which was on that day signed, sealed, and made a part of the record. No greater evil could arise than to contradict a record in this manner. Mr. Justice JAMES delivered the opinion of the court: It is claimed by the appellee that this case is not properly here, for want of a bill of exceptions. The bill shown to us appears to be dated the 10th of February, while the minutes of the Circuit Court state, under the date of 14th of January, that the court adjourned finally on that day. They state also that on that day a bill of exceptions was duly signed. Of course we are not to presume that the judge signed two sets of bills of exceptions. On the record, then, the case stands thus: the date of the bill names a day which fell after the adjournment of the court term; the minutes state that it was signed on the last day of the term. shall treat this bill as having been signed during the term. As we understand counsel on both sides to say that, as a matter of fact, the entry of final adjournment was not made until after the bill of exceptions was signed, we conceive that the ends of justice are served by giving weight to the statement of the record that the bill was so signed, notwithstanding the conflict of dates. We shall consider, therefore, the questions raised and argued upon the exceptions presented. It was objected that Mrs. Spaids, being a married woman, could not purchase the furniture taken under the writ of replevin, and could not execute a valid deed of trust to the vendor to secure the price. Neither of these propositions is correct. She could acquire title either by gift or by sale to her. As this title was derived, not from her husband, but from a stranger, the furniture became her separate property, under the Married Woman's Act, and she was competent to make contracts concerning it. She could convey it absolutely or mortgage it or pledge it. It was next objected that the deed of trust was executed by Mrs. Spaids before the goods were delivered to her, and, therefore, before title had passed to her by the contract of sale. But delivery is not necessary to a transfer of title to personalty. If the vendor and vendee agree that the title is in the vendee at once and without any further act, it changes hands by that agreement although no delivery is made. It is plain that the contract of the parties intended to pass the title in this case, and one of the strongest proofs of that intention was the fact that the vendee executed and the vendor accepted a deed of trust which assumed that the title had first passed to the vendee by the contract of sale. After the execution of this deed of trust the property was placed in the Owen House, which was carried on by Mrs. Spaids, and it is claimed that the landlord had a lien on it for arrears of rent, and that his right of possession under his attachment was paramount to that of the trustee under his deed of trust. The statute relating to landlords and tenant (Sec. 677-679 R. S. D. C.), gives to the landlord a lien upon the goods of the tenant, and not upon the goods of other persons which are upon the demised premises. It is true that the tenant in this case had an interest in the property in question, but the legal title and the right of possession upon default of payment were in the trustee. It was only subject to this right of the trustee that the landlord's lien could attach. He fastens his lien upon the property just as he finds it; in other words subject to the trustee's paramount right of property and possession. The instruction to the jury stated a contrary doctrine. Judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. JAMES S. EDWARDS, ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF THOS. B. ENTWISLE, AND OF ENTWISLE & BARRON, COPARTNERS. vs. THOMAS B. ENTWISLE, MARY M. ENTWISLE, HIS WIFE, AND OTHERS. EQUITY. No. 6452. Decided October 23, 1882. The CHIEF JUSTICE and Justices Cox and JAMES sitting. 1. Evidence of intent to defraud existing creditors by a voluntary conveyance of property by one largely indebted is prima facie evidence of fraud against subsequent creditors, but not conclusive; it may be rebutted by showing that the existing debts were secured by mortgage, or were provided for in the settlement itself, or that they have since been fully paid off. But when those debts are paid off by creating new debts, as by borrowing money, or by purchasing goods on credit and out of the proceeds, which ought to be applied to pay the purchase price, discharging the antecedent debt, or in any way which only relieves an indebtedness in one direction by increasing it in another, the case is to be treated as if the prior indebtedness had continued throughout. 2. Where a voluntary conveyance is void as against creditors, those acquisitions of the donee, which are the mere fruit and outgrowth of the property conveyed, share the same fate. 3. The burden of proof is upon the wife, when she claims that expenditures made in the purchase and improvement of property are from her separate estate. 4. In the District of Columbia the labor of the wife and the earnings | resulting therefrom are the legal property of the husband. 5. Where, in the case of a voluntary conveyance, it is shown that the donor had continued all the time to pay the taxes and repairs and interest on encumbrances, and had raised money on the property, for his own use, by deed of trust, and had also applied the largest part of the proceeds of a sale of a part of it to his own use, these, or such facts, will be conclusive evidence to a court of equity that the conveyance was a mere cloak to protect the property from creditors; and where the donee is the wife the force of the evidence is a question of degree only; her allowance of such a control and beneficial use by her husband of property previously settled upon her by him, is at the risk of having it declared responsible for his debts. 6. It is sufficient in a bill brought to have a conveyance set aside on the ground that it was made with intent to defraud creditors that the complainant state a prima facie case, to be afterwards established by proof; mere matters of evidence on the general question of fraudulent intent need not be made the subject of special averment. 7. Where a partner uses the funds of the partnership to purchase property and settle it upon his wife, creditors of the partnership may pursue the property in equity.—Concurring opinion. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. On May 6, 1878, Thomas B. Entwisle and George O. Barron, copartners, doing business under the firm name of Entwisle & Barron, were, as a firm and individually, on their own petition, adjudicated bankrupts. The assets, as returned in the bankruptcy schedule, were merely nominal. At the date of the adjudication, certain real estate in this city, of the assessed value of $16,967, stood in the name of, and was held in trust for, Mary M. Entwisle, the wife of the senior member of the firm. This property was conveyed to Mrs. Entwisle, and for her use, between January, 1864, and May, 1873. In March, 1866, another building lot was conveyed to the use of this lady, which, with the improvements thereon, was sold in April, 1874, for $11,500. The plaintiff, who is the assignee in bankruptcy, filed this bill to have these conveyances set aside as fraudulent and void, and the same decreed the property of the husband and assets in the hands of the assignee. All the allegations of fraud were fully denied in the answers, and the defence set up was that these various pieces of property were purchased by Mary M. Entwisle out of the profits derived from one piece, that known as lot 37, in square No. 127, and by loans effected on said piece of real estate, which property was settled upon her by her husband on January 19, 1864. The testimony was very voluminous, but the facts as found by the court appear in the opinion. EDWARDS & BARNARD for complainant : 1. Conceding that the money claimed to have been used in the purchase of any of the property in controversy was derived through the wife's earnings in taking boarders and renting rooms while residing and cohabiting with her husband, such earnings belong to the husband at common law and are not made her property by any statutory enactment of force in this District. Seitz vs. Mitchell, 94 U. S., 580; R. S. D. C., sec. 789. Gifts of this character by a husband to his wife, as against creditors, are subject to the same rules which apply to other voluntary conveyances. Schouler's Dom. Rel., 243. 2. Subsequent creditors may impeach a voluntary convey ance by showing antecedent debts sufficient in amount to afford a reasonable evidence of a fraudulent intent. The in. tent to defraud antecedent creditors is prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud subsequent creditors. Bump Fraud. Conv., 326, and cases cited. "If an individual, being in debt, shall make a voluntary conveyance of his entire properoy, it would be a clear case of fraud." Parish vs. Murphree, 13 Howard; Pratt vs. Curtis, 6 Bank. Reg.. 139; Kehr vs. Smith, 20 Wal., 31. The true principle is that a fraudulent intent against one or more creditors is fraudulent against all, and the statute justifies no other distinction between prior and subsequent creditors than that which arises from the necessity of showing a fraudulent intent against some creditor, which cannot be done in behalf of creditors whose demands were not in existence at the time of the conveyance, but by proving either a prior indebtedness or a prospective fraud against them only. It is accordingly settled that if the donor is insolvent at the time of the transfer, the conveyance is void as against subsequent creditors. Bump Fraud. Conv., 326, 327; Walker rs. Burrows, 1 Atk.. 94; King vs. Wilcox, 11 Paige, 589; 1 Story Eq., sec. 361. Entwisle incurred other obligations, and used the means of his subsequent creditors to pay off those existing at the time of the first settlement. The inference of fraud which arises from the existence of debts at the time of the conveyance is not repelled by proof that such debts have been paid, if it appears that such payment be made by incurring other liabilities; and, as in this case, there be a continuous indebtedness terminating in bankruptcy. Payment alone of the prior debts will not render the transaction valid, if by so doing others to an equal amount are contracted. In such instances the subsequent creditors are subrogated to the rights of the creditors whose debts their means have been used to pay. Bump Fraud. Conv., 327-328; Paulk vs. Cook, 39 Conn., 566; Antrim, assignee, vs. Kelly et al., 4 Bank. Reg., 189, LIBRARY OF THE COLUMBIAN UNIVERSITY, |