a carrier, though he does not name any particular one, or where that is the usual course of business between the vendor and purchaser, a delivery to the carrier operates as a delivery to the purchaser. (Meigh v. Meredeth, 2 Ell. & Black. 584.) But such a delivery will not necessarily be a sufficient acceptance to satisfy the statute of frauds, that is, to dispense with a written contract; for, it is said, the carrier has no authority, as such, to accept. (Roscoe's Evid. 358, 9th ed.) It has, indeed, been contended (Smith's Merc. Law, 472, n. 5th ed.) that facts constituting a delivery sufficient to sustain an action for goods sold and delivered ought also to constitute an acceptance and actual receipt, under the statute of frauds, et e converso: but no such rule is deducible from the decisions. No. XII. (p. 309) is thus briefly and correctly answered in the Index to the 9th ed. of Roscoe's Evidence :-"A master is liable for the negligence, but not for the wilful trespass, of his servant." No. XIV. (p. 310) must have been a trying question to those persons who have not the faculty of applying their knowledge and bringing it readily to bear ; many could not, particularly in the anxiety consequent on the examination, have understood that the question had reference to the very modern doctrine of garnishment in courts of common lawotherwise termed attachment of debts, as to which see Law Dict. 33, 34; Prac. Com. Law, 254-256.

Conveyancing. The Questions and Answers will be found in Vol. III. pp. 310-315. As to No. I. (p. 310), it is to be borne in mind that though estates in fee-tail are of inheritance, and therefore classed with estates in fee simple, they differ in one essential point from fees simple, inasmuch as, unlike fees simple, they are particular estates, shown by the fact that such an estate may be limited to A., with remainder to B. and his heirs, whereas a fee simple cannot be limited to A., with remainder to B. and his heirs, or, indeed, any remainder. (F. Bk. 123.) It is also, of course, understood that there are other exceptions than wills to the rule that to create an estate in fee, technical words must be used. (F. Bk. 122.) As to executory gifts, see the recent case of Davenport v. Davenport (12 Week. R. 6), and an article thereon in 8 Sol. Journ. p. 85. to No. II. (p. 310), it must be borne in mind that the term "base fee" is used in different senses; properly and originally, it is that estate in fee which has a qualification annexed to it by express grant or by construction of law, whereby it is liable to be determined, and not merely defeated: in the Abolition of Fines Act it is, for the purposes of that Act, defined (s. 1) as "that estate in fee simple into which an estate tail is converted where the issue in tail are barred, but persons claiming estates by way of remainder or otherwise are not barred." (F. Bk. 122; 10 Coke's Rep. 97, 98; Law Dict. p. 51.) With reference to No. III. (p. 311), the following is taken from

As

2 Davids. Conv. 194, n., 195:-" A vendor claiming under a settlement covenants against the acts of the settlor and his representatives (Dart. 352), and in re London Bridge Acts (13 Sim. 176, 179). Shadwell, V.C., assumed that upon a sale under a power with the consent of the tenant for life, the tenant for life was, as a matter of course, obliged to enter into the usual covenants for title thus carried back. But it is urged, with great force and reason (Dart, 353), that although a tenant for life or other owner of a particular estate may be required so to covenant in respect of his beneficial interest, yet that as respects the reversion (in which he has no beneficial interest), his liability under the covenants should be confined to the acts of himself and parties claiming under him. The proviso at the end of the covenants in the text was framed by Mr. Dart, with the view of limiting the liability of the covenantor in accordance with these views, and its insertion was approved of by an eminent conveyancing counsel of the Court of Chancery (see Dart, pp. 353-4.) The following is the conclusion of the covenant of the tenant for life, C.D. :-" Provided always, that, as respects the reversion or remainder expectant on the life estate of the said C. D., of and 'in the said premises, and the title to and further assurance of the said premises after his decease, his (C. D.'s) covenants hereinbefore contained shall not extend to the acts, deeds, or defaults of any person or persons other than or besides himself and his own heirs, and persons claiming or to claim through or in trust for him, them, or some of them." As to No. IV. (p. 311), the reader is assumed to be aware that, by Lord St. Leonard's Act to "Further Amend the Law of Property," the 23 & 24 Vict., c. 38, s. 1, in order that even registered judgments may affect the lands of a debtor, a writ of execution must be registered, and that alone will not suffice, for it must be "executed and put in force within three calendar months from the time when it was registered,"—whether the writ must be an elegit, and what is meant by "executed and put in force," remain for decision. The entry (sect. 2) is made, not by the name of the judgment debtor, but of the judgment-creditor, that is, of the plaintiff and not of the defendant. This defect (for such it is, though greatly mitigated by the entries made in the books of the Registry Office) was proposed to be remedied in a bill brought in last session, but which did not become an act. With reference to No. V. (p. 311), the reader will bear in mind that, if an estate had been conveyed to a man with the usual dower uses, even though the deed should contain the then frequently-inserted words "To the intent that the purchaser's then present or any future wife may not be entitled to dower out of the said hereditaments," a wife married to him after the coming into operation of the Dower Act will be entitled to dower, if not barred by any of the means pointed out by

that Act, for the husband was entitled to such an estate at law or in equity, or both, as entitled his wife to dower, and the above words could not operate as a declaration against dower under sect. 6 of the Act, for by sect. 14 the Act is not to give to any deed executed before 1834 the effect of defeating any right of dower (F. Bk. 127; 2 L. C. 47; Try v. Noble, 2 Jur., N. S., 28.) From No. X (p. 313) it will be seen that there is no impediment to the gift of pure personalty (not to be invested in lands) to charitable purposes, whether by deed or by will; further, that as to real estate, no gift can be made to a charity (except to certain favoured institutions and for certain objects), except the requisitions of certain statutes be complied with (F. Bk. 162; Law Dict. pp. 118-129.) As to No. XI. (p. 313), it may be remarked that enfranchisements of copyholds may be made either without or under statutory provisions. The first is termed a Common Law Enfranchisement, and is effected either by the lord's conveying to the tenant the freehold of the particular specific premises which were held by copy, or by releasing to the tenant his seignorial rights. (Watk. Copy. ch. 10; F. Bk. 193.) The statutory enfranchisement is either voluntary or compulsory. Before proceeding further, we may mention that the following are the Enfranchisement Acts, with the years of their enactment :The 4 & 5 Vict. c. 35, the Act of 1841; the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 23, the Act of 1843; the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 55, the Act of 1844; the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 51, the Act of 1852; the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 57, the Act of 1853; the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 94, the Act of 1858. As to voluntary enfranchisements, by the Act of 1841, sect. 56, for the purpose of enabling lords and tenants of manors to effect either general or partial enfranchisements, it shall be lawful for the lord of any manor, whatever may be his estate or interest therein, with the consent of the commissioners, at any time or times after the passing of the Act, to enfranchise all or any of the lands holden of his manor, in consideration of such sum or sums of money, whether payable forthwith or at a future time, as shall be agreed to be paid by the tenant or tenants, whose lands are to be enfranchised; and it shall be lawful for any tenant, whatever may be his estate or interest, with the like consent of the Commissioners, to accept such enfranchisement on the terms agreed on. By the Act of 1843. sect. 1, in addition to the above provisions, any enfranchisement may be made either wholly or in part, for the consideration of a grant of a valued and variable annual rent in fee, to be thenceforth charged on and issuing out of the lands enfranchised; and by the Act of 1852, sect. 41, the rent charge may be variable or fixed in money. Also, wholly or in part, in consideration of a conveyance of lands, parcel of the manor, and subject to the same uses and trusts as the lands commuted, or any right to mines or minerals on or under

such lands, or any right to waste lands belonging to such manor; extended by the Act of 1844, sect. 5, to lands or right to mines and minerals, though not so parcel of or situate under the lands to be enfranchised. As to compulsory enfranchisement, there is a difference between the case of a copyholder admitted on or after the 1st July, 1853, and where before such 1st July; as to the former, by sect. 1 of the Act of 1852, at any time after an admittance taking place on or after 1st July, 1853, in consequence of any surrender, bargain and sale, or assurance thereof (except upon or under a mortgage in cases where the mortgagee is not in possession), or in consequence of any descent, gift, or devise, and whether such surrender, &c, before or after that day, the tenant or lord may by notice require and compel enfranchisement, provided that no tenant shall do so until after payment or tender of the fine or fines, and of the fees consequent on such admittance. Under sect. 8 of the Act of 1858, the consideration to be paid to the lord for such enfranchisement is, unless the parties agree about the same, to be ascertained under the directions of the copyhold commissioners, and upon a valuation to be made in manner therein mentioned. As to the latter, that is a compulsory enfranchisement, where the admission was before the 1st July, 1853, by sect. 6 of the Act of 1858, it shall be lawful for any tenant or lord, where the last admission has taken place before the above date, to require and compel enfrauchisement, provided that no tenant shall be entitled to require such enfranchisement, until after payment or tender of such fine, and of the value of such heriot, as would become due and payable in the event of admittance or death subsequent to the 1st July, 1853, and also of two-thirds of such a sum as the steward would have been entitled to for fees in respect of such admittance. (See Rouse's Copy. Enfranch. Manual, 1827.) In answering No. XII. (vol. iii. p. 314), we have stated that the deed of disposition of an equitable copyhold estate must be entered on the court rolls of the manor within six calendar months after its execution; the statute does not apparently limit the time for such entry, but the M. R. has in two cases held that in reality it does so limit the time. The first case was Honeywood v. Foster, 30 Beav. 1. The second is very recent, being Gibbons v. Snape, 9 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 133, where the Lords Justices upheld both of the decisions of the M. R. It must, therefore, be considered as clear law, that the provisions of the Fines and Recoveries Act, the 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, require a disentailing deed of an equitable estate in copyholds to be entered on the courtrolls of the manor in which the lands lie, within six months after the execution of the deed.

Equity. The Questions and Answers will be found in Vol. III, pp. 315-319. As to No. I. (p. 315), it is to be remembered that it

is

person

very rarely that a plaintiff enforces the appearance of a defendant by an attachment, inasmuch as he has a much more speedy and efficacious remedy by entering an appearance for the defendant, which, however, as of course, must, as stated at p. 315, be done within a limited period, otherwise a special application must be made to the Court. (Ayckb. Pract. chap. 1, sect. 4.) As to No. II. (p. 316), Vice-Chancellor Stuart, in the late case of Lovergan v. Stourton (9 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 197), said: "A distringas has the effect of notice, and is recognised by the general orders of the Court. The writ is of a formal kind, and can only issue upon the oath of a that he has a right to the fund. And it is provided that if a man does not file a bill to assert his title within eight days after service of the distringas, the Bank of England is authorised totally to disregard it." With respect to No. XIV. (p. 319), as to whether the claim of a cestui que trust against a trustee for a breach of trust is a simple contract or specialty debt, we may remark that in the case of Wood v. Hardisty (10 Jur. 486), reliance was placed on a remark of Lord Eldon's, in Montford v. Cadogan (19 Ves. 638), that "it is said the trustees are not under covenant, and they are not bound under hand and seal; but they have in equity undertaken to execute the trusts exactly as if they had so executed the instrument, and the several words 'it is declared and agreed' amount to a covenant." Counsel urged that although a breach of trust creates a simple contract debt, as in Vernon v. Vaudrey (2 Atk. 119), and Cox v. Bateman (2 Ves. sen. 119), yet it was otherwise where the trust was accepted, as in that case, by deed under seal, citing Gifford v. Manley (Cas. t. Talb. 109); Mavor v. Davenport (2 Sim. 227); Turner v. Wardle (7 Sim. 80). The deed contained a declaration that the trustee would stand possessed of certain specified funds in trust for the ccstui que trust, her executors, &c. Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce said: "I thought at first this was a mere simple contract debt. The cases, however, seem to be sufficient to support a contrary conclusion." In Lockhart v. Reilly (27 Law Journ. Ch. 54; 4 L. C. 262), it was held to be generally true that where a trustee executes a trust-deed, and afterwards commits a breach of trust, such a breach of trust gives rise to a specialty debt. The most important case, however, is that of Adey v. Arnold (16 Jur. 1123), which is a decision of Lord St. Leonards. There it appeared that by deed of indorsement, under seal, appointing new trustees, and executed by them, a trust fund was assigned to the new trustees, "to hold unto them, their executors, administrators, and assigns, as their own money, property, and effects, but, nevertheless, upon the trusts, and for the ends, intents, and purposes declared by the within indenture." But there was no declaration of trust by the trustees. His Lordship held, that a loss which occurred by a breach of trust did not consti