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uld be in the care of his second ti ly objection to whom was that ung, and without much experient re of children. In that case it sa at a father, at his wife's funeral

, a at he be left alone with her remize o brothers of the wife remained i pm, and one of them requested the lit consent, in the name of his wife, tri puld have the custody of the intes i e father remained silent, and card pthers said to him that, it be mal pak, to shake hands. The father test ads, and after the funeral left the di eir care, where it remained tor 21 e father, during such time, for imed the right to its custody. Ito It he had not surrendered his right to

stody of the child.

RanLROAD COMPANY – RELIES AO VALIDITY OF RELEASE.-In Chicag gton & Quincy R. R. Co. v. LE 1. Rep. 439, the Circuit Court de

the Eighth Circuit, has held ion against a railroad company de employees to recover damages here aries through negligence

, a ples ployee had accepted benefits as an a relief association organized by py, under an agreement that del inquished his right of action, de m a valid defense when it fait it, if the association was at any tice funds to meet its obligations to t member could maintain an active

company, or fails to set out there nt between the company and its cu h such fullness and certainty that ly be able to see that the air

and reasonable, and not again icy, nor voidable for want of valul

1, Circuit Judge, is worth quoting ning that contracts of this chase

id, this case is rightly decided pund stated in the opinion. cts, in so far as they attempti

road company from liability to icted on its employees through Ice, are without sufficient and inst public policy, and mai al

mately be so declared by all couns

lum, while not consonant witte

towns are bound to protect travelers against such dan-
gers, by erecting railings to prevent them from stray.
ing out of the highway, it is difficult to see the limit
of their liability. In passing over an unfenced plain
in the nighttime, the traveler might stray away from
the road to a great distance, at the risk of the town,
unless they fenced in their whole highway; or be
might, by mistake, enter a private way, or an open
space, such as is often let about a farmhouse, or a
large public common, or an unfenced forest, and hold
the town responsible for any injury he might receive
there, because they had not fenced against the private
way, or open space, or common or forest. Indeed,
they would be liable to him for any injury he might
receive from coming in collision with any building or
structure in the city by straying beyond the limits of
a street in the dark, unless they provided railings
along all their public streets.'',Considering the fact that
Burgess street, in its entire width of sixty feet, was
graded and in good condition; that plaintiff was well
acquainted with the neighborhood; that he turned
his horse purposely, or allowed him to turn, at right
angles with the street, and had to pass over the gut.
ter and sidewalk before reaching the embankment-
and all the other attending circumstances, we are of
the opinion tbat the trial court was fully justified in
directing a verdict for the defendant and denying the
motion for a new trial.

ligation to light its streets, where they are safe and convenient for travel the whole width, unless the duty to do so is imposed by its charter. The court says:

The grounds of negligence alleged are (1) that the defendant city had neglected to build a fence or rail. ing along the edge of this street, to prevent the tray. eling public from falling into the marsh; (2) that defendant neglected to furnish lights to enable trayelers to avoid this dangerous place. There was no claim made that the street was improperly or unskillfully graded, or that the embankment was not properly constructed. Plaintiff was perfectly familiar with the street and neighborbood, with the location of the house, and that it was near, or, as he testified, alongside of the marsh. One of two things quite conclusively appears, viz., that he allowed his horse to go to the place of the accident unguided, or else that he drove the horse there himself. The undisputed evidence showed, by the wagon tracks, that, when nearly opposite the place of accident, bis horse turned nearly at right angles with the highway, and in so doing, if he was in the traveled part of the road, he must have passed over the gutter, three feet wide, and the sidewalk, ten feet wide, before reaching the edge of the street, from which point he was precipitated down the embankment. There was no snow in the street, but some snow and mud in the gutter; but he stones in the gutter could be readily seen by day. ight. Evidently he supposed that he was nearly opposite the house of Mrs. McCusick, his place of destination; but in driving, or permitting his horse to turn, from the main track too soon, and allowing him to go too far, the accident occurred only a few feet from Mrs. McCusick's house. The plaintiff's famil. iarity with the street, the McCusick house, and the embankment, and the manner in which the horse was managed, were impurtant factors in the case, all of which were admitted; and all the facts appearing show conclusively that plaintiff was guilty of negligence in his conduct, resulting in being precipitated down the embankment, and which caused the injury. If he saw fit, on a dark night, as this was, to encounter the risk of going with his horse and wagon to Mrs. McCusick's house, and thus pass beyond the limits of a properly and skillfully graded street, without any latent or patent defects in it, and the injuries received were beyond the line of such street, we do not think the city liable.

This court has already beld in the case of Miller v. City of St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. Rep. 271, that a city is under no obligation to light its streets, and a mere neglect to do so is not a ground of liability, un. less the charter expressly imposes the duty. This is the general rule, and, if there are exceptions, the facts herein do not bring this case within the exception. Nor are towns necessarily bound to fence, or erect barriers, to prevent travelers from getting out. side of the road or way, 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.), section 1005. The reason for the rule is well stated, in cases of this kind, in Sparhawk v. City of Salem, 1 Allen, 30, as follows: “It appears that the highway in question was safe and convenient for travelers throughout its entire width, and the land adjoining it was also sale and convenient to travel upon. After getting entirely outside the highway in safety, the traveler must proceed still further in order to reach a dangerous place. If Le reached that place, and was injured, the want of a railing was remotely, and not mmediately, connected with the injury. If cities and

20 obly two titles seserted, establishe na cintor the damages suffered joint riz!

thich passes to oibers by ery must be repe. in case of the death of by sone al

E' aber is an action for dam. the right o! tante parents on account of tire in al!

ar an action by the par- | injured b.i. 120 child's services. There considered lah damages suffered by beneficiary ale prents' right for damages sues as su

rareat in the loss of the child that the co se nese two rights may pre- one is a dtle caibe four different aspects said is, that and lod there is still another repre-enta?

fata plich the case might be that the u antere a minor has neither that right

urte, intiz ander the care, contended by 24. sed protection of its best which wola

reaires, and one of these himsell sue and ontributory negligence that he can on te nd, that element of a negligence, des being guilty of contributors

can or shou es exist, but it is a case of tributory !

gore on the part of one of ian-custo ha a bez brianes. Many of the delle importa keras die vjew is endorsed by some that belt thi And Diskt recent text-writers-

corporation to the cop



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on a dat child, the contributory mental inte

al sud u one is a good defense these organi

There are two notable instances wherein the act of one is imputed to another in railway law. The first is the case of the negligence of the parent or custodian of a minor being imputed to the minor. And the other is where the wrongful, malicious act of the employee is imputed to the master so as to subject the master to exemplary damages. In the case of the minor, there are four different aspects in which the subject may present itself. First. Where the action is by

BRIA 9 DEPAS parent guilty of condividuals f

quasi-publi file na bojury causing the death of | cerned in had the cases, hereto- | Hot or coil

hogenie, sles as administrator of

sa fiarther, and hold that the fact be run; the a realidiary, who is guilty of con

to the pul

armi). Second. Where the action is brought
by the administrator of the deceased minou

Where the action is in the name of
and for the benefit of the parent of the minor.
by the administrator of the minor; in which
action the administrator sues, not only in
right of the intestate, but also in right of the
in view of both aspects of the case.

Walters v. R. Co., 41 lowa, 71; Hartfield v. Roper,

by the sting as administrator them duties file alimenterial, is but a matter of private ente

il pencedere. And that it mat- | trains is ali

to buy the vice of administrator, | danger, the the minor suing by next friend (procheir

se rely mu beneficiary, and such

para os geh negligence is a defense that these Third.

Hot be true, then by
Fourth. This is a statutory action brought contributory negli necessities

Debould be a defense on

ex contributory negligers; a rail

pa bang it is an old and well next of kin, "and the damages are assessed

blema. 5. E. Bep. 772: Bottoms v. from a trace

6.8. Rep. 798; Nisbit v.


switb speed. likest one of several joint danger to r

In all

a place of ered as alwa

21 Wend. 615; Kay v. R. Co., 3 Am. Rep. 628; Grant
v. Fitzburg, 39 Am. St. Rep. 450; Wymore v. Ma
baska Co., 78 Iowa, 396; Railway Co. v. Crawford, 2
Ohio St. 641; City of Chicago v. Major, 68 Am. Dec.
553; City of Chicago v. Starr, 89 Am. Dec. 499; Vis
will v. Doyle, 160 Mass. 42; Westerfield v. Levis, 41
La. Ann. 64; Whirley v. Whitman, 1 Head, 610; Rail

10,1L R A. 150; Loague

: Lilroad Cor. Gravecloses' Bp. 454; Glassey v. Bailway

Trenerz r. R.Co. (Pa.), 24 Am.

through the todian, is

2 Chitty op 3 Loagué v

19:314; Bisbop, Non-con. F'itzburg, 160


ting a verdict for the defendants po for a new trial.



here are two notable instalte: ict of one is imputed to another law. The first is the case of con e of the parent or custodias it : g imputed to the minor. Arden 'bere the wrongful, malicious si loyee is imputed to the master ect the master to exemplars dag le case of the minor, there 1?) it aspects in which the subjecten minor suing by next friend ! ). Second. Where the action k ne administrator of the deceases d. Where the action is in the

I* are bound to protect travelenizuzeta these cases there are only two titles asserted, established rule of pleading, that where a

by erecting railings to prevent there ut of the higbwas, it is difficult to it

the one is an action for the damages suffered joint right of recovery is asserted, the recovdeir liability. In passing over an nak by the child, and which passes to others by ery must be joint. It is not true as asserted le birbtume, the traveler migbt stri

right of inheritance, in case of the death of by some authorities, that the statute gives road to a great distance, at the risk of to

the child; and the other is an action for dam** they lenced in their whale bicon

the right of action to the personal representa2t, by mistake, enter a private

ages suffered by the parents on account of tive in all respects the same as if the party t'i xucbasis often let about a baba the loss of the child, or an action by the par- | injured himself had sued. Because the best public common, or an unfenced fena

ents for the loss of the child's services. There wwn responsible for any injury bear

considered authorities hold that where a sole p, because they had not fenced airco

is the child's right for damages suffered by beneficiary guilty of contributory negligence, or open space, or common O: RE

the child, and the parents' right for damages sues as administrator to the deceased minor, would be liable to bim for any OTTIE

suffered by the parent in the loss of the child that the contributory negligence of such an Ive from coming in collision with antre

or its services, and these two rights may preiture in the city by straying beyond

one is a defense on the nerits. All that can be met in the dark, unless they provide

sent themselves in the four different aspects said is, that the statute gives to the personal call their publie streets.". Considerazione

above mentioned. And there is still another representatives of the minor, the same right *** street, in its entire width of 1

point of view from which the case might be and in good condition; that plau

that the minor bad, but the enforcement of considered ; this is where a minor has neither ainted with the neighborhood: 113! ?

that right by the administrator may be atore purposely, or allowed him to

father nor mother, but is under the care, con** With the street, and had to page trol, maintenance and protection of its next

tended by circumstances different from those od sidewalk before reaching the epic

which would have existed, had the minor of kin, its near relatives, and one of these ill the other attending circumstica i

himself sued. Where a minor is so young protectors is guilty of contributory negligence pinion that the trial court was falls

that he cannot be held liable for contributory with respect to the child, that element of a sole beneficiary being guilty of contributory

negligence, the question arises whether he negligence, does not exist, but it is a case of tributory negligence of his parent or guard

can or should stand chargeable with the concontributory negligence on the part of one of several joint beneficiaries. Many of the de

ian-custodian. This is a question of no litcided cases and the view is endorsed by some

tle importance to the great railroad systems of the ablest and most recent text-writers

that belt this union with bands of iron. These hold that where a sole beneficiary sues as

corporations have become a public necessity administrator to the child, the contributory

to the commercial, business and governnegligence of such a one is a good defense

mental interests of the people, and whilst on the merits, as where a parent guilty of con

these organizations are formed by private intributory negligence, sues as administrator of quasi-public nature, and the public are con

dividuals for private gain, still they are of a the child, for an injury causing the death of the child. And some of the cases, hereto

cerned in their management and operation. fore cited, go further, and hold that the fact

Hot or cold, wet or dry, railroad trains must of the sole beneficiary, who is guilty of con

be run; they have come under an obligation

to the public, and this obligation lays on itself. First. Where the

stributory negligence, suing as administrator
to the child, is immaterial, is but a matter of

them duties which do not belong to a mere

private enterprise. The running of railroad And that it matfers not who fills the office of administrator, danger, they are not easily controlled, not

trains is always attended with more or less flat if there be only one beneficiary, and such readily stopped when once started, but the gence, then that such negligence is a defense

necessities of rapid transportation demands for the benefit of the parent of the beneficiary be guilty of contributory negli. th. This is a statutory autori

that these corporations shall run their trains panty of reasoning, it one of several joint | danger to railroad employees and to passen

with speed. This rapid speed increases the gers; a railroad train and a railroad track is a place of danger-a red flag may be considered as always floating from a train or waiving from a track. Now, then, if a young child,

through the negligence of its parents or cusnd. 615; kay F. R. Co., 340. I izburg, 39 Am. St. Rep. the

todian, is suffered to wander on a railroad

2 Chitty on Pld., vol. 1, p. 79; Gould on Pld. p. 230.

8 Loague v. Railroad, 91 Tenn, 461; Grant v. City ity of Chicago v. Starr, de

Fitzburg, 160 Mass. 160; Wiswill v. Doyle, 160 Mass. · Doyle, 160 Vass. 42; Westerkets

107. 20. 64; Whirley r. Whitman, IR

mere form of procedure.

on the merits. If this be true, then by a

ne administrator of the mini n the administrator sues.

of the intestate, but also is to of kin, "and the damages ew of both aspects of the case alters v. R. Co., 11 lowa, 71;Hamid

beneficiaries he guilty of contributory negli-
gence, this negligence should be a defense on
the merits. Because it is an old and well
zoad Co. v. Robinson, 18 N. E. Rep. 772; Bottoms v.
B. Co. (N. C.), 25, 41 Am. St. Rep. 799; Nisbit v.
Town of Garner (Iowa), 1 L. R. A. 153; Loague
P. Railroad, 91 Tenn. 461; Railroad Co. v. Graseclooes'
Admr. (Va.), 13 S. E. Rep. 454; Glassey v. Railway
Co., 57 Pa. St. 172; Westerberg

v. R. Co. (Pa.), 24 Am.
. Rep. 510; Whart. Neg. 312-314; Bisbop, Non-con.

Co., 78 Iowa, 396; Railwaria, 6.15 t. 611; City of Chicago F. Vat*

Law, $ 582.

the prote:

track, in front of a rapidly moving train, and is chargeable either with his own negligence as The minor's title

, in the and justi.. is injured or killed, should the railroad be

or with the negligence of others. Butlet these

stiluded on the negligence doctrine ! dealt with as though the minor and its parents same gentlemen who are prone to use such

Se spot separate bis title may wel : were free from fault? Shall the parents, but strong language, when speaking of the doc- EN Negligence is a link who clasi. for whose negligence the child would not have trine to which they are opposed-I say, let

ades which will snap when his own been hurt, shall the very parties whose negli- these gentlemen remember, that the minor is

pozza al to the line." Es is the bei.e

a pau is a wholesome doc. when the gence was the direct and proximate cause of asserting a right founded on the negligence

13 sbout as near enforctor of the in the misfortune, be allowed to recover heavy of those who are responsible for his conduct, damages against the corporation for the results yes, the minor is asserting a right founded ped doing unto others as of their acknowledged negligence? If such is on the culpable negligence of those who are

en do to you as bumian protect the the law, then the law is in conflict with nat- his keepers and custodians by birth and by

iba conduct can come safely rely ural justice. Mr. Bishop in bis work on Non- blood. A low and depraved parent could

Ta sai wholesome application a minor fr.

in Then the parent is pro- danger in o. contract Law, takes strong position on this willfully expose his own offspring to danger subject against the railroad, and says that and death, and make profit from the transac

"treing either for damages of an in the negligence of the parent should not be tion, nay even, this doctrine allows the guilty

2 01, or for damages he question, w imputed to the minor, and says that the law

parent to go from the temple of justice with

sur death or injury of the dead, but never took away a child's property because the price of his iniquity in his bloody hands.

222 urent has been guilty of are not the its father was a scoundrel, poor or shiftless. The opposers of imputing to the minor the

9. In fact, we cannot todians of But this has nothing to do with the matter, negligence of the parent virtually abandon

*** kz, truly, may tbe minor kin might 1,

sted from a friend, wbo will covered for the two cases are not parallel; the question their position when they decide that the neg.

niz de binor to be exposed to custodiano here is shall an individual profit by an act of ligence of the parent is a bar in a suit by the which he was the proximate cause.

I have administrator of the minor, wben the parent never heard of anyone proposing to take a is the sole beneficiary. They say, to allow child's property because its father was the parent to recover in such case, despite scoundrel. Mr. Bishop may know of such

his negligence, would be to allow bim to take cases, but he does not cite any authorities to advantage of his own wrong directly. These that effect. And until he does I cannot give respectable authorities then hold, that conup my convictions, especially in the light of tributory negligence is a defense when to the arguments he makes.

deny or refuse the same would be to allow a Mr. Beach in his work on Contributory party to take advantage of his own wrong: Negligence says that the doctrine of the im

If a parent through bis negligence suffers his

in en te trek. I hope to live to which made putability of the parents' negligence to the

child to get injured by a railway train, and minor is an anomaly, and in striking contrast

then brings suit in his own name as parent

atas teresy will be banished passer and

and with the case of a donkey, exposed on the

for the loss of the child or his services, highway and negligently run down and in

recovers damages therefor, is he not taking

para braght against the doc. case, that is

z takiej tability of the negli- could not b. jured, or with oysters in the bed of a river,

advantage of his own wrong? And in all

cases where a parent sues for an injury, cuardian to the minor. act of the se injured by the negligent operation of the vessel, in both of which cases actions have been when his negligence was the proximate cause

mid doctrine, have driven authorize or sustained, and he adds that if the child were

of that injury and recovers damages of the an ass or an oyster, he would secure

fridge which will shatter common la a pro

defendant, is he not taking advantage of his tection, denied him as a human being. The

own wrong? The law will not allow that to learned author certainly will not contend,

be done indirectly, which it will not allow dope

in the role beneficiary, in a suit act, which t

har et entrator of the minor, ratify. Wh that the two cases are parallel. To make the

directly. And if the parent cannot directly parallel, there must be two persons, one take advantage of his own wrong, he will

agence of such parentemplary dar guilty of the negligence and the other suing,

not be allowed to indirectly do that which he to which last person, the plaintiff, the negli

4 Nisbet v. Town of Garner, 1 L. R. A. 163; gence of the first is proposed to be imputed.

case of Wi Whirley v. Wbituan, 1 Head, 610; Railroad Co. . In Mr. Beach's case, we have the master at Wilcox, 8 L. R. A. 494; Kay v. Railroad Co., 3 Am.

P one end of the line and an ass at the other

Rep. 629; Railway Co. v. Crawford, 24 Obio st. 611.

5 Grant v. City of Fitzburg, 160 Mass. 160; Glassey end, this is the parallel he makes. We are v. Railway Co., 57 Pa. St. 172, Wiswill v. Doyle, 39

a pergence, that such per- damages is told by the advocates of the doctrine of the Am. St. Rep. 451; Bottoms v. R. Co. (N. C.), 23, 41

a negligente, reason the doctrin non-imputability of negligence to minors,

Am. St. Rep. 799; Burger v. R. Co., 112 Mo. 249; Rid

wow2, 3; Westerberg v. that the minor has done no wrong, that his

enbrur v. R. Co., 102 Mo. 286; Bluedorn v. Railway

Co., 121 Mo. 268; Pat. Ry. Acc. Law, $ 72; Pol. Torts, tender years forbids the supposition that he § 299; Cooley, Torts, $ 681;

hal. Enc. Law, $; Tiffany, l ters v. R. CO., 6 Blackstone's Comm. vol. 2, p. 154.

chat, sad then come demand. | life.” of a negligence. Most of the We come suas inicting severe penal. willful, ma

to carelessly or negligently imputer to est raber, yet, these courts master lia!, 23 in their codes, will reward the common se sabor, whose negligence to the same

' isi, by suffering him to servant, eve 4 luns against the railroad employment ** bus ita mer a child who besonal act.

tertentie, and the trend of the the master (

svet ndich have been firm of his emplo

art by holding that where ble to make

a var, or in evidence on and Lord C

waris will be compelled serede iary, or the plaintiff contained na potrbutory negligence,

ses through others who ment, yet

or of the right

her #; Hartfeld v. Roper, 21

Thompson Veg. $ 1184.

laid down. 8 City of 1

9 McManus

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Day even, this doctrine allow

opposers of imputing to the gence of the parent virtually su position wben they decide the 2 ce of the parent is a bar in a con nistrator of the minor, when e sole beneficiary. There arent to recover in such as egligence, would be to allow to itage of his own wrong diren ctable authorities then bo. 3. tory negligence is a defense or refuse the same would be

to take advantage of his or arent through his negligent to get injured by a railway tri brings suit in his own dalk :: je loss of the child or his sermos ers damages therefor, is de 3 atage of his own wrong:

where a parent sues for di his negligence was the provisi at injury and recorers damage Jant, is he not taking adrezte

argeable either with his
or cannot do directly. The minor's title,

in the and justice alike point to this result. As the
th the negligence of others. Be case supposed, is founded on the negligence doctrine now stands in many courts, the infaní
gentlemen who are prone to another. You cannot separate his title may well pray to be delivered from his friends,
g language, when speaking de from this negligence. Negligence is a link who claim that the parent is not estopped by
to which they are opposedly
in his chain, and a link which will snap when- his own contributory negligence. When he

Esgentlemen remember, that becam ever the "plummet is laid to the line." is the beneficiary either in his own right, or ‘ing a right founded on the ter toppel by matter in pais is a wholesoine doc. when the suit is brought by the administraose who are responsible for his ..

trine. In fact it comes about as near enforc- tor of the minor. A great deal is said about the minor is asserting a right be

ing the golden rule of doing unto others as the protection of minors. Does this doctrine le culpable negligence of those i

you would have others do to you as human protect them? But it is said the law can

rules applied to human conduct can come. safely rely on the parental affection to shield eepers and custodians by birth is

And it is a wise and wholesome application
I. A low and depraved per

a minor from the danger of being exposed to
of this doctrine. When the parent is pro- danger in order that advantage may be taken
illy expose his own offspring :
leath, and make profit from the 11 hibited from recovering either for damages of an injury to the minor. Waiving that

suffered by the minor, or for damages he question, we say, that both parents may be

has suffered by the death or injury of the dead, but still the law; applies for parents it to go from the temple of je

minor, when he the parent has been guilty of are not the only persons that can act as cusrice of his iniquity in his bilmir

contributory negligence. In fact, we cannot todians of minors, for some of the next of see how it can be; for, truly, may the minor kin might be sole beneficiary of damages repray to be delivered from a friend, who will covered for the minor's death, as well as negligently suffer the minor to be exposed to custodian of the minor's person during his almost certain death, and then come demand

life. 8 ing the price of his negligence. Most of the We come, now, to consider the case of the States have statutes inflicting severe penal- willful, malicious wrong of the employees ties on persons who carelessly or negligently imputed to the master, so as to make the cause the death of another, yet, these courts master liable for exemplary damages. By with this statute in their codes, will reward the common law the master was not liable, the custodian of a minor, whose negligence

to the same extent, for the trespass of the Causes the minor's death, by suffering him to

servant, even when done in the line of his recover beavy damages against the railroad employment, as for the master's own perwhose train has run over a child who he sonal act. When the servant did an act Caused to be on the track.? I hope to live to

which made the perpetrator thereof a tres. see the day when this heresy will be banished

passer and suable in an action of trespass, from our jurisprudence, and the trend of the

the master could only he sued in an action of current of judicial thought against the doc.

case, that is, by the common law, the master trine of the non-imputability of the negli

could not be treated as a trespasser for the gence of the parent or guardian to the minor.

act of the servant even when done in the line Some of the courts which have been firm supporters of the old doctrine, have driven of his employment, where the master did not

The authorize or ratify the servant's act. bome the entering wedge which will shatter

common this judicial heresy, by holding that where

law only held the master liathe parent is the sole beneficiary, in a suit

ble to make compensation for the servant's

act, which the master did not authorize or brought by the administrator of the minor, | ratify. Whilst we find no instance of exthe contributory negligence of such parent | emplary damages in the early common law, is, as a special plea, a bar, or in evidence on

and Lord Camden's charge to the jury in the

case of Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft. 1, 18, 19, to bold, that the beneficiary, or the plaintiff contained perhaps the first clear enunciation

of the right of the jury to inflict this punishment, yet the principle on which punitive damages is at this day allowed, is found in the doctrines of the common law above laid down.' But some modern author

8 City of Chicago v. Hesing, 25 Am. Rep. 378; Wal

ters v. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 71. 0.263; Pat. Rr. Acc. Lu

9 McManus v. Cricket, 1 East. 108. Bourcher y.

wrong? The law will not in ne indirectly

, which it will not in 1.6 And if the parent canta". advantage of his own e allowed to indirectly do nas

ab estoppel. Such courts will be compelled

bet v. Town of Garner, 14

". Ibitman, 1 Head. 610; RIM K, s L. R. A. 194; karr. Bailma!! P9; Railway Co. v. Crawford, :! It Y. pantv. Cits of Fitzbury, 160 MA war Co., 57 P3. St. 179; W. t. Rep. 451; Bottoms v. R. OK!

Rep. 799; Burger F. R. Co, li: 1. R. Co., 102 Mo. 286); Blueber

who is guilty of contributory negligence, or
when the plaintiff claims through others who
are guilty of such negligence, that such per-
30n is estopped by such negligence, reason

Wymore v. Mahaska, 78 Iowa, 396; Westerberg v.
L. Co., 24 Am. St. Rep. 510; Harttield v. Roper, 21
Wend. 615; 4 Am. & Eng. Euc. Law, 88; Tiffany,
Death by Wrongful Act, $$ 68-72.

Pooley, Torts, $ 6$i; 2 Thompras. *2 stone's Comm. vol. 2, p. 164

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