I.

to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, so Discourse it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will is the cause of willing. And therefore the understanding hath no place in that concourse of causes which according to T. H. do necessitate the will.

yet to one

Course un

alterably. ]

Thirdly, the judgment of the understanding is not always 3. [Nor practicè practicum', nor of such a nature in itself as to oblige and determine the will to one. Sometimes the understanding proposeth two or three means equally available to the attaining of one and the same end. Sometimes it dictateth, that this or that particular good is eligible or fit to be chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible or that it must be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means, but not the only means, to attain the desired end. In these cases, no man can doubt but that the will may choose or not choose, this or that, indifferently. Yea, though the understanding shall judge one of these means to be more expedient than another, yet, forasmuch as in the less expedient there is found the reason of good, the will in respect of that dominion which it hath over itself may accept that which the understanding judgeth to be less expedient, and refuse that which it judgeth to be more expedient.

that the

Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so effi- 4. [Nor in caciously, but that it may be, and often is, deterred from the such a way, prosecution of it by the difficulty of the means; and notwith- will cannot standing the judgment of the understanding, the will may own act.] still suspend its own act.

suspend its

Fifthly, supposing but not granting, that the will did 5. [Nor antecedently necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, yet or extrinsethis proves no antecedent necessity, but co-existent with the cally.] act; no extrinsecal necessity, the will and understanding being but two faculties of the same soul; no absolute necessity, but merely upon supposition. And therefore the same authors who maintain that the judgment of the understanding doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more earnestly oppugn T. H. his absolute necessity of all occurrences. Suppose the will shall apply the understanding to deliberate, and not require a review; suppose the dictate of

[See below in the Castigations of vii. p. 768 (fol. edit.) Disc. ii. Pt. iii.] Mr. Hobbes's Animadversions, Numb.

III.

PART the understanding shall be absolute, not this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that comparatively, but this posi- 659 tively, not this freely, but this necessarily; and suppose the will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act; then here is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute, nor extrinsecal, nor antecedent, flowing from a concourse of causes without ourselves, but a necessity upon supposition, which we do readily grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth, whilst he maintains, either that the apprehension of a greater good doth necessitate the will, or that this is an absolute necessity.

[6. T. H.'s affectation of new

terms of art.]

[Further

T. H.]

Lastly, whereas he saith, that "the nature of election" doth "consist" in "following our hopes and fears," I cannot but observe, that there is not one word of art in this whole treatise which he. useth in the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt of former writers, nor out of a desire to take in sunder the whole frame of learning, and new mould it after his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would give us a new dictionary, that we might understand his sense. But because this is but touched here sparingly and upon the by, I will forbear it, until I meet with it again in its proper place. And for the present it shall suffice to say, that hopes and fears are common to brute beasts, but election is a rational act, and is proper only to man, who is

"Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ "."

T. H.-The second place of Scripture is Josh. xxiv. 15, answer of the third is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12; whereby 'tis clearly proved, that there is election in man, but not proved, that such election was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if they were a thousand.

[Reply.]

J. D.-This answer being the very same with the former, word for word, which hath already been sufficiently shaken in pieces, doth require no new reply.

DISCOURSE
I.

NUMBER VIII.

answer of

T. H.-Supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have [Further done, that necessity and election might stand together; and T. H.) instance in the actions of children, fools, and brute beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined to one; before these his proofs out of Scripture he desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says, that the actions of "children, fools, madmen, and beasts," are indeed "determined," but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but from spontaneous agents; as, for example, that the bee when it maketh honey does it spontaneously, and when the spider makes his web, he does it spontaneously, and not by election. Though I never meant to ground any answer upon the experience of what children, fools, madmen, and beasts do, yet, that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and shew, that it fighteth against its fellow arguments. Your Lordship is therefore to consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also spontaneous, and said to be done by a man's own accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord; which in Latin is sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous : though to give one's money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary: for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and be therefore spontaneous, of which nevertheless as he thinks we never consulted, nor deliberated of in ourselves; as when, making no question nor any the least doubt in the world but that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in anger strike or revile, which he thinks spontaneous but not voluntary nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions

PART
III.

he says necessitation may stand, but not with such as are
voluntary, and proceed upon election and deliberation. Now
if I make it appear to you, that even these actions which he
says proceed from spontaneity, and which he ascribes only to
fools, children, madmen, and beasts," proceed from deliber-
ation and election; and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and
spontaneous, are ordinarily found in those, that are by
themselves and many more thought as wise or wiser than
ordinary men are; then his argument concludeth, that neces-
sity and election may stand together, which is contrary to that
which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove.
And, first, your Lordship's own experience furnishes you
with proof enough, that horses, dogs, and other brute beasts, 660
do demur oftentimes upon the way they are to take. The
horse retiring from some strange figure he sees, and com-
ing on again to avoid the spur. And what else does man
that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action,
another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good
draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him? A child
may be so young as to do all which it does without all
deliberation; but that is but till it chance to be hurt by
doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod;
for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall be de-
liberated on the second time. Fools and madmen mani-
festly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they
make not so good a choice, the images of things being by
diseases altered. For bees and spiders, if he had so little to
do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have con-
fessed not only election, but also art, prudence, and policy in
them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of bees, Aristotle
says, their life is "civilt." He is deceived, if he think any
spontaneous action, after once being checked in it, differs
from an action voluntary and elective; for even the setting
of a man's foot in the posture of walking, and the action of
ordinary eating, was once deliberated how and when it should
be done; and though it afterward become easy and habitual,
so as to be done without forethought, yet that does not
hinder but that the act is voluntary and proceeds from

I.

election. So also are the rashest actions of choleric persons DISCOURSE voluntary and upon deliberation for who is there but very young children, that has not considered, when and how far he ought or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then he agrees with me, that such actions are necessitated, and the fancy of those that do them is determined to the actions they do, it follows out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of electing this or that individual thing. And thus one of his arguments fights against another.

J. D. We have partly seen before, how T. H. hath coined [Reply.] a new kind of liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of election; and now, in this section, a new kind of spontaneity, and a new kind of voluntary actions. Although he say, that here is nothing "new"" to him, yet I begin to suspect, that either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his election is not the result of a serious mature "deliberation."

mistakes

The first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my [1. T. H. meaning in this one section. First, I make voluntary and the author's spontaneous actions to be one and the same; he saith I dis- words.] tinguish them, so as spontaneous actions may be necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Secondly, I distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith I confound them, and make them the same. Thirdly, he saith, I ascribe spontaneity only to fools, children, madmen, and beasts; but I acknowledge spontaneity hath place in rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty, and as it is distinguished from liberty.

contradicts

himself. ]

Yet I have no reason to be offended at it; for he deals no [2. And otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he tells us, that "voluntary presupposeth deliberation." But, Numb. xxv, he tells us contrary;-"that whatsoever followeth the last appetite" is "voluntary, and where there is but one appetite, that is the last;" and that "no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden." So, Numb. xxxiii, he tells us, that "by spon[Below, p. 712. fol. edit.]

[See above T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.]