Mr. Henry Jackson, of West Bromwich; and Mr. Joseph Needham, of London.

Tatham, Leonard, aged 22, who served his clerkship to Mr. George Remington, of Ulverston; Messrs. Loftus and Young, of London; and Messrs. Loftus, Vizard, Crowder, and Anstie, of London.

The Council have accordingly awarded them certificates of merit. The number of candidates examined in the term was 136; of these, 121 were passed and 15 postponed,

INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATIONS.

THE elementary works, in addition to book-keeping (mercantile), selected for the intermediate examination of persons under articles of clerkship executed after the 1st of January, 1861, for the year 1865, are-Williams on the "Principles of the Law of Real Property," 6th Edition. 1862. Chitty on "Contracts," Chapters 1 and 2. Any edition published in or after 1850.

The Examiners deal with the subject of Mercantile Book-keeping generally, and do not in their questions confine themselves to any particular system. Candidates are not examined in the method of Book-keeping by double entry. Candidates are required by the Ju 'ge's Orders to give to the Incorporated Law Society one calendar month's notice before the commencement of the Term in which they desire to be examined. Candidates are also required to leave their articles of clerkship and assignments (if any) duly stamped and registered, seven clear days before the commencement of such Term, together with answers to the questions as to due service and conduct up to that time. The notice shall contain the name and residence of the candidate, and of the attorney to whom the applicant is articled. [See form of notice, infra.]

Candidates may be examined either in the Term in which one half of their term of service will expire, or in one of the two Terms next before, or one of the two Terms next after one half of the term of service under their articles. The Examinations are held in the Hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, London, in Hilary, Easter, Trinity, and Michaelmas Terms.

Form of Notice.-Notice is hereby given that A. B., of is now under Articles of Clerkship to C. D., of apply in Term next for Intermediate Examination.

Dated the

day of

18

who

intends to

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS.

ADMINISTRATION SUIT.-Two suits -Practice-Executors --Costs. Where an administration suit is pending, and another suit is instituted against the executors of the testator in the former suit, it is the practice, if they are entitled to their costs of the latter suit, to direct in that, that they shall be allowed to prove in the administration suit for such costs, as part of their discharge. (Graham v. Wickham, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 438.)

ARBITRATION.-Time for making award-Umpire—Public Health Act, 1848-Enlargement of time--C. L. P. A. 1854—17 § 18 Vict. c. 125.-An award under the Public Health.Act, 1848, must be made within three months after the appointment of the arbitrators; therefore, where an umpire published his award after the expiration of the period, without enlarging the time :-Held, that the award was bad: Held, also, that the Court had no power afterwards to enlarge the time. (Re Tranmere v. Kellett, 11 Law Tim. Rep.,

457.)

ARTICLED CLERKS.-Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery— Solicitor and articled clerk-Cancellation of articles-Return of premium.—In the case of Hirst v. Tolson (2 Mac. & G. 138) it was Held, that the premium paid with an articled clerk, or part of it, would be ordered to be returned where, owing to the fault of the party receiving it, there had been a failure of the consideration for which it was paid. In the following case it appeared that part of a scheme settled in chambers for the maintenance and education of a minor was, that he should be articled to a solicitor and live with him, £100 a year being provided for his board and lodging. Articles of clerkship were prepared and executed, and upon the application of the solicitor a premium of 300 guineas was ordered to be paid to him, in addition to the sum of £100 a year. Differences afterwards arising between master and pupil, the guardian of the minor, at the instance of the latter, took out a summons to vary the scheme by a cancellation of the articles, with a view of the pupil entering upon a different course of study. The solicitor was served with notice of the summons, and attended, but no affidavit was filed by him. V. C., in chambers, after hearing evidence, ordered the articles to be delivered up to be cancelled, and directed the £100, part of the premium, should be paid by the solicitor. This sum having been paid, the solicitor appealed against that part of the order which directed the repayment. There was no regular evidence of any default or failure of duty on the part of the solicitor, and nothing to show that he submitted to the order of cancellation, although he did not appeal against it :-Held, that, in absence of any proof of misconduct, the Court had no jurisdiction to order repayment of any part of the premium, and

the sum repaid was ordered to be paid back to the solicitor. The discretion which the Court exercises in dealing with the care and maintenance of infants does not extend to the rights under legal contracts of persons of full age. (Craven v. Stubbins, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 402.)

BANKRUPTCY.-Description in petition-Error-Amendment -When.-Debtors coming to the Court upon their own petition ought to describe themselves correctly. An error in the description of the debtor in his petition for adjudication, as where he describes himself as an appraiser" only, he being at the same time an "auctioneer and valuer," is a misdescription material to the merits of the case, as tending to mislead creditors, and cannot, therefore, be amended under the 30th General Order of October 19th, 1862, but the petition will be dismissed. (Exparte Savory, re Savory, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 460.) BANKRUPTCY.-Debtor petitioning, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 184 s. 93Three days' statement must be "fuli, true, and accurate" — How constructed-Dismissal of petition.-In judging whether the three days' statement required by the 93rd section of the B. A., 1861, is "full, true, and accurate," within the terms of the section, the Court must exercise its discretion, and give a practical signification to the expression; and if the omissions in the statement so filed are numerous and important, as where debts and costs of judgments are altogether omitted, and a mis statement is made of the amount of another debt to a considerable extent, the Court will dismiss the petition (Re C. Frost, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 428.)

BANKRUPTCY.-B. L. C. A. 1849-(12 & 13 Vict. c. 106) 8. 178-Contingent liability -Joint-stock Company-Action for calls. -By the above Act, a person having a right to the payment of money due on a contingency which has not happened, may make a claim on the bankrupt's estate. Where, therefore, there is such a liability to pay money on a contingency, a party may become clear of his liability in consequence of such claim becoming in time a proof. The following decision applies only to the above Act, and does not extend to the Act of 1861, which has extended the rights of claim and proof. In an action for calls the defendant pleaded his bankruptcy and discharge, which had been obtained before the making of the calls :-Held, that the bankruptcy was not a defence to the action, as the defendant's liability to pay prospective calls was not "a liability to pay money upon a contingency which had not happened" within the meaning of sect. 178 of the B. L. C. A. 1849, for which the plaintiffs could have proved under the bankruptcy. (The General Discount Company v. Stokes, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 423.)

BANKRUPTCY.-B. A., 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 154—Covenant by surety to pay premiums.-By sect. 154 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, it

is enacted that" if any bankrupt shall, at the time of adjudication, be liable, by reason of any contract or promise, to pay premiums upon any policy of insurance, or any other sums of money, whether yearly or otherwise, or to repay to or to indemnify any person against any such payment, the person entitled to the benefit of such contract or promise may, if he thinks fit, apply to the Court to set a value upon his interest under such contract or promise, and the Court is hereby required to ascertain the value thereof, and to admit such person to prove the amount so ascertained, and to receive dividends thereon." In an action by a surety who had covenanted to pay the premiums on a life policy in default of his principal doing so, against his principal (who had become bankrupt), for the amount of premiums which he had been obliged to pay :-Held, that since the passing of the above Act a plea of bankruptcy was a good answer to the action. (Sanders v. Best, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 421.)

BILL OF SALE.-Construction-Assignment of term Ejusdem generis-Trespass-Entry.—It is stated in Princ. Com. L., p. 288, that a lessee for years cannot bring trespass before entry, for the mere execution of the lease does not vest any estate in the lessee, but gives him a right of entry only on the land. In the following case this and another point as to what is called ejusdem generis construction were considered. It appeared that a tenant from year to year of an inn executed a bill of sale to the plaintiff, to whom he was indebted, of "all and every the household goods and furniture, stock-in-trade, and other household effects whatsoever, and all other goods, chattels, and effects now being, or which shall hereafter be, &c., and all other the personal estate whatsoever, of or to which," &c. The assignor remained in possession for more than a year, at the end of which time his landlord distrained for rent, and sold all the goods and chattels on the premises, but the sale did not realise enough to satisfy the rent and expenses. The tenant then surrendered his term, and gave up possession of the inn to the landlord, and the premises were let to the defendant, who entered into possession. The plaintiff thereupon brought an action of trespass against him :-Held, first, that the words " personal estate" in the bill of sale must be taken to include only things ejusdem generis with those previously mentioned, and that the assignor's interest in the premises did not pass to the plaintiff under the general words. Secondly, that even supposing the assignor's interest in the premises to have passed by the bill of sale to the plaintiff, he, not having entered, could not maintain trespass against a person actually in possession. (Harrison v. Blackburn, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 453.)

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DAMAGES.-Liquidated penalty-Solicitor and clerk-Bond not to practise. A party cannot, by payment of a penalty, or stipulated liquidated damages, entitle himself to do the act provided

against where it is clearly the intention that the act shall not be done. In the following case it appeared that A. B., having entered into an engagement as clerk to a solicitor, bound himself not to practise within certain limits. The bond was conditioned to be void upon payment of £1,000, as liquidated damages in case of breach of the contract not to practise :-Held, that as upon the scope of the whole agreement, it was not the intention of the parties that the defendant should be at liberty to satisfy the condition of the bond by the payment of £1,000 the Court would grant an injunction. (Howard v. Woodward, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 414.)

DEVISE. Real estate-Tenant for life--Gift in remainder"Or the survivors "-Period of distribution.—The rule established by Cripps v. Wolcott (4 Mad. 11), that when personal estate is given to A. for life, and at his death to several persons, 66 or the survivors of them," those only take who are survivors of the tenant for life, applies also to a devise of real estate, and is not confined to the case of personalty. (Re Gregson's Trusts, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 460.)

DOWER.-Statute of Limitations-3 & 4 Will 4, c. 27.-The following is a decision on a novel point arising out of the Statute of Limitations as to real estate. The right of a widow to enforce a claim to dower by bill in equity is a right within the purview of the Statute of Limitations, and consequently one which may be barred by force of that statute. Semble, a widow's right to bring an action at law to establish a claim to dower is within the Statute of Limitations. (Marshall v. Smith, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 443.)

EVIDENCE.-Husband and wife-Competency of wife against husband-Desertion.-The general rule is that a wife is not admissible as a witness for or against her husband, except in civil cases. But in criminal matters, from an early period, there was an exception to the rule, which went on the principle that, where the offence charged touches the person of the wife, and she must be cognisant of it, and may be the only person who is cognisant of it, there the wife is an admissible witness against her husband. That applies to all cases where there is personal violence inflicted by the husband on the wife (F. Bk. 111, 347). In the case of an abduction of a woman, who afterwards becomes the wife of the person abducting, there is the carrying off, which, although no personal injury has been sustained, may well be considered as within the principle; for she must be cognisant of it, and may be the only witness who can fix the offence on the man. But it has been decided that a wife is not an admissible witness against her husband in support of a charge of desertion of wife and children, preferred by the parish under the Vagrant Act, 5 Geo. c. 84. (Reeve v. Hood, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 449).

GAMING.-Suppression of Betting Houses Act (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119) ss. 1, 5.-The defendant, a betting agent and bookmaker, was