A bill drawn by bankers in the country on their correspondents in London, payable after sight, was indorsed to the traveller of the plaintiffs. He transmitted it to the plaintiffs after the interval of a week, and they, two days afterwards, transmitted it for acceptance. Before it was presented to the drawees, the drawer had become bankrupt; the drawees, consequently, refused to accept. Had the bill been sent by the traveller to the plaintiffs, his employers, as soon as he received it, they would have been able to get it accepted before the bankruptcy. "This is," says Lord Tenterden, "a mixed question of law and fact; and, in expressing my own opinion, I do not wish at all to withdraw the case from the jury. Whatever strictness may be required with respect to common bills of exchange, payable after sight, it does not seem unreasonable to treat bills of this nature drawn by bankers on their correspondents, as not requiring immediate presentment, but as being retainable by the holders for the purpose of using them, within a moderate time (for indefinite delay, of course, cannot be allowed,) as part of the circulating medium of the country." The jury concurred with his Lordship, that the delay was not unreasonable.(d) Where the purchaser of a bill on Rio Janerio, at sixty days' sight, the exchange being against him, kept it nearly five months, and the drawee failed before presentment, it was held that the delay was not unreasonable. "The bill," says Tindal, C. J., "must be forwarded within a reasonable time under all the circumstances of the case, and there must be no unreasonable or improper delay. Whether there has been, in any particular case, reasonable diligence used, or whether unreasonable delay has occurred, is a mixed question of law and fact, to be decided by the jury, acting under the direction of the Judge, upon the particular circumstances of each case.(e)

But where a bill, payable after sight, was drawn in duplicate on the 12th of August, in Newfoundland, and not presented for acceptance. in London till November 16, and no circumstances were proved to excuse the delay, it was held *unreasonable,(f) the Court laying some stress on the fact that the bill was drawn in sets.

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Presentment should be made during the usual hours of business.(g)(1)

(d) Shute v. Robins, 1 M. & M. 133; 3 C. & P. 80, S. C.

(e) Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416; 2 M. & Sc. 570, S. C.

(f) Straker v. Graham, 4 M. & W. 721.

(g) Mar. 112.

(1) Business hours, except in the case of banks, range through the whole day

The holder may, however, put the bill into circulation without presenting it. "If a bill, drawn at three days' sight," says Mr. Justice Buller, "be kept out in circulation for a year, I cannot say that there would be laches; but if, instead of putting it into circulation, the holder were to lock it up for any length of time, I should say that he would be guilty of laches;"(h) "But this cannot mean," says Tindal, C. J., "that keeping it in hand for any time, however short, would make him guilty of laches. It never can be required of him instantly on receipt of it, under all disadvantages, to put it into circulation. To hold the purchaser bound by such an obligation would impede, if not altogether destroy, the market for buying and selling foreign bills, to the great injury, no less than to the inconvenience, of the drawer himself."() Two bills, one for 4007., the other for 5007., were drawn from Lisbon, on May 12, at thirty days after sight, indorsed to G. at Paris, and by G. to R. at Genoa, and by R. indorsed over. They were not presented for acceptance till 22d August. The jury found, and the Court concurred, that the bills were, under the circumstances, presented within a reasonable time.(k)

Illness or other reasonable cause, not attributable to the misconduct of the holder, will excuse. But the holder must present, though the drawer have desired the drawee not to accept.(1)

The presentment must be made either to the drawee himself, or to his authorized agent. The holder's servant called at the drawee's residence, and showed the bill to some person in the drawee's tan yard, who refused to accept it; but the witness did not know the drawee's person, nor could he swear that the person to whom he offered the bill was he, or represented himself to be so. Lord Ellenborough, "The evidence here offered proves no demand on the drawee,` and is, therefore, insufficient."(m)

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*When the bill is presented, it is reasonable that the drawee should be allowed some time to deliberate whether he will ac

cept or no. It seems that he may demand twenty-four hours for this

(h) Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bl. 565.

(i) Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416; 2 M. & Sc. 570, S. C.

(k) Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 160; 2 Marsh. 454, S. C.

(7) Hill v. Heap, D. & R., N. P. C. 57.

(m) Cheek v. Roper, 5 Esp. 175.

down to the hours of rest in the evening. hon v. Fotteral, 7 Leigh, 179. Cayuga Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635. Ne

purpose, (and that the holder will be justified in leaving the bill with him for that period;) at least, if the post do not go out in the interim,(n) or unless, in the interim, he either accepts or declares his resolution not to accept.(o) If more than twenty-four hours be given, the holder ought to inform the antecedent parties of it.(p)

If the owner of a bill who leaves it for acceptance by his negligence, enables a stranger to give such a description of it as to obtain it from the drawee, without negligence on his part, the owner cannot maintain trover for it against the drawee.(q)

In case the bill is directed to the drawee at a particular place, it is to be considered as dishonoured if the drawee has absconded. (r) But, if he have merely changed his residence, or if the bill is not directed to him at any particular place, it is incumbent on the holder to use due diligence to find him out. And due diligence is a question of fact for the jury.(s) If the drawee be dead, the holder should inquire after his personal representative, and, provided he live within a reasonable distance, present the bill to him.(t)

In an action against the drawer on non-acceptance, it is not sufficient to allege mere non-acceptance, presentment for acceptance must be alleged.(u)

BY THE ACCEPTOR TO PAY A BILL 144 BEFORE BILL FILLED UP

(n) Marius, 15; Com. Dig. Merch. F. 6; Bellasis v. Hester, 1 Ld. Raym. 281.

(6) Bayley, 194, 6th ed.

(p) Ingram v. Foster, 2 Smith, 242.

(9) Morrison v. Buchanan, 6 C. & P. 18.

() Anon. 1 Ld. Raym. 743.

(s) Collins v. Butler, 2 Stra. 1087; Bateman v. Joseph, 12 East, 433.

(f) Chitty, 9th ed. 357.

() Mercer v. Southwell, 2 Show. 180.

ACCEPTANCE, in its ordinary signification, is an engagement by the drawee to pay the bill when due, (a) in money.(b)

An instrument drawn by A. upon B., requiring him to pay to the order of C. a certain sum at a certain time "without acceptance," is a bill of exchange, and may be so described in an indictment for forgery.(c)

We have already seen, that without acceptance a banker may be liable to his customers, if, having sufficient funds, he neglect to pay his checks.

A banker, at whose house a customer accepting a bill makes it payable, is liable to an action at the suit of that customer, if he

[*144] refuse to pay it, having at the time of presentment funds suffi

cient, and having had those funds a reasonable time, so that his clerks and servants might know it.(d)

Where a bill is accepted payable at a bankers, though money had been remitted by the acceptor to the banker for the express purpose of paying the bill, the banker is not liable to the holder in an action for money had and received, unless he have assented to hold the

(a) Clark v. Cock, 4 East, 72.

(b) Russell v. Phillips, 19 L. J. 297, Q. B.

(c) Miller v. Thomson, 3 M. & G. 576; Reg. v. Kinnear, 2 M. & Rob. 117.

(d) See Whitaker v. The Bank of England, 6 C. & P. 700, and 1 C., M. & R 744; 1 Gale, 54, S. C.

money for the purpose for which it was remitted. (e) But where there is anything in the conduct or situation of the banker which amounts to an assent to hold the remittance upon trust to discharge the bill, he is liable to the holder.(f)

A bill can only be accepted by the drawee,(g) and not by a stranger, except for honour.(h) Where, indeed, the bill was not addressed to any one, but only indicated the place of payment, the acceptor was held liable as having admitted himself to be the party pointed out by the place of payment.(?) But this decision goes to the very verge of the law.(k)

If the drawee be incompetent to contract, as, for example, by reason of infancy or coverture, (2) the bill may be treated as dishonoured.

We have already seen(m) that one partner may, by his acceptance, bind his co-partner. But, if a bill be drawn upon several persons not in partnership, it should be accepted by all, and, if not, may be treated as dishonoured.(n) Acceptance will, however be binding upon such as do make it.(0)

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There cannot be two or more separate acceptors of the same bill not jointly responsible. A. refused to supply B. with goods, unless C. would become his surety. C. agreed to do it. Goods to the value of 1577. were accordingly sold by A. *to B. For the amount A. drew on B., and the bill was accepted both by B. and C., cach writing his name on it. Lord Ellenborough, "If you had declared that, in consequence of A. selling the goods to B., C. undertook that the bill should be paid, you might have fixed C. by this evidence. But I know of no custom or usage of merchants, according to which, if a bill be drawn upon one man, it may be accepted by

(e) Williams v. Everett, 14 East, 582; Yates v. Bell, 3 B. & Ald. 643; Wedlake v. Hurley, 1 C. & J. 83.

(ƒ) De Bernales v. Fuller, 14 East, 590, n.; 2 Camp. 426; and see the observations of Abbott, C. J., on this case, in Yates v. Bell, 3 B. & Ald. 643.

(9) Unless he have recognised the acceptance as his. See Lindus v. Bradwell, 5 C. B. Rep. 583.

(h) Polhill v. Walter, B. & Ad. 114; 1 L. J. 92, K. B.; Davis v. Clarke, 13 L. J., Q. B. 305; 6 Q. B. Rep. 16, S. C.; see Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 18 L. J. 274. (i) Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739.

() See the observations of Patteson, J., in Davis v. Clarke, supra.

(7) Chit. 9th ed. 283.

(m) Chapter II.

(n) Mar. 16, Dupays v. Shepherd, Holt's Rep. 297; Marius 64.

(0) B. N. P. 270; Bayley, 58; Owen v. Von Uster, C. P., M. T. 1850.