of the gift by the will, and the court will presume he meant to satisfy the one by the other; it differs from the performance or satisfaction of a covenant in this, that the Court overlooks small differences in the circumstances of that which is proposed to be given, and that in satisfaction of which it is intended to be given. The Court does not inquire whether the portion by the will is entirely and absolutely to the child, or what is afterwards advanced in this form, a settlement on marriage, which, not being a performance of a covenant, or satisfaction of a debt, yet is a presumed satisfaction of the intended portion." In the following case it appeared that the testator, H. B., had had two daughters, Caroline and Louisa. On the marriage of Louisa no settlement was made. On the marriage of Caroline he covenanted to pay £10,000 to trustees, with interest in the meantime. The general trusts of this settlement were, for Caroline for life; then husband for life; then for the children of the marriage in the usual way, with remainder as Caroline should appoint; in default of appointment, to her next of kin. Testator by his will, after several specific devises and legacies, gave the residue of his property to trustees upon trust, as to one moiety, for his daughter Caroline for life for her separate use; remainder as she should appoint (excluding her husband); in default of appointment, to Louisa for life for her separate use; and after the decease of the surveyor of Caroline and Louisa, and Louisa should appoint (excluding her husband); and, in default of appointment, to H. B.'s nephew, C. B., absolutely. The other moiety was given upon similar trusts, mutatis mutandis, in favour of Louisa. At the death of the testator the £10,000 had not been paid. There were no children of the marriage of Louisa. On bill filed by the trustees for the administration of the testator's estate-Held, that although there were differences between the limitations of £10,000 in the settlement, and those of the moiety of the residue contained in the will, yet they were not sufficient to prevent the application of the doctrine of satisfaction as to double portions, and that, consequently, Caroline could take nothing under her father's will without bringing the £10,000 contained in the settlement into hotchpot. (Coventry v. Chichester, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 103). SCOTCH LAW.-22 & 23 Vict. c. 63, s. 3.-Case for the Opinion of Scotch Court.-The 22 & 23 Vict. c. 63, is an Act to afford facilities for the more certain ascertainment of the law administered in one part of her Majesty's dominions when pleaded in the Courts of another part thereof, by means of a case. It was in the following case held that where a question of Scotch law arises in a suit instituted in England, it is competent for the Court, under the above Act, to direct a case to be settled for the opinion of the Scotch Court, and to make an order in accordance with that opinion. (Wilson v. Moore, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 102.)

SUCCESSION-DUTY. - Domicil - Personalty of a foreigner situated in England-Liability of to legacy or succession-duty.-In the last Annual Report of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, it is said: "Several important questions under the Succession Duty Act have been settled by judicial decisions. One of these judgments, if maintained, will effect so considerable an alteration in the legacy duty that it deserves more than a passing notice, more especially because in our first report, in 1857, we drew attention to the inconvenient state of the law as it was then supposed to stand, and suggested legislation in order to effect that which is now declared, by high judicial authority, had actually been effected by the terms of the Act of 1853. The question to which we allude is that of domicil as affecting the liability of British subjects to legacy duty. It was decided by the House of Lords, in 1845, in accordance with the opinion of all the judges, that the operation of the Legacy Duty Act must be deemed limited to the property of persons domiciled in the United Kingdom at the time of death, and from that time to the present this has been considered settled law; the questions which have been the subject of litigation having been questions of fact as to the actual domicil of the testator; it has now, however, been decided by the Lord Justices, "In Re Wallop's Trust, 32 Law Journ., Ex., 351; 10 Law Tim. Rep. N.S., 174, that there is no such limitation of the scope of the Succession Duty Act as that which the House of Lords considered as necessarily attaching to the Legacy Act, and consequently that property which, on account of the foreign domicil of the testator, is exempt from legacy duty, is, nevertheless, liable to the same tax under the name of succession duty. We understand that this decision is not to remain unquestioned; but if it be ultimately pronounced unsound, it may, at least, have the good effect of bringing the subject into notice, and of affording a fair opportunity for taking the sense of Parliament upon it. The whole history of the question is remarkable as an instance of the uncertainty attaching to the interpretation of statute law; for although the legacy duty in its present form was imposed in 1796, it was not ascertained before the year 1845 that the Act had no operation upon the property of persons domiciled abroad, and now, ten years after the passing of the Succession Duty Act, the public learn, for the first time, that it has imposed the legacy duty-which the terms of the Act of 1796 were inadequate to sanction." This subject has been again considered by the Court of Exchequer in the following recent case, where it appeared that a testator, a native-born Frenchman, had lived for twenty-nine years in furnished lodgings at Manchester, where he carried on business as a merchant, but had always expressed to his friends, in France and elsewhere, both verbally and by letter, his intention to retire at

some indefinite period, and end his days in his native village, which he had twice visited during the twenty-nine years, viz., in 1835 and 1846; and in the latter year he had bought an estate and house there, which was kept up for him, at his expense, by his niece, who lived in the house for that purpose, by his desire, from 1846 to his death in 1859. In the contract of purchase, he was described as a merchant of Manchester, in England. He subscribed to the charities of his native place, and by a solemn act of law between him and his relatives, before a notary public in France, it was declared that, although absent so long from France, he had not forfeited his rights to a patrimonial property in that country. In fact, he always considered himself a Frenchman, and not an Englishman. On his death at Manchester, in 1859, his will, by which he left all his property, real and personal, to his nephew, whom he had sent for from France to succeed him in his business, was proved in the Probate Court here, the greater part of his personal property being English railway shares :-Held, by Martin and Channell (dubitantibus, Pollock, C.B., and Bramwell, B.), in conformity with the doctrine of the H. of L. in the cases of Aikman v. Aikman, 4 Law Tim. Rep. N.S., 374; 3 Macq., 854; and Moorhosue v. Lord, 8 Law Tim. Rep. N.S., 212, 10 H. of L. Cas. 282, viz., "that domicil of origin continues until another is acquired by actual residence with an intention to abandon the domicil of origin, residence alone without such intention not being sufficient to change the original domicil; and that domicil of origin is not changed until a man has done all that in him lies to give up his country; that the testator's domicil was French, there being no evidence of any intention on his part to change his domicil, and that therefore legacy duty was not payable :-Held, also by Pollock, C.B., Martin and Channell, BB. (dubitante, Bramwell, B.), following the decision of the Lords Justices in Re Wallop's Trusts, 10 Law Tim. Rep., N. S., 174; 32 L. J. 351, Ex., that, even if the domicil were French, and so legacy duty were not payable, yet that succession duty was payable on the deceased's property in England under the Succession Duty Act (15 & 16 Vict. c. 51), s. 2. (Re Domingo Capdeirelle, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 89.)

WILL-Construction-Trust for benefit of children.-A testator gave to K. £50, and also ten leasehold houses, wishing the profits of the houses to be solely applied for the benefit and support of K.'s children, he paying the rents and performing the covenants contained in the lease :-Held, that K. took the gift in trust for his children, to be applied exclusively for their benefit. (Kennett v. Gadbury, 11 Law Tim. Rep. 17.)

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.
(Michaelmas Term, 1854.)

COMMON LAW.

I. When is notice before action necessary, and what notice is sufficient where notice is necessary?

ANS.-The examiners mean notice of action, which is required in a great variety of cases; such as justices of the peace, for anything done by them in pursuance of their duty; Commissioners of Bankruptcy, and officers of the army, navy, marines, customs, or excise; persons acting under the Highway Acts, Poor-law Acts, Boards of Health, and under numerous parochial and district Acts, for anything done by them in execution of their offices or duties. By 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, a calendar month's notice must be given, when notice is required under any statutes passed previously to that Act. (Roscoe's Evid. 774-778, 9th ed.)

II. What must be stated in an affidavit in support of an application for an order for the arrest of a defendant on mesne process?

ANS.-The affidavit must state that the plaintiff has a cause of action to the amount of not less than £20, and that there is probable cause for believing that the defendant is about to quit England unless he be forthwith apprehended; also, that the action has been commenced. (See Com. Law Pract. 80-82; 2 Exam. Chron. 113, 137.)

III. When may judgment be signed and execution issued, on a verdict at a trial in and out of Term?

ANS.-By the C. L. P. Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), s. 120, and Rule 57, H. T., 1853, when a plaintiff or defendant has obtained a verdict, or in case the plaintiff has been nonsuited at the trial in or out of Term, judgment may be signed and execution issue thereon in fourteen days, unless the Judge who tried the cause, or some other Judge, or the Court, order execution to issue at an earlier or later period, with or withou: terms. By the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 185, in ejectment judgment may be signed and execution issue fourteen days after verdict, or on the fifth day in Term after, whichever first happens. (Com. Law Pract. 217, 263; see more fully 2 Exam. Chron. pp. 24, 25.)

IV. When is it necessary to revive a judgment before issuing execution, and how is such revival effected?

ANS.-By the C. L. P. Act, 1852, ss. 128-142, a judgment must be revived after six years from the recovery thereof, though both

the plaintiff and the defendant be living; and also after the death of any party to the judgment, whose death previously rendered a sci. fa. necessary; and so in the case of a woman defendant who marries, where it is wished to issue execution against the husband (s. 141). The revival is effected either by suing out a writ of revivor, or applying to the Court or a Judge for leave to enter a suggestion upon the roll, to the effect that it appears to the Court that such party is entitled to have execution of the judgment and to issue execution thereupon; and upon such application the Court or a Judge may allow such suggestion as aforesaid to be entered, and execution to issue thereupon; but if it does not appear that the party is entitled to make the suggestion, and the application is therefore dismisssed, he may, nevertheless, proceed by writ of revivor or action upon the judgment. (15 & 16 Vict. c. 75, ss. 129, 130; see fully Com. Law Pract. 232-237; 2 Exam. Chron. 25.) The bankruptcy of a plaintiff does not render a revivor necessary, but such proceedings may be had as stated in the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 142. (Com. Law Pract. 236; 23 L. J. Q. B. 116.)

V. How is the innkeeper's liability in respect of the goods of his guest affected by the Act of 1863 ?

ANS.-The Act of 1863 is the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 41, stated in 3 Exam. Chron. 229-231, by which no innkeeper is now liable for any loss of goods or property brought to his inn (not being a horse or other live animal, or any gear appertaining thereto, or any carriage) to a greater amount than £30, unless the goods are stolen, lost, or injured through the wilful act of the innkeeper or his servant, or the goods have been deposited for safe custody with the innkeeper, in which case he may require, as a condition of his liability, that the goods be deposited in a box, or other receptacle, fastened or sealed by the person depositing the same. The innkeeper is bound to receive the property, and to have at least one copy of the 1st section of the Act plainly printed and exhibited in a conspicuous part of the entrance to his inn. (See more fully 3 Exam. Chron. pp. 228 -231; Com. Law Princ. 335, 336.)

VI. Define the husband's interest in his wife's choses in action. ANS. The choses in action of a married woman do not become the husband's until he reduces them into possession; and if he dies before this is done they belong absolutely to the wife. So if she dies before the husband has reduced them into possession they form part of her estate, and he must take out administration in order to become the owner. (2 Exam. Chron. 287; F. Bk. 203; 8 Week. Rep. 429; 3 Exam. Chron. 9, 146, 233, where the latter part of the answer is explained.)