Nightingale vs. Sheldon. the primary objects of his bounty, after the wife's life estate is spent. If after the devise to his wife for life, the testator had 'added the words, "and after her death the remainder to my three children and their heirs," and then the devise over had followed, could there be a legal doubt, that the Court, upon acknowledged and settled principles, must have construed the remainder immediately to have vested in the children upon the testator's death, subject to be defeated by the executory devise over taking effect? I presume not. If the Court were driven to give a construction to the will upon the two clauses abovementioned, drawn into such connexion, and to create an estate by implication in the children, I confess I know not what words, more appropriate, or more exact to express such implication, could be used. But it would be sufficient for the present case to say, that the construction, which the defendants wish the Court to give to the words of the will, is not in its own nature more probable, or more consistent with any ascertained intention of the testator, than that before suggested. If it were necessary to decide the case upon the very form of the provisions in the will, my present judgment is, that one of two constructions ought to be adopted. 1st. That the clause as to the division of the estate, on John's arrival at 21, should be construed to apply as well to the case of the wife being then alive, as of her being then dead; and in this view the devise over ought to be restrained to all the children's dying during John's minority, without leaving issue. Or, 2dly, putting that clause aside, that the children should be deemed to take a vested estate in fee in remainder after the wife's life estate, with an executory devise over to the wife, if she survived them and their issue. Upon either construction the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. But if these constructions are to be rejected, as not fully supported by any resonable implication upon the terms of the will, I am most clearly of opinion, that the construction set up by the defendants is indefensible in point of law, and rests upon a Nightingale vs. Sheldon. far more unsatisfactory and infirm foundation. The consequence, then, must be, from the very doubt of the testator's intention, and from the omission to provide for the case, which has happened, that the estate must be deemed intestate; and then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the one third, which was John's distributable share. In either view my opinion is, that upon the facts agreed, judgment ought to be entered for the plaintiff. The District Judge concurs in this opinion, and therefore judgment must be entered for the plaintiff for one third of the demanded premises. CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Fall Circuít. MASSACHUSETTS, OCTOBER TERM, 1829, AT BOSTON. BEFORE Hon. JOSEPH STORY, Associate Judge of the Supreme Court. UNITED STATES vs. EDMUND Davis. The offence of larceny is not punishable under the act of 1790, ch. 9, [36,] unless committed in a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States; and to bring the case within the statute there must be an averment of such sole and exclusive jurisdiction in the indictment. "Personal goods," in that statute, do not include choses in action, the latter not being the subject of larceny at the common law. Where a larceny is committed in a place not under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, it may yet be punishable under the third section of the act of 1825, ch. 276. Offences are punishable under that section according to the state laws, where they are committed, under circumstances, or in places, in which, before that act, no Court of the United States had authority to punish them. It seems that a reservation on a cession of "concurrent jurisdiction," to serve state process, civil and criminal, in the ceded place, does not exclude the exclusive legislation or exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over the ceded place. It merely operates as a condition of the grant. INDICTMENT against the defendant for larceny. The indictment charged, that the defendant, on the 15th of May, 1829, in the Marine Hospital at Chelsea, in the Dictrict of Massachusetts, a needful building belonging to the United States, the site whereof has been and is ceded by the State of Massachusetts to the United States, with force and arts, one trunk of the value, &c. one United States vs. Davis. bank bill of the North Bank, of the value, &c., one bank bill of the Bank of the United States, of the value, &c. [describing also sundry other articles, and gold and silver coins,] and one promissory note, being then unsatisfied &c. of the goods, chattels, monies, and property of Charles Turner, steward and overseer of the said Marine Hospital, then and there in the said Marine Hospital, being found, did then and there feloniously steal, take, and carry away, against the peace and dignity of the said United States, and contrary to the form of the statute of the United States in such case made and provided. Plea, not guilty. Upon the trial the jury disagreed as to the facts, and were, by consent of the parties discharged from giving any verdict. And thereupon F. Dexter, for the defendant, moved the Court to quash the indictment upon an objection, which he had taken at the trial. It was as follows. The present indictment is founded on the act of 1825, ch. 276, § 3. That section applies only to offences, which have not been previously provided for by the crimes act of 1790, ch. 9, [36,] 16. The offence described in that section is larceny; and so is that in the present indictment. The offence too is committed in a place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. And if not so, still as the specific offence is provided for, although not when committed in such a place as the Marine Hospital under the cession, it is out of the purview of the act of 1825. The words of that act (§ 3) are "that if any offence shall be committed in any of the places aforesaid, the punishment of which offence is not specially provided for by any law of the United States, such offence shall receive the punishment provided by the laws of the state in which the ceded territory is situate. The terms of the statute do not apply to the place, but to the description of the offence. If not punishable when committed in the particular place, still, if the offence is provided for, and punishable when committed in any other place, the statute does not authorize the Court to entertain jurisdiction. H United States vs. Davis. Dunlap (District Attorney) for the United States. The motion to quash the indictment rests upon two grounds; first, that the indictment is not supported by the statute of 1825, ch. 276,4; secondly, that it is not supported by the statute of 1790, ch. 36. § 16. It is said, that it is not within the statute of 1825, because the offence is "specially provided for " by the statute of 1790; and not within the statute of 1790, because the indictment does not aver, that the place where the larceny was committed was within the "sole and exclusive" jurisdiction of the United States. The answers offered to these objections to the indictment are these. The offence, charged in the indictment, stealing a trunk, containing money, bank bills, and a promissory note, was not provided for by the statute of 1790, for the Marine Hospital at Chelsea was not a place within the "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" of the United States, within the words and meaning of that statute. It was a place where Congress must necessarily, by the constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 8, exercise "exclusive legislation; " but the act of cession, by the state of Massachusetts, expressly provides, that the state of Massachusetts shall retain "concurrent jurisdiction," so far as that all criminal and civil processes of the state may be executed within the ceded tract of land, and persons residing there are to be considered inhabitants of the town of Chelsea. If the cession of the tract to the United States necessarily vested the "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" in the United States, upon the ground, that "jurisdiction" must be "sole and exclusive," then alleging the place, as is alleged in the indictment, to be "under the jurisdiction of the United States," is alleging it to be under the "sole and exclusive jurisdiction ;" and, consequently, the indictment, if not supported by the statute of 1825, is, clearly, by that of 1790. It was the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, delivered by Chief Justice Parsons, in relation to offences in the Springfield Armory, in Clary's case, (8 Mass. Rep. 72,) that the cession by the state of Massachu |