for value, are confined to the acts of himself and those claiming under him, but if he took by descent or devise, the covenants would extend back to the ancestor or devisor. (1 Davids. Convey. 101, 194; 2 id. 168; Dart's Vend. 350, 3rd edit.)

V. If A. seised of land in fee demises it to B. for life, rendering for the same to A., his heirs and assigns, an anual rent (without futher powers or covenants in the demise), what remedies would A. and his heirs have for recovery of the rent? ANS.-There being a reversion, A. and his heirs would have a right of distress for recovery of arrears of rent, and as the redendum would amount to a covenant, they would be entitled to sue him thereon. (Com. Law Princ. 247, 249, 250.)

VI. If A. agrees to grant a lease of an estate to B. for a term of years at an annual rent, without any premium, and without any conditions as to title in the agreement, what, if any, title may the lessee require to be shown by the lessor ?

ANS.-The general opinion is that the intended lessor must show his title in the same manner as on a contract for the sale of a leasehold interest. The intended lessee is, in respect of the rent, a purchaser.

VII. Describe what covenants on the lessee's part are usually inserted in a lease for years of a house in town at a full yearly rent.

ANS.-They are to pay rent and taxes (except land tax), to repair, to paint, to insure, to surrender at end of term, not to use the premises as a shop, and not to underlet without the license of the lessor. (4 Exam. Chron. 165, 250.)

VIII. State what are the proper and prudent trusts and provisions to be inserted in a marriage settlement of the lady's property, the husband being in trade at the time of marriage.

ANS.-The first trust should be to pay the income to wife for life for her sole, separate, and inalienable use, and after her death in trust for her husband for life, or until he become bankrupt, &c., and then upon trust for the children, as both husband and wife, or the survivor, should appoint, and in default of appointment in trust for the children equally, sons at twenty-one, daughters at that age or marriage, and, if no children, general power of appointment to the wife, and in default for her next of kin. There should be a proviso enabling the wife to settle some part on the husband and children of a second marriage. A power to advance children should be given.

IX. If money be directed, either by deed or will (dated in 1865), to be settled in trustees' names, but without any direction as to the mode or species of investment, on what securities or investments would the trustees be justified in placing the money?

ANS.-The trustees, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust, may invest in £3 per cent consols, £3 per cent. reduced, new £3 per cent. annuities, new £2 per. cent. annuities on exchequer bills or bank stock of England or Ireland, East India Stock, and upon freehold and copyhold estates in the United Kingdom. (22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 32; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s 11; Order of 1st February, 1861; ante, p. 66; 1 Exam. Chron. 27, 46, 77, 107, 136, 144, 169; 2 id. 150.)

X. If lands be settled upon A. for life, with remainder to B. for life, with remainder to the heirs of the body of A. in tail, with remainder to the heirs of B. in fee, what estates do A. and B. respectively take?

ANS.-Under the rule in Shelley's case, and assuming the limitations are by the same instrument, A. takes an estate tail subject to the life estate of B., who takes an estate in fee, subject to the estate tail of A. (2 Exam. Chron. 117; F. Bk. 150.)

XI. If a will devises property to A. for life, with remainder to B. for life, with remainder to B.'s first and other sons successively in tail, and B. dies between the making the will and the death of the testator, what effect would that death have on the devises, and how would the property go?

ANS. The limitation to B.'s first and other sons not being such as to coalesce with that to B. for life, it not bringing the case within the rule in Shelley's case, nor within the provision in the 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 32, by which devises of estates tail are not to lapse by the death of the devisee in the lifetime of the testator, leaving inheritable issue, the death of B. will not, of course, affect the gift to A. for life, but will accelerate the estate in tail limited to B,'s first son, &c.

XII. On what words or expressions in a will of real property, and on what other circumstance, will depend the question whether or no real estate purchased by the testator after the date of the will will pass under the devises in it?

ANS.-Future acquired property will not pass by a will where the word "now" is used in such a manner (shown by other portions of the will or the surrounding circumstances) that the testator must have intended to allude to the period of the making of his will. (Hawkins on Wills, 20; Hutchinson v. Brown, 9 Week. Rep. 538.)

XIII. What is the longest period having reference to the lives

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of the parties for which personal property can be settled so as to be inalienable ?

ANS.-A life or lives in being and twenty years after, the period of gestation, if existing, being allowed. (Cadell v. Palmer, 7 Bligh, 202; Burton's Comp. Pl. 784, 785, and note; Will. Pers. Prop. 245.)

XIV. For what period can property be tied up and directed to accumulate without any one having a present beneficial interest in it?

ANS.-It may be tied up for lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards, allowing for gestation if it exist. The four periods allowed for the accumulation of income are:-1. The lifetime of the grantor or settlor; 2. Or twenty-one years from the death of such grantor, settlor, devisor, or testator; 3. Or during the minority of any person living, or in ventre sa mere at the death of such grantor, settlor, devisor, or testator; 4. Or during the minority only of any person who under the settlement or will would, for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to the income so directed to be accumulated; but this is not to extend to any provision for payment of debts, providing portions for children, or touching the produce of timber. (Ante, p. 118; 4 Exam. Chron. 137, 219.)

XV. In what cases would the receipt of a trustee, which has not been expressly declared to be a good discharge, be a sufficient discharge to a purchaser or other person paying him money as such trustee, and in what would it not? ANS-Independently of the recent statutory provisions, where there is a trust for the payment of debts, or any other trust requiring for its performance time and discretion, or exercisable during the minorities of cestui que trust, &c., the trustees have implied power of giving receipts. And, by the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, 8. 23, the bond fide payment to and the receipt of any person to whom any purchase or mortgage money is payable upon any express or implied trust effectually discharges the person paying the same from seeing to the application or being answerable for the misapplication thereof. And, by the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 29, trustees' receipts for any money payable to them by reason or in exercise of any trust or power are to be sufficient discharges, and will exonerate purchasers. This, however, only applies to instruments executed after the date of the Act and where the operation of the Act is not negatived; and, under both statutes, the person paying the money must ascertain that he is paying the money to the proper person. (Hay. & Jarm. Wills, 152, last ed.; Hunter's Prop. Acts, p. 66; 2 Exam, Chron. 31, 32, 78, 133, 167; 4 id. 218.)

EQUITY.

I. State the chief conditions required by a Court of Equity to enable it to decree the specific performance of an agree

ment.

ANS. They are-1. That the contract be in writing (except in case of fraud, part performance, or where the agreement is admitted, and the statute is not set up as a bar); 2. And made between parties able and willing to contract; 3. For a valuable consideration; 4. The terms must be clear and definite; 5. A contract for breach of which damages are not a sufficient compensation; 6. The plaintiff must have performed his part of the agreement. (Smith's Man. of Eq. p. 213, 7th. ed.; ante, p. 102; I Exam. Chron. 234; 2 id. 31, 32, 81; 3 id. 149, 249, 290).

II. If the only question in a suit is the title to land, can the Court dispose of it by any and what interlocutory proceedings before answer?

ANS.-Assuming this question to refer to a suit for specific performance, the Court, on motion, will direct an inquiry as to the title even before the defendant has filed his answer. (Ayck. Ch. Prac. 229, 6th ed.)

p.

III. State the proceedings that the plaintiff's solicitor must in such case take to prosecute his client's case to a final result. ANS.-A copy of the order and the abstract of title, together with written objections to the title, are carried into the judge's chambers. It is then referred to any of the conveyancing counsel of the Court, and the certificate is made upon his report. If either party objects to the chief clerk's finding, he should take the opinion of the judge thereon in chambers, or wait till the certificate is signed, and then move to vary it. If the title is not approved the bill is dismissed; if approved a specific performance is directed, with costs, and, the conveyance being settled, the purchase money is paid, and the conveyance executed, &c.

IV. A person interested in stock transferable at the Bank of England is desirous of preventing a transfer of such stock, can he do so by any and what summary process?

ANS.-He may obtain a writ of distringas on the Bank of England. Such a writ is sealed on the production of an affidavit that the applicant is, or his solicitor believes him to be, interested in the stock in question, which is described by its nature, its amount, and the name in which it is standing. This affidavit is filed, and the writ is sealed and taken to the bank, together with a noticè desiring them not to permit a transfer of the stock, or not to pay any dividends on it, as the case may be. If any application be afterwards made to the bank,

they will not allow the transfer or pay the dividends for eight days after, and will at once send notice of the application to the person for whom the distringas was obtained. (Ante, p. 114; 1 Exam. Chron. 27, 232; 3 id. 151, 282, 316.)

V. In case of doubtful construction of deeds or instruments referring to matters falling within the jurisdiction of equity, is there any mode of obtaining the opinion of the Court judicially by persons interested without filing a bill?

ANS. By the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, persons interested in any question cognizable in the Court of Chancery as to the construction of any Act of Paaliament, will, deed, or other instrument in writing, &c., may state a special case thereon for the opinion of the Court. (Ayck. Ch. Prac. p. 516, 6th ed.)

VI. When lunatics, married women, or infants are concerned, how are their respective interests to be represented, so as to show their concurrence in the necessary application to the Court?

ANS.-The question refers to a special case, and by the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, when a lunatic is concerned the committee of his estate, after being authorised by the Lord Chancellor, may concur in the application in his own name. A husband interested in right of his wife may concur in his own name, and in that of his wife, where the wife claims no interest distinct from her husband; and if she does claim an interest distinct from her husband, she may, in her own right, concur in such case, provided her husband also concurs therein. The guardian of an infant may concur in the special case in the name and on behalf of the infant, unless he has an interest adverse to that of the infant. If there is no guardian, or one who has adverse interests, the Court may appoint any proper person to be guardian, for the purpose of concurring in the case. (Ayck. Ch. Prac. p. 517, 6th ed).

VII. How are executors, administrators, or trustees protected and indemnified in respect of matters comprised in a special case, and on the declaration of the Court to be made thereon, are the rights of others not comprised in such declaration defeated thereby?

ANS. By the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, s. 15, every executor, administrator, trustee, or other person, making any payment, or doing any act in conformity with the declaration contained in any decree made upon a special case, shall, in all respects, be as fully and effectually protected and indemnified by such declaration as if such payment had been made or act done under or in pursuance of the express order of the Court made in a suit between the same parties instituted by bill, save only as to any rights or claims of any person in respect