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Appellate Jurisdiction (a)

Referred Case No. 5 of 1862.

KRISTNA CHETTI against BALA'RAMA CHEȚȚI and others.

The obligor's consent is not necessary to the assignment of a common money-bond.

THIS

1863. January 5.

HIS was a case referred for the opinion of the High Court by R. B. Swinton, the Judge of the Court of R. C. No. 5 Small Causes at Tanjore.

No counsel were instructed.

The facts appear from the following

JUDGMENT:-This is the case of a common money-bond given by the second defendant to Kristna Chetți, and by the latter bond fide and for good consideration absolutely assigned to the plaintiff, who thereupon sued to recover the amount secured by the bond. It appears that the second defendant (the obligor) objected, upon the hearing of the suit, that his consent was essential to the validity of the assignment, and no evidence was given of such consent; and the single question submitted for the opinion of the Court is, whether the Judge was right in deciding that proof of the obligor's consent to the assignment was not necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover in the suit? We are of opinion that he was. The right of the obligee to assign was, in the absence of any express stipulation in the bond, quite independent of subsequent consent on the part of the obligor. Here, by the terms of the bond, Kristna Cheṭṭi possessed, as obligee, a general unqualified right to sue upon it for the amount secured; and he was at liberty, by a bona fide assignment, to transfer that right to the plaintiff.

(a) Present Scotland, C. J. and Frerc, J.

of 1862.

1863. January 5. R. C. No. 9

of 1862.

Appellate Jurisdiction (a)

Referred Case No. 9 of 1862.

ANONYMOUS against MUTTUSA'MIYA PIĻĻAI and another.

The obligee of a common money-bond of which a bona fide valid assignment has been made, is not liable to be made a defendant in a suit by his assignee to enforce payment of the bond and to a decree against himself jointly with the obligor.

THIS

THIS was a case referred for the opinion of the High Court by R. B. Swinton, the Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Tanjore.

No counsel were instructed.

The Court delivered the following

JUDGMENT:-The question submitted in this case for decision of the Court is, whether the obligee of a common money-bond, who had for a good consideration made a valid assignment to the plaintiff of all his right and interest under it, was afterwards properly made a defendant to a suit by the plaintiff (the assignee) to enforce payment of the bond, and liable jointly with the obligor to a decree against him? The Judge before whom the suit was tried has decided this question in the negative, and we are of opinion that he decided rightly. There are no special terms in the assignment: it simply assigns the bond and all right to sue upon it; and being in all respects bond fide and valid, the plaintiff's right of action upon the bond to enforce payment was against the obligor, and the obligor only. The right to the obligee's evidence is not affected by his not being made a party to the suit.

(a) Present Scotland, C. J. and Frere, J.

NOTE. The same point was decided in Referred Case No. 10 of 1862.

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Appellate Jurisdiction (a)

Special Appeal No. 15 of 1862.

SUBBARA'YULU NA'YAK...

RA'MA REDDI..

.Appellant.

Respondent.

Regulation XXV of 1802 strictly restrains the alienation of proprietary rights except in manner therein provided, and invalidates a disposal or transfer of such rights as against the Government and the heirs and successors of the proprietor making the disposal or transfer.

Semble such alienation would be valid against the proprietor himself. A permanent lease is as much within the operation of the Regulations XXV and XXX of 1802 as an absolute transfer by gift or sale.

THIS

HIS was a special appeal from the decision of J. W. Cherry, the Civil Judge of Salem, in Appeal Suit No. 175 of

1860.

The principal ground of appeal was that a permanent lease, which had been upheld by the Civil Judge, was invalid as not being in accordance with clauses 2 and 3 of section 4 of Reg. XXX of 1832 (which provide that "Paṭṭás and muchalkás shall contain the date of the month, and the year on which they may be executed; the names and situation of the contracting parties" and that "Pattás for village-rents shall contain the names of the village, the extent of the land therein, the amount of the rent per annum, the period of the kists which proprietors or farmers of land shall be compellable to adjust according to the time of reaping or of selling the produce of the land and the coin in which the rent is to be paid"), nor with section 5 of the same Regulation, which enacts that "Pattás and muchalkás shall be regularly required and registered by the karaṇam of the village in which the land engaged for are situated."

Branson for the appellant, the eighth defendant, cited Special Appeal No. 210 of 1861(b), and referred to the clauses and section above set out, and also to the following sections of Reg. XXV of 1802:

(a) Present Scotland, C. J. and Frere, J.

(b) Mad. S. J. 1862, p. 19.

1863.

January 5. S. A. No. 15

of 1862.

1862. January 5.

S. A. No. 15 of

1862.

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VIII. Proprietors of land shall be at free liberty to transfer, without the previous consent of the Government, or of any other authority, to whomever they may think proper, by sale, gift or otherwise, their proprietary right on the whole or in any part of their Zamíndárís; such transfers of land shall be valid, and shall be respected by the Court of Judicature and by the officers of Government; provided they shall not be repugnant to the Muhammadan or to the Hindú laws, or to the regulations of the British Government. But unless such sale, gift or transfer shall have been regularly registered at the office of the collector, and unless the public assessment shall have been previously determined and fixed on such separated portions of land by the collector, such sale, gift or transfer shall be of no legal force or effect, nor shall such transaction exempt a Zamíndár from the payment of any part of the public land tax assessed on the entire Zamíndárí previously to the whole such transfer, but the whole Zamíndárí shall continue to be answerable for the total land tax, in the same manner as if no such transaction had occurred."

XII. "It shall not be competent to proprietors of land to appropriate any part of a landed estate permanently assessed, to religious or charitable, or to any other purposes, by which it may be intended to exempt such lands from bearing their portion of the public tax; nor shall it be competent to a proprietor of land to resume lands, or to fix a new assessment on lands which may be allotted (at the time when such proprietor may become possessed of the estate in which lands are situated) to religious or to charitable purposes under the denominations of Devasthana or Devadáyam, of Brahmádáyam or Agraháram, of Yaumiá, Jívadána or Madad-ma'ásh, of Pírán, Fakírán, or any other description of exempted lands described under the general term of Lákhiráj, unless the consent of the Government shall have been previously obtained for that purpose."

Mayne, Srinivásacháriyár with him for the respondent, the plaintiff.

The facts and arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment, which was delivered by

1863. January 5.

of 1862.

SCOTLAND, C. J.-This was a suit for the recovery of the three villages of Pullánéri Bommináykkampuṭṭi and Vírap- s. A. No. 15 pampuțți, forming a portion of the Tiriyála muthṭhá, in the ta'aluk of Tiruppattúr, to which the plaintiff claims to be entitled under a permanent lease or pațțá executed in 1838 by the first defendant, Venkata Pillai since deceased, and his brother Ranga Pillai, the father of the second, third and fourth defendants, who died some years prior to the commencement of the suit. These persons, with another brother, Vírarágava Pillai, the husband of the fifth and fatherin-law of the sixth and seventh defendants, were, it appears, proprietors of the muththá, and had before the date of the lease divided between them the enjoyment of the villages of which the muthṭhá consisted. The plaintiff entered and was in possession under the lease until 1842, when he was dispossessed; and in 1852 he brought the present suit, which was subsequently transferred in the year 1856 to the Subordinate Court.

The eighth and ninth defendants pleaded amongst other things that their father acquired a portion of the muththa including the three villages now in question, by purchase from the proprietors Venkata Pillai and Vírarágava Pillai in the year 1842, that the lease on which the plaintiff's claim is based, is of an illegal character, and that it had been expressly disallowed by the Collector.

The Subordinate Judge considered that the plaintiff had proved his right to recover under the permanent lease, and passed judgment in his favour. This decision was confirmed on appeal by the Civil Judge.

The eighth defendant has now preferred a special appeal against this latter judgment, upon the grounds, amongst others, that the lease of 1838 was not in accordance with clauses 2 and 3, section 4 and section 5 of Regulation XXX of 1802, and therefore invalid in point of law; and that at all events all right and title of the plaintiff under the lease ceased upon the death of the parties making it, and consequently the plaintiff could not succeed in his claim to recover possession.

Upon neither of these grounds have the Courts below given any opinion, though the points appear to have been

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