ABATEMENT. See Married Women, 4.
ACCOUNT. See Use and Occupation, 1.
ACCOUNT, ACTIONS OF. See Auditor, 1, 2.
ADMINISTRATORS. See Executors and Administrators.
AGENCY. See Principal and Agent.
ALTERATIONS OF WRITINGS. See Evidence, 7.
APPEALABLE ORDERS. See Attorneys, 3.
An order passed by the justice holding the Circuit Court, vacating a judgment rendered ex parte, at a previous term, and awarding a new trial upon the merits, is not an appealable order within the provision of Section 722 of the Rev. Stats. D. C. Phillips v. Neyley, 236.
ASSIGNMENT. See Evidence, 9; Vendor and Vendee, 1, 2. The Maryland act of 1763, chap. 23, sec. *, providing that where a judgment has been recovered against principal debtors and sureties and the judgment has been satisfied by one surety, the creditor shall be compelled to assign the judgment to him, is in force in this District, but it applies only to cases where payment is made by a surety on judgments, and not to decrees. Herr v. Barber, 545.
1. The landlord has no right to an attachment against his tenant's chattels which have been removed from the premises before the rent is due. His remedy is by judgment against the tenant and execution to be levied upon such chattels, or any of them, in whosesoever hands they may be found. Wallach v. Chesley, 209. 2. Circumstances under which an attachment for rent may be issued by the landlord against the goods and chattels of the tenant. Id. 3. Notwithstanding the act of Congress of April 29, 1878, providing for the recording of deeds, &c., property in the possession of one who has in good faith purchased and paid for it, but has failed to record the conveyance, is not liable to attachment in a suit by a creditor against the absconding vendor, when it appears that as between the vendor and vendee the entire equity in the property has passed to the latter; the statute regulating attachment pro- ceedings permits the plaintiff to attach only the property of the defendant, not the property of some one else. United States v. Howgate, 408.
1, Before judgment, the parties to a pending suit may settle it between themselves without considering either the wishes or the interest of the attorneys. Lemont v. Railroad Company, 502.
2. Plaintiff brought an action of tort to recover damages for injuries received. Pending the suit, plaintiff and defendant, without the knowledge of plaintiff's attorneys, settled the case. Plaintiff then gave defendant an order on the clerk of the court to dismiss the suit, which being filed, plaintiff's attorneys moved the court to set the cause down for trial notwithstanding, on the ground that the settlement was collusive, and was made with knowledge on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff's attorneys were interested in the case to the extent of their fees for services. An affidavit accompanied the motion showing that the plaintiff had agreed to pay his attorneys a contingent fee of thirty-three per cent. of the amount that should be recovered. The court thereupon passed an order that defendant should pay to plaintiff's attorneys one- third of the sum for which the case had been settled, and in default thereof the entry of dismissal should be struck out and the cause set down for trial. On appeal this court reversed the order, holding:
That the court will not interfere to enforce in a summary way through
the original suit, the collateral engagement of a client for the compensation of his attorney, but will leave the latter to his com- mon law remedy. Id.
3. Whether the order of the court below was an appealable order, quære. Id.
AUCTION SALES. See Building Associations, 1, 2.
1. Where, in a reference to an auditor under the Act of Maryland, 1785, ch. 80. the proceedings before the auditor are such as in actions of accounts, the right of hearing before the court as to all questions of law, and of trial by a jury upon all matters of fact, is to be preserved to the contestants. McCullough v. Groff, 361. 2. And where the auditor undertakes to decide all questions of fact, it would seem to be clearly against the spirit of the statute to admit the report before the jury even as prima facie evidence of the truth of its assertions or conclusions.
1. The act of Congress of June 30, 1877 (19 St., 94), is substantially an enactment that the acts of Congress relating to national banks, including the provisions of Section 5154, providing for the con- version of banks into national banks, shall be applicable to sacings and other banks in this District, except that savings banks ex-
isting at the time of the passage of the act are not required to have a capital of $100,000 in order to be converted into national banks. It was competent, therefore, for a savings bank, organ- ized in this District under the General Incorporation acts of May 5, and June 17, 1870, R. S. D. C., § 553, to avail itself of the law for converting banks into national banks. Keyser v. Hitz, 473. 2. The certificate of the Comptroller of the Currency is conclusive as to the regularity of the proceedings by which any bank has been converted into a national bank. Id.
3. Where the owners of more than two-thirds of the stock of a bank consent to the conversion of the bank into a national bank, such a conversion may take place without the concurrence of the re- maining stockholders.
4. While it might be more regular, on the conversion of a bank into a national bank, for a new stock book to be opened and new cer- tificates to be issued in the name of the national bank, yet as there is nothing in the law prescribing the form of the stock book, or of the certificates of stock, there is nothing to prevent the new bank from treating the old books and certificates as sufficient evi- dence of title in the concern; neither the rights nor liabilities of the stockholders could be affected by the mere omission to issue a new form of stock certificate to them. To hold otherwise would be to allow all the stockholders to escape liability by the mere omission of the formality of issuing the shares in a new form. Id.
5. Where a stockholder of the old bank has given his consent tha the stock should be converted into stock of the national bank, he becomes by virtue of that consent a stockholder in the new bank, Wathstanding any omission to issue new certificates of stock.
6. The powers of the directors of a national bank are not regulated by the strict principles of a special trust. They act in a fiduciary capacity, but are clothed by the statute with a power to manage the affairs of the bank, and this implies a considerable element of discretion. Keyser v. Hitz et al., 513.
7. It is not an improper exercise of that discretion, where cash is needed for the legitimate business of the bank, to accept antici- pated payment of a debt bearing a high rate of interest where such debt constitutes an unavailable asset. Id.
8. Where a bank, under a contract made by its officers, receives money for the purpose of being applied by it to certain uses, such money cannot be retained by the bank except in accordance with the contract under which it was received, although its officers ex- ceed their powers in making the contract. The money comes into its hands charged with a trust and the retention of it consti- tutes an acceptance of the trust, and at the same time a ratifica- tion of the acts of its officers. Id.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Gaming Contracts, 2; Evidence, 2; Laches, 1; Specialties, 1.
1. Although during the pendency of a suit brought upon a promissory note endorsed in blank the plaintiff transfer it by delivery, he may still maintain the action if it be agreed between him and the transferee that notwithstanding the delivery the legal title shall be considered as still remaining in the plaintiff for the purpose of prosecuting the suit. Keyser v Shepherd, 66.
2. The holder of a promissory note endorsed in blank transferred it by delivery pending a suit brought by him upon it, his attorney filing an order in the cause for the entry of the suit to the use of the transferee, which was done. On the trial the defendant con- tended that plaintiff had parted with his title and could not maintain the action.
Held, That the order of the attorney was to be presumed as author- ized by plaintiff, and that this order was equivalent to an agree- ment that the suit should be prosecuted for the benefit of the assignee of the note, the legal title to remain in the nominal plaintiff as far as necessary for that purpose, and that under such circumstances the suit could be maintained. Id.
3. Semble, If M. accept an order of B. & C. in favor of H., payable out of whatever will be due B. & C. on the completion of their contract, and afterwards advances to B. & C. money that was due only on such completion, he will be liable to H. for as much as was thus paid away to the latter's prejudice. Hammond v. Miller, 145.
4. Where by a resolution of a stock company a promissory note is issued to pay an indebtedness of the company, the note being signed by the treasurer and endorsed by the directors as such, and afterwards the paper is taken up by one of them, this is nothing more than an advancement by him in behalf of his co- obligors, and entitles him to a contribution for the money thus ad- vanced; he cannot pick out one of the endorsers and charge him with the whole liability, as in the case of an ordinary endorse- ment. Middleton v. Mc Cartee, 420.
BILLS OF EXCEPTION. See Practice, 7.
1. The 65th Rule of Court requires bills of exceptions to be settled before the close of the term, which may be prolonged for that pur- pose. A bill of exceptions was brought to the court in General Term, dated twenty-seven days after the close of the term at which the case was tried, while no prolongation of the term was shown to have been ordered. On the other hand, the entry in the minutes of the court stated that the bill of exceptions taken in the case had been signed and sealed on the last day of the term. Held, That the court, having the ends of justice in view, would, in such a conflict of dates, give weight to the statement of the
BILLS ON EXCEPTIONS (continued.)
minutes and treat the bill as having been signed during the term. Johnson v. Douglass, 3.
2. A general exception to the granting of prayers is irregular. The party objecting should except specially to the granting of each prayer. Moore v. Railroad Co., 437.
3. So, too, with the charge; the unobjectionable parts should be segregated from that which is objectionable, and the latter excepted to specially. Id.
Where on appeal the court in General Term remands a case to the Special Term, a bill to review the decrec entered in obedience thereto cannot be entertained by the Special Term. But where the decree of the General Term extends to part only of the decree appealed from, the Special Term may entertain a bill to review so much of its own decree as was not affected by the decree of the appellate court. Williams v. Gardner, 93.
1. Where, by the constitution of a building association, it is provided that the association shall continue until the unsold stock is worth fifty per cent. premium, and shall then proceed to close," if the value of the association's real estate and other assets aggregate the fifty per cent. of profit contemplated by this clause of the constitution, then the association cannot make the stockholders keep on paying dues while it holds its real estate for some further advance, but it must close up. Burns v. Building Association, 7. 2. Where the real estate held by the association consists of property bought in by it at public auction in competition with other bidders, the price bid by the association must be taken, as against it, as conclusive of the value of the property for the purpose of ascer- taining if the time has arrived when the association should close; but the value, if greater, may be shown by witnesses, for the asso- ciation cannot, with an all-sufficient amount of property in its hands to enable it to close up, go on collecting dues. Id.
BUILDING CONTRACTS. See Contracts, 3–6.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See Principal and Surety, 3; Husband and Wife, 1.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES. See Landlord and Tenant, 2.
CHECKS. See Bank Checks.
Stock of an incorporated company is a chose in action. Keyser v. Hitz,
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS. See Patents.
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