Rep. 168. Where a person, not the payee of the note, indorses it in blank before delivery by the maker, he is liable as surety. Barton v. American Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. Rep. 210. Persons who, before delivery, sign on the back of a note, the interest for which is payable in advance, the following agreement: "Waiving demand and notice, we hereby indorse and guaranty the full payment of the within note; future pay. ments of principal or of interest in renewal thereof not releasing us as indorsers," "-are joint makers of the (note. Jackson Bank v. Irons (R. I.), 30 Atl. Rep. 420. Where a person, not the payee of the note, indorse his name in blank, parol evidence is admissible to show whether he signed as a surety or an indorser. Barton v. American Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. Rep. 210. One, not the payee, who indorses a note before it is uttered, or indorsed by the payee, is a joint maker. Gumz v. Giegling, (Mich.), 66 N. W. Rep. 48. One who signs his name on the back of a note payable to the maker's order and by him indorsed in blank, and does so for the purpose of aiding the maker in negotiating the note, is liable as indorser, not as guarantor. Chicago Trust & Savings Bank v. Nordgren, 42 N. E. Rep. 148, 157 Ill. 663. One who writes his name on the back of a note at the time it is made is liable as a guarantor, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. Varley v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 60 Ill. App. 565. CORRESPONDENCE. INJUNCTION AGAINST CRIME-DEBS CASE. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: In your issue of Feb. 19 you publish a decision of the Court of Appeals of Texas holding that the State cannot maintain a bill to enjoin, as a common nuisance, the maintenance of a gaming house. In that case the court distinctly rules that, in order to such relief, the State must prove an injury to the property or civil rights of the public at large. In your annotation you remark that in this decision the court followed the Debs Case. It did to the extent of holding, what no well read lawyer ever doubted, that the jurisdiction of chancery to enjoin is not ousted because that sought to be enjoined is criminal. But in the Debs Case the Supreme Court of the United States, adopting almost literally the argument of the attorney-general, held that chancery, at the suit of the sovereign to enjoin, might take cognizance of the property rights of the citizen-in this, that case was an advance upon all former adjudication. On that point it is not followed in the case referred to; nor, so far as the writer is aware, has it been by the decision of any court of last resort in any of the States. S. S. GREGORY. Chicago, Ill. WEEKLY DIGEST Of ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of the United States, except those that are Published in Full or Commented upon in our Notes of Recent Decisions, and except those Opinions in which no Important Legal Principles are Dis. cussed of Interest to the Profession at Large. ALABAMA.......................... ARKANSAS....... BOOKS RECEIVED. Handbook of the Law of Partnership. By William George, of the St. Paul Bar. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1897. The Law of Receiverships as Established and Applied in the United States, Great Britain and her Colonies. With Procedure and Forms. By John W. Smith, Esq., of the Chicago Bar. Chicago: Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co. Rochester, N. Y. 1897. Handbook of the Law of Private Corporations. By Wm. L. Clark, Jr. Instructor in Law in the Catholic University of America, and Author of Hornbooks on "Criminal Law," "Criminal Procedure," and "Contracts." St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co. 1897. The Historical Development of Code Pleading in W. H. England and America, with Special Reference to the Codes of New York, Missouri, California, Kentucky, Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Kansas, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, Montana, Arizona, North Carolina, South Carolina, Arkansas, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Connecticut, and Oklahoma. By Charles M. Hepburn, of the Cincinnati Bar. Cincinnati: Anderson & Co. 1897. Commentaries on the Laws of England. In Four Books. By Sir William Blackstone Knight, one of the Justices of his Majesty's Court of Common Pleas, With Notes Selected from the Editions of Archbold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and Others; and in Addition, Notes and References to all Text Books and Decisions Wherein the Commentaries Have Been Cited, and all Statutes Modifying the Text. By William Draper Lewis, Ph. D. Dean of the Department of Law of the University of Pennsylvania. Book 3. Philadelphia: Rees, Welsh & Company. 1897. A Treatise on the Law of Railroads, Containing a Consideration of the Organization, Status and Powers of Railroad Corporations, and of the Rights and Liabilities Incident to the Location, Construction and Operation of Railroads, and also the Duties, Rights and Liabilities of Railroad Companies as Carriers under the Rules of the Common Law and the Interstate Commerce Act. By Byron K. Elliott and William F. Elliott, Authors of Roads and Streets, Appellate Procedure and General Practice. In Four Volumes. Indianapolis and Kansas City. The Bowen-Merrill Company. 1897. INDIANA....................6, 12, 13, 50, 53, 62, 83, 110, 113 IOWA.. .2, 61 ....8, 70 CALIFORNIA... ...7, 103 .....5, 44, 52, 65, 77 KENTUCKY....... ...9, 15, 63, 79, 98, 108 ..18, 23, 34, 48, 55, 80, 87, 92 MAINE.. MARYLAND.. MICHIGAN... MINNESOTA......... MISSOURI...................... MONTANA....... NEBRASKA.............4, 10, 11, 19, 29, 49, 69, 72, 105, 106, 107 NEW MEXICO................. OHIO........................................ OREGON..... PENNSYLVANIA..... RHODE ISLAND.......................................... 24 .21 ..20, 41, 56, 59, 84 .31, 54, 58, 76 .43 .90 ......14, 28, 33, 40, 67, 68, 85, 94, 95, 104 UNITED STATES C. C...... UNITED STATES S. C........... VIRGINIA..................... WASHINGTON.................................... WISCONSIN.. .22,93 ...17, 42, 64 .25, 89, 75, 82 ..45, 78, 86, 96, 99, 101, 102 ..51, 91, 111 1. ACKNOWLEDGMENT-Impeaching Mortgage Fore closure.-A certificate of acknowledgment in proper form can be impeached only by clear and convincing proof that it is false and fraudulent.-SAGINAW BUILD ING & LOAN ASSN. V. TENNANT, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 1118. 2. ACTION Joinder of Causes-Joint Trespass.Several persons guilty of a joint trespass may be sued severally, or jointly in one action.-HENRY V. CARLE TON, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 225. 3. ADMINISTRATOR- Right to Maintain Action.-An administrator cannot sue to set aside a sheriff's sale under foreclosure, on the ground of fraud in the sale. -THORP V. MILLER, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 929, 4. ADVERSE POSSESSION.-One who has been in the open, notorious, exclusive, adverse possession of real property for 10 years becomes vested with a valid title to the same.-CITY OF FLORENCE V. WHITE, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 50. 5. ALIENS-Ability to Hold Land.-The alien law pro hibits aliens from taking lands by devise or otherwise, except that heirs who had acquired title might hold and sell the land within three years. Section 8 provides that a resident alien, who has declared his intention to become a citizen, may take and hold real estate, and during six years dispose of it as a citizen, provided he records a certified copy of his declaration in the recorder's office. In 1891 a proviso was added to section 3, that, where a deed to land is made to an alien, he may convey to a citizen a good title, if the deed is executed before proceedings by the State to seize the land; and any deed "heretofore made" by any such alien shall have the same force against land so conveyed to an alien as if it had been made to a citizen: Held, that such proviso only applies to the class of aliens in section 8 of the act of 1887.-DE GRAFF V. WENT, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 1075. 6. APPEAL-Waiver of Errors.- Where an order sus taining a demurrer to the complaint, in that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, is assigned as error on the ground that the complaint shows that the action is excepted from the operation of the statute, the question thus raised goes to the sufficiency of the facts stated in the complaint and a failure to discuss the question of suffciency will be considered a waiver of the error.-GUY V. BLUE, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 1052. 7. APPEAL BOND - Liability of Sureties-Waste.Sureties in an appeal bond against waste on certain described land cannot be held for waste on other land, on parol evidence of a misdescription.-OGDEN v. DAVIS, Cal., 47 Pac. Rep. 772. 8. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-Validity. -A description of property, in a deed of assignment, sufficient in itself, is not vitiated by a further reference, for a more particular description, to a schedule annexed, which contains no description of such property.-MANSUR & TIBBETS IMP. Co. v. Wood, Ark., 38 8. W. Rep. 898. 9. ATTACHMENT- Intervention Judgment.-Under Code, § 3016, providing that on intervention in attach ment "the petitioner's claim shall be in a summary manner investigated. If it is found that the petitioner has title to a lien on or any interest in such property, the court shall make such order as may be necessary to protect its rights,"-the court can only pass on an intervener's claim to the property, and cannot render a money judgment against him.-VALLEY BANK OF CLARINDA V. WOLF, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 1131. 10, BANKS-Collections.-The legal title of commercial paper indorsed "for collection" passes to the indorsee only so far as to enable him to demand and enforce payment thereon. The owner of paper s0 indorsed may control the same until paid in full, and may intercept the proceeds thereof in the hands of an intermediate agent.-BRANCH V. UNITED STATES NAT. BANK OF OMAHA, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 34. 11. BANKS-Successors-Liability.-A petition of a creditor of a banking association, which discloses that another bank, as successor of said association, had assumed the liabilities upon a sufficient consideration, moving from said association, and that the claim of plaintiff was one of said liabilities remaining unpaid, states sufficient facts to entitle to relief, as against the bank which assumed the aforesaid liabili. ties.-TECUMSEH NAT. BANK V. BEST, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 41. 12. BENEVOLENT SOCIETY-Dissolution-Subordinate Lodge. Where the constitution of a beneficial associa tion provided that on the dissolution of a subordinate lodge its property, etc., should be turned over to the grand lodge, a resolution of withdrawal from the or. der, providing that the property of the lodge should be turned over to a different association, was void, as being ultra vires.-KOERNER LODGE, NO. 6, K. of P. v. GRAND LODGE K. OF P. OF INDIANA, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 1163, 18. BILLS AND NOTES-Action on Note by Indorsee.In an action by an indorsee of a negotiable promissory note against the maker, its mere production by the plaintiff, doly indorsed, raises a presumption of law that it was transferred before maturity, and for value; and the burden is on the defendant to show that plaint!ff is not an innocent holder.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF DUBUQUE V. MCKIBBIN, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 38. 14. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS Negligence Proximate Cause. Where plaintiff alleged that, while alightng from defendant's train at a station, he was vio lently thrown down and injured by defendant's negligence in starting the train suddenly and defendant alleged that plaintiff's injuries were due to his neg. igence in jumping from a moving train, the only issue raised was as to which party was negligent; rendering an instruction as to proximate cause erroneous, as Ulsleading.-GULF, C. & 8. F. RY. Co. v. RowLAND, Tex., S. W. Rep. 756. 15. CONFUSION OF GOODS.-It is not a mingling of goods to put potatoes into one end of a trench where potatoes belonging to another person are stored, sep arated therefrom by a partition of hay.-SCOTT v. SCHOFIELD, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 1127. 16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Delegation of Legislative Power. The fact that the taking effect of the act in a city is made contingent upon a vote of the city council does not constitute a delegation of legislative power.-STATE V. SULLIVAN, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 1094. 17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Federal Judicial PowerSailors in the Merchant Service.-The power to arrest deserting seamen in the merchant service, and deliver them on board their vessel, is not a part of the “judicial power," as defined by the constitution (article 3, §§ 1, 2); and congress, therefore, had power to confer it, by Rev. St. §§ 4598, 4599, on justices of the peace.ROBERTSON V. BALDWIN, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 326. 18. CONTRACT-Consideration Contest of Will.-A contract between an heir at law of a testatrix and certain devisees and legatees under her will, by which the first party agreed to abandon a proposed contest of the will, in consideration of which he was to be paid the amount of a bequest intended to be given him, but omitted from the will by mistake of the draftsman, is not invalid, as against public policy. - WALLER'S ADMX. V. MARKS, Ky., 38 S. W. Rep. 894. 19. CONTRACTS-Public Policy.-A stipulation in a contract giving a person the exclusive agency for the sale of the principal's property for an indefinite period does not render such contract void, as being against public policy.-WOODS V. HART, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 53. 20. CONTRACT FOR SALE OF PATENT.-A contract for the sale of a patent for an invention implies the valid ity of the patent; and where a court of competent authority has declared the patent void, and has enjoined the manufacture and sale of the article patented, the purchaser may defend an action for the price on the ground of want of consideration.-HERZOG V. HEY. MAN, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 1127. 21. CORPORATIONS Contracts.-A corporation hav. ing accepted labor and an assignment of stock without any attempt at repudiation, under a contract signed by its general manager alone, but which was agreed to by the officers, and which was reduced to writing, and signed by him in their presence, cannot escape liability thereon because of a by law requiring that its contracts be signed by at least two of its officers.WESTERN, ETC. Co. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF ALBUQUERQUE, N. Mex., 47 Pac. Rep. 721. 22. CORPORATIONS-Dissolution-Abatement.- Under the statute of Oregon (Hill's Ann. Laws, § 3233), providing that corporations, after their dissolution, shall continue to exist for five years, for the purpose of prosecutiug or defending suits, etc., a corporation, at the expiration of such five years, becomes absolutely defunct, and a suit, commenced by it before its dissolution, abates.-DUNDEE MORTGAGE & TRUST INVESTMENT CO. V. HUGHES, U. s. C. C., D. (Oreg.), 77 Fed. Rp. 855. 23. CORPORATIONS Dividends Limitation of Actions. A declaration of dividends, which by law is required to be entered on the records of the corporation, is an obligation in writing for the pay ment of money within the meaning of St. § 2514, providing that actions, on such obligations shall be brought within 15 years.WINCHESTER & LEXINGTON TURNPIKE Co. v. WICK LIFFE'S ADMR., Ky., 38 S. W. Rep. 866. 24. CORPORATIONS Insolvency - Preferring Directors. A mortgage ordered by the board of directors of an insolvent corporation to secure an antecedent debt due a director, whose vote was necessary to a legal expression of the corporate will, is voidable.-SAVAGE V. MILLER, N. J., 36 Atl. Rep. 579. 25. CORPORATION-Insolvent Corporation.-A simple contract creditor of an insolvent corporation, which has ceased to do business, and has been abandoned by its directors, may sue in equity, on behalf of himself and other creditors, to have the assets administered through a receiver, and applied in payment of their debts.-NUNNALLY V. STRAUSE, Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 580. Organization. 26. CORPORATIONS - Subscriptions Where subscribers representing 50 per cent. of the capital stock of a proposed corporation unite in call. ing and holding the first meeting for organization, the fact that other subscribers were not notified of the meeting does not afford grounds for those present and participating to object to the validity of the organiza. tion.-NICKUM V. BURCKHARDT, Oreg., 47 Pac. Rep. 788. 27. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Homicide-Reputation.-On a trial for murder, a witness who has testified that defendant is a peaceable citizen, and in good order as such, may be asked on cross-examination if defendant is not known to habitually manufacture and sell whisky in open violation of law.-STATE V. DILL, S. Car., 26 5. E. Rep. 567. 28. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE - Rape.-Witness who testifies to the age of the prosecutrix may testify to va rious collateral circumstances which impressed the date of her birth on his mind.-RICE V. STATE, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 803. 29. CRIMINAL LAW-Burglary.-That the act be com. mitted in the nighttime is an essential element of the crime of burglary.-IN RE MCVEY, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 51. 30. CRIMINAL LAW-Forgery-Variance.-Under Rev. St. 1889, § 4114, declaring that variance in names shall not be deemed fatal unless it is material and prejudicial to defendant, it is admissible, on a trial for uttering a forged note purporting to be signed by "J. Mugumry," to show that defendant agreed to have J. H. Montgomery sign the note, and represented the signature on the note as his.-STATE V. HARL, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 919. 31. CRIMINAL LAW-Pure Food Law - Adulteration.A sale of beer as food, containing salicylic acid in any quantity, without a label on the package, notifying the purchaser that it contains such an ingredient, is, when found to be poisonous or deleterious to health by its continuous or indiscriminate use, an offense against the pure food laws of the State, under the definition of an "adulteration" contained in clause 7, par. b. § 3, of the act, as amended April 22, 1890.-STATE V. HUTCHINSON, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 1043. 32. CRIMINAL LAW-Subornation of Perjury- Pending Cause. To come within Rev. St. 1889, § 3670, providing for the punishment of one who attempts to induce a person to commit perjury "in any cause, matter, or proceeding in or concerning which such other person might by law be sworn," etc., such attempt must be in reference to a cause then pending.-STATE V. HOWARD, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 908. 33. CRIMINAL PRACTICE-Rape - Indictment.-An indictment under Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 633, providing that "rape is the carnal knowledge of a female under the age of fifteen years, other than the wife of the person," an indictment is fatally defective which fails to negative the fact that the female was the wife of defendant.-RICE V. STATE, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 801. 34. DAMAGES Exemplary Damages. - The rule that exemplary damages cannot be allowed against a master for negligence of a servant if he is personally free from fault is not applicable where a railroad train was wrecked, and a person killed, by reason of the failure of the conductor and engineer in charge to obey orders received, though they were competent and selected with due care.-LOUISVILLE, ETC. Co. v. KELLY'S ADMX., Ky., 38 S. W. Rep. 852. 35. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-Damages.-In a statutory action to recover for death by wrongful act, it is error to allow the jury to consider damages sustained by decedent's children from the loss of nurture, instruction, and moral and physical training received from the father, of the value of which there was no evidence.-WALKER V. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. Co., Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 1114. 36. DEEDS-Trees.-When a grantor in a deed con. veys hemlock bark and trees upon a certain tract of land "with the right to enter upon said lot of land at any and all times during the term of ten years, to cut any trees, and make necessary roads to remove said bark and trees, during said term, without being liable for trespass," there is not an absolute sale of all the bark and trees upon the land, but only so much as the vendee may cut and remove within the term mentioned.-WEBBER V. PROCTOR, Me., 36 Atl. Rep. 631. 37. DIVORCE-Jurisdiction.-A court of Indiana has jurisdiction to decree a divorce, where the marriage took place and the cause for divorce occurred in an other State, only when the applicant has, in good faith obtained a domicile in Indiana.-DICKINSON V. DICKINSON, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 1091. 38. DIVORCE IN FOREIGN STATE-Validity.-Where a married woman living with her husband in Arizona goes to Montana to spend the summer, and, on hearing that her husband has commenced action for a divorce, returns io Arizona, and is there served with summons, and thereafter, before decree rendered, returns to Montana, there is no evidence to establish the fact that she was a non-resident of Arizona.-STATE v. GIROUX, Mont., 47 Pac. Rep. 798. 40. ESTOPPEL 39. DOWER - Assignment.-In assigning dower, the commissioners should not regard merely the fee-simple value of the various tracts, but should estimate the income of the entire estate, and set off to the widow such part as will yield her one-third of such income.FULLER V. CONRAD'S ADMR., Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 575. Damages. In an action to recover for the wrongful seizure and sale on execution of plaintiff's wagons left in the hands of its agent, as the property of the agent, it was error to charge that, if the agent claimed the property, plaintiff was estopped from claiming it, where it did not appear that it did any act, or made any false representations to defend ants, which caused them to believe that the wagons belonged to the agent, or that, knowing the manner in which the agent was dealing with them, they ac quiesced therein.-STRATTON WHITE Co. v. CASTLE BERRY, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 835. 41. EVIDENCE-Parol Evidence to Explain Writing.In a suit to recover the price of goods delivered under an instrument reciting, "P bought of E (plaintiff) the marble counters $2,500," parol evidence is admissible to prove that the agreed price was more than the sum mentioned.-EMMETT V. PENOYER, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 1041. 42. FEDERAL COURTS-Supreme Court.-A writ of er ror to a State supreme court cannot be sustained when no federal right was set up or claimed until the filing of a petition for rehearing, after final decision by such court.-PIM V. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, U. S. S. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 322. 43. GARNISHMENT - Funds in the Hands of Assignee. -After an assignment for the benefit of creditors, the funds in the hands of the assignee cannot be bound by process of foreign attachment served upon the as signor as garnishee.-IN RE MCDANIEL & HARVEY CO.'* ESTATE, Penn., 36 Atl. Rep. 567. 44. GUARANTY-Release of Guarantor.-The fact that the debtor gave the creditor security for the debt, payment of which was guarantied, did not discharge the guarantor, where the security was also given expressly for his benefit. -PEORIA SAVINGS, LOAN & TRUST CO. V. ELDER, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 1083. 45. HOMESTEAD - Sale on Execution.The fact that the owner of a homestead executes a warranty deed of it does not authorize its sale on execution against her, where the deed is in fact a mortgage.-WISS V. STEWART, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 736. 46. HUSBAND AND WIFE - Cancellation of Deed. - A married woman is not estopped to recover property voluntarily conveyed by her to her husband, such conveyance being void, by the fact that she afterwards joined her husband in conveying it to a third person, without consideration, in order to have it conveyed to a daughter of the husband by a former marriage, in fraud of plaintiff's rights. - CONNAR V. LEACH, Md., Atl. Rep. 591. 47. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Wife's Separate Property.Where money belonging to the wife was, by her direction, invested in land by the husband, who took title in his own name, the fact that the wife allowed the title so to remain, in ignorance of the effect thereof, does not show an assent to the use of the money for his benefit, sufficient, under Rev. St. 1889, § 6869, to raise the presumption that it had been reduced to pos. session by the husband. ALKIRE GROCERY CO. v. BALLENGER, Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 911. 48. HUSBAND AND WIFE Wife's Wages Rights of Creditors.-Under Aet April 11, 1873, § 1, providing that the wages of a married woman are free from the debts of the husband, real estate paid for by the labor of the wife is not subject to a judgment against the husband. -WALLACE V. MASON, Ky., 38 S. W. Rep. 887. 49. INSOLVENCY - Preferences - Frand. A debtor in failing or insolvent circumstances may prefer one creditor notwithstanding the fact it may be to the exclusion of others; and this rule may include relatives of the debtor, who are his creditors.-NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE V. CHAPMAN, Neb., 70 N. W. Rep. 39. 50. INSURANCE-Assessments-Forfeiture.-Forfeiture of a mutual fire policy for non-payment of assessments is waived if the company, with knowledge of the loss, collects from the insured, and retains, the amount of the delinquent assessments. MARSHALL FARMERS' HOME FIRE INS. Co. v. LIGGETT, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 1062. 51. INSURANCE-Defenses.-The neglect of the insured to use all reasonable means to save the property at and after the fire, and his misconduct in dissuading others from attempting to save it, defeats a recovery only as to the property lost in consequence of such neglect and misconduct.-WOLTERS V. WESTERN ASSUR. Co., Wis., 70 N. W. Rep. 62. 52. INSURANCE-Insurable Interest.-To constitute an Insurable interest in realty, the title of the assured need not be one in fee. It is enough if he holds such a relation to the property that its destruction by the peril insured against involves pecuniary loss to him.HOME INS. CO. OF NEW YORK V. MENDENHALL, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 1078. 5. INSURANCE Parties. Application of one to be made a defendant in an action on an insurance policy, alleging that he is a stockholder in the company on whose property the policy was issued, that he paid for the insurance, and that the policy should have been made payable to him, but by mistake, and without his knowledge, was made payable to plaintiff, shows an interest entitling him to be made a defendant.-KIRSH. BAUM V. HANOVER FIRE INS. Co., Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 1113. 54. INSURANCE POLICY Construction of Contract.The meaning of a contract is to be gathered from a consideration of all its parts, and no provision is to be wholly disregarded as inconsistent with other provisions unless no other reasonable construction is possible.-GERMAN FIRE INS. Co. v. Roost, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 1097. 35. JUDGES-Liability for Judicial Acts. A judge, acting within his jurisdiction, is not liable to a suit for damages, however illegal or erroneous his acts may be, in the absence of a malicious or corrupt motive.HOLLON V. LILLY, Ky., 38 S. W. Rep. 878. 56. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata - Indemnity.-In an action by a city on the bond of a contractor, for indemnity after payment of a judgment recovered against it for personal injuries caused by a pipe left on the sidewalk, where the contractor had notice to come in and defend, the judgment roll in that action is conclusive evidence of the amount of the damages, the existence of the obstruction, and the freedom of the injured person from negligence. MAYOR, ETC. OF CITY OF NEW YORK V. BRADY, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 1122. 57. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Accretions.-A lease for 30 years described the land by its boundaries, the eastern being a river, and as containing "145 acres, more or less," and provided that the rent should be a cer tain per cent. of the value, to be determined by ap. praisements at intervals of 10 years: Held, that in such appraisements the lessor was entitled to have considered accretions subsequently formed by recession of the river. ALLEN V. ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. Co., Mo., 38 S. W. Rep. 957. At com 58. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Destruction. mon law, where there is a covenant on the part of the lessee to pay rent for the term, and buildings on the demised premises are destroyed by fire, the; tenant is not relieved from the payment of rent unless he has protected himself by a provision in the lease to that effect.-FELIX V. GRIFFITHS, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 1092. 59. LANDLORD AND TENANT- Vacation by Insolvent Tenant. A re-entry and reletting by the landlord, under the terms of a lease, after the premises were vacated by the receiver of an insolvent lessee, and a presentation of a claim by the landlord to the receiver for the difference between the amount of rental reserved in the first and second leases, is not a cancellation of the open, subsisting engagement, and substitution of a claim for a contingent liability of the original lessee, which the receiver had no power to recognize. -PEOPLE V. ST. NICHOLAS BANK OF NEW YORK, N. Y., 45 N. E.Rep. 1129. 60. LIBEL PER SE Proof of Malice. A certain pub lication made by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff as an attorney at law and county attorney set forth in the opinion herein, considered and held, that it is obviously libelous per se, and that the trial court rightly instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict in some amount without proof of malice.-SHARP V. LARSON, Minn., 70 N. W. Rep. 1. 62. LIS PENDENS Bona Fide Purchaser.-Where the reversal of a decree to enforce a vendor's lien has been entered in the lower court, and no lis pendens has ever been filed, one who, for value, and without actual knowledge of the pending suit, purchases the land before another decree is rendered, takes it discharged of the lien, under Rev. St. 1894, § 327 et seq. (Rev. St. 1881, § 325 et seq.), providing that a suit to enforce a lien on realty, not founded on an instrument executed by the party holding the legal title as appears of record, shall not operate as constructive notice as against a bona fide purchaser, unless a lis pendens has been filed.PENNINGTON V. MARTIN, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 1111. 63. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-Probable Cause.-In an action for malicious prosecution, the fact that the examining magistrate discharged plaintiff without evidence in his behalf is prima facie evidence of want of probable cause.-HIDY V. MURRAY, Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 1138. 64. MARITIME LIENS Supplies. One furnishing supplies, on the order of a person or corporation having control and possession of a vessel under a charter party requiring the charterer to provide supplies at his own expense, acquires no lien, when the circumstances are such as to put him on inquiry as to the existence and terms of the charter party, and he fails to make such inquiry, and chooses to act on a mere be lief that the vessel will be liable.-THE VALENCIA V. ZIEGLER, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 323. 65. MARRIAGE-Validity- Evidence.-The contract of marriage being a contract jure gentium, capable of being entered into as of common right, a common-law marriage between a white man and a colored woman, contracted in another State per verba de præsenti, is void, in the absence of proof that common-law marriages or marriages between white and colored persons were prohibited by the laws of that State at the time of the marriage. LAURENCE V. LAURENCE, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 1071. |