Although doubts have been suggested as to the right of the state to inflict capital punishment in any case, and elaborate arguments urged against the policy of it, the right to imprison for crime in all cases is unquestioned. It is not that crime has become less odious in the sight of legislators, but the rights of life and liberty more precious, that the severity of the penalties of the criminal codes of England and America has been so greatly mitigated. It may be said now, that in the United States the personal liberty of offenders supplies the principal revenue of Penal Justice. She inflicts, indeed, pecuniary fines for slight offences, and exacts the forfeit of life for the most atrocious; but the great multitude of felons are required to expiate their crimes in prison. Of Contempts. The right of liberty is also subject to restriction as a punishment for contempts of court which may, without impropriety, be classed with crimes. A court of justice represents the judicial majesty of the people. Through the forms of law it utters their mighty voice in judgment. Property, character, liberty and life itself, are involved in the issues before it; and it needs all the aid which composure can lend to reason to enable it to discharge wisely and impartially its manifold and momentous duties. Contempts, therefore, tending to interrupt or disturb the court in the administration of justice, have always been held to deserve instant and severe punishment.' The authority to punish contempts is a necessary attribute of judicial power, inherent in all courts of justice from the very nature of their organization. Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 33; State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 451; 4 Bl. Com. 284. 8] *SECTION II. LIMITATIONS COERCIVE OF DUTIES TO THE STATE. 1. The duty of supporting and defending the state. 2. The duty of testifying for the state in criminal cases. 1. The duty of supporting and defending the State. -It is no less the duty of the citizen to support the state than it is of the state to protect the citizen. And although our army and navy are now supplied by volunteers, it is the undoubted right of the state, whenever in her judgment the public emergency requires it, to compel the citizen to enter her service. And when engaged in that service, whether by compulsion or voluntary enlistment, he be comes subject to her control under officers acting within their appointed spheres. Whatever charms the life of the soldier or marine may possess, it is not one of perfect liberty. The restraints to which they are subjected, though necessary to that rigor of discipline which the art of war demands, are oftentimes felt to be serious and sometimes annoying if not oppressive restrictions. 2. The duty of testifying for the State in Criminal Cases.-Besides the obedience which a witness owes to a subpoena, for neglect of which he is exposed to punishment, he may also, in criminal cases, be compelled to enter into a recognizance to appear at a future day to give evidence. in behalf of the state; and in case of his refusal, he may be committed to prison. Such appears to have been the 9] common law, *and such is the statute law of several states.' It may seem harsh thus to imprison a man not only innocent of crime but not even charged with it. But it is of the highest interest to the community that offend 11 Chit. Cr. Law, 76. ers should be brought to justice; and he who refuses to be laid under bonds to give evidence against them is delinquent in public duty. The witness was not, however, at common law required to procure any surety. His own recognizance was all that was exacted. To require him, as has sometimes been done, to procure sureties in addition is certainly an extraordinary exercise of legislative power.1 3. The duty of obedience to judicial mandates. The judiciary would hold but a barren scepter if their powers ceased with declaring the law. They are vested with a power to enforce as well as pronounce their judgments. In many cases of contumacious conduct they secure obedience to their orders by attachment and commitment of the delinquent party. Imprisonment in such cases is not regarded merely as a punishment for a contempt, but as a necessary means of enforcing compliance with the decision of the court. SECTION III. EXECUTIVE OF DUTIES TO THE CITIZEN. It would be a very narrow view of the obligations of the state to suppose that her protection should be limited to such as may be able in return to render *aid [10 to her. The lunatic, the idiot and the helpless pauper, no less than the industrious citizen and the valient soldier claim her fostering care. The irresponsible lunatic must not be allowed a liberty fraught with danger to himself and others-nor must he or the idiot be left exposed to the cupidity and rapacity of heartless relatives. Neither must the invalid pauper be suffered to starve in a land overflowing with plenty. 1 Bickley v. Commonwealth, 2 J. J. Marshall (Ky.), 572; 4 Bl. Com. Wend. ed., 296. This obligation of government has long been recognized, but not so long efficiently discharged. There is, however, no more gratifying evidence of the progress of society than is afforded by the asylums which a just sense of public duty has, in many of the states, provided for these unfortunate classes. Irrespective of any statutory provision, the custody of such persons would, especially in case of infants, devolve upon the nearest in blood; but in view of laws enacted to provide for their support and custody, the right of private restraint must yield to the call and benevolent design of the state. Hence it has been held that a lunatic could not be kept in close confinement by his relatives or friends, except on the ground of temporary necessity, and that only so long as may be reasonably required to obtain the benefits provided by law.' In the exercise of this power the legislature may prescribe and cause to be enforced such regulations as in its judgment the public good may require. The lunatic may be made a close prisoner, or suffered 11] to go at large under the custody of a *committee; and the pauper may be required to perform moderate labor and abide in the public infirmary, or become the servant of the "lowest bidder." The restrictions in these cases being designed for the benefit of the unfortunate subjects and for the safety of the community, should cease when the cause which required them is removed; as, when the lunatic recovers his reason, or the pauper acquires property adequate for his maintenance by gift or otherwise, or gains sufficient health and strength to earn his support. 1 Matter of Josiah Oakes, VIII Law Reg. 122. No principle of right is violated in putting a reasonable and salutary restriction on the liberty of a person who, from the loss of reason and judgment, is unable to provide means for his own cure or who is liable to use freedom from restraint in such way as to increase or prolong his malady. Denny v. Tyler, 3 Allen (Mass.), 227; Colby v. Jackson, 1 N. H. 181; Hinchman v. Ritchie, Brightley (Penn.) Rep., 143; see In re Shuttleworth, 9 Ad. & El. 651, N. S. *CHAPTER III. LIMITATIONS OF A PRIVATE NATURE. Section I. LIMITATIONS COERCIVE OF PRIVATE OBLIGATIONS. [12 II. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION OF HUSBAND and wife. III. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION OF PARENT AND CHILD. IV. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION OF GUARDIAN AND WARD. V. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION OF MASTER AND APPRENTICE, VI. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION OF MASTER AND SERVANT. VII. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION of master and scholar. VIII. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE RELATION OF PRINCIPAL AND SPECIAL BAİL. SECTION I. LIMITATIONS COERCIVE OF PRIVATE OBLIGATIONS. The duty of the state to provide some means of redress for private wrongs, has long been recognized by all civilized nations. Pecuniary demands, whether springing from contracts express or implied, or from injuries to the person, property or reputation, have been made the subjects of various civil remedies, in some of which a heavy hand has, not unfrequently, been laid upon the right of personal liberty. 2. Demands arising out of contracts, express or implied.—The relation of debtor and creditor has long been a matter of legislative concern; and the principles of freedom and avarice have, in their persons, for ages struggled with each other for the mastery. Legislative favor seemed at last to declare against freedom; and in England, and even under American skies, the victims of a cruel and oppressive policy could be reckoned by thousands [13 locked in prisons built and guarded by the state. The distinctions of age and sex were disregarded, and not even the decrepid patriot soldier could excite the pity or escape the rapacity of the merciless creditor. It almost supasses bellef that ever on American soil and |