gavelkind (F. Bk. 4-6); the freeholds in Sussex (subject as before), to the eldest son only; land contracted to be sold being treated and considered as money, the proceeds of the farm in Surrey go as personal estate. The intermixed leaseholds, proceeds of farms contracted to be sold, railway bonds, and Government stock will go onethird to the widow, and the remaining two-thirds equally to A.'s five children. The New River share, being of the nature of real estate, goes to the eldest son.

X. In favour of what objects will equity grant relief against a donee of a power who has executed the power defectively? ANS.-In the absence of any countervailing equity, relief will be granted by a Court of Equity in the case of a defective execution of a power, where the defect was occasioned by mistake and is not of the very essence of the power, and the defective execution is in favour of a charity, or of a purchaser, or an intended husband or wife, or a legitimate child. (See fully, ante, pp. 282-284.)

XI. If a donee of a general power of appointment over a fund exercises the power, can his creditors claim the fund against the appointee and purchasers from him?

ANS.-A general power of appointment is equivalent ownership; therefore creditors, to whom the appointor was indebted at the time of making the appointment, can claim the fund from an appointee without valuable consideration, but they cannot claim against bona fide purchasers for value from him without notice. (2 Tudor's Lead. Cas. Eq. 103.)

XII. Define a chose in action, and mention what steps are necessary to render an assignment of a chose in action effectual?

ANS.-A chose in action is either the right to bring an action or the subject-matter of the action; it, however, properly includes both. It is not (with a few exceptions, such as negotiable securities and certain statutable cases) assignable at law. To render an assignment of it effectual there should be a notice of the assignment to the party liable to pay. (F. Bk. 197, 203, 209; 8 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 530; 3 Exam. Chron. 319, No. XV.)

XIII. Can a married woman alienate a chose in action vested in her, and how, and with any, and what exceptions? ANS.-A married woman alone cannot dispose of her choses in action, not settled to her separate use (3 Exam. Chron. 147). If her husband join with her, and the property be received during the coverture, it will bind them. If not received or otherwise reduced into possession during the coverture the alienation will not bind the

wife surviving, though she was a party to the assignment. But as to the wife's reversionary interests in personal property, if her husband concur in the assignment, and the wife be separately examined, and the deed acknowledged as required by 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, the property being acquired by her under an instrument other than a marriage settlement, and made since 31st December, 1857, and not being settled to her separate use without power of anticipation, the assignment will, under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 57, usually called Mr. Malins' Act, be valid. (1 Exam. Chron. 134, 168, 233; 2 id. 117; 3 id. 9, 146, 233, 225).

XIV. In respect to what species of property, and when are probate duty, legacy duty, and succession duty respectively payable.

ANS.-Probate duty is payable in respect of all personal property (including leaseholds) in the United Kingdom belonging to a testator domiciled here at the time of his death (including property appointed under a general power), if it exceeds £100 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 56, s. 5; ante, p. 280); but a return may be afterwards obtained on account of debts. Legacy duty is payable on all the personal property of the deceased (except leaseholds and legacies under £20); and succession duty is payable on all real property (including leaseholds), which any person becomes entitled to on the death of another person, and on personal property on which legacy duty is not payable; but no duty is payable where the whole succession derived from the same possessor, and passing upon death, does not amount to £100, nor upon any succession of less value than £20, and husband and wife are exempt from legacy and succession duty. It has been decided that the personalty of a person domiciled out of England, if not liable to legacy duty, is yet liable to succession duty: the question, however, will have to be finally decided by the Lords. (Ante, pp. 297, 298).

XV. What is the effect of a bequest of residuary personal

estate-1. "To my friends and relations ?" 2. "To my near relations ?" 3. "To my nearest relations?" 4. "To my poor relations?" and 5. "To the most necessitous of my relations ?"

ANS.-It is settled that a bequest to relations applies to the person or persons who would, under the Statute of Distribution, take the personal estate on an intestacy either as next of kin, or by representation of next of kin ; and it will be so in all the above cases, but in the third instance the property is distributed per capita, and no representation is allowed, as in the other instances. (2 Jarman on Wills, p. 108, 3rd ed.; 11 Jarm. Convey., by Sweet, p. 355-359; 9 Week. Rep. 425.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

I. If a justice of the peace be required to do an act relating to the duties of his office, and he refuses, by what mode can the party requiring the act to be done compel the justice to do it?

ANS.-The justice may be compelled (except where, being discretionary, he has exercised his discretion) to do it by obtaining a mandamus from the Court of Queen's Bench, which has a general superintendence over all inferior jurisdictions. In some cases the Court may, without mandamus, order a justice to do an act which he has refused to do. (See F. Bk. 90, 257; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 5.)

II. If a justice wrongfully convict a man (e.g. for an offence over which the justice has no jurisdiction), can the man get rid of the conviction, and how?

ANS. Such conviction may be quashed either upon appeal to the Quarter Sessions (if not expressly taken away), or upon application to the Court of Queen's Bench, for a certiorari for the removal of the conviction, as the magistrate had no jurisdiction; it is possibly within the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, allowing an appeal to a superior common law court against a conviction erroneous in point of law. (See 31 Law Tim. 101; F. Bk. 332, 342, 348, 361.)

III. If X. be indicted for stealing from the person of Y., and the evidence be that X. attempted unsuccessfully to pick Y.'s pocket of a purse that was in it, what ought the verdict of the jury to be?

ANS.-By sect. 9 of 14 & 15 Vict., c. 100, if, upon the trial of a person charged with felony, it is found that he only attempted to commit the felony, but did not succeed, such person shall not be acquitted, but the jury may return a verdict that the defendant is not guilty of the felony, but is guilty of an attempt to commit the same, and that such person is punishable as if he had been convicted upon an indictment for an attempt to commit the particular felony charged in the said indictment.

IV. If X. be indicted for stealing from the person of Y., and the evidence be that X. put his hand into Y.'s pocket with intent to steal Y.'s purse, but that the pocket was empty, what ought the verdict of the jury to be? Give reasons for your

answer.

ANS.-The verdict must be not guilty, for it has been decided that in order to convict of an attempt to commit larceny, it must appear that there is property in the place where the attempt is made that

could be stolen. (Reg. v. Collins, 10 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 581; 12 Week. Rep. 886; stated ante, pp. 205, 206.)

V. If a witness against a person charged with an indictable offence die after his deposition has been taken, and before the trial of the accused, what proof must be given before the deposition can be read in evidence at the trial?

ANS.--After evidence of the death of the witness it must be proved that the deposition was taken in the presence of the justice and the accused, and that he, or his counsel or attorney, had a full opportu nity of cross-examining the witness, in which case, if the depositions purport to be signed by the justice before whom it purports to have been taken, it may be read in evidence without further proof, unless it be proved that the deposition was not in fact signed by the justice. (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42; F. Bk. 338, 347; 2 Exam. Chron. 166; Reg. v. Watts, 9 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 453; stated, ante, pp. 63, 64.)

VI. A. is the owner in fee of a game covert through which runs a highway. B. in the day time stands in the highway, and, without any authority from A., but in spite of him, shoots the pheasants as they fly from one side of the highway to the other. Does B. commit any and what offence? Give reasons for your answer.

ANS. It was decided in the case of R. v. Pratt (24 Law Journ., M.C., 113; 19 Just. Pea. 578) that B. is a trespasser in pursuit of game, and punishable as such under the 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, s. 30. The soil of the road belonged to A., subject only to the right of user by the public, and shooting pheasants is not an exercise of the road as a highway, but for search of game. (Oke's Mag. Syn. 302, 7th ed.)

VII. Within what time must a woman, who has been delivered of a bastard child, apply to a justice for a summons against the person alleged to be the father, in order to obtain an affiliation order?

ANS. The summons must be applied for against the putative father either before the birth or within twelve calendar months from the birth, or at any time thereafter, upon proof that the man alleged to be the father has, within twelve months next after the birth, paid money for its maintenance. (Oke's Mag. Syn. 931, 8th ed.; Stone's Just. Man. 94; F. Bk. 114; 7 Week. Rep. 413; Law Dict. 51; 2 Exam. Chron. 167, 168.)

VIII. For how long a period is an affiliation order in force? ANS. An affiliation order remains in force until the child is thirteen years old, or the marriage of the mother, or the earlier death of the child. (Stone's Just. Man. 98: Oke's Mag. Syn. 933, 8th ed.)

IX. If the putative father wishes to appeal against the order, within what time must he give notice to the mother of his intention to appeal, and within what time must he enter into recognisances to prosecute his appeal?

ANS.-The father must, within twenty-four hours (Sunday excluded) after the order is made, give notice to the mother of his intention to appeal, and within seven days enter into a recognisance before one justice to prosecute the appeal. (Oke's Mag. Syn. p. 935, 8th ed.; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 4; F. Bk. 114; Re Grimes, 22 Law Journ., M.C., 153; 1 Law Chron. 82; 2 id. 411, 412.)

X. Name the offences for which no indictment can be preferred without a preliminary inquiry before justices?

To prevent the practice which had grown up of preferring indictments in certain cases without first going before a magistrate, the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17, s. 1, has provided that, in the following offences, no indictment can be preferred without a preliminary inquiry-1. Perjury; 2. Subornation of perjury; 3. Conspiracy; 4. Obtaining money or other property by false pretences; 5. Keeping a gambling house, or a disorderly house; 6. Indecent assaults. (2 Exam. Chron. 134; 2 Law Chron., N.S., 3.)

XI. If upon the trial of any person indicted for larceny it be proved that he embezzled the property in question, what verdict ought the jury to give? And what if it be proved that he obtained the property by false pretences?

ANS.-By the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 75, s. 72, if upon the trial of any person for larceny it is proved that he embezzled the property in question, the jury may return by their verdict that he is guilty of embezzlement, and he is to be convicted and punished in the same manner as if he had been indicted for embezzlement; and by s. 88, if a person be indicted for obtaining property under false pretences, and he is proved to be guilty of larceny, he is not on that ground to be acquitted of misdemeanour. (3 Exam. Chron. 42, 328.)

XII. State the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours as to principals and accessories?

ANS.-In felonies there may be accessories, except in those offences which are sudden and 'unpremeditated, as manslaughter, which therefore cannot have accessories before the fact. But in misdemeanours there are no accessories, all persons concerned therein being principals. (F. Bk. 294; 16 Jur. 390; Law Dict. 5; 2 Exam. Chron. 2, 40, 297.)

XIII. A., a peace officer, lawfully apprehends B.; B. resists A.,

a conflict ensues in which neither use more force than is necessary to attain his object, B.'s object being to escape, and