which might be stolen, it should be left to the jury to say whether there was any property in the pocket. (Reg v. Collins, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 581.)

LEASE.-Agreement-8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3—Contract-Condition-Condition precedent-Void lease good as an agreement-[First Book, 134, 172.]-The plaintiff, by agreement not under seal, agreed to do certain work upon a house, and to complete the whole work necessary by the 14th June. The defendant, "in consideration of these conditions being fulfilled," agreed to take the house for three years, with the option of continuing possession by taking a lease for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years, rent to begin from Midsummer next, dated 22nd May :-Held, that the instrument, though void as a lease, was good as an agreement. To a declaration for not taking the house, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff did not complete the whole work necessary on the 14th June: -Held, on demurrer, that the completion of the work on that day was a condition precedent, and that the plea was good. (Tidey v. Mallett, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 380.)

MARKET OVERT.-[First Book, 208.]—Sale in-What is-Sales by sample-Delivery from different premises from those where contract made.—To bind the property of third persons by a sale in market overt, every part of the transaction, as well the contract of sale as the delivery, should take place in the open market. A sale by sample is not such a sale. A quantity of opium had been stolen from the premises of the defendants, and subsequently a person called upon the plaintiff, who was a drug merchant, at the premises in the city of London, and produced samples of such opium, and a contract of sale of it was entered into. Two days afterwards the opium was brought to the premises, which (though it was before sunset) were closed, whereupon the vendor took it to the other premises of the plaintiff, where he carried on the business of an oil and colourman, where it was delivered. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the opium having been so stolen-Held, that this was not a sale in market overt, and that the plaintiff acquired no right of property in the opium as against the defendants. (Crane v. the London Dock Company, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 372.)

MORTGAGE.-Joint tenants-Sale by-Receipt for one only Charge upon the lands.—In the following case the question raised was, whether, when any equitable charge is vested in two persons as joint tenants, the money can be paid to one without any special authority from the other, so as to discharge the estate, that is, so as to discharge anequitable burden upon the estate, and it was decided that, without special circumstances, such as were not shown to exist, that cannot be done. It appeared that the owner of a freehold estate conveyed it, by way of mortgage, to A., B., and C., for a term of 600 years, to secure £3,751. He then sold the estate to the testator in this cause,

and on that occasion the mortgage was paid off by a payment of £751 to A., B., and C., and a payment of £3,000 to Y., to whom, jointly with Z., that sum was recited to have belonged. Z. was made a party to the deed, but never executed it, and the receipt for £3,000 was signed by Y. only. This was in 1845, and on the death of the purchaser the property was sold in an administration suit. The purchaser, at that sale, refused to complete, on the ground that there was no release from but upon a summons taken out by the plaintiffs, he was ordered to pay his purchase money into Court. He appealed, and it was:Held, that where an equitable charge upon lands is vested in two persons, even as joint tenants, the estate cannot be discharged by a payment to one only, without special circumstances. (Matson v. Woodthorpe, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 391.)

PARENT AND CHILD.-Access to children pending suitDiscretion of the Court.-On an application for an order for access to children pending suit on behalf of the mother, the Court will require to be satisfied that the motive is natural love and affection for the children, and that the applicant has no indirect object in view; as to which, lapse of time in making the application may be material. The Court will also consider the convenience of all parties in the circumstances, and how the children would probably be affected if the order were made. (Codrington v. Codrington, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 387.)

POWER.-Delegating discretion to appointee-Purposes foreign to power. The donee of a power must, at the time of the exercise of the power, and for any purpose for which it is used, act with good faith and with a single view to the real purpose and object of the power, and not for the purpose of accomplishing or carrying into effect any extraneous object, whether laudable or not. Quære where an appointment has been set aside as void, whether the donee of the power, having a power of revocation, may still exercise the original power. (Bentinck v. Topham, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 355.)

POWER.-Execution by will-Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 10-Married woman-Validity of appointment.-In the case of Buckell v. Blenkhorn (5 Hare, 131), which was heard in 1845, and decided early in the following year, it appeared that Sarah McLauchan, by a deed made since the statute of Wills (the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26), appointed certain trust funds to trustees, upon trust for herself for life, and after her death for such person or persons, for such interest or interests, chargeable with such sums of money, and for such intents and purposes, and in such manner in all respects as she should by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, to be by her sealed and delivered in the presence of and attested by one witness or more, direct or appoint. Sarah McLauchan afterwards made her will, which was duly executed and attested as a will according to the statute, and thereby bequeathed a part of the trust fund. The

V. C., Sir James Wigram, held that the will, though not sealed, was a good execution of the power reserved to Sarah McLauchan, by the deed. The same point afterwards came before the M. R. in the case of Collard v. Sampson (4 De G. M. and Gord. 224), which was a suit for specific performance. His Honour then took the view of the question which had been taken in Buckell v. Blenkhorn. He thought Sir James Wigram's construction of the 10th section of the Wills Act the most convenient because it was the most liberal one, and he, therefore, then compelled the purchaser to take the title. The Lords Justices, however, on appeal, differed from the M.R. and reversed his decision, considering the title too doubtful to force upon the purchaser. In West v. Ray (1 Hay, 385,, before Wood, V.C., which was subsequent to the decision of the Lords Justices in Collard v. Sampson, it was held that a power of appointment, which was directed to be "exercised by any deed or deeds, writing or writings, under the hand and seal" of the donee of the power, was not well exercised by a will executed with only the formalities required by the Wills Act. The V.C. thought the case was not within the 10th section of the Act; but he added at the end of his judgment "that if the power had been to be executed by a writing testamentary or otherwise, then the case would have fallen within the statute, but in that case the donor [of the power] would have made a will [to be] of the substance of the case, and then the provisions of the statute wonld [have] applied." It is to be observed that in that case the power was created in 1835, before the passing of the Act. Lord St. Leonards, it is true, dissented from the decision in West v. Ray, and Grange v. Pickford (4 Drew, 363), a power to a married woman to appoint at any time or times during her life, by any " deed or instrument in writing" to be scaled and delivered in the presence of two or more witnesses, was held by Kindersley, V. C., to be well executed by an appointment by will before the Wills Act, sealed and delivered, as well as signed and published, in the presence of three witnesses. In the following recent case, where a power was given since the Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, to a married woman to appoint real property, "by any instrument in writing to be by her signed, sealed, and delivered, in the presence of, and attested by, two or more credible witness or witnesses ;" and she afterwards exercised the power of a will duly executed according to the Wills Act, but not sealed, it was held, by the M.R., that such will was a valid execution of the power. The property subject to the appointment was, in default thereof, devised to her in fee," for her sole and separate use." Whether, if her will had not been a valid execution of the power, she would otherwise have had power to devise it, quære. (Taylor v. Reads, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 475.)

PROBATE DUTY.-Return of, claimed in respect of debts dueReal and personal estate given and made the common general fund by

testator for payment of debts.-The 38th section of the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, in substance enacts that an affidavit shall be made, that the personal estate, without deducting anything on account of debts due by the testator, is under the value of a certain sum (in the present case £25,000) in order that the proper duty may be paid. And the 23rd section of the 5 & 6 Vict., c. 79, directs that when the executors shall have paid the debts due, and owing from the testator as payable by law out of his personal movable estate, and such amount, on being deducted from the value of such personal estate in respect of which probate duty had been paid, should reduce the same to a sum in respect of which a lesser amount of probate duty would have been payable, the difference is to be returned. The substance, therefore, is that the probate duty ultimately payable shall be upon the value of the personal estate, after deducting the debts due and owing by the testator, and payable by law out of the personal estate. In the following case the question was raised what are such debts. It appeared that a testator gave all his real and personal estate to his executors upon trust to sell, and out of the proceeds to pay his debts, funeral expenses, and legacies, and invest the residue for his relations. The trustees had power to postpone the sale for such period as they should deem expedient. The executors paid the simple contract debts out of the personal estate only, without selling any realty, and claimed a return of duty upon the amount of such debts so paid. The commissioners refused to return the sum claimed on the ground that the will created a mixed and general fund, to be applied in payment of debts, and that the real and personal estate should contribute in proportion to their respective value. Held, that the executors were entitled to deduct the simple contract debts from the value of the personalty only, and were, therefore, entitled to a return of probate duty claimed by them, pursuant to the 5 & 6 Vict., c. 79, s. 23. (Daniel Percival v. the Queen, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 622.)

PUBLIC COMPANY.—Railway and Canal Traffic Act—Limita tion of liability for articles in section 7-Value not being declared.The above statute recites, "That it is expedient to make better provision for regulating the traffic on railways and canals," and its principal objects are, first to compel railway and canal companies to give equal facilities to traffic to be brought to them to be carried; and, secondly, impose a limitation upon the power of such companies to protect themselves from liability for injury resulting from the negligence of their servants; and, thirdly, to give a modified protection to such companies from loss or injury done to any horse, &c., in receiving, forwarding, or delivering thereof. The statute

accordingly contains a proviso regulating the conditions which may be imposed by such companies with respect to the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of any such animals, which is immediately followed by a second proviso that no greater damage shall be recovered

for the loss of or for any injury done to any such animals, beyond the sum hereinafter mentioned, that is to say, inter alia, for any horse, £50,"unless the person sending or delivering the same to such company shall at the time of such delivery have declared them to be respectively of a higher value than as above-mentioned.' In the following case it appeared that a horse was brought into the station yard of a railway company, for the purpose of being delivered to the company for conveyance, but while in the actual charge of the owner's groom, and before the fare had been paid, or ticket procured, or its value declared to the company, an accident, occasioned by the negligence of the company, necessitated the horse being killed-Held (per Blackburn and Mellor, JJ., Cockburn, CJ., dissentiente), that by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, the liability of the company was limited to £50 (Hodgman v. The West Midland Railway Company, 10 Law Tim. Rep. 609).

SETTLEMENT.-After acquired property-Reversion vested in estate-Anticipation-Purchase by Trustees-Col urable appointment. -A lady, at the date of her marriage, was absolutely entitled to a share in real and personal estate, subject only to the life interest of her mother therein, and to no other property whatever. By her settlement her husband covenanted with a trustee to convey and assign to him all property which should be "given or devised, descend or devolve, be bequeathed or come to," a lady upon trust to pay the income to her, to the intent that the same might be "a separate, personal, and inalienable provision for her " during the marriage :Held (affirming the decision of Wood, V.C.), that the reversion was included in the settlement, and that the whole income was to be for her separate use, without any power of anticipation; and this, notwithstanding a further trust "to pay, assign, and dispose of the same from time to time, as the lady should, notwithstanding her coverture, direct or appoint" the words "upon this further trust" being read as equivalent to "subject to the trust aforesaid." The trustees made advances to the lady and her husband, and ultimately, before the reversion came into possession, purchased the lady's interest, at once, however, retiring from the trusts before the death of the tenant for life: ---Held, that he was wholly incapable of making such a purpose, and that the same was not rendered valid by his retirement. The sale was, therefore, set aside, with costs to be paid by the trustees. Wood, V.C., decreed that the balance which might be found due to the trustees should be a charge upon the remainder, expectant on the coverture; but upon this point their lordships came to no decision, and an arrangement was made between the parties. (Spring v. Pride, 10 Law Tim Rep. 473.)

TRADE-MARK. - Property in- Right of assigning - Cutlers Company-Partnership assets. Upon the formation of a partnership with a person entitled to a trade-mark, such mark will, in the