I. J. D. Either I am free to write this discourse for liberty DISCOURSE against necessity, or I am not free. If I be free, I have ob[Introductained the cause, and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I tion of the be not free, yet I ought not to be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable necessity". subject.] tion of the T. H.—Right Honourable, I had once resolved to answer [IntroducJ. D.'s objections to my book De Cive in the first place, as subject.] that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine this discourse of liberty and necessity, which (because I never had uttered my opinion of it) concerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordship's and J. D.'s desire, that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do. And here I present and submit it to your Lordship's judgment. J. D.-The first day that I did read over T. H. his defence [Reply.] of the necessity of all things, was April 20, 1646: which pro [The present "Discourse" is composed of three several tracts, printed in successive portions: viz. 1. “a discourse of liberty and necessity," written by Bramhall in 1645 in consequence of a conversation between Hobbes and himself in the presence of the Marquis of Newcastle, but not printed until 1655; 2. Hobbes' answer to this discourse, written also in 1645 III. PART ceeded not out of any disrespect to him; for if all his discourses had been geometrical demonstrations, able not only to persuade but also to compel assent, all had been one to me; first my journey, and afterwards some other trifles (which we call business), having diverted me until then. And then my occasions permitting me, and an advertisement from a friend. awakening me, I set myself to a serious examination of it. [T.H.'s own words con We commonly see those who delight in paradoxes, if vict his they have line enough, confute themselves, and their specutheory of latives and their practicks familiarly interfere one with falsehood.] another. The very first words of T. H. his defence trip up the heels of his whole cause ;-"I had once resolved." To "resolve" pre-supposeth deliberation; but what deliberation can there be of that, which is inevitably determined by causes without ourselves, before we do deliberate? Can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed or not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he should increase in stature. Secondly, to "resolve" implies a man's dominion over his own actions, 650 and his actual determination of himself; but he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this dominion over himself, and (which is worse) hath quitted it to the second extrinsecal causes, in which he makes all his actions to be determined. One may as well call again yesterday, as "resolve," or newly determine, that which is determined to his hand already. I have perused this treatise, weighed T. H. his answers, considered his reasons; and conclude, that he hath missed and misted the question, that the answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralogisms, that the opinion of absolute and universal necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill-chosen principles, and that the defect is not in himself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore, by his favour, I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps another man, reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be pertinent and well founded. How comes this to pass? The treatise [Hobbes' letter was dated Aug. 20, 1645, from Rouen. The journey of Bramhall alluded to appears to have been his return from Paris (where he had met Hobbes) to Brussels, which was his ordinary place of residence from 1644 to 1648: See above in vol. i. p. x.] I. is the same, the exterior causes are the same; yet the resolu- DISCOURSE tion is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and loose? Do they necessitate me to condemn, and necessitate him to maintain? What is it then? The difference must be in ourselves; either in our intellectuals, because the one sees clearer than the other, or in our affections, which betray our understandings, and produce an implicit adherence in the one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, the difference is in ourselves. The outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to the other resolution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective deliberations and affections are in part the causes of our contrary resolutions, and do concur with the outward causes to make up one total and adequate cause to the necessary production of this effect. If it be so, he hath spun a fair thread, to make all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denied or doubted of. When all the causes have actually determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they are together in time. And the old rule is," whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is." This is no absolute necessity, but only upon supposition,-that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we question whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question whether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary in sensu composito-after we have resolved and finally determined what to do, but whether they were necessary before they were determined by ourselves, by or in the precedent causes before ourselves, or in the exterior causes without ourselves. It is not inconsistent with true liberty to determine itself, but it is inconsistent with true liberty to be determined by another without itself. T. H. saith further, that "upon your Lordship's desire and" mine, he "was contented" to "begin with this discourse of liberty and necessity," that is, to change his former resolution. If the chain of necessity be no stronger but that it may be snapped so easily in sunder, if his will was no с [“ Τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὅταν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἂν μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη· οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη είναι, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ὂν ἅπαν εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγκης III. PART otherwise determined from without himself but only by the signification of your Lordship's "desire" and my modest entreaty, then we may safely conclude, that human affairs are not always governed by absolute necessity, that a man is lord of his own actions, if not in chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth, and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward and precedent causes, but that fair entreaties and moral persuasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which otherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He that can reconcile this with an antecedent necessity of all things, and a physical or natural determination of all causes, "shall be great Apollo to me." Whereas T. H. saith, that he "had never uttered" his "opinion" of this question, I suppose he intends in writing. My conversation with him hath not been frequent; yet I remember well, that when this question was agitated between us two in your Lordship's chamber by your command, he did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute necessity of all events, and for the ground of this necessity, the flux or concatenation of the second causes. [T. H.'s boast.] [Reply.] NUMBER II. T. H.-And, first, I assure your Lordship, I find in it no new argument, neither from Scripture nor from reason, that I have not often heard before; which is as much as to say, that I am not surprised. J. D. Though I be so unhappy, that I can present no novelty to T. H. yet I have this comfort, that if he be not 651 surprised," then in reason I may expect a more mature answer from him, and where he fails, I may ascribe it to the weakness of his cause, not to want of preparation. But in this case I like Epictetus his counsel well, that the sheep should not brag how much they have caten, or what an excellent pasture they do go in, but shew it in their lamb and wool. Apposite answers and downright arguments d е ["Et eris mihi magnus Apollo." Virg., Ecl., iii. 104.] advantage a cause. I. To tell what we have heard or seen, is DISCOURSE to no purpose. When a respondent leaves many things untouched, as if they were too hot for his fingers, and declines the weight of other things, and alters the true state of the question, it is a shrewd sign, either that he hath not weighed all things maturely, or else that he maintains a desperate cause. NUMBER III. J.D.'s Pre act does. not imply will.] T. H.-The preface is a handsome one, but it appears [Answer to even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For face.] whereas he says thus-"If I be free to write this discourse, I have obtained the cause,"-I deny that to be true; for 'tis not enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove, that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should write it afterward. It may be, he [Liberty to thinks it all one to say, I was free to write it, and, it was not necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he liberty to is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear if he have the will to forbear: and yet, if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his will; but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will; but to say I can will if I will, I take it to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause upon this preface. レー J. D.-Tacitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, which [Reply.] evermore begin with a man's praise'. The crisis or the catastrophe of their discourse is when they come to their "but." As, he is a good natured man, but he hath a f [Vide Agric. c. 41.] |