also the delivery of deeds will be presumed, unless contradicted by particular circumstances. (a) 2. Enrolment and Registry.-Enrolment, when necessary to the operation of a deed, as an annuity deed, will also on certain occasions be presumed; no evidence of non-enrolment being produced on the other side; (b) but an enrolment in a court of record will not in general be presumed, unless a chasm appears in the rolls about the period when the enrolment ought to have been made; (c) but if the rolls have been regularly and properly continued, this presumption cannot arise. (d) If an annuity deed has not been enrolled according to the provisions of the acts of parliament passed for that purpose, but is afterwards enrolled, and the delay can be satisfactorily accounted for, and a considerable time is allowed to pass without any objection being made, the annuity being regularly paid, the grantor will not be permitted to avail himself of the defect. (e) But where there is a direct non-compliance with the positive requisitions of the acts, although no fraudulent intent is shown, mere lapse of time will not remedy the defect, or render the annuity valid. (ƒ) The question, whether a registry of a deed of lands in a register county can be presumed, came before the court in the case of Doe d. Beauland and others v. (a) Talbot v. Hodson, 7 Taunt. 251. (b) Doe d. Griffin v. Mason, 3 Camp. 7. (c) See 1 Jac. & W. 620. (d) Wright d. Smithies, 10 East. 409. Doe d. Howson v. Waterton, 3 B. & A. 149. (e) Symmons v. Mortimer, 5 T. R. 139. Ex parte Maxwell, 2 East. 85; but see 12 Ves. 378. (f) Van Braam v. Isaacs, 1 Bos. & Pull. 451. Ex parte Sir R. Mackreth, 2 East. 563. Drake v. Rogers, 2 Brod. & B. 19. Goold, 1 Bing. 234. Williamson v. ter, 2 Bing. 370; 12 Ves. 378. Hirst; (a) and the court decided that it could not be presumed, but gave no reason for their decision; but it would seem that the circumstances must be peculiarly strong, which will raise the presumption of the registry of a deed. 3. Livery of Seisin.-Livery of seisin will be presumed after twenty years' possession, in order to support a lease or a conveyance, (b) although the usual endorsement attesting the fact be wanting; nor will the rule be different, although the feoffment comprises property in two counties, and a memorandum of livery of seisin is endorsed as to the lands in one county, but omitted in the other; (c) but possession of land for any time less than twenty years, by a feoffee, is not presumptive evidence of livery of seisin. (d) 4. Interlineations.-So also, interlineations, which are made subsequently to the execution of a deed, and which would either vitiate it, or at least be nugatory, will, on the principle now under consideration, be presumed to have preceded the sealing and delivery, unless the contrary clearly appear. (e) 5. Stamping. So also, where secondary evidence of a deed can be given, it will be presumed that the proper stamps were affixed to the original, notwithstanding evidence which tends to negative the supposition. (ƒ) 6. Priority. So also, where two instruments, as a (a) 11 Pri. 475; ante, p. 450. (b) Biden v. Loveday, 1 Vern. 196. cit. Throkmorton v. Tracy, 149, 2nd exception, Roll. Rep. 132, pl. 9; 12 Vin. Ab. 125, pl. 5. Rees v. Lloyd, Wightw. 123. (c) Jackson v. Jackson, Sel. Cha. Ca. 81. S. C. Fitzgib. 146. (d) Doe d. Wilkins v. Marquis of Cleveland, 9 B. & C. 864. (e) Trowell v. Castle, 1 Keb. 22. Glanville v. Paine, Barnard, 19. Fitzgerald v. Fauconberg, Fitzgib. 204. (f) Rex v. Long Buckhy, 7 East. 45. lease and release, bear date the same day, and it is necessary for their validity that one of them should have been executed first, the law will presume that it was so executed. (a) (a) Barker v. Keate, 1 Freem. 251; 1 Burr. 106, 7. CHAPTER XXVIII. OF THE PRESUMPTION OF SATISFACTION OF DEBTS AND CHARGES IN ABSTRACTS OF TITLE. WE shall now consider the important subject of presumptive satisfaction of debts and charges. There are few subjects which occasion more doubt and difficulty in the examination of an abstract than this; and we shall therefore endeavour to ascertain the precise time at which the presumption in each case will arise. The chapter will be divided into the following sections-I. Presumption of satisfaction of mortgage, bond and other debts.-II. Presumption of satisfaction of judgments and decrees.-III. Presumption of satisfaction of annuities.-IV. Presumption of satisfaction of rents.--V. Presumption of satisfaction of portions.-VI. Presumption of satisfaction of legacies.-VII. Presumption of satisfaction of covenants. VIII.-Presumption of satisfaction of a vendor's lien. I. PRESUMPTION OF SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE, BOND, AND OTHER DEBTS. 1. Mortgages. Although the Statutes of Limitation do not expressly apply to mortgage-debts, yet, after the lapse of the period of twenty years, without any demand either of principal or interest, equity will, it seems, presume their satisfaction. In two early cases, seventeen years and sixteen years were held to be a bar, under such circumstances, to the mortgagee; (a) but in both these cases, a sale had taken place, of the lands, in the mean time, and the mortgagee had given no notice of his claim to the purchaser. These cases, however, have not been followed in subsequent decisions. Thus, in Trash v. White, (b) where there was some little doubt whether interest had not been paid for twenty years on a mortgage, it was referred to the Master, to inquire whether interest had been paid, Lord Thurlow, C. observing, that if the case were clear, that no interest had been paid for twenty years, he had always understood that it raised the presumption that the principal had been paid; but there must not only be non-payment of interest, but no demand; and in that case, he thought the presumption on a mortgage as strong as that at law, but, upon the circumstances, referred it to the Master. In Leman v. Newnham, (c) the rule is still further qualified. Sir Wm. Fortescue, M. R., after observing (a) Gibson v. Fletcher, 1 Cha. Rep. 59. Abdy v. Loveday, Finch. Rep. 250. (b) 3 B. C. C. 289. |