Damages. Responsi bility for "all possible consequences." Damage too remote. where he did not lay the information, or, in the first instance, request the magistrate to award compensation (†). Generally speaking, where an injury arises from the misconduct of another, the party who is injured has a right to recover from the injuring party for all the consequences of that injury. And it is quite clear that every person who does a wrong is at least responsible for all the mischievous consequences that may reasonably be expected to result, under ordinary circumstances, from such misconduct (u). But it is doubtful whether a person guilty of negligence is responsible for all possible consequences of it, although they could not have been reasonably foreseen or expected. For instance, if a person chooses to walk in a crowded street with an open knife under his coat, and another person negligently runs against him, is that other person to be responsible for all the injury which the knife may inflict on the person who carries it (x)? A servant, in breach of the Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54), washed a van in a public street, and allowed the waste water to run down the gutter towards a grating leading to the sewer, about twenty-five yards off. In consequence of the extreme severity of the weather, the grating was obstructed by ice, and the water flowed over a portion of the causeway, which was ill-paved and uneven, and there froze. There was no evidence that the master knew of the grating being obstructed. A Horse, while being led past the spot, slipped upon the ice and broke its leg. It was held that this was a consequence too remote to be attributed to the wrongful act of the servant (y). And Bovill, C. J., said, "No doubt, one who commits a wrongful act is responsible for the ordinary consequences which are likely to result therefrom; but, generally speaking, he is not liable for damage which is not the natural or ordinary consequence of such act, unless it be shown that he knows, or has reasonable means of knowing, that consequences not usually resulting from the act are, by reason of some existing cause, likely to intervene so as to occasion damage to a third person. Where there is no reason to expect it, and no knowledge (t) Wright v. London General Omnibus Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. D. 271; 46 L. J., Q. B. 429; 36 L. T., N. S. 590; 25 W. R. 647. (u) Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Ex. 243. (r) See quære per Pollock, C. B., Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243, 246. (y) Sharp v. Powell, L. R., 7 C. P. 253; 41 L. J., C. P. 95; 26 L. T., N. S. 436. in the person doing the wrongful act that such a state of things exists as to render the damage probable if injury does result to a third person, it is generally considered that the wrongful act is not the proximate cause of the injury, so as to render the wrongdoer liable to an action” (≈). A Carriage was driven against the wheel of B.'s Chaise, Injury done and the collision threw a person who was in the Chaise to a Carriage. upon the dashing-board. The dashing-board fell on the back of the Horse, and caused him to kick, and thereby the Chaise was injured. It was held, that B. was entitled to recover in Trespass against A. damages commensurate with the whole of the injury sustained (a). where a Where a Horse has been injured by negligent driving, Measure of the Jury must give as Damages the expenses of curing damages the Horse and of his keep during that time, in addition Horse has to the difference between the value of the Horse before been injured. he was injured, and his value after he had been cured. Thus in an action for negligent driving, whereby the plaintiff's Horse was injured, it appeared that the Horse was sent to a Farrier's for six weeks for the purpose of being cured. At the end of that time it was ascertained that the Horse was permanently damaged to the extent of 201. And it was held by Mr. Justice Coleridge, that the proper measure of Damages was the Keep of the Horse at the Farrier's, the amount of the Farrier's bill, and the difference between the value of the Horse at the time of the accident and at the end of six weeks; but that the plaintiff ought not to be allowed also for the hire of another Horse during the six weeks (b). son has been In an action by the personal representatives of a de- Damages ceased person, to recover Damages for his death under where a per9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, the Jury, in assessing the Damages, killed. are confined to injuries of which a pecuniary estimate can be made, and cannot take into their consideration the mental suffering or the loss of society occasioned to the survivors by his death (c). Such an action cannot be maintained without some evi- How limited. dence of actual pecuniary damage (d), or the loss of the reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of the life of the deceased (e). (z) See note (y), ante. (a) Gilbertson v. Richardson, 5 C. B. 502. (b) Hughes v. Quentin, 8 C. & P. 703; and see Percival v. Dudgeon, Appendix. (c) Blake v. Midland Railway Co., 21 L. J., Q. B. 233; Pym v. Great (d) Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 H. & (e) Pym v. Great Northern Railway Co., 4 B. & S. 396. Cannot be given for funeral ex penses. Damages not given to a class but to individuals. The expectation of life of the deceased is an element to be considered by the Jury in assessing Damages (ƒ). But the Jury are to give a fair compensation, and not to treat the Damages on the footing of the value of an annuity (g). No Damages can be given for funeral expenses or mourning. For the subject-matter of the Statute is compensation for injury by reason of a relative not being alive, and there is no language in the Statute referring to the cost of the ceremonial of respect paid to the memory of the deceased in his funeral, or in putting on mourning for his loss (h). The remedy given by Lord Campbell's Act (i) is not given to a class but to individuals; and, therefore, on the death of a person, whose income arose from land and personalty independent of any exertion of his own, although no portion of it was lost to his family, as a whole, by his death, the action is maintainable, if, in consequence of that death, the mode of its distribution is changed to the detriment of some of the members of the family, though to the advantage of others (k). (f) Rowley v. London and North (g) Armsworth v. South Eastern N. P., 13th ed. 753. (h) Dalton v. South Eastern Railway Co., 27 L. J., C. P. 227. (i) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. (k) Pym v. Great Northern Railway Co., 4 B. & S. 396. IT is laid down that "there is a difference between Wild and things feræ naturæ, as Lions, Bears, &c., which a man tame animals. must always keep up at his peril, and beasts that are mansuetæ naturæ, and break through the tameness of their nature, such as Oxen and Horses (a). (a) Rex v. Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1583. Thus in the case of Besozzi v. Harris (b), the defendant was owner of a bear, which he left fastened by a chain six feet long, on a part of his premises accessible to persons frequenting his house. The plaintiff walking past his house was seized by the bear, and injured. An action being brought for damages for this injury, it appeared at the trial that there was no notice or caution, written or verbal, to those visiting the premises, but the bear was proved to have been always tame and docile in its habits up to the time of this attack being made on the plaintiff. The evidence was contradictory as to the plaintiff's knowledge of the bear being there. Mr. Justice Crowder thus laid down the law to the Jury, "The statement in the declaration, that the defendant knew the bear to be of a fierce nature, must be taken to be proved, as every one must know that such animals as lions and bears are of a savage nature. For though such nature may sleep for a time, this case shows that it may wake up at any time. A person who keeps such an animal is bound so to keep it that it shall do no damage. If it be insufficiently kept, or so kept that a person passing is not sufficiently protected, the owner is liable. If the plaintiff, with knowledge that the bear was there, put herself into a position to receive the injury, she could not recover. But, assuming such knowledge, it is for you to say, whether she had such notice of the proximity of the bear as would amount to negligenee disentitling her to recover." The Jury found for the plaintiff. It would appear, however, only fair and right that whoever keeps an animal of any description, should keep it at his risk, and that for any injury occasioned by it he ought to be civilly responsible, whether he know of its mischievous propensities or not. And it ought only to be necessary to prove a scienter, where it is sought to make him criminally responsible. Neither the Athenian nor Roman law required it to be proved, that the owner had Notice of the mischievous propensities of the animal. They probably thought that for civil purposes, when A. sustains damage by the horns, hoofs or teeth of an animal in which B. has a beneficial property, and over which he has the exclusive control, it is for B., and not for A., an innocent stranger, to ascertain (b) Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F. & F. 92. |