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(226 Mass. 14)
The facts out of which these exceptions BARRY v. NEW YORK HOLDING & CON- grew are as follows: In November, 1913, the STRUCTION CO. et al.
plaintiff brought an action of contract for (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. breach of an agreement dated September 22, Suffolk. Jan. 24, 1917.)
1913, by which the defendant employed the 1. MASTER AND SERVANT 41(1)-WAGES plaintiff as its agent for the term of one year AMOUNT OF RECOVERY.
then next ensuing. The case was sent to an An employé working on a salary and commission basis, and wrongfully discharged, may auditor and by subsequent agreement the recover damages based upon the commissions auditor's findings were made final. On Octohe probably would have earned for the unexpir- ber 22, 1915, an order was entered directing ed portion of the contract term. (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and tiff in the sum of $2,090 damages and his
judgment to be entered in favor of the plainServant, Cent. Dig. § 117; Dec. Dig. Om 41(1).]
taxable costs. The costs were afterwards 2. GARNISHMENT 198—JUDGMENT AGAINST taxed in the sum of $37.89 and judgment was PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT EFFECT ON GAR- entered for those two sums on November 15th
A general judgment against the principal following. On the 15th of December followdefendant without having the trustees charged ing this judgment was vacated on motion of discontinues the action against the trustees. the plaintiff. On the following day a sug
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Garnish- gestion of the defendant's bankruptcy was ment, Cent. Dig. $ 391; Dec. Dig. Om 198.]
made and an order was entered giving the 3. GARNISHMENT Caw 198—VACATION OF JUDG• trustee in bankruptcy leave to appear. MENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL_EFFECT ON GAR
The action was begun by trustee process Rev. Laws, c. 193, § 14, providing that up- and E. J. Cross Company, Edward F. Miner on vacating a judgment the case may be dis Building Company and Joseph M. Dolan were posed of as if no judgment had been entered, duly summoned as trustees. After the judg. eliminates a discontinuance against trustees occasioned by entering the vacated judgment ment had been vacated the E. J. Cross Comagainst the principal defendant.
pany and the Edward F. Miner Building Com[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Garnish- pany filed trustees' answers stating that at ment, Cent. Dig. $ 391; Dec. Dig. Om 198.) 4. GARNISHMENT wo 198–JUDGMENT AGAINST $816.25 and $4,415.25 respectively. Thereaft
the date of the writ they had in their hands PRINCIPAL DEFENDANT EFFECT ON GAR
er the plaintiff made a motion to charge Rev. Laws, C. 193, $ 20, continuing at these trustees and to have the other trustee tachments expiring within a limited time after
defaulted. He also made a motion for a entry of a general judgment, does not continue a trustee attachment after entry of a special judgment against the defendant under general judgment against the principal de- the provisions of R. L. C. 177, § 25. fendant.
The facts which gave rise to the motion for [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Garnish- a special judgment were as follows: On Dement, Cent. Dig. § 391; Dec. Dig. Om 198.) 5. GARNISHMENT ww245—SPECIAL JUDGMENT which was in fact a claimant's bond to re
cember 10, 1913, the defendant filed a bond -POWER TO ENTER.
Rev. Laws, c. 177, § 25, authorizing entry lease property attached by trustee process. of special judgments upon bonds dissolving at. On the reverse side of the bond there were tachments after the principal debtor's bank- originally printed the words “Claimant's ruptcy, etc., does not empower the court to enter a special judgment against the sureties Bond to Dissolve Attachment Trustee Proon a common-law bond.
cess." In this sentence the word "Claim[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Garnish- antis" had been stricken through and the ment, Dec. Dig. Om 245.)
word “Defendant's" appears (we assume it Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk was written) above it. After this bond bad County; William Cushing Wait, Judge.
been filed the clerk of the court signed at Action by Richard F. Barry against the least two certificates that: New York Holding & Construction Company.
"A bond for the purpose of dissolving the Special judgment for plaintiff, and defendant attachment made in said action, and of the
goods, effects and credits of defendant in the and its trustee in bankruptcy bring excep- hands and possession of said supposed trustees tions. Exceptions sustained and overruled. has been filed with me this day.
Bates, Nay, Abbott & Dane, of Boston, for These certificates were sent by the plainplaintiff. Jas. T. Connolly and M. J. Mulkern, tiff's then attorney to two of the trustees, both of Boston, for defendant and trustee in namely, to the E. J. Cross Company and the bankruptcy,
Edward F. Miner Building Company. A con
dition of this bond is: LORING, J. This case comes before us on "If the said New York Holding & Construcexceptions taken by the trustee in bankruptcy tion Company shall within thirty days after of the defendant corporation. Exceptions special judgment entered therein in accordance
final judgment in the aforesaid action, or after were also taken by the defendant. They add with the provisions of section twenty-five of nothing to those taken by the trustee and if chapter one hundred and seventy-seven of the the trustee's exceptions are not good it is Revised Laws of the commonwealth of Massa
chusetts, pay to the said plaintiff the amount plain that the defendant's are not.
for which the said trustee may be charged, not For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and lodexes
exceeding the value of the property in their , auditor found that during the period covered hands, or so much thereof as will satisfy the by the first contract the plaintiff had secured amount that may be recovered by said plain contracts under which the defendant had retiff, then this obligation shall be void," etc.
ceived from $51,000 to $52,000. He further At the hearing on the motion to charge the found that the method of conducting business trustees and the motion for this special judg- by the parties was for the plaintiff to call ment, the trustee in bankruptcy asked the
upon architects and get plans and specificajudge to rule (1) in effect that upon the facts tions of fireproof buildings to be constructed found by the auditor the plaintiff is entitled and submit the plans and specifications to the to $90 damages only; (2) that upon the dock
defendant. et entries and record in the case the trustees November 20, 1913, the plaintiff submitted
Between January 1, 1913, and cannot now be charged; and (3) that upon all to the defendant plans of sixty-five buildings the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to to be constructed and during that time he the entry of the special judgment asked for. made from ten to fifteen calls a day on archiThese rulings were refused, exceptions were tects in pursuance of the defendant's busitaken and these are the exceptions now be
When the plaintiff was discharged on fore us.1
November 21, 1913, he had not in fact pro  1. The findings of the auditor as to the cured any contract for the use of the defirst of these three exceptions are in sub- fendant's material under the second contract. stance as follows: The defendant was the The facts as to what was done under the inventor of a material known as “ribbed con- first contract were admitted by the auditor crete” or “salt glazed tile.” This was a com. (subject to the defendant's exception) upon paratively new building material. It was the the question of damages suffered by the best fireproof building material on the mar- plaintiff by reason of the wrongful terminaket. It was more costly than brick or terra tion of the second contract. The auditor cotta, but by using it a saving could be made found that the defendant owed the plaintiff in the construction of buildings consisting $90 for salary and for cash expenses. In adof a steel frame and a concrete exterior. In dition he found that the plaintiff had sufDecember, 1912, the defendant corporation fered damages to the amount of $2,000 from made an agreement with the plaintiff by the wrongful breach of the second contract. which it appointed him its agent for a de
We are of opinion that the judge was fined territory for a period of six months right in refusing to give the first ruling asked from January 1, 1913. Under this agreement for by the trustee in bankruptcy. The plainthe plaintiff was to devote one-half his time to procuring contracts for “ribbed concrete” tiff in the case at bar is claiming damages in the construction of buildings, and was to charging him from its employ ten months be
for the defendant's act in wrongfully disreceive a commission on the gross amount of fore the period had terminated during which those contracts. Although this contract came to an end on July 1, 1913, the parties contin- it had agreed to employ him upon the basis ued to work under it until September 22, 1913. mentioned above. We are of opinion that on
the facts found by him the auditor was warOn September 22, 1913, the defendant corporation made the contract with the plaintiff ranted in making a finding for more than on which this action is based. That con
nominal damages for this breach of the contract was to continue for one year from its tract on its part. Of course the auditor could date. The plaintiff was to devote all his not know what commissions would have been time in place of one-half his time and was to earned. But under the circumstances of this receive a certain salary there mentioned and case that did not prevent the auditor finding a commission on all contracts procured under more than nominal damages. The amount the agreement, the amount of the commission of his earnings during nine months under the being a percentage of the gross amounts re- first contract might well be taken as a basis ceived under these contracts. The auditor
for determining what he would have earned found that on November 21, 1913, the defend- under the second contract during the ten ant wrongfully discharged the plaintiff and months during which he had a right to earn this action was brought on the next day. The commissions under that agreement. The
case comes within Dennis V. Maxfield, 10 1 The exact rulings asked for in this connection Allen, 138; Speirs v. Union Drop Forge Co., 1. That evidence upon which the auditor based his 180 Mass. 87, 89, 61 N. E. 825; Gagnon v. alternative finding of two thousand and ninety dol- Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 206 Mass. 547, 9:2 lars ($2,090) was improperly admitted.
N. E. 761; Hetherington v. Firth, 210 Mass. 2. That the alternative finding of the auditor for 8, 95 N. E. 961; Fox v. Harding, 7 Cush. 522 two thousand and ninety dollars ($2,090) based upon (cited in the Gagnon Case with approval) ; 3. That upon the facts found by the auditor no
Earle v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, 63 judgment for the plaintiff for two thousand and N. E. 10, 57 L. R. A. 292, 91 Am. St. Rep. ninety dollars ($2,090) can properly be entered. 326; Loughery v. Huxford, 206 Mass. 324, 92
4. That as matter of law the evidence introduced N. E. 328; Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., as to damages for loss of commissions as set forth in the auditor's report was not sufficient to justify 212 Mass. 375, 380, 99 N. E. 221. Of the cases a finding for the plaintiff in the sum of two thou- relied upon by the trustee in bankruptcy
are as follows:
such evidence is erroneous.
is the only case which requires notice. In gave the court the power to dispose of the case that case the defendants agreed to employ at bar on the footing that the discontinuance the plaintiff as a selling agent until they against the trustees which came about from should discontinue business. The course of the plaintiff taking judgment against the business was for them to sell the plaintiff | principal defendant without having had the samples from which he could get orders. It trustee charged was wiped out.
We agree appears from the original papers that the with counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy breach which the judge (who tried the case that the trustee attachment is not continued without a jury) found to have been commit- in effect by force of R. L. c. 193, 20. That ted consisted in not having sold to the plain- deals with the continuance of attachments tiff the samples which he ordered. The plain which expire within a limited time after tiff made no claim for commissions on the a general judgment has been taken. The fact sale of these samples. What he did ask was that an attachment by way of trustee process for commissions which he would have earned is not included within those specified in R. L. had he had these samples to show. On its c. 193, § 20, does not stand in the way of face this case seems to be more like the case the conclusion being reached which we have at bar than it will be found to be on an ex- reached by force of R. L. C. 193, § 14. There amination of the original papers. In that was no occasion for including an attachment case as in the case at bar commissions had by the trustee process in R. L. C. 193, 20. been earned by the plaintiff during an earli  3. We are of opinion that the judge er period and by agreement of the parties the was wrong in refusing to rule that on all judge made a finding in favor of the plain the evidence the plaintiff was not entitled tiff on the first and second counts for the bal- to the entry of the special judgment as asked ance due the plaintiff for the earlier commis- for. sions. But the amount found to be due was What the plaintiff asked for was a special the balance due on account of those earnings judgment under R. L. c. 177, 8 25. In the and the amount and the particulars of those words of the original act (St. 1875, c. 68, § 1, earlier commissions were not in evidence. not changed by the re-enactment) the case In addition the plaintiff in that case did not where the court is authorized to enter a speask to have the amount of the commissions cial judgment under what is now R. L. c. which he would have earned during the later 177, § 25, is a case where “the defendant period determined on the basis of what he
dissolves an attachment made in did earn during the earlier period. What the said suit by giving a bond as provided by plaintiff in that case did was to ask the judge the statutes of this commonwealth." It is to find without any evidence of previous conceded by the plaintiff on the authority of earnings what he would have earned if the Atwood v. West Roxbury Co-op. Bank, 156 samples which he was entitled to had been Mass. 166, 30 N. E. 558, that the bond given furnished to him when he was entitled to in the case at bar was not a bond which disthem. The exception to the first ruling must solved the attachment. What the plaintiff be overruled.
seeks to obtain by getting the special judg[2-4) 2. We are of opinion that the judge ment (asked for by him) is to hold the sure was justified in ordering the trustees to be ties on the bond here in question as a comcharged.
mon-law bond. But R. L. c. 177. § 25, does By taking a general judgment against the not give power to the court to enter a spe. principal defendant without having had the cial judgment to hold sureties on a comtrustees charged the plaintiff discontinued mon-law bond. The case at bar is not a case against the trustees. Jarvis v. Mitchell, 99 in which the court had power to make the Mass. 530; Dalton-Ingersoll Co. v. Andrew J. special judgment which the plaintiff asked Fiske et al., 175 Mass. 15, 55 N. E. 468. The for. The exception taken to the refusal to summary right to vacate a judgment given to give this instruction must be sustained. the court originally by St. 1875, c. 33, now R. The result is that the exception must be L. C. 193, § 14, provides that upon vacating sustained which was taken to the request to the judgment the court can “dispose of the rule that the court had no power to make the case as if such judgment had not been enter- special judgment asked for by the plaintiff ed." The provision that upon vacating the and that the other two exceptions must be judgment the court can “dispose of the case overruled. as if such judgment had not been entered” So ordered
(226 Mass. 30)
report from superior court. Demurrer of deAMERICAN TRUST CO. V. HOLTSINGER fendants overruled. et al.
Weld A. Rollins, of Boston, for plaintiff. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Frank L. Simpson, of Boston, for defendants. Suffolk. Jan. 24, 1917.) 1. CORPORATIONS m573(3)–REORGANIZATION PIERCE, J. The several certificates of deAGREEMENT CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT
posit issued by the First Savings & Trust RIGHTS OF HOLDER.
On the deposit of a mortgage bond and the Company of Tampa to the depositors of transfer of the legal title thereto to the reorgan-bonds, deposited in pursuance of an agree ization committee as trustee, by taking in ex- ment and plan for the reorganization of the change a negotiable certificate of deposit the de- Wauchula Manufacturing & Timber Compositor acquired the right to compel performance in equity of the requirements of the terms of the pany, provided that “upon said reorganizacertificate.
tion being completed" the depositor "or its [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, assigns shall be entitled to the securities isCent. Dig. $ 2296; Dec. Dig. Om573(3).] sued according to, and in pursuance of, said 2. PLEDGES Om30(2) RIGHT OF PLEDGEE plan, upon return of this certificate duly CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.
indorsed by the holder thereof or its asThe pledge of negotiable certificates of deposit of mortgage bonds as collateral security for signee.” Under the plan: a promissory note was an equitable pledge of
"The committee is hereby vested, under the the owner's right in equity to compel the per- terms of this agreement, as trustee of an express formance of the obligations arising out of the trust, with the legal title to all the bonds certificate, and was not restricted to the legal in
which may be deposited under this terest of the pledgor in the certificates as chat- agreement, and the depositors thereof hereby astels.
sign and transfer the same to the committee."
"Said reorganization [Ed. Note.For other cases, see Pledges, Cent.
• issues of bonds of said new corporation Dig. 88 77-80; Dec. Dig. On30(2).]
to be disposed of as follows: (a) To the holders 3. PLEDGES 58(1) CERTIFICATE OF DE- of the present outstanding first mortgage bonds POSIT.
of the Wauchula Manufacturing & Timber ComWhere a certificate of deposit of mortgage pany
a like amount of said first mortbonds was pledged as collateral for a note, the gage bonds of said new corporation to be situs of the right under the certificate to compelformed." performance of its obligations was with the
The plan does not contemplate the return pledgee, because such performance is conditional upon the surrender of the certificates of deposit, of the deposited bonds or mark any period of and the presence of the certificates gives value time for the duration of the reorganization to the right.
committee or the termination of the trust. (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Pledges, Cent.
(1) On deposit of the bonds and the transDig. 88 186–189; Dec. Dig. Om 58(1).]
fer of the legal title thereto to the reorgan4. PLEDGES 57-SALE-STATUTE, In view of Rev. Laws, c. 198, § 10, providing depositor acquired in exchange a negotiable
ization committee as trustee, the holder and that the two preceding sections, requiring a notice to the pledgor of personal property of an in- certificate of deposit, one of the incidents of tention to sell, and for the sale of the pledge at which was a right to compel performance in public auction, shall not limit the right of the equity of the requirements of the terms of pledgee to avail himself of other rights, and that such a sale would not be reasonably unimpeach
the certificate. able, suit in equity to foreclose under Rev. One of these terms was the delivery at the Laws, c. 159, 81, is available.
appropriate time to the certificate holders of [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Pledges, Cent. certain securities of the reorganized comDig. 88 184, 185; Dec. Dig. Om57.]
pany. Montgomery v. McDermott, 103 Fed. 5. COURTS OW19 – JURISDICTION FORECLO | 801, 806, 43 C. C. A. 348. SURE OF PLEDGE. Where a certificate of deposit of mortgage
[2, 3] It is plain that it was the intention bonds was pledged as collateral, a court of equi- that these certificates of deposit, when pledg. ty had jurisdiction to decree foreclosure, al- ed as collateral security for the defendants' though the res was without the commonwealth, promissory note, should create an equitable since such decree only sold the equitable right of the pledgor through the sale of the tangible in- pledge of the owner's right in equity to comdicia of that right within the commonwealth, pel the performance of the obligation arising and did not attempt to direct the performance of out of the certificate. And it is equally the obligation.
plain that the pledge was not restricted to [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. the legal interest of the pledgor in the cerDig. $$ 47–52; Dec. Dig. 19.)
tificates as chattels. Pierce v. Boston Five 6. EQUITY 362-BILL-RELIEF.
A bill in equity should not be dismissed be- Cents Savs. Bank, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. cause it asks for more relief than the court on 371; Taft v. Bowker, 132 Mass. 277. The final hearing may adjudge the plaintiff enti- situs of this right is with the pledgee because tled to.
the performance of the obligation is condi[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. tional on the surrender of the certificates of Dig. 88 758–761; Dec. Dig. Om362.]
deposit, and because the presence of the cerReport from Superior Court, Suffolk Coun- tificates gave value to the right. ty; Chas. F. Jenney, Judge.
 The facts of this case do not require Suit by the American Trust Company a decision whether the courts of equity of against Eugene Holtsinger and others. On this commonwealth under R. L. c. 159, $ 1,
will assume jurisdiction to foreclose a pledge issue to restrain the association from excluding of personal property according to the general him from membership and other access to meetprinciples of equity jurisprudence or wheth- ings. er they will refuse to do so, in the absence Cent. Dig. 3; Dec. Dig. Om4.]
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases, see Trade Unions, of special circumstances, where there is a
3. TRADE UNIONS 4-EXPULSION. statutory remedy which is plain, adequate
Upon the expulsion of a member from a voland complete. It is provided expressly by R. untary association or trade union, such memL. C. 198, § 10, that the two preceding sec- ber's interest in the funds and property of the tions shall not limit the right of the pledgee able to the penal code of such association, and to avail himself of other rights. See Wheel- after his expulsion has a right to sell and diser v. Newbould, 16 N. Y. 392, 396, 397; pose of his labor according to his own will
, White River Savs. Bank v. Capital Savs. unrestrained and unaffected by the rules and Bank & Trust Co., 77 Vt. 123, 131, 59 Atl. agreements of the association. 197, 107 Am. St. Rep. 754; Morrissey v cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. em. 4.]
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trade Unions, Broomal, 37 Neb. 766, 56 N. W. 383; Montgomery v. McDermott, 103 Fed. 801, 806, 43 4. TRADE UNIONS Omt-EXPULSION OF MEMC. C. A. 348. The power of sale contained in
The expulsion of a member of a voluntary asthe collateral note, if exercised, would not sociation or trade union which had a peace pact carry with it that certitude of a reasonably or agreement with the employer did not termiunimpeachable and indefeasible title that in- nate the member's employment, and his continu
ance at work until retired through the efforts of heres as an attribute of a judicial sale, or the association held not to constitute a breach is imputed to the conclusiveness of a judicial of his peace pact or agreement for which the decree.
member would be liable to the association in
damages. We are of opinion that the plaintiff had
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trade Unions, the right to resort to a court of equity upon Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. eww4.] the failure of the maker of the note to pay 5. Torts 10—TBADE UNIONS-BOYCOTT. the interest as it became due, notwithstand
Where a voluntary association or trade uning the fact that the collateral note contains ion expelled a member for violation of his obligaa power of sale of the security. 2 Kent's tions, and thereafter prevented his employment Com. (4th Ed.) 581, 582, 583.
by other employers, not to conserve and promote (5) The contention that the court is with through the offer of friendly advice, and not for
bis welfare or the welfare of his employers out jurisdiction because the res is without the purpose of protecting their own members in the commonwealth, would be unanswerable obtaining sufficient work, but for the purpose of if the decree of foreclosure attempted to con- compelling discipline in their own ranks and of trol or to direct the performance of the obli- making
an example of the member, their conduct
was a boycott, for which the plaintiff could regation, res, or did more than to sell the cover damages. equitable right of the pledgor through the (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Torts, Cent. sale of the tangible indicia of that right Dig. $ 10; Dec. Dig. fm10.j within the commonwealth. See Donohoe v. 6. TORTS 10-INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYGamble, 38 Cal. 340, 354, 99 Am. Dec. 399. MENT-BOYCOTT.  The bill should not be dismissed be equal with the right to acquire property by con
The right to acquire property by labor is cocause it asks for more relief than the court tract, as is the right to sell such labor, and it is on final hearing may adjudge the plaintiff an actionable wrong where the right of one to entitled to. Nudd v. Powers, 136 Mass. 273: sell his labor as a means of subsistence has been Ginn v. Almy, 212 Mass. 486, 493, 99 N. E. taken away or impaired by an intentional boy.
(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Torts, Cent. Demurrer overruled.
Dig. $ 10; Dec. Dig. Om 10.)
Appeal from Superior Court, Essex Coun
ty; John D. McLaughlin, Judge. (226 Mass, 21)
Action by David Shinsky against Michael SHINSKY v. TRACEY et al.
Tracey and others. From a decree of dis(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Es- missal from the superior court, the plaintifr Jan. 26, 1917.)
appeals. Reversed, and decree for plaintiff
on the master's report ordered. 1. TRADE UNIONS O 4 MEMBERS RULES AND DISCIPLINE.
H. D. Linscott, of Lyun, for appellant. One who becomes a member of a trade union, Fredk. W. Mansfield, of Boston, for'appellees. & voluntary association, is bound by its rules and subject to its discipline.
(Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Trade Unions, BRALEY, J. [1-3] By becoming a member Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 4.]
of the voluntary association known as “the 2. TRADE UNIONS Ow4-EXPULSION OF MEM- United Shoe Workers of America" the plainBERS-INJUNCTION.
tiff engaged to be bound by its rules and subWhere a member of a trade union, a volun- jected himself to its discipline. Correia v. tary association, has been tried by the associa- Supreme Lodge of the Portuguese Fraternity tion for infraction of his obligations in accordance with the constitution, his expulsion is not of the United States of America, 218 Mass. reviewable by the courts, and injunction cannot | 305, 105 N. E. 977; Carter v. Papineau, 222
Om For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes