sage needs no comment. It stamps the value of this portion of Mr. Faber's speculations. Like Gibbon and Milner, he has not consulted what is beyond all question the most important document connected with the subject. Yet the work of Photius is by no means of rare occurrence. The historical part is printed in Montfaucon's Bibliotheca Coisliniana, and it is given entire in Wolf's Anecdota Græca (vols. i. ii.), and the last edition of the Bibliotheca Patrum (tom. xii.) Of the latter part of the note every clause contains an error. 1st. We learn from Petrus Siculus himself, that his residence among the Paulicians was not in 870, but in 868. 2nd. It is quite clear, as I have shewn elsewhere,† that Photius wrote at least two or three years before Peter. 3rd. The illustrious patriarch survived the Sicilian's embassy twenty-three years. Mr. Faber evidently confounds the time of his second deposition (886) with his death. He is supposed to have lived till 891. I need not say more. After what I have written, it is quite superfluous to remark, that no one who is curious about the revival of Dualism in the middle ages-one of the most interesting subjects in the history of heresy, will find much to gratify him in Mr. Faber's Inquiry. He has treated the subject hastily and superficially, and, I am sorry to be compelled to add, in a tone of supercilious violence. But, "the ancient Paulicians of Armenia were clearly the theological ancestors of the Albigenses." p. 32. It was therefore necessary that they should, on any terms, be acquitted of the charges laid against them. His labours form another attempt to press history into the service of a theory. I am sure that you, my dear Sir, and such as you, cordially join me in the wish that such attempts may be less and less frequent; that we may see truth sought for her own sake, without any fearful apprehension of the results of what she may discover; and that, taught by a long experience, we may at length be content to receive in meekness and quietness the precious lessons of the past, without this distracting turmoil of sectarian warfare. Believe me to be, with great respect, yours, very truly, J. G. DOWLING. Gloucester, Sept. 6, 1838. ON MR. FABER'S VIEWS OF PRESBYTERIAN ORDINATION. DEAR SIR,-Will you allow me to call your attention to the following passage in Mr. Faber's late work on the Waldenses and Albigenses, which, in the present circumstances of the church, seems to me to require some notice? "As I thus pronounce the two communions of the Vallenses and the Albigenses to be the two witnessing churches of the Apocalypse; and as I further contend, against Bossuet, that the Vallenses, in a more especial manner, constitute that visible church which connects the churches of the reformation with the primitive * Οπερ καὶ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ δευτέρω ἔτει τῆς βασιλείας Βασιλείου, καὶ Κωνσταντί νου, καὶ Λέοντος, τῶν εὐσεβῶν καὶ θικαίων μεγάλων βασιλέων ἡμῶν. Petr. Sic. Hist. p. 72. The second year of Basil was 868. + Letter to Mr. Maitland, p. 29, note x ; p. 24, note f. Fabr. Bibl. Græc. ix. 370. church: it may be expected, that I should say something, as to their right to be considered churches at all, in regard to their possessing, or their not possessing, the apostolical succession. "I readily confess, that I am not able to demonstrate the circumstance of their possessing an apostolical succession, either as regularly transmitted by episcopal ordination, or as less regularly handed down by the simple imposition of the hands of the presbytery. "Yet, though a strictly legal demonstration of this matter, in the case of two churches subjected to incessant persecution, or driven into the obscurity and poverty of an alpine wilderness, may well have been thus rendered impracticable, and thence, in common fairness, cannot be rigidly demanded: we may nevertheless, come so near to the point, that, in concurrence with the scriptural declaration of the assured existence of precisely two witnessing churches during all the middle ages, we may deem it sufficiently established for all legitimate ecclesiastical purposes."-p. 553. Without at all entering into the question of the Albigenses and Waldenses, or their claim to be considered as the two witnesses, I must confess myself rather startled to find an author of some tact and experience, almost at the end of a long work, where his whole system has rested on the supposition that "the two churches of history (as Mr. Faber is pleased to call the Albigenses and Waldenses) are the two churches of prophecy," gravely turn round to inquire or more truly, it would seem, to satisfy the captious reader, who may rather unreasonably expect him to say something on the subject-whether, after all, these "two churches of history" have any "right to be considered churches at all." To most men this would probably have occurred rather at the commencement than at the end of such an investigation. But Mr. Faber seems to feel no difficulty in the matter, notwithstanding what might be thought a somewhat serious feature in the case,-namely, that of all the churches of Christendom, during the whole period which Mr. Faber has selected, these "two churches of history" are very specially the only two churches which have any difficulty in proving that they are churches at all; the only two about which such a question could be seriously entertained for one moment by any person with the least pretension to a knowledge of history. Mr. Faber readily confesses that he is "not able to demonstrate the circumstance of their possessing an apostolical succession, either as regularly transmitted by episcopal ordination, or as less regularly handed down by the simple imposition of the hands of the presbytery." I believe that some of your readers are not prepared to have the question of apostolical succession dismissed as a mere "circumstance" in an inquiry of this sort. But finding himself perplexed to prove "the two churches of history" to be churches at all, either his theory must be renounced, or the question of apostolical succession be thrown overboard. The remarkable expression which Mr. Faber has used to convey his opinion, that succession may be transmitted "by the simple imposition of the hands of the presbytery," is followed up by a long note, in which, with I know not what purpose, we have the story of Pelagius I., a quotation from Jerome, and another from St. Clement of Rome. Mr. Faber's conclusion I give in his own words: "Certainly, to depart from the divinely-appointed model by the entire rejection of bishops, save only in a case of palpably overbearing necessity, would, I think, be unwarrantable and presumptuous and not improbably in the event dangerous. Yet, when the departure had occurred, I cannot, with some, undertake to say, that, in such circumstances, the transmission of the apostolical succession was an ecclesiastical impossibility. I would rather, until better informed, express myself as in the text. A transmission of the apostolical succession, by the simple imposition of the hands of the presbytery, they themselves having previously received the imposition of hands, and so backward to the very beginning, is rather to be deemed less regular than roundly to be pronounced invalid.”—p. 562. As to his authorities, I am quite ready to examine them if required. But what I ask is, can it be necessary to inform Mr. Faber that the passage of St. Jerome, on which he has mainly relied, has been, ever since the question was first started among protestants, the very passage by which the presbyterians have endeavoured to justify themselves and to weaken the church, and that it has been again and again examined by almost every writer who has undertaken to defend our church, (for instance, Hooker, Bingham, Potter, &c.,) and demonstrated to make nothing for our adversaries? Are we to understand, that sooner than give up "the two churches of history," Mr. Faber is willing to join the presbyterians? It may serve a temporary object to say that presbyterian ordination "is rather to be deemed less regular than roundly to be pronounced invalid;" but I should be glad to be informed if the church of England has not already distinctly pronounced it invalid in the Book of Common Prayer-a document to which some of us, who are clergymen, have, more than once, declared our unfeigned assent and consent? I am, dear Sir, faithfully yours, JOHN CLARKE CROSTHWAITE. MR. GOODE IN REPLY TO MR. PERCEVAL, SIR,-I am glad to find that the discussion of this subject has produced from Mr. Perceval a modification, to say the least, of his original position, that "rates, up to this hour, are a voluntary contribution on the part of the parish, to which, if they refuse, there is no earthly power to compel them," (Origin of Church-rates, p.31,) "an obligation which can only be enforced by those appeals to conscience, with which only the spiritual courts as such have to do." (British Magazine for June.) "My meaning was (he says of the former passage) that they could not be wrung from them by earthly violence; that no distress could issue against their goods;" which he still maintains, but now thinks "that only sentence of contumacy can issue; which though exercised, indeed, by a spiritual court, I admit can hardly be termed an appeal to conscience." Now I must say, that there appears to me to be as much " earthly violence" in getting an offender imprisoned by a writ de contumace capiendo, as in taking his goods by a warrant of distress; and I do not quite understand how that can be called "a voluntary contribution," for the nonpayment of which a man may be imprisoned, and suffer divers other temporal inconveniences. At least, I hope that all those who may be inclined to take encouragement from this statement of Mr. Perceval to resist the payment of church-rates, will clearly understand what sort of a voluntary contribution church-rate is. The attorney-general, at any rate, must give up his reference to Mr. Perceval, as having "stated that the agreement to make a rate is a spiritual duty, and to which men are no otherwise bound than by those motives of conscience and religion to which alone the spiritual courts appeal." (Letter to Lord Stanley, pp. 31, 32.) Mr. Perceval adds, " But besides this, I believe, and still believe, that the most simple and summary mode for the bishops to adopt is, by interdict of religious offices in the place. . . This I think Mr. Goode must admit to be an appeal to conscience, and not an exercise of earthly power." Certainly I do, and for that very reason believe that it would be utterly ineffectual to produce the payment of church-rates. On the contrary, I should say, judging from the present spirit of the dissenters, that the very prospect of such a consummation as the parish church being shut up, would greatly promote opposition to church-rates; and I trust, on many accounts, that no such remedy may even be threatened. But though Mr. Perceval has made the above (may I not call it important) admission, as to the power of the ecclesiastical courts in this matter, he still maintains his ground in denying that church-rate is a "common-law liability in the strict sense of the terms," or "one that can be enforced by the common-law courts;" nay, thinks that he has proved that it is not so. I will now, therefore, proceed to consider his statements upon this point. My position, as quoted by Mr. Perceval, is as follows: “The obligation in question-viz., that parishioners should keep in repair a certain part of their parish church-is maintained to be, in the strict sense of the terms, a common-law obligation; and that on two grounds, first, on the ground of immemorial custom, and secondly, because it has been repeatedly said to be so by the common-law judges, and therefore, of course, one that can be enforced by the common-law courts; i. e., one that comes within the authority and power of those courts, if they consider their interference necessary.” "The last clause (says Mr. Perceval) strikes me as very remarkable;" and he thinks it strange that it should be "competent for the judge of the temporal court to refuse a man redress because he does not think his interference necessary." Mr. Perceval's doubts upon this point at least, may, I think, be easily set at rest. "If (says Dr. Nicholl, supported by authorities he adduces in the passage from which I quote, and to Dr. N.'s authority Mr. Perceval himself refers,) no other legal remedy can be found, the court of King's Bench will always, in aid of justice, interfere by mandamus, to compel the discharge of that liability......On the other hand, the court of King's Bench will not, save under very special circumstances, grant a mandamus where a specific legal remedy does exist. Thus, in the King v. the Bishop of Chester (1 T. R. p. 404,) Buller J. says-' During the time Lord Mansfield has presided here he has taken great pains to state particularly the ground on which this court will either grant or refuse writs of mandamus. He has always said, this court will not interpose by granting a mandamus, unless the party making the application has no other specific legal remedy. It must be a legal and specific remedy.'"-(Church-rates, pp. 18, 19.) Hence it is asserted, that the Court of Queen's Bench will grant a mandamus if it considers its interference necessary. VOL. XIV.-Oct. 1838. 3 G It will be recollected that the ground which the attorney-general and others have taken is, that though the ecclesiastical courts can enforce the payment of a rate properly made, yet that they cannot oblige the parishioners to make a rate. "A valid rate (says the attorney-general) they can enforce, but without a valid rate they are powerless." (Letter to Lord Stanley, p. 14.) It is replied then, If this is true, and the ecclesiastical courts are thus powerless, and there is "no other specific legal remedy," in case of a refusal of a churchrate, the Court of Queen's Bench will grant a mandamus, seeing that church-rate is a common-law liability. I have not denied, but on the contrary maintained, that the ecclesiastical court retains the power to oblige the parishioners to make a rate, and that it is a matter properly belonging to their jurisdiction; but I maintain also that, church-rate being a common-law liability, it is "one that can be enforced by the common-law courts if they consider their interference necessary," and it is necessary if the ecclesiastical courts are powerless. "The legal liability being established, the attorney-general [and I may add Mr. Perceval] is in this dilemma If no specific legal remedy exists, the Court of King's Bench will grant a mandamus; if a specific legal remedy does exist, cadit quæstio." (Dr. Nicholl on Church Rates, p. 20.) Mr. Perceval may hence see the reality and importance of the distinction, to which he has objected, between "the enforcement of the payment of a rate actually made and the enforcement of the obligation lying upon the parishioners to make a rate." It is allowed on all hands, that a valid rate can be enforced by the ecclesiastical courts, and consequently, as church-rate is a matter of which the ecclesiastical court is allowed to have the cognizance, "previous to the act of 1813 the ecclesiastical court was the only proper place in which to sue a recusant for the payment of church-rates, and still remains so for sums above ten pounds;" but this is no proof that if the ecclesiastical court is unable to compel parishioners to make a rate, the commonlaw courts cannot interfere by mandamus to oblige them to do so. No such conclusions follow from this distinction as those which Mr. Perceval has deduced from it. He says, "As I had not contemplated that any one would maintain that a court can have power to compel a tax to be made, the payment of which, when made, it has no power to enforce," &c. I need hardly say that nothing like this has fallen from Again :-"While therefore he admits, if I understand him aright, that the obligation to pay a rate, when made, is not, strictly speaking, a common-law obligation, seeing that previous to 1813 it could only be sued in the ecclesiastical courts, he stoutly maintains that the obligation to make a rate is a common-law obligation, and can be enforced if necessary in the temporal courts." I have nowhere maintained that the obligation to pay a rate is not a common-law obligation, but directly the contrary. It does not in the least follow, that because "the ecclesiastical court is the only proper place in which to sue a recusant for the payment of church-rates," that it is not a commonlaw liability, nor that it is " an obligation which can only be enforced in the ecclesiastical courts." Mr. Perceval seems to forget the relative me. |