feels anxious about his claim, the obtaining additional security, or
the receiving payment of the debt is not prohibited, if the belief
which the act requires is wanting. Grant v. National Bank, 97 U. S.
80, approved and followed. Stucky v. Masonic Savings Bank, 74.

FREIGHT.

See CONTRACT, 1.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8.

HABEAS CORPUS.

See JURISDICTION, A, 20.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. Where a wife lends to her husband money which is her separate prop-
erty, upon his promise to repay it, it creates an equity in her favor
which a court of equity will enforce in the absence of fraud. Medsker
v. Bonebrake, 66.

See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 1;

LEASE.

ILLINOIS.

1. It is a general rule in the State of Illinois that when a person has exe-
cuted two deeds for the same land, the first deed recorded will hold
the title. Stebbins v. Duncan, 32.

Con-

2. The statutes of Illinois relating to the redemption of mortgaged prop-
erty from sales under decree of the federal courts, examined.
necticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Cushman, 51.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6, 7;

EVIDENCE, 7;
MORTGAGE;

MUNICIPAL BONDS, 4;
RAILROADS.

INCOME TAX.

See INTERNAL REVENUE.

INDIAN COUNTRY.

The payment of a special internal revenue tax for selling liquors in a col-
lection district does not authorize the licensee to introduce or to
attempt to introduce spirituous liquors or wines into Indian country
in violation of the act of June 30th, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, as amended by

the act of March 15th, 1864, 13 Stat. 29, when an Indian treaty,
ceding lands embraced within the territory covered by the license,
provides that the laws of the United States then in force, or which
might thereafter be enacted, prohibiting the introduction and sale of
spirituous liquors in the Indian country, should be in full force and
effect throughout the country ceded, till otherwise ordered by Con-
gress or the President. United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whis-
key, 491.

Same case in 93 U. S. 188, referred to. Id.

INDICTMENT.

1. It is no violation of the provisions of § 5440 Rev. Stat., subjecting to
penalties persons conspiring to commit an offence against the United
States, and persons doing acts to effect the object of the conspiracy;
and no violation of § 5209 Rev. Stat., subjecting to punishment a
president or a director of a national banking association who wilfully
misapplies the money, funds or credits of the association, if the presi-
dent and such a director conjointly cause shares in the capital stock
of such association to be purchased with the money of the association,
and held on trust for its benefit.. United States v. Britton, 192.

2. It is not an offence under § 5209 Rev. Stat., which forbids the wilful
misapplication of the moneys of a national banking association by a
president of the bank, for such officer to procure the discount by the
bank of a note which is not well secured, and of which both maker and
indorser are, to the knowledge of the president, insolvent when the
note is discounted; and to apply the proceeds of the discount to his
own use. United States v. Britton, 193.

3. Assuming that it was the duty of a president of a national banking
association to prevent the withdrawal of deposits while the depositor
is indebted to the association, he is nevertheless, not liable for a crimi-
nal violation of § 5209 Rev. Stat., forbidding the wilful misappropri-
ation of the funds of the bank, solely by reason of permitting a
depositor who was largely indebted to the bank to withdraw his de-
posits without first paying his indebtedness to the bank. Id.
4. In an indictment for a conspiracy under § 5440 Rev. Stat., the conspiracy
must be sufficiently charged: it cannot be aided by averments of
acts done by one or more of the conspirators in furtherance of the
object of the conspiracy. United States v. Britton, 199.

5. The procuring by two or more directors of a national banking associ-
ation of a declaration of a dividend by the bank at a time when there are
no net profits to pay it, is not a wilful misappropriation of the money
of the association within the provisions of § 5204 Rev. Stat.; and an
allegation of a conspiracy to do that act is not an allegation of a con-
spiracy to commit an offence against the United States. Id.

6. § 5392 Rev. Stat. enacts that "every person who, having taken an oath

before a competent

person in any case in which a law of the
United States authorizes an oath to be administered ... that
any written . . . declaration, . . or certificate by him
subscribed is true, wilfully and contrary to such oath states or sub-
scribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true,
is guilty of perjury." . . . On an indictment against a clerk of a
circuit and district court for perjury in swearing before a district
judge to his emolument returns, and an account for services ren-
dered to the United States: Held, (1) That the words "declaration "
and "certificate," as employed in this section of the Revised Statutes,
are used in the ordinary and popular sense to signify any statement of
material matters of fact sworn to and subscribed by the party charged.
(2) That the returns and accounts set forth in the indictments were
written declarations within the meaning of § 5392 Rev. Stat. (3)
That the written statement and oath of the party together constitute
the declaration or certificate of the statute, for the falsity of which a
party is chargeable with perjury. (4) That the authority of the dis-
trict judge to administer the oath not having been certified from be-
low as a question of division, cannot be considered. United States v.
Ambrose, 336.

INSURANCE.

A and B formed a partnership with a capital of $10,000, in which each
was to contribute one-half the capital. A furnished B's moiety tem-
porarily, and when after some time B failed to comply with his agree-
ment, A, in May, 1869, applied for a policy on B's life for $5,000.
One of the brothers of B had committed suicide. One of the questions
asked A by the company was as to the number of brothers of B de-
ceased, and causes of death; to this A made no answer. B, in the
previous February, had applied to the same company for a policy, and
in answer to the same question had replied: "Brothers dead, one;
cause of death, accident." A policy was issued on A's application,
by which the company agreed to insure the life of B for $5,000, and
to pay the money "to the assured" within 90 days after notice of the
death of B. B died in an insane asylum. Held, (1) That although
by the terms of the policy the life of B was insured, the person in
whose favor it was assured was A, and that the action on the policy
was rightfully brought in his name. (2) That A had an insurable
interest in B's life to the extent of the moiety of the capital which B
should have contributed to the firm, without respect to the condition
of the partnership accounts, unless his estimate of the interest at the
time of the application was made in bad faith. (3) That the failure
of A to answer the question as to the suicide of B's brother could not
necessarily be imputed as a fraud; and that the concealment of the
cause of the brother's death in B's application could not be imported
into this suit and applied to defeat A's application. Connecticut Life
Insurance Company v. Luchs, 498.

INTEREST.

When the amount of the face of a rote represents a principal sum and
interest thereon at a rate higher than the legal rate, and nothing is
said in the note itself about interest, the note after maturity will bear
interest at the legal rate. Ewell v. Daggs, 143.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

1. A manufacturer of cigars, in his statement furnished in May, 1878,
under § 3387 of the Revised Statutes, according to Form 361, set forth
"the room adjoining the store in the rear, on the first floor" of cer-
tain premises, as the place where his manufacture was to be carried
on. Circular No. 181, issued in March, 1878, by the commissioner of
internal revenue, required that a cigar factory should be at least an
entire room, separated by walls and partitions from all other parts of
the building," and that the factory designated in Form 36 should
not any part of it be used, "even though marked off or separated
from the remainder by a railing, counter, bench, screen or curtain,
as a store where the manufacturer can sell his cigars otherwise than
in legal boxes, properly branded, labelled, and stamped." This cir-
cular went into effect May 1st, 1878. The manufacturer was en-
gaged at the same time and place in doing business as a dealer in
tobacco, having paid the special tax as such, and also the special tax
as a manufacturer of cigars. He did not comply with the said circu-
lar, and had no division between the factory in the rear part of the
room, and the front part of the room, where he sold articles as a
dealer in tobacco, except a wooden counter extending part of the way
across the room, and some three feet high. He sold out of a show-
case in the front part, in quantities less than 25, from stamped boxes,
which were duly branded, marked and stamped, cigars which he had
made in the rear part, on which cigars the tax had been paid. For
doing so, as a violation of § 3400, in removing cigars made by him
without the proper stamps denoting the tax thereon, a quantity of
cigars, the property of the manufacturer, found in the rear part of
the room, in boxes not stamped, were seized as forfeited to the
United States, under § 3400: Held: (1) The requirements of the
circular were within the power of the commissioner to prescribe,
under § 3396; (2) The sales at retail were in violation of the law;
(3) The forfeiture claimed was incurred. Ludloff v. United States, 176.
2. The provisions of § 3236, and subdivisions 8 and 10 of § 3244, and
§§ 3387, 3388, 3390 and 3392, considered and held not to authorize
such sales, they constituting, under §§ 3392, 3397 and 3400, removals
of cigars from the place where they were manufactured, without the
proper stamp denoting the tax thereon, because the sales were sales of
cigars by their manufacturer, at retail, at the place of manufacture,

not in stamped boxes, the cigars being in his hands as a manufacturer
and not as a retail dealer. Id.

3. A railroad company whose railroad was in the military possession of
the United States during the civil war, and whose rolling stock was
in the possession of the company within the confederate lines, and
which earned or distributed dividends during the war by the use of
its rolling stock, which dividends were paid in confederate notes, is
held liable to pay an income tax on the dividends so earned and paid.
Memphis & Charleston Railroad v. United States, 228.

4. A railroad company which after the close of the civil war, with the
consent of its stockholders, applied its surplus carnings to the restora-
tion of its property, and distributed to its stockholders bonds at a dis-
count in lieu of money, with option, however, to take money, is held
not liable to an income tax on the income so applied. Id.

5. On the facts in this case the court finds no error in the instruction to
the jury respecting the exclusion of evidence in regard to the
understanding of the defendants below about an alleged compro-
mise. Id.

6. The provisions in the act of June 30th, 1864, 13 Stat. 284, ch. 173, § 122;
and in the act of June 13th, 1866, 14 Stat. 139, ch. 184, § 9, that the
profits of a railroad company carried to the account of any fund, or
used for construction, shall be subject to and pay a tax, do not apply
to earnings by a railroad company which are used for construction or
carried to a fund, unless, on a rest made and balance struck for the
period for which the tax is demanded, the operations of the com-
pany show a profit. In this respect the rule in the statute differs
from that which it lays down in respect to earnings used to pay inter-
est or dividends, which were taxable whether there were actual
profits or not. Little Miami & Columbus & Xenia Railroad v. United
States, 277.

7. When an indorsement is made upon a distiller's bond, "We hereby
accept the within survey and consider the same as binding upon us
on and after this date," which is signed by the obligees in the bond,
the parties thereby waive the delivery of a copy of the survey, and
the difference between the capacity of the still and the returns of
production may be recovered in a suit on the bond. Wright v. United
States, 281.

See INDIAN COUNTRY.

JUDGMENT.

1. A judgment of a State court set up as an estoppel cannot be corrected
in a collateral proceeding in a court of the United States. Until re-
versed or brought for review in the manner provided by law, it is en-
titled to the same effect in the courts of the United States as in the
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