Stallion master has a lien. Latour (h), but the case was decided on another point. The doubt seemed to be whether in the contract for training there was a stipulation for the re-delivery of the Horse trained for the purpose of Racing. And in a later case Mr. Baron Alderson said, "It may be very doubtful whether a Trainer would not be considered to be in the situation of a Livery-stable keeper, if by the contract he is to allow the owner to run the Horse" (i). Mr. Baron Parke, shortly afterwards in another case, said, "As to the case of the training Groom it is not necessary to say anything, as it has not been formally decided; for in Jacobs v. Latour (h) the point was left undetermined. It is true there is a Nisi prius decision of Best, C. J., in Bevan v. Waters (k), that the Trainer would have a lien, on the ground of his having expended labour and skill in bringing the animal into condition to run at Races; but it does not appear to have been present to the mind of the Judge, nor was the usage of training to that effect explained to him, that when Horses are delivered for that purpose the owner has always a right during the continuance of the process to take the animal away for the purpose of running Races for Plates elsewhere. The right of lien, therefore, must be subservient to this general right which overrules it; so that I doubt if that doctrine would apply where the animal delivered was a Racehorse, as that case differs much from the ordinary case of training. I do not say that the case of Beran v. Waters (k) was wrongly decided; I only doubt if it extends to the case of a Racehorse, unless perhaps he was delivered to the groom to be trained for the purpose of running a specified race, when of course these observations would not apply" (1). It has however been decided in a later case, that the labour and skill employed on a Racehorse by a Trainer are a good foundation for a lien (m). But if by usage or contract the owner may send the Horse to run at any race he chooses, and may select the Jockey, the Trainer has no continuing right of possession and consequently no lien (m). The owner of a Stallion is entitled to a specific lien on the Mare in respect of his charge for covering her. Thus (h) Jacobs v. Latour, 2 M. & P. 205. (i) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 276. (k) Bevan v. Waters, 3 C. & P. (1) Jackson v. Cummins, 5 M. & W. 350. (m) Forth v. Simpson, 13 Q. B. 680; S. C. 18 L. J., Q. B. 266; Lee v. Irwin, 4 Ir. Jur. 372. in the following case S. sent a Mare to M., a farmer, to be covered by a Stallion belonging to him, and the Mare was taken to M.'s stables and covered accordingly upon a Sunday. However, the charge for covering not being paid, M. detained the Mare, and on a demand of her being afterwards made, M. refused to deliver her, claiming a lien not only for the charge on that occasion, but for a general balance due to him on another account. It was held that M. was entitled to a specific lien on the Mare for the charge for covering her, and that the claim made by M. to retain the Mare for the general balance was not a waiver of his lien for the charge on the particular occasion, and did not dispense with the necessity of a tender of that sum (n). It was also decided that such a contract was not void For work within 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 1, on the ground of its having done on a Sunday. been made and executed on a Sunday, but that even if it were void the contract having been executed the lien attached. And Mr. Baron Parke said, "We are of opinion that this is not a case within the statute 29 Car. 2, c. 7, which only had in its contemplation the case of persons exercising trades, &c. on that day, and not one like the present, where the defendant, in the ordinary calling of a farmer, happens to be in possession of a Stallion occasionally covering Mares; that does not appear to me to be exercising any trade, or to be the case of a person practising his ordinary calling" (n). (n) Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270. 258 Cannot be used by a Servant.. 261 Or else the Borrower is an- Where no Time is fixed for Redelivery on Request Borrower bound to feed the Where the Horse is exhausted .... Where the Horse dies from Where Borrower is answerable Bailment ended by Misuser མལ་པ་ཚོང་ངང་ དྲྭ་ ང་ཚོདྲྭ་གླ་ ངོ་ཚུང་སྤྱི་ཚོ 262 LIVERY-STABLE KEEPER. A Livery-stable Keeper, who is not an Innkeeper, has no Has no priprivilege himself, and none can be claimed under him; he vilege. must therefore rest on his own agreement (a). But he is not liable to the inconveniences to which Innkeepers are subject, such as taking out Licences, &c.; and he is not bound to have Soldiers quartered upon him (b). But if a Horse in his keeping be lost or stolen, he is Liable where answerable for it (c). the Horse is lust. Horse at A person should satisfy himself of the credit and solvency of the Livery-stable Keeper, to whom he proposes to entrust Livery dishis Horse; because Horses and Carriages standing at trainable. Livery are distrainable for rent (c). But the case of a Horse sent to a Livery-stable merely But not to be cleaned and fed, is very different from one, where he (a) Yelv. 66; Chapman v. Allen, Cro. Car. 271; Yorke v. Greenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 687; S. C. 1 Salk. 388; Gelly v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 188. In some of the States in America statutes are in force giving the livery-stable keeper a lien upon animals for their keep. See Hanover on Horses; Colquit v. Kirkman, 47 Ga. 555 (1873). (b) Parkhurst v. Foster, 1 Salk. (c) Yorke v. Greencugh, 2 Ld. where he is merely to be cleaned and fed. is sent to remain during the owner's pleasure, the feeding and grooming being only incident to the principal object (d). In the case of Parsons v. Gingell (e), the following distinction was taken by Chief Justice Wilde: "If the goods are sent to the premises for the purpose of being dealt with in the way of the party's trade, and are to remain upon the premises until that purpose is answered, and no longer, the case falls within one class; but if they are sent for the purpose of remaining there merely at the will of the owner, there being no work to be done upon them, it falls within a totally different consideration." A Livery-stable Keeper cannot detain a Horse for his keep as an Innkeeper may, because he is not bound to take it, much less can he detain, or be bound to take a Carriage without Horses (ƒ). But he may have a lien by special agreement, as where a Mare was placed with a Livery-stable Keeper, who advanced money to her owner, and it was agreed that she should remain as a security for the repayment of the sum advanced, and for the expenses of her keep, the Liverystable Keeper was held to have a lien on her for the amount due (g). And if he have such lien by agreement, and the owner of the Horse fraudulently take it out of his possession to defeat the lien, the Livery-stable Keeper may retake it without force, for the lien is not put an end to by his having parted with the possession under such circumstances(). A Livery-stable Keeper has no lien on a Horse for money expended by him on the Horse at the request of the owner. Thus in a case in which a Livery-stable Keeper had employed a Veterinary Surgeon at the request of the owner to blister a Horse standing at Livery with him for splints, and had actually paid the bill, it was held that he had no right to detain the Horse for the amount of this bill, inasmuch as the Veterinary Surgeon had no lien for his bill, nor the Livery-stable Keeper for his keep; and inasmuch as there is no rule of law, which gives a Livery (d) See per Wilde, C. J., Parsons V. Gingell, 4 C. B. 558. (e) Parsons v. Gingell, 4 C. B. 558. (f) Barnard v. How, 1 C. & P. 366; Yorke v. Greenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 867; Francis v. Wyatt, 3 Burr. 1498; S. C. 1 Bla. Rep. 485; (g) Donatty v. Crowder, 11 Moore, 479. (h) Wallace v. Woodgate, R. & M. 193; S. C. 1 C. & P. 575. |