voluntarily, and the creditors had notice of that resolution, it was on a motion for an injunction to restrain the action :-Held, that the injunction must be granted; but the creditor was to be at liberty to go in and attend the proceedings of the winding-up, to prove his debt and to add his costs to his claim. (Re The Life Association of England, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 833.)

TRUSTEE-Breach of trust--Accumulation during infancyMaintenance of infant-Incapacity of father-Receipt-Release.-A fund was given to one for life with a direction that upon her death the dividends should be accumulated for her children (of whom the plaintiff was one) during their minorities. Upon the tenant for life's death, the father assumed to act as a trustee, and by sufferance of his co-trustee (the defendant), received and applied the dividends for the support of his children, he being otherwise incapable of maintaining them, the dividends were therefore not accumulated. He died, leaving his children his universal legatees. Fourteen days after the plaintiff came of age she gave to the defendant an acknowledgment upon his transferring her share of the fund to her, from which it appeared that the share was the capital only, and in which it was clearly stated how the dividends had been applied. The defendant was also sole executor of the father, and on winding up his estate six months later, the plaintiff and her sisters joined in formally releasing all claims upon, or in respect of, that estate. Later she filed this bill to make the trustee account for the accumulations :— Held, under these circumstances that, as the acknowledgment showed that the plaintiff was well acquainted with the actual facts, and as the trustees would be entitled to be recouped any sum for which he might be held accountable out of the estate of the father, of whom the plaintiff was one of the universal legatees, the bill must be dismissed, for the release in effect operated as a discharge of the claim. (Aveline v. Melhuish, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 830.)

BANKRUPTCY ASSIGNEE'S TITLE.

Doctrine of Relation-back.

THE relation of the title of assignees in bankruptcy back to the Act of Bankruptcy (2 Exam. Chron. 37, 294), was formerly supposed to operate with so much harshness as to require mitigation or modification in particular instances. This doctrine was itself a creature of statute, as is shown by Lord Mansfield in Cooper v. Chitty (1 Burr. 31). "This relation," he says, "the statutes concerning bankrupts introduced to avoid frauds. They vest in the

assignees all the property that the bankrupt had at the time of what I may call the crime committed (for the old statutes consider him as a criminal), they make the sale by the commissioners good against all persons who claim by, from, or under the bankrupt after the act of bankruptcy, and against all executions not served and executed before the act of bankruptcy." But the 1 Jac. 1, c. 15, rendered valid the payment of debts due to the bankrupt without knowledge that he was a bankrupt; the 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, sales by the bankrupt more than five years before the commission; the 19 Geo. 2, c. 32, payments by the bankrupt in the ordinary course of trade, without notice of bankruptcy on the part of the receivers. By the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, ss. 81, 82, 84, 86, 108; by the 2 Vict. c. 11, s. 12, and particularly by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29, further important concessions were made in favour of creditors dealing with secret bankrupts, which may be said to have been substantially re-enacted in the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, ss. 133, 134. By these last-named sections, all transactions by and with any bankrupt, bona fide entered into before the date of the filing of the petition, are protected, notwithstanding any prior act of bankruptcy, provided the person dealing with the bankrupt has no notice of any such prior act. And this protection would apply to a re-taking by the real owner of goods left, with his consent, in the apparent ownership of the bankrupt, without notice of any act of bankruptcy. Moreover, under the same statute (sect 69) the title of assignees of a bankrupt who had been a prisoner for debt related back, not to the first day of his imprisonment, but to the twentyfirst, as being the day that completed his act of bankruptcy. This limitation of the period of relation had existed since the passing of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, which also shortened the period of lying in prison that was necessary to constitute an act of bankruptcy. Under the Insolvent Debtors Acts the same state of things did not prevail. The title of the assignee commenced with the vesting order, but though in general it thus had no relation to any anterior date, yet the case of goods in the reputed ownership of the insolvent was made an exception to the general rule; and goods falling within this category were to vest in the assignee from the commencement of the insolvent's imprisonment. Now, by the Bankruptcy Act of 1861, which amalgamated bankruptcy and insolvency law, the old modes of discharging prisoners were swept away, and a new one provided by sections 93 to 95, and 98 to 104. The former sections regulate the petitions of ordinary prisoners willing and able to petition. The latter sections contemplate two classes of prisoners-those who are unwilling and those who are unable (through poverty) to get out of prison. A monthly return of all the inhabitants of prisons is to be made to the Court of Bankruptcy; and one of their officials is to visit each gaol within three weeks from the date of the return, to

examine the prisoners, and to adjudicate bankrupt, and discharge, all trader prisoners who have been lying in prison for fourteen days, and all other prisoners who have been lying there for two months; whilst prisoners refusing to answer, or otherwise obstructing dealings with their estate, may be committed for an extra month. Other prisoners willing, but unable, through poverty, to get released, may petition the Court in forma pauperis, and then (sect. 99) are to be "brought up" to the county court of the district, and there adjudicated bankrupt. And the 103rd clause is, "every adjudication against any prisoner for debt so brought up' as aforesaid, shall, unless the Court shall otherwise direct, have relation back to the date of his commitment or detention, as the case may be." We may remark that the word "detention is used once only previously in the statute (viz. in the 71st section, which defines generally acts of bankruptcy, through lying in prison), and then in conjunction with the word "committed;" and that the words "brought up" are only previously used in the 99th section, whilst a bringing up may be implied in the 102nd section. In the recent case of Bramwell v. Eglinton, 10 Jur., N.S., 583; it was decided that the title of the assignees of a pauper bankrupt, who has been a prisoner for debt, relates back to the first day of his imprisonment. It appeared that the defendant, after the arrest of the bankrupt, had retaken his own goods from the bankrupt's house, where they had been in the reputed ownership of the bankrupt; and the assignees, relying on this 103rd clause, brought trover for those goods, whilst the defendant contended that the clause referred only to the case of a contumacious prisoner, dealt with by the 102nd section, and in which section the word "commitment" had been used, and the "detention" implied. It was also contended for the defendant that the retaking was a protected transaction, under sect. 133 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1849. The Court of Queen's Bench, however, after taking time to consider, and experiencing "much embarrassment and great difficulty" in coming to any conclusion at all, decided in the plaintiff's favour. After an elaborate analysis of the statute, and various speculations as to the intentions of the Legislature, and regrets that those intentions had not been more clearly expressed, they were of opinion that, as the words of sect. 103 were all satisfied by applying that enactment to the case of a pauper prisoner who had been committed in execution, or detained for debt, and brought up before the county court, the provision applied to this case; and also that, as the adjudication was made to relate back, not to the commitment as an act of bankruptcy, but to the commitment absolutely, there was here no prior act of bankruptcy, and therefore this transaction was not protected by sect. 133 of the Act of 1849. The judgment also intimates that, as regards other prisoners for debt not brought up before the county

We may

court, the question is still left open and undecided. remark that when a former Act, passed in pari materiâ (6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 5), was before the courts, a different rule was adopted. In the case of Higgins v. M'Adam (3 Y. & J. 1), the Court of Exchequer said:" The relation back to any antecedent period to make an act of bankruptcy, is a case strictissimi juris, and ought not to prevail, except where the words of the statute upon which that construction is to be founded are clear, and without doubt." And this ruling was approved and adopted in Moser v, Newman (6 Bing. 556) and Belcher v. Gummow (9 Q. B. 877); so that all the three courts concurred in a broad and liberal construction of a similar bankruptcy act, and in favour of the rights of creditors; whereas the court, in Bramwell v. Eglinton, has preferred a very narrow construction in favour of the rights of assignees.

PREPARATION OF DEEDS.

SIR,-With your permission, I should like to say a few words to my fellow articled clerks in reference to the preparation of deeds.

In solicitors' offices deeds are generally, as you are aware, prepared in a great hurry, and there is not enough care and attention bestowed upon them as regards neatness. I frequently see deeds of this description, and on reading them find that in one recital the property will be referred to as the "land, hereditaments, and premises hereinafter described and intended to be hereby granted; in another recital, as the "land and hereditaments intended to be hereby conveyed and assured," or in similar terms, and in some deeds I have noticed that the property is hardly ever referred to in the same terms. I do not complain (except as I shall next mention) of the words used by solicitors in referring to the property, but what I complain of is, that they use so many different expressions in referring to it, which, I think, shows a want of care on their part.

Again, in drafts drawn by solicitors you will almost invariably find that the word "premises" is used as one of the words of reference to the parcels in the recitals, although the property is not described in any previous recital. Now this, I contend, is not correct; but I will not trouble you with my reasons for thinking so, as they may (if my memory serves me) be found in Davidson and Bythewood's Conveyancing.

If any gentleman differs from me, I think he should notice particularly any drafts that come before him, drawn by solicitors, and then he will be able to judge whether I am justified in making the above remarks,

I advise those articled clerks who wish to know anything of the rules for drawing deeds, and who wish to be able to draw creditable deeds, to read the introduction to the first volume of Davidson's Conveyancing, and then a few of the precedents in the subsequent volumes, and notice carefully how Mr. Davidson carries out his rules in practice.

Trusting that the importance of the subject will be a sufficient excuse for my troubling you with this letter, and thanking you for allowing me this opportunity of calling the attention of my fellow articled clerks to the same, I am, &c.,

ONE WHO LIKES TO SEE A NEAT DEED.

NOTE. Our correspondent has opened up a topic of great interest and importance, and one which we have often thought of touching upon in a more extended manner, but business occupations have hitherto prevented, and will, in all probability, ever prevent us doing so. The defects pointed out are by no means confined to drafts drawn by solicitors, for we have seen some drawn by counsel open to the same objections. A little work might be produced upon the proper "language," if we may use that term, of deeds, and would prove very beneficial to the profession if the members of it would condescend to use it. The use of synonymous words is the opprobrium of conveyancers. We shall be glad to hear from other correspondents pointing out other defects in drafts.-ED.

NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS.

A. B. C.-The first point is not very clear, but we think the executors of B. are the proper persons to convey. 2. This point is clear, and receives a confirmation from the fact that the Lord Chancellor, in one of his withdrawn bills, proposed a clause rendering it unnecessary for a feme-covert trustee to acknowledge her conveyance as a trustee.

CONTRACTS.-Either Addison or Chitty; if you have not passed the Intermediate Examination, you had better procure the latter work, as it is one of those upon which you will be examined.

C. A. You will see in last number a notice of the books on which the Intermediate Examinations for 1865 will be founded. We cannot say whether they will be the books chosen for 1866. It is not likely that the Secretary to the Examiners can tell you for certain, and probably he would object to say even if he could speak with certainty.