the value, the Price offered for the Horse whilst in the plaintiff's hands. The Jury found for the plaintiff 907. 13s. damages. A rule nisi was obtained for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, or for a reduction of damages. Cause was shown in Easter Term, 1836, before Lord Denman, C. J., and Littledale, Patteson, and Coleridge, JJ. The Court took time to consider, and the case stood over for several terms, but was at length settled. And in another case, where the Horse had been tendered Expense in to the defendant and refused, Chief Justice Tindal in selling. charging the Jury said, "You will give as damages the difference between the Price paid and the real Value of the Horse, and damages for the Expense which the plaintiff was put to by the defendant selling him that which was of no use to him, for a certain time, at least to the time when he offered the Horse to the defendant" (k). the Horse's The increase in value consequent on the care and ex- Expenses in pense bestowed on a Horse after purchase, and evidenced advancing by an advance of price on a resale, might probably be value. recovered, if the cause of such increase were properly laid as special damage. Because, although the Court of Queen's Bench thought it unnecessary to give their opinion in Clare v. Maynard (1), as that point did not there properly arise; yet Lord Denman, C. J., appeared to hold that if it had arisen, he should have directed the Jury as he did in the case of Cox v. Walker, and then the measure of Damages would be the difference between the Price ultimately obtained for him, and his actual Value if he had been sound at the time of such last resale (m). then sold by Auction. And where a Horse had been bought in the country, Horse tenand brought up to London, and after it was discovered dered and to be Unsound was tendered to the seller, and then sold by auction, Lord Denman, C. J., told the Jury that the measure of Damages was the difference between the Value of the Horse, if Sound (of which the price was only strong evidence), and the Sum it brought as Unsound (n). Certificate That the buyer could not recover the expenses of obtain- Expense of ing a Certificate of Unsoundness from the Veterinary Col- Veterinary lege or of Counsel's opinion, as they were no part of the and Counnecessary expenses, but were merely for the plaintiff's own sel's opinion. (k) Watson v. Denton, 7 C. & P. 91. (Clare v. Maynard, 6 A. & E. 523. (m) Cox v. Walker, cited ibid. comfort, and to convince him that he could bring an action in safety (n). But that he was entitled to be paid the expenses of bringing the Horse up to London, and of its Keep (n). A person who has bought a Horse warranted sound, and has had it returned to him after resale at a profit, cannot in an action on the Warranty recover Damages for the "Loss of a good bargain" (o); and on this ground the Court of Queen's Bench gave their decision in Clare v. Maynard (p), because the Declaration there merely alleged that the plaintiff bought the Horse at so much, and resold him at so much, without alleging the cause of the advance, or averring that he had laid out any money on the Horse in the meantime. And it was held, in that case, that although the contract of sale at a profit had been actually completed before the Unsoundness was discovered, yet the plaintiff could not recover as special Damage the advance in value, which, as stated in the Declaration, was the mere loss of a good bargain (2). If the buyer of a Horse with a Warranty, relying thereon, resells him with a Warranty, and being sued thereon by his vendee, offers the defence to the vendor, who gives no directions as to the action, the plaintiff defending that action is entitled to recover the costs of it from his vendor, as part of the damage occasioned by his breach of Warranty (r). He may also recover not only a sum fairly and reasonably paid to the second vendee as compensation (s), but also a sum in respect of damages, which he has agreed to make good, although no amount has been fixed, nor any sum actually paid, the mere liability to pay such costs being sufficient to sustain the claim for special damage (t). But he cannot recover any such costs if, by a reasonable examination, he could have discovered the breach of Warranty before sale (u). Where there is a misrepresentation of the character or (n) Clare v. Maynard, 7 C. & P. 741. (0) Flureau v. Thornhill, 2 W. Bla. 1078; 1 Sug. Vend. & Purch. 14th ed. 237, and the cases there cited. (p) Clare v. Maynard, 6 A. & E. 524; and see a form of Special Damage in such case given in Pears. Chit. Plead. 202. (a) Clare v. Maynard, 6 A. & E. (r) Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153; S. C. 2 Marsh. 43; and see Rolph v. Crouch, L. R., 3 Ex. 44; 37 L. J., Ex. 8. (s) Dingle v. Hare, 7 C. B., N. S. 145. (t) Randall v. Roper, 27 L. J., Q. B. 266. (u) Wrightup v. Chamberlain, 7 Scott, 598; Chit. Contr. 10th ed. 816. condition of goods, the vendor is responsible for all injury Misrepresenwhich is the direct and natural result of the purchaser's tation. acting on the faith of his representation. Therefore, where a cattle dealer fraudulently represented a cow to be free from infectious disease when he knew that it was not so, and the purchaser placed it with five others which caught the disease and died, the latter was held entitled to recover as damages, in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, the value of all the cows (x). And the same rule would be applied where there was no fraud, but the beast was warranted free from disease, and both parties contemplated its being placed with other stock (y). It is illegal to bring a glandered Horse into a public market or fair (≈), but there is nothing illegal in a simple sale; therefore a person who sold a glandered Horse without a Warranty and without Misrepresentation was held not responsible for disease communicated to other Horses of the purchaser's in the stable to which he removed it (a). But a breach of statutory duty may not constitute the foundation for a private right of action. A statement that the purchaser of a Horse must take it "with all faults" and that the vendor will give no warranty with it, and will refuse all future claim for compensation (where the vendor does nothing to conceal the defect), relieves the vendor from all liability in respect of any defect in the Horse itself (b). If such a statement were followed by a declaration of the vendor (who knew the reverse) that he knew the animal to be free from objection, there might be ground for an action of deceit (c). Thus where a statute prohibited persons from sending animals infected with a contagious disease to market, and inflicted penalties on any person so sending them, the act of sending them, if known to be so infected, was a public offence, but did not amount by implication to a representation that they were sound, and did not itself raise as between the vendor of the animals and the purchaser of them any right of the pur (x) Mullet v. Mason, L. R., 1 C. P. 559; 35 L. J., C. P. 299; Mayne on Damages, 3rd ed. 167; Sherrod v. Longdon, 21 Iowa, 518. (4) Smith v. Green, L. R., 1 C. P. D. 92; 45 L. J., C. P. 28. And see Bradley v. Lea, 14 Allen, 20. (2) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 74, s. 32, Ord. 442. (a) Hill v. Balls, 2 H. & N. 299; 27 L. J., Ex. 45. And see per (b) Ward v. Hobbs, L. R., 3 Q. () Ibid. per Lord Cairns, C. Where the very small. chaser to claim damages in respect of an injury he had suffered in consequence of their purchase (d). But it seems that if the defendant had sent tainted animals into the public market-place, and the plaintiff's animals, in that public place, by contact or neighbourhood had been infected, and the plaintiff suffered loss, that he might have recovered damages for that loss (e). Of course if the Unsoundness be slight, so also ought Damages are to be the Damages; and if they be very inconsiderable, the Judge may make an order under Ord. LV. r. 1, that the costs shall not follow the event (f). (d) Ward v. Hobbs, ante, note (b). Cas. 944; 48 L. J., Ex. 186; 39 L. T., N. S. 261. Reversing judgment of the Court of Appeal, L. R., 2 Ex. D. 349; 46 L. J., Ex. 545; 36 L. T., N. S. 725. |