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tary of War, to the same compensation that was, at the times of his service, allowed by law to the Secretary of War-that is, at the rate of six thousand dollars a year. Such allowance is in accordance with the decision of the circuit court of the United States in the case of the United States vs. White and others, cited in our opinion in the case of Dickins vs. The United States.

The account rendered by the claimant is as follows:

"The United States to John Robb, Dr., for services as acting Secretary of War.

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175 days.

At the rate of $6,000 per annum, making $2,876 73."

We consider that account to be proved by the evidence; and we therefore render judgment in favor of the claimant for the said sum of two thousand eight hundred and seventy-six dollars and seventythree cents. A bill for that sum is accordingly reported.

A BILL for the relief of John Robb.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury pay to John Robb the sum of two thousand eight hundred and seventy-six dollars and seventy-three cents, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, as a compensation in full for his services as acting Secretary of War, in the years eighteen hundred and thirty-two and eighteen hundred and thirty-three.

ASBURY DICKINS vs. THE UNITED STATES.

The opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Blackford:

This is a claim for compensation for services performed by the claimant as acting Secretary of the Treasury, at different periods, between the 24th of April, 1829, and the 31st of May, 1833-both days inclusive. It is also a claim for compensation for services performed as acting Secretary of State, at different periods, between the 10th of August, 1833, and the 9th of November, 1836-both days inclusive. The petition, which is hereto attached, states that the claimant was appointed to said offices by the President of the United States, and rendered the services accordingly. It states, further, that during the times the claimant was acting as Secretary of the Treasury, he was also chief clerk in the Treasury Department; and, during the times

he was acting as Secretary of State, he was chief clerk in the State Department.

The petition also states, that the claimant's appointments of acting Secretary of the Treasury were made on account of the absence from the seat of government, or sickness, of the Secretary of the Treasury; and that his appointments of acting Secretary of State were on account of the absence or sickness of the Secretary of State.

The objection to the claim, relied on in this case, is founded on the 9th section of the act of Congress of 1818, entitled "An act to regulate and fix the compensation of the clerks in the different offices.' That section is as follows:

"SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That the compensation allowed by this act to clerks, shall commence from and after the 31st day of March last. And it shall be the duty of the Secretaries for the Departments of State, Treasury, War and Navy, of the Commissioners of the Navy, and the Postmaster General, to report to Congress, at the beginning of each year, the names of the clerks they have employed, respectively, in the preceding year, together with the time each clerk was actually employed during the year, and the sums paid to each; and no higher or other allowance shall be made to any clerk in the said departments and offices than is authorized by this act. And all acts, and parts of acts, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, are hereby repealed." 3 Stat. at Large, 447.

The meaning of that part of the above section, relied on by the solicitor, is only this: That no such clerk, as there referred to, shall receive any other compensation, as clerk, than what the act allows. It does not affect the question, whether the claimant is not entitled, besides his salary as clerk, to a compensation, and, if any, to what amount, for his discharge of the duties of the other offices conferred on him.

The 8th section of the act of Congress referred to by the claimant, is as follows:

"SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That in case of the death, absence from the seat of government, or sickness, of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, or of the Secretary of the War Department, or of any officer of either of the said departments, whose appointment is not in the head thereof, whereby they cannot perform the duties of their said respective offices, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person or persons, at his discretion, to perform the duties of the said respective offices, until a successor be appointed, or until such absence, or inability by sickness, shall cease." 1 Stat. at Large,

281.

It was under that law that the claimant received from the President the appointments, authorizing him to perform the duties, respectively, of Secretary of the Treasury and of Secretary of State.

It appears to us that the petition shows that the claimant, at the times he performed the duties of Secretary of the Treasury, held an office separate from his office of chief clerk; and that he also held an office separate from that of chief clerk at the times he performed the duties of Secretary of State. He held two offices at those times; and

there was no law to prohibit him from doing so. He discharged the duties of both offices, and must be entitled to compensation accordingly. He does not claim any pay beyond his salary as chief clerk, for extra services. His claim for compensation beyond his salary as chief clerk, is on account of his holding other offices at different times whilst he was chief clerk, and of his discharging the duties of such other offices.

The claim, we think, is well founded. There is the following decision on the subject, by the circuit court of the United States for the Maryland district. It was the case of a navy agent who had been appointed acting purser. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the court, uses the following language:

"But he is entitled to set off the sum of $5,328 08, for his salary as acting purser to the naval establishment at Annapolis. The Secretary of the Navy had a right to appoint a purser ad interim, usually called acting purser, to discharge the duties of purser at this establishment, if the demands of the public service elsewhere, or any other sufficient cause, put it out of his power to employ a purser regularly appointed. The court is bound to presume that the power, in this instance, was exercised under circumstances that justified the appointment of the defendant as acting purser. He performed all the duties of purser at the naval establishment, settled his accounts with the proper officer at Washington as such, and not as navy agent; and was recognised as acting purser in the reports to Congress concerning certain expenditures chargeable to that branch of the service. The act of Congress fixes the salary of purser, when not otherwise provided for, at $1,500 a year. As the defendant performed all the duties of the office, and performed them in the name and in the character of purser, he is entitled to the compensation which the law has provided for such services. The circumstance that he held the office of navy agent at the same time, can make no difference. There is no law which prohibits a person from holding two offices at the same time. As a matter of policy it would certainly be highly objectionable in most cases as a permanent arrangement; but in the absence of any legal provision to the contrary, this appointment was valid. Indeed, it often happens that in unexpected contingencies, and for temporary purposes, the appointment of a person already in office to execute the duties of another office, is more convenient and useful to the public than to bring in a new officer to execute the duty. And if the duties of the second office are performed, and the law has fixed the compensation which it deems just for such services, it cannot be material whether they are rendered by one holding another office or not, provided they are faithfully discharged." The United States vs. White and others, April term, 1851.

That case is very similar to the one before us, and is, no doubt, correctly decided. It shows that the present claimant is entitled to receive for his services, as acting Secretary of the Treasury and as acting Secretary of State, the same compensation, for the time he acted, which the law then allowed to the Secretaries of the Treasury and of State, respectively.

The petition further states that, from the 21st of June to the 7th

of August, 1831, the claimant received a compensation as Secretary of the Treasury; but that during that time, he did not receive his salary as chief clerk. The circumstance here stated will be taken into consideration, when an account shall be taken from the evidence, of the amount to which the claimant is entitled.

The solicitor refers us to certain acts of Congress of 1839 and 1842, (5 Stat. at Large, 349, 510, 525.) It is only necessary to observe, with respect to these acts, that they were not in force when the services now sued for were rendered.

Testimony is ordered to be taken in this case.

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