deemed the greatest man in Europe. We do not bling notes taken on receiving the news of Napomean to suggest that this is done at any unworthy leon's death in 1821." (P. 187.) The generous sacrifice. Lord Holland never seeks to palliate attention and kindness which both Lord and Lady the cruelty of Napoleon in the murder of the Duke | Holland had shown to the captive of St. Helena, d'Enghein. On the contrary, he affirms "that no in supplying his many wants and lessening the discovery that he can conjecture can efface the stain inevitable trials of his seclusion, were well known that guilt left on the French government." (P. and justly appreciated throughout Europe. This 225.) Nor does he condescend to give the weight kindness on their part, as we learn, "introduced of his authority to that most absurd of all delusions, them to the society of those who openly professed, which holds up to mankind the military ruler of or sincerely felt, most veneration for Napoleon ;" France as the friend of civil liberty or of popular and we are informed, that it was from the converrights. Though called by Pitt the "child and sation of these parties that Lord Holland's notes champion of Jacobinism," Napoleon never exhib- were taken. We confess we cannot but feel some ited any filial duty towards his parent; against mistrust of this information; not so much from a whom, on the contrary, he was ready at all times suspicion that it was the intention of Lord Holto enter the lists and to do battle. It is true that land's informants to mislead, as from the inevitable in the early stages of his life he spoke revolution- and justifiable consequences of their respect, gratiary language, and assumed the republican garb. tude, and affection for one, who, having been their In so doing he bent to necessity, spoke the vulgar monarch and their hero, was finally raised to the tongue, and wore the habit of the day. Nor could higher dignity of being made their martyr. he otherwise have risen to power-great as was his We do not therefore feel surprise, if, forewarned ambition, and commanding as was his genius. His against such influences, we are driven to refuse our earliest tendencies were, in truth, towards author- assent to some few of the judgments of Lord Holity and despotism. Even at the age of eighteen, land. We are, perhaps, cold and phlegmatic, and his dreams led him to calculate whether, with an too fearful lest any false enthusiasm should carry army of 2000 men, he could not have made himself us astray. Lord Holland condemns, as cruel and the "principe" or ruler of Italy. (P. 210.) If ungenerous, the confinement of Napoleon at St. in his youth he had embraced any democratic con- Helena. In this we cannot concur. As to the victions, his own testimony establishes that they want of those courtesies and attentions which might were soon cast aside. We doubt whether they have alleviated his imprisonment without endangerwere ever strongly rooted. Lord Holland informs us ing his safe custody-the petty torments and mortithat," by Napoleon's own account of himself, it fications, the limitations imposed on his supply of was in Egypt he weaned his mind from the re- books and necessaries, the refusal of a barren title publican illusions in which his early youth had to one who had ruled and conquered half the terribeen nursed. Those who knew him well assured tories of Europe, and with whom we had not only me that the scenes of the Revolution had estranged fought but negotiated-all this was inexcusable. and even disgusted him with democracy; he There was exhibited, throughout, a wretched and checked every tendency to revive in France, or pitiful meanness, as well as a want of common produce elsewhere, any excesses of that nature, feeling, disgraceful to all concerned. But that from a conviction that the evil created by them was Napoleon should have been subjected to such positive and certain-the ultimate good to be de-restraints as were indispensable to his safe custody, rived from them, uncertain and problematical." was due to the best interests of mankind-more (P. 257.) During "the hundred days," whatever especially after his escape from Elba had proved approach he made towards popular principles, he how undeserving he was of further confidence. made under compulsion—and it is unquestionable Lord Holland, indeed, justifies this breach of treaty that he hated, and perhaps despised, the doctrinaires obligations, by an assertion made, on the authority and philosophers with whom he was at that time of an anonymous witness, that the removal of reduced to make terms, regarding them as much Napoleon to St. Helena had already been "started his personal enemies, as the Allied Sovereigns and discussed" at the Congress of Vienna. It is themselves. Count Molé assured Lord Holland, not suggested that any resolution to this effect had on the authority of Napoleon himself, that Napo-ever been adopted. A supposed negotiation beleon felt great apprehensions lest the Republicans should prevail; and he acknowledged that had he but foreseen how much of compliance with the democratic party would have been required, he never would have left Elba. (P. 303.) We have dwelt upon this, because the absurdity of connecting the name of Napoleon Bonaparte with the cause of liberty-though recognized as such by rational men-is not admitted by the fanatical and the ignorant, at home or abroad. It appears to us the most irrational of all attempts at imposture in hero-worship. If there be a class who are desirous of raising temples to such a divinity, let them do so on the ground of his military genius and achievements.

tween our government and the East India government, to place St. Helena under the control of the crown, is relied upon in evidence of the participation of England in this design. No such negotiation is proved. Nor was it in any respect requisite, even for the imputed purpose. St. Helena continued under the authority of the company during the whole of Napoleon's captivity, and for ten or twelve years after his death. It was only on the last renewal of the East India Company's charter that the island was transferred to the crown. It is true than an act of Parliament was then judged to be necessary to give legality to his detention and to authorize his treatment as a prisoner of war. With this view the 56 Geo. III. c. 22 was passed. Lord Holland admits that the evidence on which In the statute passed concurrently for regulating the he writes was, in the strongest sense of the word, intercourse with St. Helena, (c. 24,) there was a ex parte. We do not mean that it was therefore clause specially saving the commercial rights of the inadmissible. Our objections go more to the credit East India Company; but no assent of that corporathan to the competency of his witnesses. Lord tion seems to have been given or required. Lord Holland describes this portion of his work to be no Brougham, then a member of the House of Commore than " a transcript of some hasty and ram-mons, stated his belief that on the occasion of

"securing the safe custody of the person of Napo- peace whilst the Corsican sat in the king's gate, leon opinions would be almost unanimous ;" and still less when he was the superior of kings themhe added, in a subsequent explanation, "that no selves. He therefore felt that the war must come, term could be put to his imprisonment, except and that it was better to meet it before peace had under circumstances which it was impossible to unnerved his army, and destroyed his means of atanticipate.' (Parl. Debates, vol. xxx., pp. 210, tack and defence: "Il faut d'ailleurs," he ob211.) Thus the whole hypothesis resorted to for served, "l'armée-les généraux ;" and he feared the purpose of excusing a violation of engagement he might lose both by a protracted peace. Withfalls to the ground; and the naked fact remains out stopping to examine to what extent this that the prisoner of Elba had disregarded his sacred hostile spirit existed on the continent of Euobligations and that, unless effectual measures rope, it may be doubted whether the feelings were resorted to, rendering a second breach of and wishes of the government, the legislature, and faith impossible, a second escape or an attempt to the people of England warranted the belief which escape with all its calamities to Europe-was far Napoleon expressed to his philosophic counsellor, from improbable. Gallois: "L'Angleterre veut absolument la guerre. Elle l'aura." He was probably much more truthful when he added, " quant à moi j'en suis ravi." (P. 234.) One of the weaknesses of Napoleon was his sensibility to the abuse contained in the English journals. What Lord Holland terms "the scurrility of the newspapers, (p. 232,)" at that period created a constant irritation in the mind of Napoleon, and contributed to accelerate and embitter the rupture between the two countries." (P. 263.) Mounier, and his twelve clerks, employed to abridge and translate from our daily papers all the paragraphs pointed against the emperor and his family, must have furnished him with an abundance of means to perform his function of a self-tormentor. How great a mistake was it to consider that the public journals of the day necessarily spoke the sense of the people, or implied the assent and approval of Parliament or of the ministry! But the whole course of these events proves how great a responsibility rests upon journalists. In discussions on foreign policy, these writers are freed from direct or legal responsibility, yet from their own desks they possess, and sometimes exercise, the power of kindling angry passion which can only be extinguished in blood. Napoleon either did not know, or would not admit, that the feelings as well as the interests of England were eminently pacific. We believe them to be still more so at present.

A most curious method of raising the supplies was resorted to by Napoleon to meet the expenses of outfit for the great Italian campaign. It has been justly considered a mere vulgar error, to ascribe to chance events of which we are unable to state a sufficient cause. But in this instance we find that chance, in the strictest sense of the word, was the cause of events the most important. It appears that the Directory was unwilling, or unable, to supply their general with the sum he required for himself and his personal staff. After drawing on the funds and on the generosity of his friends, he resorted to Junot, then a young officer, and a frequenter of the tables of play. Napoleon confided to him all the money he had collected, to which Junot added the price of his own silver-hilted sword. He was directed by his commander to risk the whole-to lose or so to increase it as to enable the Italian expedition to be undertaken. He was promised as a reward the appointment of aide-decamp. Junot won an amount far beyond his expectation; but on reporting his success he was ordered by his employer to return and try his fortune once more to double or to lose the entire sum. Fortune was again favorable. A sum of three hundred thousand francs was won the journey was accomplished, the command assumed, and the splendid victories of the campaign of Italy ensued. Thus, perhaps, the crown of the Cæsars may be said to have depended on the cast of a die, and the independence of the Pope to have been the result of drawing "grande ou petite figure." (P. 217.) Never has there been another game played for so mighty a stake.

It is almost as curious a fact to learn, on the authority of Murveldt, the minister who negotiated the peace of Campo Formio, that, even after Napoleon had signed that treaty, contrary to his instructions, thus giving a signal proof of his selfreliance, he should have been offered by Austria a safe retreat and a small principality in Germany. (P. 242.) How little it could then have been anticipated, that the soldier, to whom so paltry a bribe was tendered, should within a few short years be the victor at Austerlitz, should plant his eagles on the walls of Vienna, and become the son-in-law of the emperor !

In an article like the present it would be out of place to enter at any length upon the political career of Bonaparte; nor does Lord Holland do so, probably, for the same reason. Some of his statements are, however, so important, that it is impossible to pass them over. Talleyrand's judgment on the errors which his master had committed belongs to history: "He committed three capital faults," the diplomatist observed, "and to them his fall, scarce less extraordinary than his elevation, is to be ascribed-Spain, Russia, and the Pope." (P. 317.) To these Lord Holland justly adds, the neglect of making peace after the victories of Lützen and Bautzen in 1813." This last error was admitted by Napoleon in conversation with Mr. Fazakerly: "Je me croyais assez fort pour ne pas faire la paix, et je me suis trompé ; sans celà c'était assurement le moment de faire la paix.' It is difficult to decide how far it could have been (P. 319.) We are inclined to think that he also possible by any course of British policy to have committed a similar error at a later time. Even at maintained the peace of Amiens. M. Gallois, who, Chatillon, in 1814, though he must then have subfrom his ability and his honorable independence, mitted to conditions far less favorable than in the was worthy of being consulted by his sovereign, previous years, he might have preserved, by peace, gave his opinion frankly: "England might have an imperial crown, and possibly have transmitted done more to preserve peace, but France has not to his offspring a noble inheritance. Mignet condone all she could to obtain it." (P. 233.) Napo- siders that the sacrifice required at that time leon must have felt the insecurity of his position was too great to have been acquiesced in by Napoarising from the jealousy and hatred of the conti- leon or by France. Lord Holland, who had seen nental sovereigns. They could hardly sleep in the official papers of Caulincourt, expresses his

of his establishment. Perhaps they were sent in vengeance for the Pope's imprisonment at Fontainebleau. They were so utterly ignorant that one of them described Alexander the Great as the most fortunate of Roman generals. We have not sufficient means provided in this work, or elsewhere, to enable us to decide whether his mind did ultimately embrace a full religious conviction, and whether in his decaying strength he was supported by religious consolations. We are willing to believe what we earnestly desire. If he died a Christian, we may most truly add, in the verses of Manzoni :

that Magdeburg was worth one hundred queens." two Roman Catholic ecclesiastics who formed part But to have thrown off the woman who had been his faithful and devoted companion in his early struggles, and during all the vicissitudes of his varying fortunes, showed a hardness of nature which we cannot pardon. He seems, indeed, to have been conscious of this. To M. Gallois he said, "Je n'aime pas beaucoup les femmes, ni le jeu; enfin rien; je suis tout à fait un être politique.' With our habits and feelings, and with examples before us drawn from our own time, we cannot persuade ourselves that, in order to constitute the character of "a happy statesman," any more than that of a "happy warrior," it is necessary that the affections and sympathies should be blunted or extinguished. Elevation of mind is inconsistent with any such unnatural sacrifices, and without elevation of mind true political greatness cannot exist.

he must therefore have admired the other works

-più superba altezza Al disonor del Golgota Giammai non si chinò.

We have

THE SLEEPING EUROPEAN VOLCANO. [We have gathered, from the leading papers, articles which are of great interest to the world.]

We now close this article, which has been protracted beyond our proposed limits. But we have Lord Holland gives us some insight into the intellectual pursuits of Napoleon. He was fond found the intrinsic interest and importance of the of French tragedy, which he loved to read aloud. book increase as we proceeded. We approached We cannot agree that, because he admired Zaire, able anticipations. We have read the volume with our task with much curiosity, and with most favorof Voltaire. On the contrary, we think that the gratification, and with instruction. use to which he had turned the pen of Geoffroy, in pointed out where we differ. We have done so furnishing replies to the Encyclopedists, and par- the more authorized to take this course, because the respectfully, but with freedom. We felt ourselves ticularly to him whom we cannot join Lord Hol- book can well afford to abide by the results of exland in calling," the great and calumniated philoso-amination, and also because, in performing our pher of Ferney," was founded upon a real dislike. There was an antagonism between the genius of duty with honest frankness, we are following the the two men; and the " esprit moqueur" of Vol- course that Lord Holland himself would have most taire must have been essentially antagonistic to approved. one who, like Napoleon, was familiar with the stern realities of life. He condemned Rousseau unreservedly. "A conversation" reported by Lord Holland to have taken place between Napoleon and Stanislas Girardin is full of interest. "C'était un méchant homme, ce Rousseau. Sans lui la France n'avait pas eu de révolution." To an observation made by Girardin, that he had not been before aware that Napoleon considered the Revolution so unmixed an evil, Napoleon replied, "Ah vous voulez dire, que sans la révolution vous ne m'aurez pas eu. Peut-être je le crois-mais aussi la France ne'en serait elle que plus heureuse!" His favorite studies towards the close of his life were French tragedy, the Odyssey, and the Bible. We are informed that he had not been previously very conversant with the Old Testament," and that he was surprised and delighted, provoked and diverted at the sublimity and beauty of some passages, and what appeared to him the extravagance and absurdity of others." (P. 306.) There seems to have been in his mind a strange combination of religious convictions with thoughts of a different nature. The former appear to have predominated, and to have acquired strength, as he advanced in life, and experienced misfortune. At Fontainebleau he stated as a final reason against suicide: "Je ne suis pas entièrement étranger à des idées réligieusHe refused to admit the administration of the Holy Sacrament as part of the ceremonial of his coronation, because he considered that no other man had a right to say when or where he (Napoleon) would take the Sacrament, or whether he would take it or not." It is singular that he should have entertained this feeling some years before the British Parliament relieved the most religious country in Europe from the disgrace and impiety of the sacramental test. The imperial captive in his latter moments was not likely to have derived much guidance or consolation from the

es."

From the Moming Chronicle, 17 Feb. Ir the proceedings of the Congress of Dresden have hitherto failed to attract in this country the attention which negotiations of such importance might seem to deserve, it is assuredly not from any want of sympathy with the efforts of the German people. It is impossible to be indifferent to the political combinations of the races which occupy the centre of Europe; and however great may have been the disappointment of those who believed that the liberties of Germany would be eventually secured by the revolutions of 1848, yet few would be willing to recognize the failure of the democratic movement as a fait accompli, and to abandon all hopes of the constitutional development of the German people. Notwithstanding the proverbial indifference of an insular people to the politics of the Continent, it is difficult to believe that the events of the last three years have been without their influence upon English opinion. It may be that the faults and shortcomings of the popular party have been exaggerated by hasty criticism, and possibly, in some cases, the rude energy by which anarchy has been suppressed has been extolled as the height of political wisdom. The security of our own political system may have led us to presume too confidently that authority is necessarily founded upon law, and to question the right of resistance. But in spite of this manifest bias, and of the innumerable exaggerations which tend further to pervert public opinion, we should be loth to conclude that those who believe in the principles of constitutional government confine to these islands exclusively the application of their political faith. If it were so, it would be a point of selfishness and humiliation

which this country never before attained, under its | had the singular merit of discovering the simplest weakest government or under its most corrupt form of government by physical force, and the fine rulers. There is, however, no foundation for such and chivalrons armies of Austria and Prussia are a supposition. There is still the same wish to de- made the instruments of this most discreditable fend national independence and popular liberty policy. As yet, these arrangements possess only which in former days armed this country against a temporary character, but, in the rumored proLouis XIV. and against Napoleon; and it may posal to create a federal army under the joint safely be affirmed, that the struggles of the popular direction of Austria and Prussia, we may trace a party during the recent revolutions, though often disposition to persist in the course which has been unfairly judged, have met with a sympathy not the entered upon. The only object of such an instituless sincere for being expressed with calmness and tion would be to serve as a police force in the discrimination. And although, so far as the affairs minor states, to check the development of any of Germany are concerned, the difficult complica- opinion hostile to the supremacy of physical force, tions which surround the political questions of that and to establish military government on the ruins country appear at first sight to defy the most labo- of those constitutions which have hitherto escaped rious criticism, yet it cannot be forgotten that Ger- the consequences of the general reaction. many is at the present moment the scene of a contest between the principles of popular right and despotic authority. The events of the last few weeks have only ceased to interest us because they have led to the apparent reestablishment of the principles which were subverted by the revolution, and which were openly disavowed by every government in Germany.

There is, indeed, but too much reason to believe that the triumph of the Austrian diplomacy over Prussia, combined with the dangerous influence of Russia, has induced the Court of Vienna to adopt fully, and without reservation, in its domestic as well as in its foreign relations, a system of reaction. If the Confederation remains unaltered in its constitution, but is made to include the non-German The meagre accounts of the Dresden Conferences provinces of Austria and Prussia, it is obvious that which we gather from the continental journals, are an enormous addition of strength will be given to sufficient to show how completely have been frus- Austrian, and therefore to absolutist influence, trated whatever expectations were formed of the which must at once preponderate in the government Congress of the German States. Nominally sum- of the Confederation from the absence of any counmoned to revise the Federal Constitution, and to tervailing power. Whatever might be the final settle the urgent questions which had threatened result, the immediate effect would be the political Germany with civil war, the functionaries congre- subjection of the free States of Germany to the ungated in the Saxon capital have as yet in no respect intelligent barbarism of Eastern Europe, directed fulfilled the objects for which they were assembled. by a Viennese bureaucracy. We do not, indeed, Various schemes have, we are told, been brought believe that such a system, however sanctioned by forward, with a uniform want of success. The treaties, or guaranteed by imperial alliances, would fundamental changes proposed by Austria and be of long duration. But in the mean time the acPrussia in the mode of administering the affairs of cession of these Sclavonian populations, by national the Confederation, have encountered an active re- feeling and tradition inveterately hostile to the Gersistance from the secondary kingdoms-an opposi- man race, and possessing no other than a purely tion which has hitherto proved efficacious, not from military organization, would be full of danger to any absence of harmony between the two great the Confederation. It would immeasurably inpowers, but because every change which they rec- crease the means of aggression possessed by the ommended was received in the spirit of absolut- two governments which the German people have ism. The reforms which they suggested were in least reason to trust. It is hardly to be anticipated every way opposed to the popular feeling, and, as that the other European powers which were co-sigthey failed to obtain the sanction of the petty natories of the treaty of Vienna will readily acquisovereigns, they were of necessity abandoned. esce in a change so immediately affecting the poNothing, therefore, remains but to return to the litical equilibrium of Europe. It is true that the forms of the Diet, as established by the treaty of resources of the Sclavonian crown-lands have been, Vienna, and the subsequent Federal acts. Suppos- and may again be, made use of for the defence of ing, however, the Diet to be permanently reïn- Germany, and that they are, to that extent, of stated, it is to be expected that it will be at least advantage to the Confederation; but a political as meddlesome and tyrannical as it was under the union with these countries would be alike dangersystem of Metternich, inasmuch as the newly-ac-ous, for the time, to the independence and to the quired energy of a reactionary government is more civilization of Germany. Whether it is also inreckless and more dangerous than a long-estab- tended to include the Lombardo-Venetian kinglished and cautious government of repression. dom is more doubtful, for it would completely There are not wanting indications of the spirit in alter the political relations of a country in which which it is attempted to regulate the internal affairs France has always professed an interest, and folof Germany. The Electorate of Hesse, the Grand lowed a distinct policy. It is clear, therefore, that Duchy of Baden, and the Hanse Towns have already these points cannot be determined merely as Gerreceived Austrian garrisons, which must be ascribed man questions. If-which we should be unwilling much more to considerations of politics than of to predict-the plenipotentiaries at Dresden should strategy. The policy of Vienna seems to consist agree upon these questions, no valid or practical in making a great military demonstration in the results can be obtained without the approval of west and north of Germany, so as to completely those by whose guarantee the present territorial overawe the democratic party, whose strength lies distribution of Europe subsists. in those more civilized portions of the Confedera- Perhaps it may seem superfluous to speculate tion. At the same time, the presence of Prussian upon that which, after all, is but a remote contintroops in these operations reveals the good under-gency. There is, however, no doubt that the standing which subsists between the two courts. project is seriously entertained, and that its authors Prince Schwarzenberg and M. Manteuffel have have succeeded in obtaining the support of the