nor their particular faults render the prince accessary, who DISCOURSE gave them their general power.

In his impertinent instance of "the Divine right of Bishops to ordain ministers"," which he bringeth in by the head and shoulders, he sheweth nothing but his ignorance and his teeth. Every man who hath an undoubted right to do some act, hath not presently a right to exercise it promiscuously, when and where and upon whom he will, without any respect to those who had a precedent right before himself. Let him inquire further into the difference between an actual and habitual power; and it will save him the further labour of inquiring, and me of informing him. "Qui pauca considerat facile pronunciat."

He demandeth, "Did not God foreknow, that Uriah in particular should be murdered by David in particular? and what God foreknoweth shall come to pass"." Yes, God doth know in eternity; for with God, properly, there is neither fore-knowledge nor after-knowledge, neither past nor to come, but all things present always. Or if he will have us speak after the manner of men ;-God did foreknow, that David should kill Uriah with the sword of the children of Ammon; and God did likewise foreknow, that T. H. should maintain this paradox so dishonourable to His majesty, that God did necessitate David to kill Uriah; but knowledge, of what kind soever it be, taketh away no man's liberty. Uriah might have gone to his own house upon David's entreaty; and then David had not killed Uriah upon any necessitation from God's fore-knowledge. Uriah might have killed David; and then God had foreknown that, not this. But this objection hath been formerly fully answered: whither I refer the reader.

II.

between

He chargeth me to "say, that the case agitated between [The true us is, whether God's irresistible power or man's sin be the question cause why He punisheth one man more than another;" T. H. and whereas "the case agitated between us is, whether a man can now choose what shall be his will anon P." There are

the author.]

III.

PART several cases or questions between us. First, the general or main question; which is already stated by consent,-whether the will of man be free from extrinsecal determination to one antecedently;—and not, as it is here proposed by him fondly and ambiguously, "whether a man can now choose what shall be his will anon." For, first, a man is not certain, James iv. that he shall live so long to be able to choose his will. And although he were certain to live so long, yet succeeding time may make such a change of affairs, that he may have just reason to choose otherwise.

13, 14.

[The Jews might recover their former estate.]

"Quemquam posse putas mores narrare futuros?

"Dic mihi, si fias tu leo, qualis eris"."

But besides the main general question, there are likewise
many particular subordinate questions; as this in this sec-
tion, whether this opinion of universal necessity do not
make all punishment to be unjust, because, if a man be
necessitated antecedently and unavoidably to do what he
doth, he is punished without his own fault, and consequently
unjustly. To escape this argument, he is driven to seek
shelter under the omnipotence of God:-" Power irresis-
tible justifieth all actions really and properly, in whomso-
ever it be found ;" and, "when God afflicted Job, He did
object no sin to him;" that " which He doth is justified by
His doing its." So the present dispute was, whether man's
sin, or God's omnipotence, were the just ground of punish-
ment. This was all I said, and more than I said. But he
can set down nothing without either mistaking it or con-
founding it. God's power is not the rule of His justice, but
His will; not because His will maketh that to be just, which
otherwise was unjust, but because He can will nothing but 780
that which is just. But he addeth not one grain of weight
more in these Animadversions about this subject to what he
had formerly said; all which hath been fully and clearly
satisfied in my former Defencet, to which he hath replied
nothing.

That which I said of the Jews-that "it was in their own

II.

power by their concurrence with God's grace to prevent DISCOURSE those judgments, and to recover their former estate","-is so Rom. xi. true, and so plainly affirmed by St. Paul, that no man but 23. himself durst have cavilled against it. But he who knows no liberty but from outward impediments, no general power of motion without a necessitation to kill Uriah, no grace but that which is irresistible; who hath never heard of the concurrence of grace and free will in the conversion of a sinner; it is no marvel if he think, that God will save men without themselves, as well as He made them without themselves.

oblige

Himself.

28.- Lev.

I said, God "may oblige Himself freely to His creature." God may Who ever doubted of it before himy? What doth he think of God's promise to Abraham-I will "be the God of thee and [Gen. xvii. 3.] of thy seed after thee?" Or of the legal covenant-" Do this [Luke x. and thou shalt live?" Or of the evangelical covenant-" He xviii. 5.1 that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved?" But he [Mark xvi. 16.] saith, "He that can oblige, can also release when he will, and he that can release himself when he will, is not obliged"." Is not this comfortable doctrine, and suitable to the truth and majesty of Almighty God, "in Whom there is no variable- James i. 17. ness nor shadow of turning?" Nothing is impossible to God's absolute power; but according to His ordinate power, which is disposed by His will, He cannot change His own decrees, nor go from His promise. If God's decrees were changeable, what would become of his universal necessity? But he shooteth at random, not much regarding, so it fit his present humour, whether it make for his cause or against it.

But now I am to expect a heavy charge; hitherto he hath God cannot do any been but in jest ;-that I am "driven to words ill becoming" unrightme "to speak of God Almighty, for" I "make Him unable to eous thing. do that which hath been within the ordinary power of man to do"." How is this? I said, "God cannot destroy the righte- [Gen. xviii. ous with the wicked,' which nevertheless is a thing done ordinarily by armies b." The great "mountain hath brought forth a little mouse"." Might not I say, that God cannot

25.]

III.

Tit. i. 2.

Numb.

xxiii. 19.

2 Tim. ii.

13.-Heb. vi. 10.

Micah vi.

2.

[Ezek.

xviii. 25.]

PART sin, though men can do it? Why might not I say, that God cannot do unrighteous things, or God cannot be unrighteous (which is the same thing in effect), as well as the Scripture saith, God "cannot lie," God "cannot repent," God "cannot deny Himself," and, "God is not unrighteous to forget your works?" As if he should say, If God could break His promise, God could be unrighteous, but He cannot be unrighteous. Yea, the Lord doth submit Himself, as it were, to a trial upon this point ;– "The Lord hath a controversy with His people, and He will plead with Israel." And He doth challenge them upon this very point;-"Hear now, O house of Israel, is not My way equal? are not your ways unequal?”—And in the same chapter He protesteth,— [vv. 2-4.] "As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel, . . the fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge;” but, "the soul that sinneth shall die." And Abraham saith the same that I say (though he deny it), by way of interrogation Gen. xviii. indeed, but with much more vehemency;-" Wilt Thou also destroy the righteous with the wicked?" &c.; "that be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked; that be far from Thee; shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Neither can he except, because it is not said, Canst Thou? but, "Wilt Thou?" for we speak of the ordinate power of God, which is ordered by His will.

23, 25.

Jude 7.

That which he saith of an armyd weigheth less than nothing. For, first, that destruction which an army maketh, is not like that destruction whereof Abraham speaketh, which fell upon Sodom and Gomorrah, which the Apostle calleth "the vengeance of eternal fire." The destruction made by an army may be a punishment to some, a chastisement or a blessing to others. Jeremy the prophet was involved with the rest of the Jews in the same Babylonian captivity; but the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah was an express punishment for sin. Thirdly, an army acteth by way of public justice, regarding the justice of the cause, not of particular persons; for it is not possible in the height of war to do justice according to the particular merits of single 781

d [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 110.]

persons.

II.

But after this necessity is over, and particular jus- DISCOURSE tice can take place, then no man ought to suffer but according to his guilt; then it is no more lawful to "destroy the righteous with the wicked." Necessity may justify the sufferings of innocent persons in some cases; but no necessity can warrant the punishment of innocent persons. "Innocentium lachrymæ diluvio periculosiores.”

Whether they did well or ill for the manner of the act, who put out their bodily eyes because they supposed them to be an impediment to the eye of the soul, is not pertinent to our purpose, yet was apt enough to prove my intention,that bodily blindness may sometimes be a benefit.

irrelevant

the brute

His instance, in "brute beasts, which are afflicted, yet can- [T. H.'s not sine," is extravagant. I did not go about to prove, that instance of universal necessity doth take away afflictions: it rather ren- beasts.] dereth them unavoidable. But I did demonstrate (and he hath not been able to make any show of an answer to it), that it taketh away all just rewards and punishments; which is against the universal notion and common belief of the whole world. Brute beasts are not capable of punishment: they are not knocked down out of vindictive justice for faults committed, but for future use and benefit. I said there was "a vast difference between the light and momentary pangs" of brute beasts, "and the intolerable and endless pains of Hell." Sure enough, Dionysius the tyrant, seeing an ox knocked down at one blow, said to his friends, "what a folly it is to quit so fair a command for fear of dying, which lasts no longer a spaces." He himself, when his wits are calmer, doth acknowledge as much as I, and somewhat more:-" Perhaps" (saith he), "if the death of a sinner were an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might, as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty, not accusing him of injustice," &c., "but of little tenderness and love to mankindh." But now he is pleased to give another judgment of it;-"As if the length or greatness of the pain made any

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xii. p. 110.]

f [Defence, Numb. xii. above p. 79; Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

Plut., [Apophthegm. Reg. &c.;

Op. Moral., tom. i. p. 488. ed. Wyt-
tenb.]

h [Qu., Animadv. upon] Numb. x.

[p. 79.]