ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL.

1. The question whether a cause
of action survived plaintiff's
death, pending an appeal by him
from a judgment for defend-
ants, properly arises, and may
be determined on the motion of
his administratrix for an order
of substitution resisted by de-
fendants, who ask leave to file a
supplemental answer alleging
plaintiff's death, or a remand to
permit filing of such answer.
Cline v. Southern Ry. Co., 113
S. C. 440.

2. A cause of action by an in-

jured employee for damages for
fraud and deceit by which
he was induced to release
his claim for injuries, and ac-
cept a contract for permanent
employment, which was later
broken by the employer, was a
cause of action for tort, and did
not survive his death pending
an appeal by him from a judg-
ment for defendants. Id.

ACCOMPLICE - TESTIMONY
OF.

1. The uncorroborated testimony
of accomplices is sufficient in
law to sustain conviction of an
offense. State v. Whaley et al.,
113 S. C. 103.

2. In a prosecution for receiving
stolen goods, statement of the
Court in instructing that it had
been suggested that no one
could be convicted on the un-
corroborated testimony of an
accomplice, but that such was

not the law, and it was for the
jury to determine what weight
should be given the testimony
of any witness, whether an ac-
complice or any other, held not
erroneous as a charge on the
facts, in that the jury were in-
structed, that the testimony of
an accomplice was as good as
that of any other witness. Id.

ACCOUNT STATED.

1. Under Civ. Code 1912, sec. 2516,

allowing interest in cases of ac-
counts stated, and in cases
wherein any sum shall be as-
certained to be due, where there
was no settlement or account
stated between a creditor and a
debtor estate during the year
in which a balance was due, the
creditor estate is entitled to in-
terest only from the date when
the account was stated, and not
from the date of the transac-
tion giving rise to the indebted-
ness. Burriss et al v. Burriss
et al., 113 S. C. 370.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. In an action to recover posses-
sion of land, where plaintiff in-
troduced probate Court records
relative to settlement of the es-
tate of one who was common
source of title of the parties,
among which was an order for
sale of land in dispute and a
report of sale to plaintiff's re-
mote grantor, and it appeared
that the deed from the probate
Judge to such grantor had been

probate was academic, where
judgments, the basis of claims
in opposition to the mortgage,
were recovered upon debts con-
tracted prior to the mortgage.
Farmers B. & T. Co. v. Fudge
et al., 113 S. C. 25.

3. Everything that was pressed on
Court's attention as ground for
continuance is brought up by the
exception assigning error in the
refusal of continuance. Ilder-
ton v. Charleston Consol. Ry.
Co., 113 S. C. 91.

4. Where an accused, convicted of
crime, has not filed an argu-
ment, his appeal will be dis-
missed. State v. Lloyd, 113 S.
C. 150.

5. The Supreme Court has no ju-
risdiction to pass upon ques-
tions of fact. Id.

6. An issue, not made in the five
exceptions before the Circuit
Court on appeal from a magis-
trate and a jury, is not properly
before the Supreme Court.
Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Renew,
113 S. C. 171.

7. An appellant has the duty of
satisfying the Court that the
finding of fact complained of
is against the preponderance of
the testimony. Lee et al. v.
Sumter Pine & Cypress Co. et
al., 113 S. C. 190.

8. Where appellant has failed to
file points and authorities as
required by Court rules, but
states in the record that it is
"submitted without argument,"
the appeal must be dismissed.
Coker v. Duncan, 113 S. C. 204.
9. Where more than one inference
can be drawn from the evi-
dence, the Supreme Court has
no jurisdiction to pass on the
manifest weight of the testi-

mony, nor to disturb the ver-
dict, though it may be greater
than Court may think proper.
Thompson et al. v. A. C. L. R.
Co., 113 S. C. 262.

10. Appellate Court will not inter-
fere with the exercise of dis-
cretion by trial Court in setting
the limits of the testimony on
issue of fraud, except in the
case of abuse of discretion.
Suber v. Parr Shoals Power
Co., 113 S. C. 317.

11. Preliminary ruling that certain

issues were triable by jury was
harmless; no issue having been
submitted to the jury. Nat'l
City Bank v. Huey & Martin
Drug Co. et al., 113 S. C. 333.
12. Where the evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish the contract
sued on, it was error to submit
to the jury the question of
whether there was a contract,
but it was an error favorable to
plaintiff, of which he could not
complain. Capital City Garage
& Tire Co. v. Electric etc. Co.,
113 S. C. 352.

13. In a depositor's action against
his bank for refusal to honor a
check, admission in evidence of
a letter from plaintiff deposi-
tor's attorney to the bank, stat-
ing that he was handling a claim
against the bank for damages
for refusal to honor the check,
under instructions not to con-
sider the letter as evidence for
any purpose except to show the
bank had notice of the depos-
itor's claim, held not reversible
error, though it would have
been better to have had only
the material portion of it read
to the jury. Wilson v. Pal-
metto Nat'l Bank, 113 S. C. 508.
14. The Supreme Court must as-

sume that the jury obeyed the
instructions of the Court as to
the purpose for which they
might consider a certain letter
in evidence. Id.

15. The trial Court, by consider-
ing oral requests to charge and
giving or refusing them on
their merits, waives the rule
requiring requests to be in writ-
ing, and the giving or refusa!
of such requests can be re-
viewed. Beauchamp v. Winns-
boro Granite Co. et al., 113 S.
C 522.

16. A request to charge that the
evidence is insufficient to war-
rant punitive damages is equiv-
alent to a motion to direct a
verdict for defendant on that
issue, so that the sufficiency of
the evidence to warrant puni-
tive damages can be reviewed
on appeal. Id.

17. Where a verdict, awarding
both actual and punitive dam-
ages against a corporation and
its manager, was erroneous as
to the manager, a new trial
must be granted, since the jury
might not have found so large
a verdict for punitive damages
against the master alone. Id.

ARGUMENT.

1. Court may limit time of argu-
ment to less than two hours.
State v. Blackstone, 113 S. C.
528.

ARMY AND NAVY.

1. Circular No. 4 of the Director
General of Railroads, provid-
ing that injured officers and
enlisted men of the army, in-
jured or killed in railroad acci-
dents, will be remitted to their

claim for compensation through
the War Risk Bureau, and
will not receive any payment
through the Railroad Adminis-
tration, applies only to soldiers
actually traveling on trains un-
der orders of the government,
or while engaged in actual mili-
tary duty, and does not apply to
a soldier killed in a collision
between a train and the auto-
mobile in which he was travel-
ing as a member of the public.
Walker v. Atlantic Coast Line
R'y Co. et al., 113 S. C. 448.

ARREST AND BAIL.

1. Arrest and bail is merely a
matter ancillary to the action,
and the question of conformity
to the statutes for arrest and
bail are proper in a motion to
discharge the arrest, but non-
conformity to the statutes does
not defeat a cause of action
set up in a complaint to re-
cover money and a note, and is
not ground for sustaining a de-
murrer to the complaint. Wes-
singer v. Duncan, 113 S. C. 205.

ASSIGNEE.

1. Where a mortgage provided
that in event of the mortgagor's
failure to pay interest at the
stipulated dates the mortgagee
should have the option to de-
clare the principal and interest
due, such right passed to an as-
signee of the mortgage. Farm-
ers B. & T. Co. v. Fudge et al.,
113 S. C. 25.

See Chattel Mortgages. F. & M.
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Heming-
way, 113 S. C. 140.
See Mortgages. Middleton et al.

v. Cockfield et al., 113 S. C. 282.

ASSUMPTION OF RISK.

1. Where the testimony tended to
show that it was necessary for
railroad bridge hands engaged
in tearing down a bridge to run
to the place where plaintiff was
injured in order to prevent the
cap of a bent from falling on
them, and that danger arising
from a barbed wire was hidden,
it was a question for the jury
whether plaintiff assumed the
risk. McDowell v. So. Railway
Co., 113 S. C. 399.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

1. In an action against an attorney
to recover money left in his
hands, whether a receipt ten-
dered in evidence by the plain-
tiff was a receipt referred to
in a power of attorney and
whether it was a part of the
contract, held for the jury.
Wessinger v. Duncan, 113 S. C.
205.

2. In an action against an attor-
ney to recover money left in
his hands, Court erred in with-
drawing from the consideration
of the jury evidence of de-
fendant that he had a contract
for the collection of certain dis-
puted claims, and that plaintiff
wrongfully settled with the
debtors without his consent,
and that defendant was with-
holding part of the money left
with him as compensation for
his services. Id.