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THE DIANA-DIGEST OF MARITIME LAW CASES. |

Dr. LUSHINGTON.-I am of opinion that this protest, which has been given in on behalf of the party proceeded against, cannot be sustained. It appears to me, as I understand the facts of the case, that the Prince being in tow of this ship the Night Watch, was by her misconduct brought into collision with another ship, and thereby received damage, so that in point of fact the ship which was employed in towing the Prince was the causa causans of the damage arising from the collision with the other ship. Now it does appear to me that, even without reference to the Admiralty Court Act 1861, s. 7, I should be of opinion, looking especially to the decision which the learned Queen's Advocate has quoted, that the action would lie. The only doubt I should have entertained upon the question was certainly the doubt raised by the learned Queen's Advocate in the case cited, viz., whether it was not a question of master and servant; and thereon I expressed my opinion, and any decision has been confirmed by the Judicial Commmittee. I thought it a very fair question for argument, and if it was raised again in this case, I should be bound by the decision of the Judicial Committee. Looking at the circumstances of the case, I shall overrule the protest with costs.

THE DIANA.

Collision-Abroad—Jurisdiction.

The High Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction of a collision between an English and an Irish vessel in the Great North Holland Canal.

This was a cause of damage brought by the owners of the English brig Prince Albert against the Irish vessel Diana, in consequence of a collision which occurred between these vessels in the Great North Holland Canal leading from Zuyder Zee to Amsterdam.

The petition and answer set forth the respective cases of the parties, and the ninth article of the answer pleaded that the High Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction over the place where the collision occurred, and therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the cause.

E. C. Clarkson, for the plt., moved the court to order that the ninth article of the answer be struck out. V. Lushington appeared for the defts.

Dr. LUSHINGTON.-It appears to me that the decision of this question depends mainly, if not exclusively, upon the construction which the court ought to give to the 7th section of the 24 Vict. c. 10, that "the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction over any claim for damage done by any ship." Now, the object of the Act, as it is stated in the preamble, is, that it is "An Act to extend the jurisdiction and improve the practice of the High Court of Admiralty." The object, therefore, sought to be attained is this-to give more extensive jurisdiction to the court than it possessed antecedently to the passing of the Act. It has not been deemed right by the Legislature to express any particular circumstances in which it was intended to extend the jurisdiction, except to use the most general terms in which their meaning could possibly be couched. If these words are to be taken literally without limitation, there is no -doubt whatever that they would cover all cases where the property came within the court; they would cover all such cases, and confer jurisdiction upon it. But it is stated that it was the intention of the Legislature to limit the 7th section-in what way I do not distinctly understand. It is very true that, before the passing of the Act of Parliament, in former times there were many decisions of the courts of common law to restrain the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, and to keep it within narrow limits. For the last sixty or seventy years the restriction to the jurisdiction has diminished; and it is a matter of notoriety that the American courts, which have taken their practice, and indeed all their leading principles, from us,

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have considered that these decisions were not binding upon them. (a) If there was no Act of Parliament to consider, I should never feel warranted in disregarding those decisions, however obsolete; but I think that, since the passing of the Act of Parliament, I am bound to give it that construction which I believe to have been the intention of the Legislature. It is not denied in this case that the courts of common law would have jurisdiction, viz., that a personal action, as they proceed there, would lie. Upon what ground am I to suppose that, if a personal action would lie in a case of collision by A. B. against C. D., it was the intention of the Legislature, in the terms they have used, to restrict the court from administering justice? There might be very many important cases where an action could not be laid against the person, but where the property would come within reach, and where, if the property was not made amenable for the injury sustained, the consequence would be that there would be no remedy at all. I am not disposed so to narrow the construction of this section; therefore I think that the objection is well founded, and the article must be struck out. I do not think it any objection that a court of common law could give a remedy in the case, and I think it no objection to say that by the Dutch law-if Dutch law there be upon the point-they have a different mode of administering justice. I do not think there being concurrent jurisdiction is any reason why I should abstain from exercising the jurisdiction which, I believe, the Legislature has committed to my hands.

DIGEST OF MARITIME LAW CASES

(EXCEPTING SALVAGE AWARDS.) FROM 1837 TO 1860.

(Continued from p. 341.)

[N.B.-The LAW TIMES REPORTS, N. S., will give all the Maritime Law Cases decided from Michaelmas Term 1859. This Digest will contain all (except the Salvage Awards) decided from 1837 to Nov. 1859. A Digest of the Salvage Cases during the same period is appearing in the LAW TIMES.]

NECESSARIES (continued).

1514. Necessaries supplied to a foreign ship at an English port, can be recovered by proceedings against the ship under the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 6; but a person who pays him who had supplied the necessaries, and then takes a bill on the owners, which is dishonoured, cannot recover in the Admiralty Court against the ship. Distinction between the present case and that of The Sophie. Release of master statute. This Act introduced a novel proceeding into the from arrest not a necessary within the meaning of the Admiralty Court, which had formerly no jurisdiction in such cases, and the court cannot extend its construction: (The N. R. Gasfabrick, A. C., April 29, 1858; W. Rep. 871.) 1515. Coppering a Spanish barque held to be a necessary within the meaning of the Act of Parliament, in an action at the instance of the Patent Metal Company against the owners for the amount of the copper bill. Question as to agreement between owner and shipwright in ordering the copper for her conditional purchase by him: (The Perla, A. C., July 23, 1858; Swabey, 353.)

NEGLIGENCE.

(See "Berth and Berthing," "Bill of Lading," 223, Collision," 676, &c., "Mooring," "Stevedore.") 1516. It has been repeatedly settled in the United States Courts that it is no ground of defence that a loss was remotely caused by negligence of the master, if the immediate cause of the loss is a peril insured against: of Story, J., in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company, United States Circuit Court, Shipping Gazette, Sept. 19, 1838.)

(Dictum

1517. Claim for loss of goods sustained by a jury against carrying company, being caused by negligence in placing a boat laden with them in an unprotected (though usual) berth, where she was dashed to pieces in a storm: (Black v. Bennett, &c., Liverpool Assizes, April 6, 1839, Shipping Gazette)

1518. The negligence of the master and crew of a ship rendering a ship unseaworthy after the voyage has commenced, by negligently or imprudently heaving ballast overboard, is no defence to an action against the under(Dixon v. Sadler, C. E., before Parke, B, June 7, 1839. writers for loss proximately caused by perils of the sea: See also 5 M. & W. 405; and 8 M. & W. 895; Arnould, 696)

(a) See the case of De Lovio v. Buit, 2 Gallison, 470 American).

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1519. Ship insured to and from Sierra Leone, made unseaworthy by the unskilful way in which the cargo was loaded at Sierra Leone by natives usually employed on coast of Atrica for that purpose. Underwriters held liable for loss.

The Lord Chief Baron expressed a decisive opinion that all underwriters are liable for loss caused by negligence of master or crew. The loss immediately arose from the ship being run ashore to prevent her from sinking: (Redman v. Wilson, C. E., June 29, 1844; 6 Jur. 714; 14 L. J. 333, Ex ; 14 M. & W. 476; Arnould, 696, 794; Harrison's Digest, 2009.) In Redman v. Hay, &c, C. E., July 4, 1844, the Lord Chief Baron said: "Suppose a person by his own negligence burns down his own house, and no fraud is proved, he is clearly entitled to recover on a policy of fire insurance, for he insures against his own negligence:" (but see Phillips, 1096.) 1520. Shipowners held liable for loss of a cask of currants, through negligence of lumpers employed by them using can hooks instead of slings in discharging from a steamer: (The Vesta; Oebricks v. Robinson, C. S. C., Jan. 19, 1854, Shipping Gazette.)

1521. Steam-shipping company held liable for damage to cargo through want of care in discharging: (Lynch v. Drogheda Steam Packet Company, Liverpool, C. C., April 11, 1836, Shipping Gazette.)

1522. Owner of ship held liable for damage done to another vessel from want of fenders: (Clarkson v. Mordey, Sunderland, C. C., Shipping Gazette, May 25, 1857.)

1523. Action against steam-tug company for loss in towing a wrecked ship. Rule for new trial refused, the court thinking there was no evidence of negligence: (Price v. The New Steam Tug Company, C. P., April 20, 1858, Shipping Gazette.)

1524. Owners of a vessel navigated by their own servants, under their order and control, held liable for injury to a passenger by the breaking of a rope through negligent management of the vessel, although the passenger contracted for his passage with a person who had hired the vessel and crew for a certain sum per day: (Dalyell v. Tyler and others, Q. B., June 15, 1858, Shipping Gazette)

NEUTRALS.

(See Nationality.)

1525. Case relative to the sale by an enemy owner to a neutral, during war, of a ship not in transitu, or in a blockaded port. The law on this subject by Lord Stowell, in the case of The Sechs Geschurstern, 4 C. Rob. 100, &c., expounded: (The Baltica, A. C., Aug. 6. 1854, Shipping Gazette; judgment reversed by J. C. P. C., Feb. 3, 1858; 11 Moore, 119; Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 479. 1763.)

See No.

1526. A ship sailing under a hostile flag having been captured, held that a neutral could not claim restitution by virtue of his being part owner of the ship up to the time of seizure. Cases cited and commented upon: The Vrow Elizabeth, 5 C. Rob. 4; The Onderneeming, 5 C. Rob. 7. See also 5 C. Rob., note in Appendix. Decision given without reference to the judgment in the case of The Primus. Right of search: (The Industrie, A. C., Aug. 15, 1854; 1 E. & A. R. 444.)

1527. Where a captured vessel had been purchased by a neutral from an enemy shortly before the commencement of the war, held that the burden rests with the neutral claiming restitution clearly to prove his title, the payment of the purchase-money, and of his being the sole legal owner. If false papers are issued by a neutral state, the court will protect the just rights of belligerents. Observations as to alleged custom in Russia and Germany for master to have a share in the profits of the vessel, with reference to transfer of the ship in the present instance: (The Ernst Merck, A. C.,

Dec. 6, 1854; 2 E. & A. R. 91.)

1528. To entitle a party to the privilege of a neutral, so as to claim restitution of cargo, he should be totally free from all connivance or participation in the transaction, the illegality of which has led to the condemnation of the ship: " (The Hon. Wm. Hulme's dictum in The Greta, A. C., Hong Kong, Shipping Gazette, Feb. 6, 1856.)

1529. Duty of a neutral purchasing from another neutral a ship which had been the property of one of the belligerents, to ascertain the legality of the transfer. Ship condemned, the original sale by a Russian subject to the neutral having been false and colourable as in the cases of The Atlantic and The Kotka:" (The Lisette, A. C., May 6, 1856, Shipping Gazette)

1530. It is competent for any belligerent state to make regulations of a municipal character, but not to affect the nationality of an individual. Cases cited: The Nayade, 4 Sir C. Rob. 251; The Indian Chief, 3 Sir C. Rob. 29, in regard to non-competency of one ally to grant exemptions binding on others: (The San Spiridione, A. C., Nov. 21, 1856, Shipping Gazette.)

1531. In claims for restitution, neutral claimants are entitled to require, if possible, an examination of the master and some of the crew of the captured ship. Further proof allowed to be produced by the claimant in the present case, that the ship had entered a blockaded port from imperative necessity, on account of her leaky condition: (The Panaghia Rhomba, otherwise The Panagia Rongu, A. C, Dec. 6, 1856, Shipping Gazette.)

NEUTRAL CARGO.

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1532. Expenses of owners of a neutral cargo not allowed to them out of the proceeds of an enemy's ship in case of capture and condemnation, the cargo having been shipped when war was notoriously known to be imminent. A motion tor such a payment was without precedent: (The Primus, Admiralty Prize Court, Oct. 6, 1854; 2 E. & A, R. 1.)

1533. General principles relative to capture of neutral ships, costs and damages, or demurrage in cases of restitution, and as to breach of blockade. Authorities cited, with comments thereon: Report made to King George II. in. 1753 by the judge of the Admiralty Court and law officers. of the Crown, laying down the principles which have been acted upon by all the chief maritime powers; the case of The Pigon, before the French Conseil des Prises in 1799; The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch, 98; Pratt's edit. of Story, 35; The Maria Schroder, 3 Rob. 152; The Triton, 4 Rob. 79; The William, 6 Rob. 316; The Acteon, 2 Dods. 51; The Elizabeth, 1 Acton, 13; The George, 1 Mason, 26; The Nemesis, Edw. 50; The Speculation, 2 Rob. 293; The Washington, 6 Rob. 275; The Wilhelmine, 2 E. & A. R. 31; The Betsy, I Rob. 93; The Luna, Edw. 190; The John, 2 Dods. 336: The Mentor, 1 Rob. 193; The Zacheman, 5 Rob. 153; The St. Juan Nepomuceno, 1 Hagg. Adm. 265; The Mentor, 1 Rob. 153; The Eleanor, 2 Wheaton, 357; Lindo v. Rodney, 2 Doug. 614; The Haabet, 6 Rob. 54; The Lively, 1 Gailison, 327: (The Ostsee, J. C. P. C, March 29, 1855; 2 E. & A. R. 170.)

1533 a. As to neutral vessels-question of blockade, &c:(see American case of The Hiawatha, in the United States District Court, noticed in Mitchell's Maritime Register,. Oct. 19, 1861.)

1534. The occupation of a neutral state by an enemy (as of Moldavia by the Russians in the late war) does not deprive its inhabitants of their neutral character, unless the country is brought under the dominion of the enemy, and its neutral character thereby changed: (The Gerasimo, J. C. P. C., March 24, 1857; W. Rep. 450.)

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Thursday, Nov. 13.

(Before Mr. Commissioner HOLROYD.)
Ex parte CASTLE, re CASTLE.

24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 110-Order of dischargeOpposition bg creditor.

Upon an application by a bankrupt, under the 110th · section of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, for his order of discharge, an opposing creditor is entitled to be heard against it, as upon an application under the 159th section.

Order of discharge. The creditors present at an adjourned meeting, held pursuant to the 110th section. of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, passed a resolution whereby they agreed to accept a composition of 5s. in the pound, and that the proceedings under the bankruptcy should be suspended. The bankrupt thereupon having filed his accounts, applied for his order of discharge.

By the 110th section it is provided that, if at such adjourned meeting a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors present shall so resolve, the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be suspended, and the estate and effects of the bankrupt shall be wound-up and administered in such manner as such majority shall direct, and the bankrupt, having made a full disclosure of his estate, shall be entitled to apply for an order of discharge.

Bagley, on behalf of the bankrupt, applied for his order of discharge, his client having complied with the requirements of the 110th section.

Lewis (solicitor) for Jeeves, an opposing creditor, claimed to be heard in opposition to the application. The words in the 110th section, "entitled to apply for his order of discharge," contemplated the case of an opposition, and did not mean that a bankrupt should be entitled to his order of discharge as of course. A.

Div.]

DICKENS v. DICKENS-POLLACK v. POLLACK AND DEANE AND MACNAMARA.

[Div.

also slightly irregular. The judge made an order | Oct. 1860. On the 14th Jan. 1862 an attachment that such affidavit should be filed.

In this case William King, of New Plymouth, New Zealand, died in Feb. 1861 intestate, leaving Eliza Mary King, his lawful widow, him surviving. In the form of affidavit sent out to enable the widow to take out administration in respect of some property in England, she was described as "Eliza Mary King, of New Plymouth, New Zealand, the lawful widow and relict of the said deceased." In the meantime Mrs. King removed to Hobart Town, Tasmania, and there made her affidavits and executed the bond. When the affidavits were returned to England it was found that the word "late" was interlined before "of New Plymouth," and the words "but now of Hobart Town in Tasmania" interlined before "the lawful widow and relict; " and such interlineations were not marked with initials of the judge before whom the oath was sworn, nor noticed in the jurat. A difficulty was felt with respect to their irregularity in the registry; it was also objected that in the above description she was not described as "Eliza Mary King, widow," though she was so described in the heading of the administration bond. The 58th rule, non-contentious business, principal registry 1862, provides that "the registrars are not to allow any affidavit to be filed (unless by leave of the judge) which is not fairly and legibly written, or in which there is any interlineation, the extent of which at the time when the affidavit was sworn is not clearly shown by the initials of the commissioner or other person before whom it was sworn."

issued against the resp. for nonpayment of 153/. 118. 5d. taxed costs, and 60l. arrears of alimony. On the 24th Jan. 1862, the resp. was brought up by habeas corpus, and charged in execution for those sums. On the 22nd Jan. the resp. filed his petition in the Court of Bankruptcy, and in his account filed under that petition the sums above mentioned were included. On the 25th March an order was made by a commissioner in bankruptcy for his discharge. On the 1st July an order nisi for a sequestration for arrears of alimony was granted, against which Mr. Hannen showed cause, and contended that the discharge granted under the Bankruptcy Act of last year protected the resp. from any such process. He relied on the effect of sections 149, 161 and 165. On the other hand it was contended that the discharge under the 165th section did not extend to alimony, although the words are general, for that alimony has always been considered as something different from other demands, the payment of which can neither be enforced or discharged as other debts, for which the case of Stones v. Corke, 7 Sim. 22, and 8 Sim. 321, in note, was cited. But it seems to me that the question is not affected by that decision. That was an application to a court of equity by the executors of a married woman to enforce payment after her death of arrears of alimony due when she died; that application was made on the ground that after her death the Ecclesiastical Court would not enforce the payment. The decision appears to have proceeded on the ground that the matter was of ecclesiastical conusance, and as the Ecclesiastical Court would not enforce payment under such circumstances the Court of Chancery had no such jurisdiction. The question, therefore, is not affected by authority, and I must endeavour to construe correctly the enactment of the Legislature and give effect to it. Now, by sect. 149 of the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, a person entitled to enforce against the bankrupt payment of any money, costs, or expenses, by process of contempt issuing out of any court, shall be entitled to come in as a creditor under the bankruptcy and prove for the amount payable under the process. The wife in this case was a person entitled to enforce against the resp. payment of money by process of contempt issuing out of this court, and as this court was in existence before the Act passed, I cannot doubt that it was included in the expression, any court." By sect. 161 it was enacted that "the order of discharge shall, upon taking effect, discharge the bankrupt from all debts, claims, or demands proveable An order of discharge under the Bankruptcy Act 1861 under his bankruptcy." This demand was so proveable. protects the bankrupt from any proceeding to en- By sect. 165, "the order of discharge shall discharge force payment of alimony, in respect of which he the bankrupt from the effects of any process issuing out has been attached before the order of discharge: of any court for contempt of any court for nonpayment A rule to show cause why sequestration should not of money, and from all costs that he would be liable issue against his estate was therefore discharged. to pay in consequence of or on purging his contempt." This was originally the wife's petition for judicial These sections appear to me to include the present case separation, and permanent alimony was allotted. An and to discharge the resp. from any proceedings to enattachment had issued against the resp. for nonpay-force payment of the alimony, for nonpayment of ment of arrears of such alimony. He subsequently, on the 25th March 1862, obtained his order of discharge under the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 184.

Dr. Spinks now moved the court to accept the affidavit, and submitted that the description, as widow, was sufficient.

Sir C. CRESSWELL-I think I may safely make the order, and that there is a sufficient description of the widow as such.

Wynne, attorney.

DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL
CAUSES COURT.
Reported by Dr. SWABEY, Barrister-at-Law.

July 15 and 22.

(Before CRESSWELL, J. 0.)
DICKENS V. DICKENS.

Order to pay alimony-Attachment-Order of dis-".
charge in bankruptcy-Sequestration-24 & 25
Vict. c. 184, ss. 149, 161 and 165.

July 1.-Aspland, on behalf of the plt., obtained a rule nisi for a sequestration against the estate of the resp. in respect of the arrears of alimony.

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which he had been attached before his discharge. The order nisi for a sequestration must therefore be discharged.

Ashurst and Lowther and Co., attorneys.

Tuesday, Nov. 11.

July 15.-Hannen showed cause against the se- POLLACK v. POLLACK AND DEANE AND MACquestration issuing; and

Aspland argued in support of the rule.
The facts and authorities cited are sufficiently
stated in the judgment.
Cur, adv. vult.

CRESSWELL, J. O.-In this case a decree was pronounced for judicial separation on the 26th July 1859, and on the 1st July 1860 permanent alimony was allotted to the petitioner at the rate of 60%. per annum. On the 30th July 1861 an attachment issued against the resp. for 75%. arrears of alimony up to the 26th

NAMARA, and the QUEEN'S PROCTOR (intervening).
Decree nisi-Queen's Proctor's intervention-Pleas-
Attendance of petitioner.

When, after decree nisi, the Queen's Proctor intervened
and pleaded collusion and condonation, and the
petitioner took issue thereon and case was ready to
be heard before the court, a motion on behalf of
the Queen's Proctor was made to order the attend-
ance of the petitioner at the hearing under the 43rd
section of Divorce Act. The court refused to make

Div.]

THOMPSON V. THOMPSON AND BARRAS-THE NIGHT WATCH.

such order, but ordered the proceedings to be stayed till he should attend.

This was originally the husband's petition for dissolution of marriage, to which the resp. did not answer. On the 25th June 1861 Cresswell, J. O. made a decree nisi for dissolution of the marriage, and before the decree was made absolute the Queen's Proctor obtained the leave of the court to intervene, and filed pleas of collusion and condonation, on which the petitioner took issue; and these issues were now ready to be tried before the court itself. On an affidavit of the Queen's Proctor stating as above, and that he believed that Mr. Pollack the petitioner was abroad, and that he was advised that in case the question of identity should be raised on behalf of the petitioner, his presence at the hearing of the cause would be necessary for the purpose of justice, and that the cause could not safely be brought to a hearing without the petitioner's presence thereat,

Dr. Spinks moved for an order on the petitioner to attend, and that cause should be deferred till next

term.

CRESSWELL, J. O.-I doubt whether I have power under the 43rd section of the Divorce Act, which undoubtedly is embodied in the more recent Acts, to make such an order unless the Queen's Proctor becomes a party to the suit whilst the questions are depending between the original parties. [Spinks referred to Marris v. Marris and Burke, and the Queen's Proctor intervening, 2 Swab. & Trist. 530; s.c. 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 768.] But there the Queen's Proctor intervened, and pleaded before the original petition was heard; but here, after the decree nisi has been obtained, the proceeding assumes a quasi criminal shape, and I am not satisfied that I have power to order the attendance of the petitioner under the 43rd section of the Divorce Act. But I will make an order to stay proceedings till he appears. Queen's Proctor,

Tuesday, Nov. 25.

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after some negotiation a deed of settlement was madein April 1860, by which the property was conveyed to certain trustees, on trust to pay, during their joint lives, as to one half of the proceeds, to Thompson, and the other moiety to Mrs. Thompson "until the said Mary Ann Thompson shall commit any act of adultery, and the trustees for the time being acting in the trusts, &c., shall declare by writing under their handsthat they have received evidence thereof," &c., from and after which time the trustees to pay Mrs. Thompson's moiety to Elizabeth Thompson, the daughter of the parties. In April 1861 the trustees gave notice that they were satisfied that Mrs. Thompson had committed adultery, and that they intended to pay her moiety to the daughter. That Thompson had contributed nothing to the support of his wife and child since 1840; on the other hand Thompson alleged that before commencing his suit for dissolution, he had made his daughter a bonâ fide offer of a home, which she refused, and that she had been living and continued to live with her mother and Barras.

Dr. Middleton, under the above circumstances, moved the court to direct that the moiety of the rents and profits now payable under the deed of settlement to Jas. Henry Thompson shall for the future be applied for the use and benefit of the said Eliz. Thompson, the only child of the said J. Henry Thompson.

Dr. Swabey, for Mr. Thompson, was not called upon by

CRESSWELL, J.O., who said :-The section relied upon must be taken in connection with the 45th of the original Divorce Act, which enacts that, "in any case in which the court shall pronounce a sentenceof divorce or judicial separation for the adultery of the wife, if it shall be made to appear to the court that the wife is entitled to any property, either in possession or reversion, it shall be lawful for the court, if it shall think proper, to order such settlement as it shall think reasonable to be made of such property or any part thereof for the benefit of the innocent party, and of the children of the marriage, or either or any of them." Under this section the court thought it had power to

THOMPSON V. THOMPSON AND BARRAS. Dissolution of marriage-Settlement-22 & 23 deal with settlements, and therefore the 22 & 23 Vict.

Vict. c. 61, s. 5.

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c. 61, gives that express power; but it never was pro-intended that the court should deprive an injured husband of the benefit he takes under a settlement at the prayer of the adulterous wife, whether for the benefit of the children or not. Motion rejected. Edwards, Layton and Jacques, attorneys for Mr. Thompson.

Ridsdale and Craddock for Mrs. Barras.

ADMIRALTY COURT.

Tuesday, Nov. 4.

This was originally the husband's petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery. On the 1st July 1862 the decree absolute was made, and the late wife now moved the court to make an order with respect to a post-nuptial settlement Reported by ROBERT A. PRITCHARD, D. C.L., Barrister-at-Law. under the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 25, which enacts that "the court, after a final decree of nullity of marriage, or dissolution of marriage, may inquire into the existence of ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlements made on the parties whose marriage is the subject of the decree, and may make such orders with reference to the application of the whole or a portion of the property settled, either for the benefit of the children of the marriage, or of their respective parents, as to the court shall seem fit."

From the petition "of Mary Ann Barras, wife of James Barras, and formerly Mary Ann Thompson, the resp. in the above cause," and from Mr. Thompson's affidavit, filed in opposition to the motion, the following facts, among others, appeared: that Mrs. Thompson, under the will of an aunt and her father, became, on the death of her mother in Aug. 1859, entitled to a life-interest in certain hereditaments with remainder to her children. As this interest was not secured to her separate use, the husband Thompson became entitled during their joint lives, jure mariti. For some years previously the parties had been living separately, and

(Before the Right Hon. Dr. LUSHINGTON.)

THE NIGHT Watch.

Vessel in tow of a steam-tug-Collision-Jurisdiction:
The High Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction upon a
claim for damage received through the misconduct
of the steam-tug by a vessel in tow of the steam-tug.
The case of the Julia, 1 Lushington, 224, followed.
A steam-tug having been the causa causans of a col-
lision is liable for the damage.

This was a cause of damage promoted against the steam-tug Night Watch by the owners of the barque Prince, by reason of a collision which occurred between the latter vessel and a ship called the Julie, through the misconduct of the steam-tug.

The owners of the Night Watch appeared and filed a petition, protesting against the jurisdiction of the court.

The Queen's Advocate and Pritchard appeared in objection to the petition; Deane and Lushington in support.

Dec. 6, 1862.]

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