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ror to reverse the judgment. The errors brought him the sum of $75,000, though that assigned and argued relate to the admission amount also included his receipts from the of evidence and the refusal of instructions. business of fortune telling, which he operated The single count of the indictment, after in connection with his clairvoyancy. Bertsetting out certain sections of an ordinance sche was not a clairvoyant, but he organof the city of Chicago establishing the police ized a combination by virtue of which the department and providing for its organiza- clairvoyants and fortune tellers, wire taption, charged that the plaintiff in error was pers, and other criminals who operated unon January 7, 1913, a captain of police as- der his authority, in consideration of paysigned to duty as chief of detectives of the ments of money were to be permitted to comcity of Chicago, and that then, and for a long mit these classes of crimes in the city of Chitime prior to that date, Christian P. Bertsche, cago without molestation by the police. Frank Ryan, James Ryan, John Strosnider, Bertsche acted as the representative of the and other persons whose names were un- combination in the transaction of its business known, were engaged in the commission of with the plaintiff in error. He received from crimes known as the confidence game, and the criminals themselves the money which had committed such crimes in the city of was paid for the purpose of securing the acChicago, and were about to commit, and did quiescence of the police, and paid over commit, other such crimes in that city; that monthly to the plaintiff in error the sums they had before that time obtained from agreed upon with him. He notified the plainWilliam T. Kirby $20,000 by means of the tiff in error when and where "book stores," confidence game, and were about to, and did, as the places were called where the operaobtain by means of the confidence game, mon- tions were conducted, were to be opened, ey, checks, and drafts of the value of $15,- and who were to conduct them. In March, 500 from Hope L. McEldowney, and like prop- 1912, two policemen, O'Brien and Carmody, erty of the value of $11,000 from Mary E. were at Bertsche's suggestion detailed by the Rapp, and large amounts of property from plaintiff in error specially on clairvoyants, other persons whose names were unknown. instead of the two policemen who had previIt is further charged that on January 7, 1913, ously had that assignment. Thereafter all the plaintiff in error unlawfully, corruptly, papers to be served and all complaints and and knowingly did accept and receive from investigations in regard to clairvoyants were Christian P. Bertsche the sum of $500 as a turned over to these officers, and Bertsche bribe, present, and reward for the purpose of paid to O'Brien $400 a month-$200 for himinfluencing the plaintiff in error in the per- self and $200 for the plaintiff in error. Nuformance of his duties as a member of the merous crimes were committed, and compolice force, and causing him to execute such plaints by victims of the conspiracy were duties with partiality and favor, and to per- made at different times, but were delayed, mit the said Bertsche, James Ryan, Frank hindered, and suppressed, and no action was Ryan, and other persons unknown, to commit taken on them. On January 4, 1913, the the crime of confidence game in the city of place of Frank Ryan in which he was opChicago without molestation, and without be-erating as a clairvoyant was raided by two ing arrested, and to permit them to avoid policemen not on the clairvoyant detailarrest in the city of Chicago for the offense Egan and Dempsey. Ryan was warned by of confidence game, and with the intent to in- his doorman before the admission of the ofduce and persuade and cause the plaintiff in ficers, and left the house by the back door error to refrain from arresting or causing until after their visit. McCabe, a clairvoyto be arrested said Bertsche, Ryan, and ant who assisted Ryan, Strauss, a man in his others for the commission of the offense of employ, and a visitor who had called to have confidence game committed by them before his fortune told, were arrested and taken to that time and to be thereafter committed in the police station, held for about an hour and the city of Chicago, and to keep and protect a quarter, and discharged without any charge them, and each of them, from arrest and pun-being made against them. Egan, one of the ishment and free, clear, and exempt from police molestation, interference, or attack while engaged in the commission of the crime of confidence game and other crimes in the city of Chicago.

officers, searched the place and took away with him a book, which Ryan called his "red book," and which Bertsche in his testimony called the "sucker book," used to keep the names of people who were swindled, and Evidence was introduced tending to show certain personal data in regard to them, and that during the time from June, 1911, until the amounts of money received from them. March, 1913, James Ryan and Frank Ryan, Through Bertsche and O'Brien the book was who are named in the indictment, and other returned to Ryan on the same day, and Egan persons under various names, at different was paid $500 for it. Frank Ryan complaintimes were engaged, under the guise of clair-ed to Bertsche about the raid, saying that he voyants, in operating the confidence game in was satisfied it was a frame-up, that O'Brien the city of Chicago; that during that time was in it, and that he wanted to have a betthey swindled their victims out of large ter assurance than that of O'Brien and Bertamounts of money in sums ranging from $50 sche against the recurrence of the raid. to $20,000, Frank Ryan's enterprises having | Bertsche told Ryan that he would have the

June, 1911, until, after the payment of the $500 charged in the indictment; the last money, as testified by Bertsche, being $100 sent by mail in a special delivery letter to plaintiff in error at Hot Springs in March, 1913.

plaintiff in error assure him everything was met him. These payments continued from all right, and two or three days later the plaintiff in error, with Bertsche, visited Ryan in his place in the evening. Ryan was a fugitive from justice from Boston, and from New York, and shortly before this had been compelled by a lawyer and a detective from New York to pay $2,900 on account of a forfeited In January, 1913, Mrs. Hope L. McEldownbail bond, and he was concerned about this, ey, in response to an advertisement of James as well as Egan's raid. Both of these oc- Ryan, came to his place to have her fortune currences were mentioned, and the plaintiff told. In the next two months Ryan succeedin error said that the New York affair could ed in getting $15,500 from her, a part of not be avoided, but in future Ryan should which was a draft for $12,500, which was go right along--nothing would happen to him. | turned over to Bertsche, who collected it. On Bertsche then gave to the plaintiff in error February 24, 1913, Frank Ryan got a draft $500 and said, "Here is a present from the boys," and the plaintiff in error said, "All right." This is the transaction which was charged in the indictment and was the basis of the prosecution.

[1] It was clearly shown that clairvoyants were engaged in conducting their business, and in connection with it operating confidence games, in the city of Chicago during the time in question, that many people were victimized, and that complaints made to the police produced no results. The direct testimony tending to connect the plaintiff in error directly with the conspiracy for the operation of confidence games without molestation by the police was given by Bertsche and others of the conspirators, whose testimony, if believed, was sufficient to establish the guilt of the plaintiff in error.

Bertsche testified that in June, 1911, he went to the office of the plaintif in error, with whom he had not been previously personally acquainted, though he had met him and knew him by sight, and told him that he wanted to open up Harry Waite in a book store, and that Waite could afford to give up $100 a month for the plaintiff in error. The plaintiff in error said that he heard they made a lot of money down East, and Bertsche answered, "Yes;" that Waite was one of that gang. Plaintiff in error then asked where he was going to open up, and Bertsche told him he was going to open up on Michigan avenue, and thereupon paid the plaintiff in error $100. He also told him that he had some "pay-off" men who wanted to open up, and in the event they made any money he would take care of plaintiff in error on a 10 per cent. basis. By pay-off men he said he meant "wire tappers, who skin a man on the wire-give him a phoney horse and beat him on it." After that Waite started in business, and subsequently the Ryan brothers and others, under Bertsche's authorization, and the wire-tapping business was also conducted by still others, and Bertsche paid to the plaintiff in error, from time to time, the $100 a month which had been agreed upon, and which was increased from time to time, and also the commissions on the wire-tapping swindles. These sums were usually paid in the Lamb's café, where the plaintiff in error went for

for $7,489.50 from Mrs. Mary E. Rapp, mak. ing, with other money, $11,000 which he had taken from her. Early in March the Ryans left Chicago not intending to return, because they were no longer able to prevent the many people whom they had swindled from carrying their complaints to the police. They went to Kansas City, with the intention of going into the clairvoyant business there, and James Ryan did not return until he was brought back from Wyoming on April 18, 1913, as a result of extradition proceedings. Frank Ryan was absent from Chicago, except two or three days, until October, 1914, when he gave himself up to the officers. Various indictments were found against both the Ryans and Bertsche in connection with their swindling operations. Bertsche and James Ryan were indicted for obtaining the $15,500 from Mrs. McEldowney, were tried in November, 1913, and were convicted. They sued out a writ of error in this court, the judgment was affirmed, and a petition for a rehearing was denied, in December, 1914. Through the connivance and misfeasance of the officers charged with the enforcement of the law and the execution of this sentence, Bertsche, although in custody, was not committed to the penitentiary under this sentence until July 6, 1915, when he was imprisoned one day, and then was permitted to leave the penitentiary, and was not confined there more than two or three days before the trial of this case, in December, 1915.

[2] Direct testimony as to the specific charge on which the indictment was basedthe payment of $500 on January 7, 1913was given by Bertsche and the Ryans. It occupies but trifling space in the record, the greater portion of which is taken up with the testimony of witnesses, records, and other documentary evidence showing the existence of a conspiracy on the part of Bertsche and his associates and certain police officers to permit the former to carry on their criminal schemes without interference by the police, and showing the crimes committed and the acts and declarations of the conspirators in the accomplishment of the purpose of the conspiracy. This evidence was competent, though the indictment was for receiving a bribe, and not for conspiracy. If the crime

the acts and declarations of the conspirators mitted in evidence on the separate trial of a were admissible in evidence the same as if co-conspirator.

the indictment were for the conspiracy. The The conspiracy in question had for its obobject of the conspiracy was not accomplish-ject, as charged in the indictment, to permit ed merely by the giving and acceptance of the the persons mentioned to escape arrest for bribe on January 7th, as alleged in the in- the crimes of confidence game which they had dictment. It continued as long as the com- committed or should commit, and "to keep mission of crimes by the one set of con- and protect them, and each of them, from arspirators continued without interference by rest and punishment, and free, clear, and exthe other set. It was therefore not error to empt from police molestation, interference, or admit evidence of the commission of other attack while engaging in the commission of crimes, and the acts and declarations of the the crimes of confidence games and other conspirators in connection with them, during crimes in the said city of Chicago, county of the continuance of the conspiracy, subsequent Cook, and state aforesaid." The conspiracy to the giving of the bribe, which was the thus charged terminated, according to the substantive charge in the indictment. very language of the indictment, when the conspirators ceased to engage in the commission of crimes in the city of Chicago. The protection from arrest and punishment, the freedom from police molestation, and exemption from interference, were to be extended only during the time the conspirators were engaged in committing crimes. When they abandoned Chicago as a field of criminal exploitation, the conspiracy had accomplished its purpose. They had enjoyed the freedom of the city for the commission of crimes without molestation or interference, and the city's police had been enriched by the fruits of the crimes committed. Nothing more remained to be accomplished or was contemplated. Even if the people were not bound by the allegations of the indictment, there is nothing in the evidence which indicates any further purpose in the conspiracy. It was a com

[3] On the trial of the present case Bertsche and Ryan were permitted, over the objection of the plaintiff in error, to tell a conversation which took place just before their trial for obtaining the property of Mrs. McEldowney by means of the confidence game, between them and Policeman O'Brien, in regard to the list of jurors drawn to try the case, the substance of which was that O'Brien knew one of the jurors and would manage to handle him through the juror's brother-in-law, and that he would speak to the captain (the plaintiff in error) about another juror who lived around Halpin's street, and have Halpin see what he could do with him. Testimony was also admitted, over the plaintiff in error's objection, of a conversation between Bertsche and James Ryan in the summer of 1913, when the latter was in jail awaiting trial on the McEldowney indict-mercial transaction for the commission of ment, in which Bertsche told Ryan that crime. Bertsche as the captain of a horde of plaintiff in error was trying to get bail for pillagers, desired to plunder the people of him. Plaintiff in error was not present at Chicago, and he made a bargain with the these conversations, and knew nothing about city's guardians not to interfere while the them; but it is insisted that they were ad- plundering continued. The objects of conmissible as the acts of co-conspirators in fur- spiracies are not ordinarily set down in writtherance of the object of the conspiracy. On ing, and usually few words spoken can be the other hand, it is insisted that this evi- proved expressly describing their purposes. dence was improperly admitted because the Such is the case here. All that appears is conversations occurred long after the con- that Bertsche said he wanted to open up spiracy had terminated. Evidence of the Harry Waite in a book store, and that he acts and declarations of conspirators in the would give up $100 a month to the plaintiff absence of their co-conspirators is admitted in error; that the plaintiff in error said, "Go against the latter on the theory "that by the ahead," and Bertsche paid him $100. Nothact of conspiring together the conspirators ing more was said, then or later but the have jointly assumed to themselves, as a monthly payments continued, and were largebody, the attribute of individuality so far as ly increased as business improved and new regards the prosecution of the common de- lines were added. This certainly did not sign, thus rendering whatever is done or said mean that absolute protection was to be furby any one in furtherance of that design a nished the criminals from all kinds of prosepart of the res gestæ, and therefore the act cutions for all time. The city was farmed of all. It is the same principle of identity out for exploitation by the month. The paywith each other that governs in regard to the ments were by the month, or on a commisacts and admissions of agents when offered sion basis, and there can be no doubt that in evidence against their principals and of there was no expectation of protection after partners as against the partnership." 3 the payments ceased. This occurred in March, Greenleaf on Evidence, § 94. While the acts 1913. The conspirators then ceased to enand deeds of a co-conspirator during the ex-gage in crimes in the city of Chicago and istence of a conspiracy are competent evi- abandoned the city permanently, as they dence against his co-conspirator, no act or hoped. The object of the conspiracy had been declaration before the beginning of the con- accomplished, and the conspiracy was terspiracy or after its termination can be ad- minated. Since the evidence of what was

said and done by the other conspirators, com-,3 Am. St. Rep. 320. It was error to admit petent against the plaintiff in error, is lim- this evidence. ited to their acts and declarations made and done while the conspiracy was pending, it was error to admit the evidence under consideration.

[4, 5] O'Brien was tried before the police trial board in the fall of 1913 upon charges preferred against him, and Bertsche testified that while the trial was going on he talked with plaintiff in error in the Lamb's café, and said to him, "I see old Doc Russell is standing up for Walter," and also spoke about the "little nigger" going against Walter (meaning by "little nigger" Frank Ryan's bell boy, Gillege). He does not say that the plaintiff in error made any response. James Ryan testified that, soon after his conviction on the McEldowney indictment, he told the plaintiff in error he wanted to go out and "open up a store, a clairvoyant's office," and asked him if he could give Ryan a letter to Louisville. The plaintiff in error refused, saying that he gave one fellow a letter, and that got at this time to send anybody else down there. O'Brien's statement called for no remark from the plaintiff in error, and Ryan's conversation with him had no relation to the case. Neither of these items of evidence was competent, and they should not have been

him in a little trouble and he did not want

admitted.

[6] Doc Russell, a clairvoyant who had operated under Bertsche and gone away, returned without Bertsche's knowledge and opened up a clairvoyant establishment. When Bertsche learned of it, he went to the place with some associates, made an assault upon Russell, cut his hair in the shape of a cross by running clippers back and forth across his head, robbed him of his jewelry, and threatened to kill him if he did not leave town. Evidence of this occurrence was admitted over objection. The people also introduced evidence tending to show that O'Brien tried to induce the Ryans to deal with him and pay the money to him directly, instead of through Bertsche. There is no evidence that the plaintiff in error knew anything about these transactions, and they were not competent as the acts of co-conspirators, because they did not tend in any manner to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy. ine acts and declarations of co-conspirators are only admissible when they are done or made in furtherance of the purposes of the conspiracy and in carrying out the common design. "It is undoubtedly the law that, after a conspiracy is established, only those declarations of each member which are in furtherance of the common design can be introduced in evidence against the other members. Declarations that are merely narrative as to what has been done or will be done are incompetent, and should not be admitted, except as against the defendant making them, or in whose presence they are made." Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 237, 12 N. E. 865, 980,

[7] In connection with the raid on Frank Ryan's place on January 4th, Bertsche and Ryan testified that they had an interview with Policeman Walter O'Brien on that same day, immediately after the occurrence, and accused him "of being in the job and shaking them down," but he denied it, and said that Egan acted for himself, and wanted $500 for the red book. The testimony of a number of witnesses was introduced to show that O'Brien was not on duty on January 4th; that in the forenoon he was in a dentist's office, where he was having dental work done, for an hour and a half or an hour and three-quarters after 8:15; that at 12 o'clock he left Chicago with his wife and went to Grand Rapids, Mich., where he arrived at 5 o'clock, and remained until 5 o'clock the next evening, when he returned to Chicago, arriving at 9 o'clock. To rebut this evidence the state introduced certain documents known as "patrol sheets." Dan O'Hara, a policeman, testified to a conversation with the plaintiff in error at the detective bureau in regard to the case of one Howard, known as the "Brass Kid," on January 30 or 31, 1913. The plaintiff in error testified that on both of those days he was at home ill, and he was corroborated by other evidence in this partrol sheets were introduced as in the case of ticular. To rebut this evidence similar paO'Brien. These patrol sheets purported to show the attendance and absence of all officers and employés at the detective bureau for the 24 hours ending at 8 o'clock a. m., one set for each day. The record shows that, under the Municipal Code, regulations of the department were promulgated requiring records to be kept in the office of the commanding officer of the bureau, in which should be entered, daily, all the transactions of the detective force in detail, including the assignment and work performed daily by each member of the bureau for the various services performed according to an established rule, and that there should also be kept a record book of credit due the members of the bureau. The patrol sheets were kept in pursuance of this regulation, and were public records, admissible in evidence upon being properly authenticated, without evidence as to the truth of their contents. The question of their weight as evidence was for the consideration of the jury. They were competent, and the objection to them was properly overruled.

[8, 9] Bertsche testified that in July, 1913, he asked the plaintiff in error to help him secure a bond for James Ryan, and the plaintiff in error sent him to see a man by the name of Skidmore in regard to it. Skidmore was called as a witness by plaintiff in error, and testified that Bertsche came to see him about the bond, and did not mention the plaintiff in error, and that the plaintiff

"The court instructs the jury that if they believe, from the evidence in this case, that the and had no knowledge of the contents of the defendant, John J. Halpin, was not informed several letters and documents on file in the detective bureau and offered in evidence in this case, then in that event the jury should entirely disregard said documents and letters in evidence in arriving at a verdict."

in error never mentioned the subject to Skid- I was conducted by O'Brien through the ofmore. On cross-examination, over the ob- fice of the plaintiff in error. The plaintiff jection of the plaintiff in error, numerous in error requested the court to give the folquestions were asked and answered by the lowing instructions: witness in regard to the class of trade he had had in saloons, which he had conducted, allowing women in them, running rooms for assignation purposes in connection with his saloon, and collecting money from women running houses of prostitution, and paying it to the police. The cross-examination of a witness as to his occupation, associations, and conduct, and as to other things immaterial to the issue, for the purpose of determining his credibility, is a matter to a great extent in the discretion of the court, and does not constitute error unless the discretion is abused. It was not proper to ask the witness, on cross-examination, as to his guilt of particular crimes, for the purpose of affecting his credibility. It would not have been proper to show his conviction, even if he had been convicted of such crimes.

"If you believe, from the evidence in this case, that communications were received at the detective bureau and placed on file while the defendant was chief of detectives, which communications might have informed him of the presence in Chicago of the witness Frank Ryan, alias Robert L. Milton, or of his identity and of his criminal operations, yet unless it has been proved from the testimony in this case that such communications came to the defendant's attention and knowledge, or that he knew the conedge of the same, and in the event that you so tents thereof, he is not chargeable with knowlbelieve you should entirely disregard such communications in arriving at a verdict, even though you may further believe that it was his duty to inform himself as to the nature and purport of the various records on file in the office."

The court refused to give these instructions, but of his own motion gave the following instruction:

"The jury are instructed that under the evidence in this case it will be for you to determine whether the defendant, Halpin, knew of the matters involved in the correspondence, or not to be held chargeable for such as you may any of it, referred to in the evidence, and he is find, from the evidence, he knew nothing about.

[10] Included in the documentary evidence introduced by the people were certain letters and telegrams received at and sent from the detective bureau. Among them were letters passing between the detective bureau and the chief inspector of police in Boston in regard to Frank Ryan. The first of these bore the signature of plaintiff in error as captain of detectives, was addressed to the chief inspector of police at Boston, and inquired in regard to any records the inspector might have of Prof. Redfern, alias Frank Ryan. The instructions requested by the plaintiff The answer to this, signed by the chief in- in error were properly refused. The effect of spector, and addressed to the plaintiff in er- the correspondence which has been set out, ror, stated that there was an indictment and its purpose, was to aid in carrying out warrant for James D. Redfern for a larceny the object of the conspiracy by protecting of $3,000 by means of bogus mining stock, Frank Ryan from arrest, and even though and stated that Redfern was also known as the plaintiff in error had no personal knowlFrank P. Ryan and John Holly; that he edge of the correspondence, yet if it was conwas arrested in New York for the police deducted by O'Brien, one of the conspirators, partment of Boston in May, 1911, and gave the effect was the same as if done by the bail, but forfeited it, in the sum of $10,000. plaintiff in error. The evidence was admissiThe letter requested information if the plain-ble against him, and he was bound by it to tiff in error had him under arrest or could the same extent as if the letters had been get him, and stated that officers would be written and received by himself. The insent to bring him back to Boston. The re-struction given by the court of its own moply to this letter, bearing the signature of tion was more favorable to the plaintiff in the plaintiff in error, stated that the officers error than he was entitled to, because it statwere on the lookout for him, and if found ed that he was not chargeable for such of would arrest him and notify the inspector the correspondence as he knew nothing about, at Boston, saying also, "He is not the Frank when, in fact, he was chargeable with such Ryan concerning whom I wrote you on De- as was conducted by a co-conspirator in furcember 24th." The evidence showed that therance of the conspiracy, whether he knew the private secretary of the plaintiff in error anything about it or not. in general opened the mail and wrote the outgoing letters, signing the plaintiff in error's name, and only in special cases was correspondence submitted to the personal inspection of the plaintiff in error. Frank Ryan had asked Policeman O'Brien to find out for him whether the police in Boston were wanting him, and there is evidence from which it might be inferred that the correspondence which has just been referred to

[11, 12] The court refused the following instruction asked by the plaintiff in error:

"If you believe, from the evidence in this case, that any of the witnesses who have testified here have done so in the hope or expectation that they will thereby be able to escape a term of imprisonment for the commission of a crime, you may take that fact into account, together with all the other evidence in this case bearing there be, in determining the weight and credit upon the credibility of such witnesses, if any to which their testimony may be entitled."

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