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An objection was made below, that the letters containing the submission were not stamped; to which it was answered, that after the parties had submitted and pleaded, and the award was pronounced, the objection could not be sustained; but that at all events, if the want of a stamp was a good objection, it might sill be remedied. Boyd v. M'Kenna, 2 Shaw, 659. The letters were, in fact, stamped.

The appeal was heard in the House of Lords in the first session of parliament in 1830; and afterwards, in the same session, the following judgment, was pronounced:

Lord Chancellor :-The facts of the case, as far as the grounds of judgment are concerned, are these: The Appellant held a farm from the Respondent on lease, commencing at the Whitsuntide 1813, at a rent of 2507., and occupied during the years 1814-15-1617. The years 1815-16-17, were, what in these places were called bad years; and the Appellant gave notice to his landlord that he must avail himself of a break in the lease in 1818, and give up the farm, unless he received a deduction of rent. The landlord was disposed to allow this, and a personal communication and correspondence took place, the result of which was that it referred to a Mr. Brown, who was named by the Appellant himself as a competent person to decide what the amount of the deduction should be; and in the mean time the Appellant continued his occupation till 1824, when Brown made his award, by which he named 747. as the amount of annual deduction for the years subsequent to 1818. The Appellant was dissatisfied with this, and instituted a proceeding in the Court of Session to set the award aside, on the grounds that the deduction should have been made for the years

1830.

MACLELLAN

v.

MACLEOD.

July 1830.

Judgment.

1830.

MACLELLAN

V.

MACLEOD.

previous to 1818, as well as the subsequent years, and that the award was bad in toto, as not having exhausted the subject of the submission. Whether the submission extended to the previous as well as the subsequent years was a question of fact to be decided on the evidence appearing in the correspondence; for there was no formal submission; and it appears to me, and also to the noble Lord (Radnor) who was present at the hearing, and read the papers, that Brown was correct in considering the deduction for the subsequent years as the only subject of submission, although there is certainly some confusion in the correspondence on that head.

But supposing it had been otherwise, and that the previous years also had been submitted, still, by the law of Scotland, the award is good as to the part decided, although the arbiter should not have decided on the whole matter; although if he had decided on evidence submitted by the one party, without notice to the other, it would have been bad. But here, where there was no objection of that kind, and where the claim was all on one side, the omission to decide on the previous years did not vitiate the award. We are of opinion therefore that the Court below was right in holding the award to be good as to the subsequent years; and then no injury was done to the Appellant, as the award and judgment as to the subsequent years were without prejudice to any claims which he might be enabled to make out as to the preceding years.

Then some objection was made, on the ground of misconduct on the part of the arbiter; but on a careful perusal of the evidence, I am of opinion that there was no such misconduct as affected the award.

Judgment affirmed.

END OF PART I.

REPORTS OF CASES

HEARD IN THE

HOUSE OF LORDS,

ON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR;
And decided during the Session 1830.

11 GEO. IV. & 1 WM. IV.

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Insurance on a vessel "at and from Leith to Shetland, and "from thence to Barcelona, and at and from thence, and two "other ports in Spain, to a port in Great Britain." The vessel was lost while loading at Saloe, and the question was whether Saloe was a port within the meaning of the policy. The affirmative held by the courts below, and the Assured declared entitled to recover. Affirmed by the House of Lords.

THE following are the facts of this case:

Of this date, the Respondent, Captain Duncan, with Aug. 4, 1821. the consent of his co-owners, entered into a charterparty with Messrs. Strong & Company of Leith, whereby he let out the vessel, the Sarah, of the burden of 119 tons, belonging to the Respondents, on freight to

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Messrs. Strong & Company, to proceed on a voyage to Shetland, and there load such a quantity of fish or "other goods, that the agent of the charterers may

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put on board, and being so laden, proceed with the "said ship and cargo, with all convenient speed, to Barcelona, or so near thereto as she may safely get, "and there deliver the same, agreeable to bills of "lading; and afterwards to take on board at Barcelona, or other ports on the Catalan or Valencian coasts (not exceeding two), such goods as the said freighter may choose to put on board, with which the said " vessel shall proceed to a port in the United Kingdom, "and deliver her cargo agreeable to bills of lading."

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The other Respondent, Mr. Gavin, who acted as ship's husband, proceeded to make insurance on the vessel for the voyage. He laid the charter-party before Mr. Gibson, secretary of the Sea Insurance Company, the Appellants directing him to get insurance done on the vessel for said voyage, to the extent of 1,2007. After considering the charter-party, Mr. Gibson desired Mr. Gavin to make out a memorandum of the insurance, which Mr. Gavin immediately did, and handed it to Mr. Gibson, who on perusing it said it was correct. Mr. Gavin employed no other broker, but trusted entirely to the good faith of the manager of the Sea Insurance Company.

The policy of insurance insures the vessel "at and "from Leith to Shetland, and from thence to Bar"celona, and at and from thence, and two other ports "in Spain, to a port in Great Britain." The policy ❝contains the usual clause: "And it shall be lawful "for the said ship," &c. "in this voyage, to proceed " and sail to, and touch and stay at, any ports and places whatsoever, without prejudice to this insurance."

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1830.

SEA

COMPANY,
SCOTLAND,

v.

GAVIN

and others.

The vessel proceeded from Leith about the 6th of August 1821, in a state perfectly sea-worthy for the voyage. She took on board her cargo of fish in Lerwick Bay, INSURANCE and in due time arrived off Barcelona. At that time there was a contagious fever raging at the place, so that the vessel could not enter the port. The master was therefore directed to proceed to Tarragona, and there discharge his cargo, and thereafter to proceed to Saloe (which is just round a head of land, about 10 miles distant from Tarragona), there to load her homeward cargo. The captain guided himself strictly by the orders he had received. He discharged his outward cargo at Tarragona, and, on the 12th of December 1821, cast anchor off Saloe, where he began to take on board his homeward cargo, which was to consist of nuts and brandy. He moored the vessel in the road-stead, the usual station there for vessels of the Sarah's burden. In so proceeding to Saloe it was never conceived, on the one hand, that there was any departure from the terms of the charter-party, by which the owners were bound, or on the other, that the vessel was in any degree placing herself beyond the protection of the policy.

While taking on board her cargo at Saloe, and about the 24th of December 1821, a storm arose, more tremendous than had ever been experienced by the oldest person in that quarter. So dreadful was it, that every vessel lying at Saloe, without any exception, was driven ashore and totally wrecked. Even at Tarragona, where there is a very extensive mole, out of about sixty vessels which were lying there, only one was saved. The Sarah shared the common fate.

The Sea Insurance Company refused to settle this loss, and the Assured brought their action in the Admiralty Court, to which the only substantial ground of

Action in the
Admiralty
Court.

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