ant. Gannon v. Peterson, 193 Ill. 372, 62 N. E. 210, 55 L. R. A. 701. Until that event happens the estate devised complainant will continue, as the will created it, a base or determinable fee. If that event never happens and complainant dies without issue, then the land will go to the testator's heirs as in case of intestacy. person; but the authorities seem clear to ever claiming any title or interest by virtue the point that a grant of an executory de- of the devise over to them but this deed vise operates in equity by way of estoppel did not change the estate of complainant to prevent the executory devisee and his created by the will from a base fee to a fee heirs from subsequently claiming the benefit simple absolute. It might be otherwise if it of the devise. Pitzer v. Morrison, 272 Ill. had become impossible for the condition to 291, 111 N. E. 1017; 2 Washburn on Real Prop- happen upon which the estate was to be enerty, 681. It would seem to necessarily fol-larged to a fee simple, but the possibility low that the deed from the complainant's of the condition happening will exist until brothers and sisters must be held to estop extinguished by the death of the complainthem and their heirs from hereafter claiming the benefit of the devise. But does it follow because all right of the executory devisees to assert any title or interest under the devise has been terminated by the deed, that this operates to enlarge the estate of complainant into a fee simple absolute? The condition imposed by the will, the happening of which would raise the estate from a base or determinable fee to a fee simple absolute, was that complainant should die leaving issue surviving him. If that event happened there was then nothing left of the estate for the executory devisees. It cannot now be known whether complainant will leave issue surviving him or not, but it is PEOPLE ex rel. O'CONNELL, County Collecclear that the will does not give him an unconditional fee in the land. To make the PEOPLE ex rel. STUCKART, County Collec The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree in conformity with the views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded, with directions. tor, v. NOONAN. tor, v. HICKS et al. (Nos. 10560, 10382.) (276 III. 430) fee absolute so as to defeat the devise over, the will requires that issue of his must survive him. So long as there is a possibility of the condition happening upon which the estate devised to complainant will become a fee simple absolute, the title of complainant 1. JUDGMENT 294 AMENDMENT AND COB (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916. Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1917.) RECTION-MOTION UNDER PRACTICE ACT. is a base or determinable fee. The condition A motion to correct certain errors of fact imposed by the will upon which the title in a judgment against real estate for delinquent was to become an unconditional fee could taxes and special assessments by striking out not be abrogated by the executory devisees, Practice Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 110) portions of the judgment order therein, under who were to take only in the event the es- § 89, providing for correction of errors in the tate was not enlarged into a fee simple by judgment in the court where rendered, is in the the death of complainant leaving issue sur-nature of a new suit, the motion taking the place of a declaration and the objections to the viving him. Until that event happened the form and sufficiency of such motion amounting estate was subject to the executory devise to a demurrer. to the brothers and sisters of complainant. They might, before the condition happened upon which the executory devise over would take effect, by grant of their expectancy Under Practice Act, § 89, abolishing the estop themselves and their heirs from claim-writ of error coram nobis, and providing that ing any benefit under the devise; but they all errors in fact committed in the proceedings could not, by their grant or any other act, of any court of record, and which by the comdefeat the provision of the will, and the mon law could have been corrected by that writ, may be corrected by the court in which the clearly expressed intention of the testator, error was committed, upon written motion, etc., that the estate devised to complainant was alleged errors, consisting of finding of facts not an unconditional fee and could never be-contained in the judgment order itself, may not come so unless he left issue surviving. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 579, 614; Dec. Dig. 294.] 2. JUDGMENT 303-AMENDMENT AND CORRECTION-FINDINGS OF FACT. RECTION IN SAME COURT-FINDINGS OF FACT be corrected by such motion, and affidavits in support of motion to correct such alleged er[2] We cannot agree with the contention rors cannot be heard to contradict the record. that the death of appellee without issue [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, means his death during the life of the wid-Cent. Dig. §§ 594, 595; Dec. Dig. 303.] ow, the life tenant. We think, under the 3. JUDGMENT 303-AMENDMENT AND CORauthority of Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. 507, 81 N. E. 1105, and cases there cited, a proper construction of the will means the death of appellee without issue at any time. Our conclusion therefore is that the broth-errors in fact, since only such errors could be cured by the writ of error coram nobis. ers and sisters of complainant by their deed [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, haye barred themselves and their heirs from Cent. Dig. 88 594, 595; Dec. Dig. 303.] It is only concerning matters of which the judgment itself is silent that the court may entertain a motion under such statute to correct 4. JUDGMENT 470-IMporting VerITY. [Ed. Note.-For other cases. see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 907; Dec. Dig. 470.] 5. JUDGMENT 319-AMENDMENT AND CORRECTION-MOTION UNDER PRACTICE ACT. Under Practice Act, § 89, providing that all errors in fact committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which by the common law could have been corrected by writ of error coram nobis, may be corrected by the court in which the error was committed, upon written motion, etc., a motion to set aside a judgment for errors of fact must set up and rely on such fact or facts as are unknown to the court and do not appear upon the face of the record, and which, if known, would have precluded the rendition of such judgment. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 617; Dec. Dig. 319.] 6. JUDGMENT 303-AMENDMENT AND CORRECTION-MOTION UNDER PRACTICE ACT FRAUD. Relief cannot be secured under such statute where certain recitals of fact in the judgment order itself were procured to be inserted therein by fraud practiced on the court, as where the party procuring the judgment drew up and handed to the trial judge for signature a judgment order incorrectly reciting that an opposing party was present in person and by attorney, that he consented to the error and released all errors, etc., and secured his signature. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 594, 595; Dec. Dig. 303.] 7. TAXATION 647 ACTION TO COLLECT TAXES-AUTHORITY TO ENTER JUDGMENT AT LATER TERM. judgment order was not a bar to the later rendition of judgment in the tax proceeding against the lots. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. & 1016; Dec. Dig. 564(2).] Appeal from Cook County Court; John H. Williams, Judge. Appeal from Cook County Court; David T. Smiley, Judge. Proceedings by the People, on the relation of the county collector of Cook County, for judgment against certain real estate for delinquent taxes and special assessments, Judgment was attacked by motions by Edward T. Noonan and by George I. Hicks, trustee, and others. From judgments for the People, objectors appeal, and their appeals are consolidated. Affirmed. William J. Donlin and Edward T. Noonan, both of Chicago, for appellants. Harry F. Atwood, Harry F. Hamlin, and Henry R. Baldwin, all of Chicago (Samuel A. Ettelson, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago), for appellees. COOKE, J. At the June term, 1913, of the county court of Cook county the county collec tor of Cook county made application for judgment and order of sale against certain real estate for delinquent taxes and special assessments. Among the tracts against which judgment was sought were certain lots in Edward T. Noonan's subdivision of the city Under Revenue Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915- of Chicago, against which there had been ex16. c. 120) § 185, providing that all applica- tended amounts aggregating about $4,200 on tions for judgment and order of sale for taxes account of a special assessment. Appellant and special assessments shall be made at the June term of the county court, and if judgment Edward T. Noonan filed objections to the apat said term is prevented it shall be legal to ob- plication for judgment against these lots. tain judgment at any subsequent term, where A hearing was had upon these objections, objections to application for judgment against and the cause was taken under advisement. certain lots were, after hearing, taken under advisement and judgment rendered against all On July 31, 1913, judgment was rendered other lots, the rendition at a subsequent term of against all lots and tracts as to which no judgment against the lots as to which objection objections had been filed, but no judgment was made was valid, although no new applica-1 tion was filed; the court not having lost juris- was then rendered against the lots involved diction by the rendition of the first judgment. in this appeal. Thereafter, in June, 1914, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, the collector advertised appellants' lots for Cent. Dig. §§ 1312-1315; Dec. Dig. 647.] sale under the judgment of July 31, 1913. Noonan thereupon filed his motion to quash the process and notice of sale, alleging that there had been no judgment and order of The court sustained sale against said lots. this motion, and on October 20, 1914, entered an order finding, in substance, that no judgment had been rendered against said lots on July 31, 1913, and directing that said process and notice of sale be quashed. Afterwards, on December 5, 1914, the county court rendered judgment and entered an order of sale against said lots on the application of the county collector made at the June term, 1913. The judgment order recites, among other things, that E. T. Noonan was present in person and by W. J. Donlin, his attorney, and that the order was entered with the consent of the said E. T. Noonan. It also recites 8. CONTINUANCE 3 LAW. BY OPERATION OF When a case on the docket of the court is undisposed of at the end of a term, it stands continued to the next term by operation of law, in the absence of a statute to the contrary. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Continuance, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. 3.] 9. JUDGMENT 17(8)-PROCESS TO SUSTAINSUBSEQUENT PROCESS. After a cause has been heard, argued, and taken under advisement, no further application for judgment or notice to the parties is necessary before the court renders its judgment. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. 17(8).] 10. JUDGMENT 564(2)—RES JUDICATA, Where motion to quash process and notice of sale of lots for taxes was sustained and order entered finding that no judgment for the taxes had been rendered against the lots in the proceeding against them therefor, but that the that said E. T. Noonan did there in open cause was then pending under advisement, such court waive and release all errors in the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Section 89 of the Practice Act abolishes the writ of error coram nobis, and provides that all errors in fact committed in the proceedings of any court of record, and which by the common law could have been corrected in which the error was committed, upon motion in writing made at any time within five years after the rendition of final judgment in the case, upon reasonable notice. It will thus be seen that while the writ of error coram nobis has been abolished, the same errors which at the common law could have been corrected by that writ may now be corrected, under section 89 of the Practice Act, upon motion in writing by the court in which the error was committed. judgment and order or in the prior proceedings, and agreed that no appeal should be prosecuted from said judgment, that no writ of error should be sued out thereon, and that no steps of any kind should ever be taken, by a bill in chancery or otherwise, to prevent by that writ, may be corrected by the court or interfere with the collection thereafter of the said special assessment, by the sale of the property assessed or otherwise. This judgment was thereafter attacked in the county court of Cook county by two separate proceedings, one by appellant Edward T. Noonan, who on September 22, 1915, filed what he designated a motion under section 89 of the Practice Act to correct certain errors of fact by striking out of the judgment order those portions which stated that he was present in person and by attorney and [2, 3] "The office of the writ of coram nobis consented to the entry of the order and waiv- is to bring the attention of the court to and ed and released all errors, etc. The other obtain relief from errors of fact, such as proceeding was a motion by appellants the death of either party pending the suit George I. Hicks, trustee, Joseph Hedrick, and before judgment therein; or infancy, trustee, and John A. McCormick, to quash where the party was not properly representthe process and notice of sale under said judged by guardian; or coverture, where the ment upon two grounds: (1) That the judg- common-law disability still exists; or insanment of December 5, 1914, was not a valid judgment; and (2) that said judgment was invalid because of the prior order and judgment of October 20, 1914, wherein, it was alleged, the same matters were adjudicated and settled adversely to appellees. Both motions were decided against appellants and judgments were entered accordingly. Separate appeals followed, which have been con solidated in this court. [1] In support of the motion of appellant Noonan to correct certain errors of fact under section 89 of the Practice Act by striking out portions of the judgment order of December 5, 1914, he offered the affidavits of John E. Owens, who was the judge of the county court at the time the judgment of December 5, 1914, was rendered, and of William J. Donlin, Noonan's attorney, and also his own affidavit, which in substance set forth that said judgment of December 5, 1914, was rendered upon the last day of the term of office of said Owens; that the order was handed to said Owens by counsel for the city of Chicago, who stated to him that the matter was pending under advisement and requested him to sign the same; that neither said Noonan nor said Donlin, his attorney, was ity, it seems, at the time of the trial; or a valid defense existing in the facts of the case, but which, without negligence on the part of the defendant, was not made, either through duress or fraud or excusable mistake, these facts not appearing on the face of the record, and being such as, if known in season, would have prevented the rendition and entry of the judgment questioned." 5 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 27. This text is amply supported by authority. It will thus be seen that it is only such errors of fact as do not appear upon the face of the record which could be cured by the writ of error coram nobis or may now be corrected under section 89 of our Practice Act. The alleged errors here sought to be corrected are findings of fact contained in the judgment order itself. It is only concerning matters of which the judgment itself is silent that the court may entertain a motion, under section 89 of the Practice Act, to correct errors in fact, and affidavits in support of such motion cannot be heard to contradict the record. [4-6] It is elementary that the judgment of a court imports absolute verity. In Mains V. Cosner, 67 Ill. 536, a motion was made under this provision of the Practice Act to correct an error in fact and to set aside the present in court when the judgment order was judgment for the reason that at the time signed; and that said order is incorrect in its of the issuing and service of the summons recitals to the effect that Noonan was present and pleading and entry of judgment the dein person and by attorney, that he consented fendant was a minor under the age of 21 to the order and that he released ali errors, etc. The judgment order of October 20, 1914, years and appeared by attorney instead of was also offered in connection with the af-by guardian. It was there held that nothing fidavits. The collector appeared and filed objections to the form and sufficiency of the motion. As a motion of this kind is in the nature of a new suit (Domitski v. American Linseed Co., 221 Ill. 161, 77 N. E. 428), the motion took the place of a declaration and the objections made amounted to a demurrer. can be assigned for error which contradicts the record, and whether a minor appeared by attorney can be determined only by an inspection of the record itself. In passing upon this question we said: appeared only by an attorney is one which "The question whether or not plaintiff in error underlies the entire merits of the application, There is nothing in the statute which prevents separate judgments from being rendered at different times or which forbids the continuance of the cause from term to term, as to any or all of the properties involved, until such day as the court is able to pass upon all the matters taken under advisement. This statute does not fix any particu and can be determined by us only by inspection, the collector is prevented from advertising and of the record itself. That record was before obtaining judgment at said term it shall be held the court below, forming an essential and indis- to be legal to obtain judgment at any subsepensable part of the grounds of decision. If quent term of said court.' Hurd's Stat. 1916, indispensable there, it must be here, in deter- p. 2193. mining the correctness of that decision. It is no answer to say that plaintiff in error swore that he appeared only by attorney, and no affidavit was filed contradicting that statement; because, if a score of witnesses had sworn to the same statement, and the records showed to the contrary, the latter would prevail. The burden was upon plaintiff in error to affirmatively show error in fact in the court below, and here to show error in law in the decision which the lower court made. Inasmuch as the fact as to how he appeared in the cause, whether by at-lar term of the county court for the final disWhen torney or guardian, could be properly ascertain- position of causes arising under it. ed only by the record in that cause, and as he a case on the docket of the court is undisposhas seen fit not to have it brought up, he must ed of at the end of a term, it stands continfail in his assignment of error.' ued to the next term by operation of law, in the absence of a statute to the contrary. Matson v. Swanson, 131 Ill. 255, 23 N. E. 595. When a cause is taken under advisement it goes over until a subsequent term by operation of law, and the court at a subsequent term may render judgment without additional service on the party. Updike v. Armstrong, 3 Scam. 564. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People, 189 Ill. 119, 59 N. E. 609, an application for judgment and order of sale for a special assessment was made at the June term, 1899, of the county court, and the owner's name was incorrectly given. The owner did not appear. Leave was granted by the court to substitute the correct name No further proceedings were had until the October term, 1899, to which term proper notice was given and application for judgment was made. The cause was continued from time to time until the April term, 1900, when judgment for sale was rendered. It was objected that the court had no juris In that case the record was not before the court. Here we have the record before us, and it appears affirmatively that Noonan seeks to contradict the record itself. This he cannot do. Under said section 89 a motion to set aside a judgment for errors of fact must set up and rely on such fact or facts as are unknown to the court and do not appear upon the face of the record, and which if known, would have precluded the rendition of the judgment. If the facts alleged in the affidavits filed by Noonan in support of his motion are true, then it is apparent that fraud was practiced upon the court in procuring the judgment of December 5, 1914. Under such a state of facts Noonan can secure no relief under the provisions of section 89 of the Practice Act. but we held that the judgment was valid. After a cause has been heard, argued, and taken under advisement, no further applica tion for judgment or notice to the parties is necessary before the court renders its judgment. [7-9] In the appeal of Hicks and others it is contended that after the rendition of the judgment of July 31, 1913, against the other property mentioned in the collector's application, the court lost jurisdiction of the sub-diction to render judgment at that term, ject-matter; that no further judgment could be rendered without the filing of a new application; and that therefore the judgment of December 5, 1914, is void. The contention of these appellants, as we understand it, is, that when the case was taken under advisement judgment should have been rendered against all of the property at the same time, and that different judgments at different times cannot be rendered. The county court has jurisdiction to render judgment for delinquent assessments at any term subsequent to the term at which application is made. vides: Section 185 of the Revenue Act pro [10] It is further urged that the judgment order of October 20, 1914, is res judicata, and therefore a bar to the judgment of December 5, 1914. The judgment of October 20th merely finds and recites that on July 31, 1913, the objections of appellants were pending under advisement for briefs of counsel to be submitted therein, and that no judgment was rendered or order of sale entered "All applications for judgment and order of as to these lots. It was then ordered that sale for taxes and special assessments on de- the process and notice of sale be quashed. linquent lands and lots shall be made at the The simple finding by the court that no judg June term of the county court. If from any cause the court shall not be holden at the term ment had been rendered as to these lots on at which judgment is prayed, the cause shall July 31, 1913, but that the cause was then stand continued, and it shall not be necessary pending under advisement, certainly constito re-advertise the list or notice required by law to be advertised before judgment and sale, but tutes no bar to rendering judgment thereat the next regular term thereafter the court after. shall hear and determine the matter; and if judgment is rendered the sale shall be made on the Monday specified in the notice as provided in section 182, such Monday to be fixed by the county collector in the notice. If for any cause The county court properly denied each of the motions, and the judgment in each case is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. (276 Ill. 363) PEOPLE v. HALPIN. (No. 10626.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916. Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1917.) 1. BRIBERY 11-RECEIVING BRIBE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In prosecution of chief of detectives for receiving a bribe, evidence held sufficient to show guilt. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bribery, Cent. Dig. § 10; Dec. Dig. 11.] 2. CRIMINAL LAW OF CONSPIRATORS. 424(1)—EVIDENCE-ACTS In prosecution of a chief of detectives for receiving a bribe pursuant to a conspiracy to permit confidence men to operate unmolested in the city, evidence showing the existence of the conspiracy, the crimes committed, and the acts and declarations of the conspirators in carrying out the conspiracy, was competent, though the crimes, acts, and declarations were subsequent to the reception of the bribe. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1002, 1006, 1008, 1010; Dec. Dig. 424(1).] CONSPIRACY. Evidence of a conversation between two of defendant's co-conspirators and a police of ficer, which took place after termination of the conspiracy, when the conspirators had separated and ceased to engage in the commission of crimes in the city, was inadmissible. under the Municipal Code, were public records, admissible on proper authentication, without evidence as to the truth of their contents; their weight as evidence being for the jury. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1028; Dec. Dig. 444.] 8. WITNESSES 349-CROSS-EXAMINATIONDISCRETION of Court. Cross-examination of a witness as to his occupation, associations, and conduct, and also as to other things immaterial to the issues, to determine his credibility, is largely in the discretion of the court, and does not constitute error, unless the discretion is abused. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1135-1139; Dec. Dig. 349.] 9. WITNESSES 337(6), 345(2)—CREDIBILITY -GUILT OF PARTICULAR CRIMES. A witness on cross-examination cannot be asked as to his guilt of particular crimes to affect his credibility, and it is not proper to show his conviction, even if he has been convicted of such crimes. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1126, 1132, 1140-1142, 1146-1148; Dec. Dig. 337(6), 345(2).] 10. CRIMINAL LAW 423(3) — EVIDENCECORRESPONDENCE OF CONSPIRATOR. In prosecution of chief of detectives for receiving a bribe, pursuant to a conspiracy to permit confidence men to operate unmolested, correspondence with the police of another city, the purpose of which was to aid in carrying out the object of the conspiracy, and which was conducted by one of defendant's co-conspirators, was competent evidence against him, as if the letters had been written and received by him. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal 4. CRIMINAL LAW 407(2)-EVIDENCE-AD- Law, Cent. Dig. 88 991, 992; Dec. Dig. SILENCE 423(3).] NATURE OF STATE11. WITNESSES [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1002, 1006, 1008, 1010; Dec. Dig. ~424(1).] MISSIONS - Testimony of witness that, during trial of one of defendant's co-conspirators before the police trial board, witness said to defendant, "I see old Doc Russell is standing up for Walter," and that he also spoke about the "little nigger" going against Walter, was inadmissible, since the statement called for no remark from plaintiff. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 949, 968; Dec. Dig. 407(2).] DENCE. 367(1)-Credibility-EVI If the jury believed that any of the witnesses in a criminal prosecution had testified in the hope or expectation that they might thereby escape imprisonment, the fact could be taken into account in determining the weight and credit to which their testimony was entitled. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1184; Dec. Dig. 367(1).] 12. CRIMINAL LAW 829(16)-INSTRUCTIONS -REFUSAL OF REQUESTS-MATTERS ALREADY COVERED. Where the court cautioned the jury as to the credibility of witnesses testifying under hope of favor from the state's attorney, conviction should not be reversed, the evidence of guilt being clear, for refusal of a special requested in [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 752, 801; Dec. Dig. struction as to the credibility of witnesses who 338(1).] EVIDENCE might have testified in the hope or expectation that they would escape a term of imprisonment. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. 2011; Dec. Dig. 829 (16).1 Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge. John J. Halpin was convicted of bribery, and he brings error. Judgment affirmed. 6. CRIMINAL LAW 423(6) John E. Northup, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. P. J. Lucey, Atty. Gen., Maclay Hoyne, State's Atty., Frank Johnston, Jr., and W. W. De Armond, all of Chicago, for "Patrol sheets," purporting to show the atDUNN, J. The plaintiff in error was contendance and absence of all officers and em-victed of bribery in the criminal court of ployés at the detective bureau, kept pursuant to the regulations of the detective department Cook county, and has sued out a writ of er |