here, under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 110, is the same as if the county of Warwick were erecting a new gaol; and it is submitted that the borough of Birmingham is expressly exempt from the payment of any portion of the money that might be expended in the erection of a county gaol. The 112th section of the Corporation Acts, 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. expressly exempts a borough like Birmingham, having a separate Court of Quarter Sessions, from contributing to any county rate, otherwise than is thereinafter provided. Then, by the 117th section, provision is made to the effect that the liability to contribute to the county expenditure shall be limited to sums required "for other purposes than the costs arising out of the prosecution, maintenance and punishment, conveyance and transport of offenders committed for trial in such county," and "other than out of coroners' inquests." Now, the words "punishment and maintenance" are sufficient to include the cost of erecting, repairing, or purchasing the building itself. In the case of The Queen v. Johnson (2) the account, the amount of which, under the 114th section of the same act, the borough of Hereford was held liable to pay as its proportion of the county gaol expenses, contained charges for "repairs, taxes, and insurance," and if such charges, as there in effect held, fall within the words "punishment and maintenance," then the borough may, if compelled to pay now, be charged twice over in respect of the cost of the building itself. If, too, the words "maintenance and punishment" were there large enough to include such charges, they are equally so under the 117th section to include the cost of erecting or purchasing the gaol. The overruling of the principle of that case can hardly be avoided if the Court now decide in favour of the claim.

[CRESSWELL, J.-The authority of that case turns entirely upon a different objection from the present. There was no discussion whatever as to the particular charges for repairs, taxes, and insurance.]

Mellor, contrà, was not called upon.

PARKE, B.-We are all of opinion that the Court of Queen's Bench were right in

(2) 10 Ad. & E. 740; s. c. 8 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 99.

NEW SERIES, XVIII.-MAG. CAS.

their view of the question, and that the borough of Birmingham is bound to make. a contribution under the 117th section to every expense other than the cost arising out of the prosecution, maintenance, punishment, conveyance and transport of offenders committed to the county gaol, and out of coroner's inquests. The burthen of erecting and maintaining the gaol itself is clearly a cost and charge equally upon the whole county, and not upon any parts of it separately from others. If there were any injustice in charging Birmingham with a larger share of expense than it ought to bear, that ought to have been looked to when the act for joining Coventry to Warwick was passed. The 5 & 6 Vict. c. 110. provides for the purchase of the Coventry gaol by the county of Warwick generally; and there is no provision which can be considered to afford any exemption to the borough of Birmingham. This is the opinion of us all; and the judgment of the Court below must, therefore, be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

1849.

April 28.

THE QUEEN v. THE INHABIT-
ANTS OF PRIORS HARDWICK.

Order of Removal-Sickness-Statement of permanent Disability-9 & 10 Vict. c. 66.

Though it does not appear on the order or examinations that the chargeability of a pauper was occasioned by relief given on account of sickness, yet it is a good ground of appeal that such was the case, and that such sickness was not shewn to be likely to produce permanent disability.

Paupers became chargeable by sickness on the 20th of April 1846. Shortly after the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. (the 26th of August 1846), they were removed by an order which did not state the sickness, or that the Justices were satisfied that it would not produce permanent disability :-Held, that such omission was a good ground of appeal.

Upon appeal, at the Quarter Sessions for the county of Warwick, against an order for the removal of Elizabeth Haynes and Alice Haynes from the parish of Priors Marston to the parish of Priors Hardwick,

2 A

both in the said county, the Court of Quarter Sessions confirmed the order, subject

to a CASE.

The order of removal was made on the 7th of September 1846, after the passing of the statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, and was in the common form. The examinations did not shew that the chargeability of the paupers was occasioned by sickness; but it appeared that their chargeability commenced about the 20th of April 1846, and that they had continued receiving relief from the parish of Priors Marston from that time to the date of the order.

The following were the material grounds of appeal :-Sixthly, that the said order of removal is bad and defective, inasmuch as the relief stated in the said examinations to have been given to the said Elizabeth Haynes and Alice Haynes had become and was necessary, by reason of the sickness of the said Elizabeth Haynes and Alice Haynes, or one of them; and it is not stated in the said order that the Justices who made the same were satisfied that such sickness would produce permanent disability. Seventhly, that the said Elizabeth Haynes and Alice Haynes, at the time of the making of the said order, had become and were chargeable, by reason of relief made necessary by sickness, which said sickness was not shewn to be likely to produce permanent disability; and that the said Elizabeth Haynes and Alice Haynes were irremovable from the said parish of Priors Marston.

On the trial of the appeal it was proved, by the relieving officer of Priors Marston, that he had given relief to the paupers by an order of the board of guardians of the union of which the parish of Priors Marston was part, made on the 20th of April 1846. The order was for weekly relief, and the practice in the union was to continue the relief until further orders. In pursuance of that order he continued to give relief to the paupers until the making of the order of removal. It was further proved, that the relief given to the paupers was rendered necessary by reason of sickness; and it was thereupon contended, for the appellants, that inasmuch as the order of removal was made after the passing of the statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, it ought to have stated in pursuance of sect. 4. that the Justices granting it were satisfied that the sickness would produce permanent

disability. The Court of Quarter Sessions overruled the objection, but reserved the question for the opinion of this Court.

The respondents gave no evidence whether the sickness of the paupers was or was not likely to produce permanent disability, and it was therefore contended, for the appellants, that the paupers were irremovable. The Court of Quarter Sessions overruled the objection, and confirmed the order, but reserved the question for the opinion of this Court.

Hayes and Bittleson, in support of the order of Sessions.-As the examinations do not shew that the relief was made necessary by sickness, it was not necessary that the order should state that the Justices who made it were satisfied that the sickness would produce permanent disability within the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. s. 4. It does not appear that the sickness was proved to the Justices.

[ERLE, J.-It is made a ground of appeal, and we must take it to have been proved at the Sessions.]

The paupers had become chargeable before the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. It may be said, that the sickness must be taken to be continuing; but a case might be supposed of a chargeability arising from an accident which befel a pauper before the passing of the statute.

[COLERIDGE, J.-The chargeability must refer to the time of making the order of removal; and if the pauper was chargeable by reason of sickness at that time, I do not see how it can be said that the case is not within the statute.]

At all events the order being good on the face of it, the appellants should have shewn that the sickness was of a temporary character.

Mellor and Pashley, contrà, were not called upon.

PATTESON, J.-It is the duty of the Justices to state in the order that the sickness which occasions the chargeability will occasion permanent disability: if they do not, an order which is made by reason of such chargeability cannot stand. The statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. was intended to protect a pauper, by providing that a temporary sickness should not be a ground of removal. It might give rise to great frauds if we were

Forgery-Uttering Forged Document. Dock Tasting Order-Imperfect Authority - Delivery of "Goods"-Immateriality of Quantity.

An order of wine-merchants purporting to direct a cooper of the London Docks to permit "self and company to taste wines ex Traveller," &c. which belonged to them, is an order for the delivery of goods. And where a prisoner was convicted of uttering such order with the wine-merchant and owner's signature to it forged,-Held, that the conviction was right, although the prisoner had failed to obtain the signature of the dock company's clerk to the order, without which the cooper addressed was not authorized to act upon it.

"Tasted Sampled

casks, Nos. ditto. Shewn by

Vincent & Pugh.

},

Docks with reference to such orders was, The course of business at the London that the merchant who has wine in the vaults and wishes to enable a party to taste it, gives an order in the above form. It is then taken to the clerk before mentioned, and he writes his name across it; and when it has been so signed by him, but not otherwise, the coopers of the company are authorized to act upon it, and allow the party presenting it to taste the wine described in

it. The instrument in question was presented to the clerk for his signature, but he, suspecting it was not genuine, refused to sign, and said he must first send to Vincent & Pugh. The prisoner said he would return in half an hour, and went away, but did not return. It was proved that the signature, "Vincent & Pugh," was a forgery, and that the prisoner knew it to be so.

For the prisoner, it was objected that a tasting order could not be considered an order for the delivery of goods; and, secondly, that this never was a perfect order, nor was uttered as such, but was handed to the clerk for his signature in order that it might become an available tasting order. The learned Judge thought it right to reserve these points for further consideration, and, the jury having found the prisoner guilty, ordered him to be discharged on his own recognizances to appear and receive judgment when called upon so to do.

Huddleston, for the prisoner (April 30).— First, the order here cannot be considered as an order for the delivery of goods within the 10th section of the 1 Will. 4. c. 66. The order there meant, as was concisely put by Mr. Justice Cresswell, is one under which

goods are required to be delivered to the party named, to be dealt with as his own in any way that he pleases. The order in question is different, being for the specific purpose of tasting the wine, and nothing else. In truth it is no more than a permission to exercise the judgment as far as the sense of tasting went.

[PLATT, B.-It is an order from the merchant to deliver up a portion of a commodity belonging to that merchant. All the wine that the party uses in the way of tasting he surely has the controul over. That which he drinks he takes away.]

But the order does not allow of the removal of any portion of the wine, by way of sample or otherwise, and the party in tasting might not even swallow the wine.

[WILDE, C.J.-But what becomes of the wine that is not swallowed? Suppose an order for a dinner which the party gets, would not that be an absolute delivery of the dinner? Or suppose the case of an order for the delivery of a sample.]

There the order would give to the party an absolute power to do what he pleased with the thing delivered. Here the delivery is merely for the limited purpose of tasting.

Secondly, until the instrument was countersigned by a clerk, as required by the practice of the docks, it was of no validity for the purpose for which it was intended when uttered. It was no authority to the cooper to act, and therefore the party charged here is not within the criminal acts upon the subject-The King v. Randall (1), The King v. Richards (2). He referred also to 2 East, P.C. 936, The Queen v. Williams (3), The King v. Pateman (4), The King v. Rushworth (5).

Ballantine, for the prosecution.

[Per Curiam.-Address yourself in the first place to the second point of objection.]

The instrument here is described in three ways; and, first, the evidence shews that it was to be an order obligatory upon the dock company. They were merely bailees of the wine, and undertook to obey the order of the merchant. It is not less a binding order upon the company whom it was intended to affect, because incomplete

(1) Russ. & R. 195.

(2) Ibid. 193.

(3) 2 Car. & K. 51. (4) Russ. & R. 455. (5) Ibid. 317.

with regard to the internal regulations of the docks, of which the merchant might be ignorant. There is no privity shewn between the merchant and the company as to any internal dock regulation; but even if there were, it could hardly alter the case, as the company would be at liberty to alter their own rules at any time. It is not material to whom the order is addressed. Here, however, the address to the cooper is, in effect, to the dock company by another name. Suppose the indictment had said, "meaning thereby the London Dock Company," that would have been enough: and it is the same now if that result can be collected from the evidence, as it is submitted it can. All goods in the docks are the company's, and not any particular servant's. Then, secondly, it is described as a warrant, and to support that description it is not necessary to shew that the instrument is obligatory upon the person addressed. It is enough if it be such an instrument as may be acted upon. In criminal cases the natural result of the document is to be looked to, and here that was to obtain the wine. It operated upon the dock company in some way, and if not bound to attend to it, they would be, at all events, justified in so doing. Then, thirdly, it is unquestionably a request.

[WILDE, C.J.-What is the difference between a request and a warrant ?]

It was not easy to say exactly. In its simple sense, a request is no more than an instrument giving the recipient of it a chance of obtaining something by means of it.

[ALDERSON, B.-You cannot call an instrument a warrant to pay unless you get it from a person who has authority to give it. Then the act of parliament introduces the word "request" to meet the case where the instrument purports to come from a person having no authority. A warrant as well as an order requires authority.]

Then, supposing it is properly to be considered as addressed to the company, it is submitted that although only complete as an order or warrant, after the counter-signature by the company's clerk, yet it is, at all events, before such signature a request upon the company.

[ALDERSON, B.-I do not see how we can go out of the document itself. If it had been directed to the company and delivered to the cooper, that would have raised a different question. But here whatever the

instrument be it is addressed to the cooper; and the question is, whether it ought not to be a joint instrument in order to make it a good order upon the cooper.]

It was intended to operate upon the company, and that is enough. But if it be not treated as upon the company, at all events it is a request upon the cooper within the meaning of the act. The cases cited on the other side are all very different from the present.

[Per Curiam.-We do not feel at all influenced by any case cited. We think, too, that whatever the description of the instrument be, it is clearly for the delivery of goods, and therefore it is unnecessary to hear any arguments in answer to the first ground of objection.]

Huddleston was heard in reply.
Cur. adv. vult.

The judgment of the Court was now (June 23) delivered by

WILDE, C.J.-Upon consideration we are of opinion that the conviction in this case was right. The question is, whether the instrument which the prisoners uttered knowing it to be forged, was an order. It was directed to the cooper at the particular vault in the London Docks, and purported to be signed by the owner of the wine in that vault, and was in this form, "Permit self and company to taste wines, ex Traveller," &c., which must mean permit the party signing and company to taste; and the order therefore to the cooper to permit the wines to be tasted was given by that party. It is true that the order was presented by the prisoner to a clerk of the company, in order that he also might affix his name to it, and without his signature the cooper had no authority to obey the order; but it was not the less an order because the cooper had not authority to obey it. Again, assuming that the signatures of both the merchant and clerk of the company were necessary to make a perfect and efficient order, it would be an order by each as soon as his signature was affixed. If a promissory note were made payable to A. and B. not in partnership, or their order, so that the signature of both would be requisite to make an efficient indorsement, a party forging the indorsement of A, and uttering the instrument to B. for the purpose of procuring his signature, would be guilty of uttering a forged indorsement-Winter

bottom's case (6). Upon the same principle, we think that the prisoner in this case was guilty of uttering a forged order.

The next question is, whether it can be considered as an order for the delivery of goods. Now, although it is true, that the quantity delivered for the purpose of tasting is very small, yet it is impossible to say that it is not an order for the delivery of some wine, and as we cannot apply the principle of "de minimis not curat lex" to such a transaction, we feel bound to say that it was an order for the delivery of goods, and that the verdict of guilty was right.

1849. May 2, 30.

Conviction affirmed.

THE QUEEN V. THE INHABIT-
ANTS OF ELLESMERE.

Order of Removal-Examination-Jurat -Grounds of Appeal-Admission of Birth Settlement.

Examination of T. P, "taken before us, A.B. and C.D, two of Her Majesty's Justices, &c. in and for, &c. on complaint, &c. touching the place of the last legal settlement of, &c. "The said T. P, upon his oath, saith, &c." "Taken and sworn at, &c. this 25th day of January, A.B. & C.D:"-Held, that the examination sufficiently appeared to have been taken on oath before two Justices.

The examination stated that the pauper was born in the appellant parish, and had gained no settlement in his own right, and then proceeded to shew a settlement acquired by the pauper's father, by renting a tenement in the appellant parish. The grounds of appeal only denied this derivative settlement : — Held, that the respondents, at the trial of the appeal, might fall back upon the birth settlement.

On an appeal to the Midsummer Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the county of Salop, in the year 1847, by the churchwardens and overseers of the township of Tryddyn, in the county of Flint, against an order under the hands and seals of two Justices for the county of Salop, for the removal of Sarah Probert, widow of Hugh Probert, deceased, and her two children, from the parish of Ellesmere, in the county of Salop, to the township of Tryddyn, the Sessions quashed the said order, subject to the opinion of the Court on a CASE.

(6) Den. C.C. 41.