PART and if the causes will give him leave, get a plantain leaf to heal his broken shin.

III.

Such an unruly thing as this top, which he fancieth, is he himself, sometimes dictating errors, sometimes writing paradoxes, sometimes justling out metaphysics, sometimes wounding the mathematics; and, in a word, troubling the world, and disordering all things, logic, philosophy, theology, with his extravagant conceits. And yet he is offended, that men will go about to keep possession of their ancient principles against his upstart innovations; and is ready to implead them (with that quarrelsome Roman), because they would not receive his weapon fairly with their whole bodies". It were a much more Christian contemplation, to elevate his thoughts from this "wooden top" to the organical body of a man, wherein he may find God a hundred times; from the external form or figure of the one, which affords it only an aptitude to move and turn, to the internal and substantial form of the other, which is the subordinate beginning of animal motion; from the turning of his top, which is so swift that it prevents the discovery of the sharpest eye-sight, and seemeth to stand stock still, to the eternity of God, where motion and rest do meet together, or all motion is swallowed up into rest; lastly, from these boys, who hold the top up by their continued lashings, to the infinite power of an Almighty God, Who is both the procreating and conserving cause of all our life, being, and motion, and to magnify Him for His wonderful works, wherein He hath manifested to the world His own power and wisdom.

Liberty of exercise

spe

AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON NUMBER IV.

These Animadversions will produce no great trouble either and of to me or the reader. I did demonstrate in this section the cification.] difference between liberty of exercise or contradiction, and liberty of specification or contrariety. He only takes notice of it, and calls it "jargone;" and so without one word more, shaketh hands and withdraweth himself.

II.
T. H. his

in logic.

I said it was a rule in art, that homonymous words, or DISCOURSE words of a double or doubtful signification, ought first to be distinguished, that disputants may understand one another deep skill rightly, and not beat the air to no purpose". I shewed out of the Scriptures, that the word liberty or freedom was such an ambiguous word, and shewed further what this liberty is, whereof we dispute,-a liberty from necessitation or determination to one by extrinsecal causes. He confesseth, that this is the question; adding, that he understandeth not how such a liberty can bef. Then what remained but to go to 764 our proofs? Yet here he raiseth a storm of words upon the by, and "foameth out his own disgrace." He denieth, that [Jude 13.] there is any such rule of art ;-"I am sure” (saith he), “not in the art of reason, which men call logics." And all logicians are sure of the contrary, who give not only one but many such rules, in treating of simple terms, of complex terms, of fallacies. They teach, that an ambiguous term before it be distinguished signifieth nothing; that it cannot be placed in any predicament; that it cannot be defined nor divided and they give this general rule, "Distinctio vocis ambiguæ prima sit in omni rerum consideratione." Either this man never read one word of logic in his life, or it is most strange how pride hath defaced all logical notions out of his mind.

definitions.

He telleth us, that the signification of an ambiguous word His silly may be rendered perspicuous by a "definition"." But logicians teach us better,-that it cannot be defined before it be distinguished. How should a man define he knoweth not what? Suppose I should ask him the definition of a degree, can he or any man define a degree before they know what degree is to be defined? whether a degree in the heavens, or a degree in the schools, or a degree of consanguinity, or a degree of comparison? He may as well define a crab before he know whether it be a crab-fish or a crab-fruit. The definition and the thing defined are the same thing; but ambiguous words have several significations, which cannot be of the same thing.

PART

III.

His definition of liberty is this,-" Liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion." Before I have done, I shall make him out of love with his definitions. "Liberty is an absence;"-if liberty be "an absence," then liberty is nothing; for "an absence" is nothing in the nature of things but a mere privation :-" an absence of impediments;" -impediments may take away the liberty of execution, not the liberty of election; there may be true liberty where there are impediments and there may be no impediments yet without liberty:-"an absence of outward impediments;"— and why of "outward impediments?" may not inward impediments withhold a man from acting freely as well as outward? may not a fit of sickness keep a man at home, as well as a shower of rain? a man may be free, and act freely, notwithstanding impediments; many impediments are vincible; a man may go out of his house though there be a great log laid at his door :-lastly, "an absence of impediments to motions;"-election is the most proper intrinsecal act of liberty, which may be without local motion. I durst not style my poor description by the name of a definition. Yet it set down the right nature of liberty, and shewed what was the difference between us. His definition hath nothing to do with liberty, and cometh not near our question by twenty furlongs. Our controversy is, whether the will be antecedently determined by extrinsecal causes: we have nothing to do with "impediments of motion."

But to let him see the vanity of his definitions, I will demonstrate out of them, that the most necessary agents are free agents, and the most free agents necessary agents; that the will is free, and necessity is liberty. First, when a stone falleth from a steeple to the ground, or when a fire burneth, there is "an absence of all external impediments to motion;" yet, by his own confession, these are not free, nor so much as voluntary, but natural necessary actions. The stone falleth necessarily, not freely. The fire burneth necessarily, not freely. So his definition fitteth a necessary agent as well as a free agent. On the other side, he defineth "necessary" to be "that which is impossible to be otherwise." But, by his

[Ibid.; and in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xxxiii. above p. 175.]

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 26.]

II.

doctrine, it is "impossible" for any free or voluntary agent DISCOURSE "to be otherwise" than it is, or act otherwise than it doth. Therefore, by his definition, all free and voluntary agents are necessary agents. Secondly, if "an absence of external impediments to motion" be a true definition of liberty, then the will is free; for the will hath no "external impediment to motion." External impediments may hinder action, not election, which is the proper act of the will. Lastly, by his definition, liberty itself is necessity, and necessity is liberty; as is made evident thus. The "absence of outward impediments to motion" is the definition which he giveth of liberty, and therefore must be reciprocal or convertible with liberty itself. But necessity is much more "an absence of outward impediments to motion." For if there were any impediments 765 that could hinder the production of the effect, there could be no necessity. Thus he confoundeth all things with his definitions; free agents with necessary agents, and necessary agents with free agents; necessity itself with liberty, and liberty with necessity. And now learning is well reformed.

He is displeased at me for calling him a "particular man,' as if (saith he) I or any other was an universal man; and he conceiveth that I "mean a private manm." I mean as I write ; a particular man is not opposed to an universal man, but to mankind: though he maketh his "city"" to be a kind of universal man. My meaning was, "a particular man," that is, not a Church, not a council, not so much as a company of men, but one single man, and it may be a handful of his seduced disciples. There is neither a Church, nor a council, nor a company of men, but they may justly challenge more respect than one single man.

little worth

use of other

Here he boasteth of his constant meditations;-that he Meditation hath "done almost nothing else but to meditate upon this and without other natural questions." Still he forgetteth Epictetus his making rule, that "the sheep should not brag how much it hath men's exeaten P." If he had "meditated" to any great purpose, we should have found it in his works. For my part, I do neither believe, that he had so much spare time from other employments to bestow upon his "meditations;" nor that private

perience.

III.

PART meditation, without making use of the studies and experience of other men, is so ready a way to attain to perfection in such hidden learning. If he had spent all his time in meditating how to become a good physician, and had never read a line of Hippocrates or Galen, or any other learned author, the meanest of which had more knowledge than he is able to attain unto with all his "meditation" during his whole life, what would it have availed him? "Facile est inventis addere;"-it is much easier to top a stately edifice, than to build it up from the very foundation. Lastly, I do not believe, that he was capable of "meditation" upon those high subjects; which he never understood, as appeareth plainly by his writings. How should a blind man judge of colours?

Terms of

art are un

rude per

sons.

Yet he will not give over, until he have had another fling grateful to against School-terms; because he findeth it easier to censure, than either to confute or understand. He hath been answered formerly, and shall receive a further answer in due place. For the present, I shall only put him in mind of two sayings the one of Scaliger,-" Voces didacticæ rudibus ingeniis acerbæ, delicatis ridiculæ sunt"-" Terms of art devised for instruction are unpleasant to palates not exercised in them, and ridiculous to nice and delicate ears." There is a double perspicuity, the one vulgar, to common people, the other more intellectual, to artists. "In vulgar appellations" (saith Aristotle) "we are to speak as the common people, but in terms of art we are to follow the most approved artists"."

[Of Luther and Melancthon, and the Schoolmen.]

He asketh," with what patience" I "can hear Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon speak" against School theology': whereof he giveth some instances, but without citing the places; so he must receive an answer without perusing of them. If they have condemned all Schoolmen and School learning, it is for him to defend them, not for me. For if they did so, I should not much value their judgment in that particular. But I do not believe that any who made so great use of School learning, did condemn all Schoolmen in general. tis atque Ciceronianis etiam ridiculæ."] Topic., lib. II. c. ii. § 9. [“Taîs μὲν ὀνομασίαις τὰ πράγματα προσαγορευτέον καθάπερ οἱ πολλοὶ, ποῖα δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα ἢ οὐ τοιαῦτα, οὐκέτι προσεκτέον τοῖς πολλοῖς."]

[Above in the Answ. to the Пpoλeyóμeva, p. 209; and below Castig. upon Animadv., Numb. xi. p. 306, &c.]

[Jul. Scalig., Exercit. de Subtilitate ad Cardan., Exercit. ccclix. c. 2. p. 1097. Francof. 1607.-"Mutuandæ sunt quotidianæ voces ad usum abstrusarum intellectionum; quæ rudibus inchoatisque ingeniis acerbæ sunt, delica

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iv. pp. 47, 48.]