tion of the Indian Railway Act. The prisoner here, one Jones, was tried before his lordship at the first Criminal Sessions for 1863. It was proved that he was an under-guard in the service of the Madras Railway Company, and that on the 1st of January 1863 he was employed in that capacity on a passenger-train from Coimbatore to Madras. Upon the arrival of the train at the Arkónam Junction-station, about 6 o'clock P. M., he was drunk, violent and unsteady. To prevent his going on with the train, he was put in charge of a peon; but, as the train was starting, he broke away, jumped into it, and so was taken on to Madras. Two of the passengers who gave evidence of his intoxication at Arkónam stated that when the train reached the Perambore station the prisoner assisted in giving out the luggage, and then appeared to be steady and sober. It was proved that the under-guard has charge of one of the breaks, and that though the head-guard is answerable for starting the train, he is obliged to depend upon his under-guard for ascertaining that everything is secure in the part of the train which is under the more immediate observation of the latter. It was also proved that serious accidents might result from the negligent performance of the under-guard's duties. Jones was stated by one of the witnesses to be an East Indian, and there was no other evidence of the prisoner's parentage or place of birth. No counsel appeared for either of the prisoners, and the judgment of the Court was delivered by SCOTLAND, C. J. :-The Act No. XVIII of 1862 was passed for the further improvement of the administration of criminal justice by simplifying and facilitating the mode of procedure; and the object of the 35th section is to remove doubts and inconveniences as regards the exact locality in which offences alleged to have occurred on a journey or voyage, have been actually committed or completed. That section enacts: "If any person shall be accused of any offence alleged to have been committed on a journey or on any voyage in British India, such person may be dealt with, tried and punished by any of Her Majesty's Supreme Courts of Judicature, if any part of the journey or voyage shall have been performed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Court." 1863. February 3. 1863. The question which the Court has now to decide is February 3. whether the section clearly gives jurisdiction to the High Court to try and convict the parties charged in either of the cases reserved for consideration; and we are of opinion that the section does not admit properly of such a construction. It is not improbable that the offence of drunkenness whilst on duty was not one of the offences contemplated when the section was framed: but the general language of the section is certainly sufficient to include such offence. Then the section applies if the offence of which the person is accused is "alleged to have been committed on a journey or on any voyage." Now the words "on a journey or on any voyage" must, we think, be read as if the provision had been whilst a journey or voyage or any part of it is being performed by a ship or carriage, without particular reference to the terminus, and so read together with the language of the rest of the section, the proper construction and effect of the enactment is that if a person is accused of an offence committed whilst a journey or voyage is going on he may be tried if any of that part of the journey or voyage during which the offence of which the person accused is alleged to have been committed is within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction. Here the offence was committed by the party accused and was alleged to have been committed on the journey between Coimbatore and Arkónam, and the one prisoner was actually detained at Arkónam, and the other was put in charge of the peon to prevent his going further on the journey, but broke away and got into the train in his then intoxicated state, so that it cannot, we think, be said that any part of the journey on or during which this. offence is alleged to have been committed by the accused, was performed within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction. The journey on which the offence is alleged to have been committed ended, so far as regards the party accused and the offence, at Arkónam. The very general terms of the section give rise certainly to some doubts and difficulty, and the considerations of convenience and inconvenience as regards the prosecution of offences committed on a journey, which have naturally occurred to us, do not so preponderate either way, as to assist materially in its construction. But looking to what 1863. must have been the object and intention of the enactment and giving the ordinary meaning to the language of the February 3. section, we think our present construction is the proper and reasonable one. The Court, therefore, we are of opinion, had no jurisdiction to try the offences charged in these cases, and the convictions must be quashed and the prisoners discharged. Convictions quashed. Appellate Jurisdiction (a) Civil Petition No. 287 of 1862. PARAVARTANI against AMBALAVANA PIĻĻAI. When a Hindú widow instituted a suit in respect of rights inherited by her from her deceased husband and then adopted a son-Held that under section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure the adopted son might be made a co-plaintiff. THE 1863. C. P. No. 287 of 1862. HE original suit (No. 7 of 1857) was brought by a Hindú widow in the Civil Court of Madura to esta- February 7. blish certain rights in respect of the Rámeçvara Devasthánam. The plaintiff was Rání Zamíndární of Rámnád: she had inherited the Zamíndárí from her deceased husband, and in right thereof she claimed to be dharmakartá of the devasthanam in question. After the institution of the suit she adopted one Muturámalinga Çetupati, and this petition was presented by her and the adopted son praying that the suit might be continued by the adopted son; or that he might be added as a supplemental co-plaintiff but that if the Court should not grant either of the above applications, then that the suit might be continued in the name of the plaintiff and as it then stood instituted. Branson for the petitioner. Norton (Mayne and Saḍagópáchárlu with him) for the counter-petitioners: Parties coming into existence after the commencement of the suit cannot apply to be admitted. (a) Present Strange and Frere, J J. Branson in reply: Granting that the interest must be 1863. in existence at the time of the filing of the plaint, the adop February 7. C. P. No. 287 tion here must be referred to the death of the plaintiff's of 1862. husband. In the eye of the law, then, the adopted son was in existence before the institution of the suit. STRANGE, J.-Section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that if it appear to the Court, at any hearing of a suit that all the persons who may be entitled to, or who claim some share or interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and who may be likely to be affected by the result, have not been made parties to the suit, the Court may adjourn the hearing of the suit to a future day, to be fixed by the Court, and direct that such persons shall be made either plaintiffs or defendants in the suit as the case may be. The Code does not admit of a supplemental plaint, but the terms of this section are very large, and I think we must hold that they authorise us to order that the adopted son be admitted as an additional plaintiff to the suit before us. FRERE, J. concurred. Ordered accordingly. Appellate Jurisdiction (a) Criminal Petition No. 101 of 1862. Ex parte VI'RABUDRA GAUD. The discretionary power given by law to examine a prisoner should be used to ascertain from him how he may explain facts in evidence appearing against him, not to drive him to make self-criminating statements. THE HE petitioner, the sixth prisoner in Case No. 155 of 1862, Sessions Court, Bellary, was convicted by that Court of receiving with guilty knowledge property stolen in the commission of a dacoity. On the 15th November 1862 the High Court called for the record and suspended the sentence. The record was returned, and the case now came on for final disposal. Branson and Tirumalácháriyár for the prisoner. The facts appear from the following JUDGMENT: The petitioner, the sixth prisoner in the case, has been sentenced to transportation for life, as a receiver of stolen property obtained by dacoity. The evidence against him is that he has been found in possession of a quantity of gold bullion, showing traces of having been melted down from gold ornaments such as were stolen at the dacoity, and for the possession of which, he has been unable to account satisfactorily. We are of opinion that this evidence is insufficient for the conviction of the prisoner upon the charge laid against him. Identification of gold thus melted down being impossible, it was necessary, in some direct manner, to connect the bullion found with the prisoner with the robbery, so as to warrant the reasonable conclusion that it formed part of what was stolen. There is no such connecting evidence; and it would be quite unsafe to decide that because this gold is of a suspicious description and its possession by the prisoner, in a lawful way, has not been properly accounted for, it formed in fact part of that particular property which was taken at the dacoity. (a) Present Strange and Frere, J J. 1863. February 7 Crim. P. No. 101 of 1862. |